The politics of development and identity in the Jharkhand region of Bihar (India), 1951-91. by Prakash, Amit
The Politics of Development and Identity in the 
Jharkhand Region of Bihar (India), 1951-91
Amit Prakash
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
School of Oriental and African Studies 
University of London 
1998
ProQuest Number: 10673204
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10673204
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Abstract
This is a study of the process by which public policy implementation 
influences the crystallisation of political identities premised on ethnic, lingual, 
religious or other similar grounds. It argues that the failure of development policy 
to intervene in socio-economic conditions encourages societal groups to articulate 
themselves as political identities. The Jharkhand movement in south Bihar has been 
studied to substantiate the theoretical formulations.
After briefly outlining the historical roots of the Jharkhand movement, the 
study locates the tribal policy of the colonial and post-colonial Indian state in the 
dynamics of the colonial and nationalist discourses. The thesis then focuses on the 
changing development profile of the Jharkhand region and correlates it to the 
fluctuating electoral support for Jharkhandi political formations. This correlation 
has been studied with the help of a Modified Resource Dependence Model 
(Echeverri-Gent, 1993). This model argues that both the State and the societal 
groups control resources which are vital to the other. As the State in India controls 
a vast array of resources, disadvantaged societal groups articulate themselves as a 
self-conscious ethnic identity in order to augment their political resources and 
influence the policy process in their own favour. The case of Jharkhandi identity 
and the movement around it is one example of such articulation of a politically 
significant self-conscious identity in order to gain a better bargaining power. To a 
certain extent, it has been successful in influencing the State’s response in terms of 
securing a development council for the area. The Jharkhandi identity, in turn, has 
been shaped by the response of the policy machinery to local needs and demands. 
This two-way interaction between the State and the Jharkhandi identity has also 
significantly altered the character of the identity itself. The ‘politics of development 
and identity’ thus born has been discussed and changing approaches of the various 
political parties towards the Jharkhandi identity and its demand for autonomy have 
been analysed.
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Map 1: Location of Bihar and the Jharkhand Region in India
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Map 2: Districts of Bihar
(Shaded Area Represents the Jharkhand region)
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Map 3: Lok Sabha Constituencies in Bihar - 1989
(Shaded Area Represents Constituencies in the Jharkhand region)
Bagaha
/  - / v, r -  ,
^  /B e ttia h  ^ '.S h e o h a r -  VMarihlI. /  i /  \ K r  "f V j  \M ad h u -;
N  fsita- pani A a"Jhar- /
A ,, M otihari \  Wiarhi I ,■ Pur
/  
f  Araria
v Kishang-
\  . /  ,-'r anj g
I
7 ^
■ Vn i \ £  /
Gopalganj | — ■4 *— " ' \  ^S ah a-,
“‘*>■•-"7 V r b a W , /rSa r ~X- '
fsiw anj'M ahrai-/A  ^ i n u ^ A ' - ' C j A  \  \Maane\
V ^ J g a n j  f  \  X P- - . , ' S s  ' ^ ! era A  iP u r a  )  /
■ \» v . /  C hapraV  .. ( } - — * Katihar,
•sk  / Haiipur /stipur . . i\ i Balia I Khagaria
4 / Rn „  \ Purnea V
\  \M a d h e \ /
/ Buxari {  t P a t n a /  Barh
_  /  i
C_Bikram- <LI5 rra*1 VA„)Nrj,^<
r*
jr 1 Sanj a
I f  >Jahanabad /
*■
j Auranga- f  L  Nawada 
I bad
, \Begu i
tNalanda,,/Sarai I "°n^ r,) < * 2„J *
Banka
Bhagalpur
... “5
Raj J  
Mahal %
:G oddaJ . /  &  t±r
* #  JS;' \  _••. " ,$ j,. ^  .,... y  ' i  Hi; '• s
^  ‘7 . 7  \  * J
^  v v y  /■_• v ,
^  Dumka1^- j*
«  /t^K tfdei^a/ \ #  WC *?* «■ & v*
% t  r  « ( i  ., ^7. ... t, “‘ w ;. A-A7 i “j  ■’ ■•■
-  P a i a m & u #  \ ^ J;V p%Hazlrib^|h g jrjdjhtf-. ^ /.b h a n bad
"■ •" ■> i- “v "• \i* *.7* A %  't  5w irf v./ A
l , v . ■■>■■• ^  /
'A” -^Lohardagga ;■•
Sfy; ip v'.:* /
f # '
V  A .,;V
/  \ / A ' ^  if/ f <f-,_ tM.
s * ,
/  !V‘ ^ -C\'..J  -.Khunti A
5 *A 5
:a
4 / .>  /C, V .A ! .  A -  4
^■\ j.-i.„  ■ ■ -  v ,  J  \  <P
^   ^ ^  \  Jamshedpur ^  V
7 *  , f  A  A ’_ ~ \ A  » 3 )
SingHbhurr?
I AA *  A . ^
A T '
Source: Butler, David, Lahiri, Ashok and Roy, Prannoy, India Decides: Elections 1952-1991, New Delhi: Living 
Media India Ltd, 1991.
14
Chapter I
Introduction: Theoretical Concerns and the Problem
The contemporary world is witness to a wave of ethnic conflict, causing 
widespread misery and bloodshed. This phenomenon has been threatening the very 
existence of many States and has resulted in the emergence of new nation-states 
premised on ethnic lines. Such ethnic revival has also significantly altered the 
premises of the relationship between societal groups and the States in which they 
reside. Therefore, the issue of ethnicity has also emerged as a major issue in 
international politics. The growth in ethnic politics -  both at national as well as at 
international levels -  has led to the demolition of the notion that, with increasing 
modernisation and communication, more particularistic identities would eventually 
be eroded or would be submerged into national identities. In reality, “instead of 
abandoning then traditional ethnic identities in the quest for socio-economic and 
political equality”, ethnic groups “have retained them along the way, even when 
they have made it to the top -  ethnicity continues to be an important and meaningful 
source of identity for millions of people in the world” .1 Hence, political and socio­
economic issues are being increasingly identified on ‘ethnic’ or ‘ethno-religious’ 
lines. Some instances of ethnic persistence or revival in the present-day world are 
Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, Sikhs and Hindus in Punjab, India, 
Muslims and Christians in Lebanon and the Philippines, Whites and Blacks in South 
Africa, Tamils and Sinhalas in Sri Lanka and multiple ethnic cleavages in eastern 
Europe and central Asia. The bases of ethnic solidarity may depend on a diverse 
number of factors ranging from cultural, linguistic and regional contiguity to 
religious, caste and historical similarity.
1 George M. Scott, ‘Group Solidarity: Towards an Explanatory Model’ in Journal o f Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, vol. 13 no. 2, April 1990, p. 148.
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Ethnicity does not operate in circumstances that are independent of other 
identities. In a multi-ethnic country like India, individuals can and do have a number 
of identities that they don and doff depending on the interaction to which they are 
exposed at a certain point of time. As the term ethnic identity carries a different set 
of meanings to different individuals, it becomes important to clearly define the term. 
It is also important to distinguish between ethnicity and nationalism, since the two 
concepts have often been used as synonyms.
Ethnic Identity and National Identity
Broadly, there are two strands of political identity articulation in the world 
today. The first kind of identity articulation is an over-arching identity which 
supports the State,2 its policies and the status quo. This identity is more inclusive 
and seeks to subsume all other identities by employing a wide variety of methods 
such as co-option, coercion and incentives and might be referred to as national 
identity defined as an over-arching identity which claims precedence over all other 
identities.
Secondly, the grassroots often throw up3 narrower, more ascriptive, 
particularistic and much more region-specific identities which may be referred to as 
sub-national or ethnic identities. These identities are not always and necessarily4 
antagonistic to the over-arching national identity and are often a part of the latter. 
Sub-national identities usually take two forms of articulation. They may crystallise 
into a national identity and seek political recognition (even a sovereign State) or may 
end up as one of the many ethnic or sub-national identities competing for control of
2 In this study, State with an upper case has been used to refer to the political concept of a State and 
to the collection of institutional and discursive structures that comprise a State. For all other uses 
of the term state (such as the states, i.e. provinces, of India or for reference to the Indian or 
colonial state) lower case has been used.
3 These sub-national identities may be articulated due to a variety of reasons. For example, some sub­
national identities may be articulated to seek greater political recognition whereas others may be 
articulated to skew the authoritative allocation of resources in the favour of the societal group that 
they claim to represent. Still others may be articulated due to a combination of factors.
4 Ethnic or sub-national identities are not always by definition, against the national identity although 
sometimes they may compete with the latter for political recognition or control over resources.
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resources in a multi-ethnic State. However, this does not necessarily imply that all 
national identities begin as an ethnic identity.
Undoubtedly, these two identities are closely related and often overlap as in 
the case of nation-states that are largely ethnically homogeneous. However, it would 
not be correct to hold that both kinds of identity articulation are the same.
Ethnic groups may be defined as a “collective within a larger society that 
claims common ancestry, a shared past, and shared subjective identifications” .5 
They are a historical entity whose members in large part, conceive of themselves as 
being alike by virtue of shared common stable features located in history, language, 
culture, stereotypes, territorial ancestry (real, fictitious or imagined), specific 
nomenclature and/or endogamy and are regarded so by other such groups. 
However, none of these constitute indispensable differentiating ethnic features. 
Ethnic Identities are groups of individuals that perceive one or more of the above 
similarities as paramount in the self-definition of their individual identities and 
organise around it in order to acquire political resources. Such ethnic identities 
might be unstable, ad hoc, shifting, sometimes opportunistic and often related to 
political necessities and demands. Thus, the phrase ethnic group pertains to a 
sociological category whereas an ethnic identity refers to a politically pertinent 
identity.
Besides, identities are either latent6 or conscious. When an identity is latent, 
it continues to serve merely a descriptive purpose. Such an identity is not politically, 
very significant (for instance, man, woman, Indian, Scot, Hindu, etc.).7 When an
5 Neil Nevitte and Charles H. Kennedy, eds., Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in Developing 
States, Colorado, 1986, p. 2.
6 Identities may be latent in the sense that although they may be seen as a distinct sociological 
category by outside observers, they are not self-conscious political identities.
7 Each of these terms is a descriptive term to refer to the relevant individual. However, any of these 
terms have the potential to become a politically relevant identity. For instance, the term woman 
may be used to distinguish between genders and remain a descriptive term. However, during the 
last few decades it has also acquired a certain degree of political currency and has emerged as a 
politically relevant identity. Similarly, the term Hindu pertains to the relevant individuals 
belonging to a religious group in the society. However, the mobilisation of a large numbers of
Contd.
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individual (or a group of individuals) consciously perceives a certain descriptive 
identity as indispensable to the definition of his/her (or their) personal identity and 
accepts that descriptive identity as predominant and paramount over other such 
descriptive identities and seeks to acquire political resources on the basis of this 
identity, that conscious identity becomes politically significant.8 Thus, a term that 
refers to an ethnic group may remain a descriptive category used to refer to certain 
individuals who are distinct on the basis of their ancestry, culture, stereotypes, and 
other such factors. Such an ethnic group, however, is not a politically self-conscious 
identity. When the individuals concerned translate this descriptive identity into a 
self-conscious political identity (by whatever process, premised on any attribute of 
the group), they emerge as an ethnic identity.9 Thus, self-consciousness is a crucial 
factor in the articulation of an identity.10 Self-consciousness is not inherent amongst 
members of an ethnic group. It is created by intellectuals from the ethnic groups 
deprived of the desirable positions in society by the dominant ethnic group. 
Consequently, the frustrated intellectuals of the minority ethnic group may invoke 
common ethnicity as a political instrument.11 Any societal group that is not a self- 
conscious identity remains a sociological category and is not a politically relevant 
identity.
Contd.
persons on the grounds of Hindutva in the recent years by the Bharatiya Janata Party in India has 
led to its emergence as a politically significant identity.
8 There may or may not be a clash between any two identities of an individual or a group of
individuals.
9 A good example of such an articulation is the case of Muslim French citizens whose ancestors had 
migrated to France from North Africa. Some of these people, despite being French citizens and 
having been bom and brought up in France, recently came to see the Islamic identity as paramount 
over their French identity (or, for that matter, North African/ Arab identity). At that point of time, 
their religious identity, which until now was merely a descriptive identity, started acquiring ethnic 
status.
10 Walker Conner is of the view that “an ethnic group may be readily discerned by the outside
observer, but, until the members are themselves aware of the group’s uniqueness, it is merely an
ethnic group and not a nation”, Walker Conner, ‘The Politics of Ethno-nationalism’ in Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. 27 no. 1, 1973, p. 3. Also see W. Conner, ‘Ethnonationalism in the 
First World’ in Esman M. J., ed., Ethnic Conflict in the Western World, Ithaca, New York, 1977, 
pp. 19-45 in which he uses the terms ‘ethno-nationalism’ and ‘nationalism interchangeably with the 
implication that ethnicity and nationalism are similar, politically relevant identities.
11 A. D. Smith, Theories o f Nationalism, London, 1971, pp. 186-7.
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As far as the differentiation between an ethnic identity and a national identity 
is concerned, the area is of a much-contested nature. Various writers have attributed 
primacy to different factors.
Anthony Smith emphasises the idea of equal citizenship rights and vertical 
economic integration as factors that differentiate a nation from an ethnic group.12 
These however, cannot be valid grounds for distinction. Direct membership with 
equal group rights offered by a nation is not substantially different from similar 
rights offered by ethnic groups to its members. Further, the criterion of vertical 
economic integration is also flawed because federal nation-states (as well as multi­
ethnic nations) exist which show varying degrees of vertical economic integration. 
Moreover, certain ethnic groups, despite a substantial degree of economic 
integration with other societal groups, nevertheless, retain their ethnic character.13 In 
fact often, the ethnic groups are very conscious of their distinctiveness only because 
of their economic and trade-related interaction with other ethnic or societal groups.
Further, the emphasis on territoriality is also flawed.14 No doubt, a sense of 
association with a territory -  mythological, actual, symbolic or commemorative15 -  
is important for an ethnic group to crystallise into an ethnic identity but this sense of 
association is hardly the same as “territorial contiguity with free mobility”. This
12 Smith’s formulation may be summarised as follows:
Cultural +  Territorial contiguity with +  Common Kinship Network =  Tribe 
Differentiation free mobility
Cultural Territorial A relative External political Considerable Ethnic
Differentiation +  contiguity +  large scale +  relation of +  group =  Group 
with free conflict and sentiment , .
mobility alliance with (Identity)
similar groups
Ethnic group +  Direct membership with +  Vertical economic integration =  Nation 
equal group rights
A. D. Smith, Theories o f Nationalism, London, 1971, pp. 186-7.
13 Fredrik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Cultural 
Difference, London, 1970, pp. 9-11.
14 ‘Territorial contiguity with free mobility’ has been emphasised for the emergence of an ethnic 
identity, Smith, op. cit.
15 A. D. Smith, Ethnic Origins o f Nations, Cambridge, 1986, pp. 28-9.
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phrase implies an actual physical association, which in turn is not as important as a 
sense of association. In fact, actual physical possession of a territory is not 
indispensable for either an ethnic identity or a national identity. Israel is a good 
example where the Jewish community was hardly in actual possession of the 
territory now called Israel but that did not deter the process of national identity 
formation amongst them.16 Moreover, a sense of association with the territory of 
Israel (often imaginary) plays a crucial role in the sustenance of the ethnic identities 
of Jewish communities in many European countries.
Moreover, none of the ‘ethnic factors’17 are indispensable for an ethnic group 
to crystallise into an ethnic identity. An ethnic identity may utilise any number of 
such factors or invent new factors18 to mobilise political support. Besides, nations 
also draw upon similar factors to forge a distinct identity. Thus, national identity 
and ethnic identity may share certain common features but this does not make them 
identical political concepts.
Further, the formulation that “in order to forge a ‘nation’ today, it is vital to 
create and crystallise ethnic components, the lack of which is likely to constitute a 
serious impediment in ‘nation-building’”19 is not unproblematic. This view implies 
that all nations emerge from the ethnic components which ‘crystallise’ into a 
national identity. However, in multi-ethnic nation-states such as India, the ethnic 
components can hardly be called as ‘crystallised’ but not much debate can focus on
16 Also noteworthy is the fact that the territory imagined by the Jewish community as an important 
premise in their identity articulation before the creation of Israel was significantly different from 
the geographical boundaries of the present Israeli state. This substantiates the argument that a sense 
of association is of greater relevance in identity articulation than actual possession of the territory 
concerned.
17 Smith lists the following factors that are important for an ethnic group to emerge as an ethnic 
identity: (a) A collective name; (b) A common myth of descent; (c) A shared history-actual or 
perceived; (d) A distinctive culture; (e) An association with a specific territory - sacred, 
commemorative or actual; and, (f) A sense of solidarity; at least amongst the elite, ibid., pp. 28- 
30.
18 For instance, declining development profile of the Jharkhand region and resultant alienation has 
been used as an additional factor for political mobilisation by the Jharkhandi identity premised on 
tribal heritage and culture.
19 Smith, Ethnic Origins o f Nations, op. cit., p. 17.
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whether there exists an Indian national identity. This can be substantiated by 
referring to a study by Walker Conner which points out that out of 132 States 
studied (many of which were nation-states), only twelve were ethnically 
homogeneous, representing only 9.1 per cent of the total. Another twenty-five, that 
is 18.9 per cent of the total, have one single ethnic community comprising over 90 
per cent of the population. On the other hand, thirty-nine States (25 per cent of the 
total) had the largest ethnic group constituting less than half of their population 
while fifty-three States (40.2 per cent of the total) were comprised of more than 5 
significant groups.20 Thus, crystallisation of ethnic components is not indispensable 
for ‘nation-building’.
The terms ethnicity and nationalism thus cannot and must not be used inter­
changeably because of the differing connotations of the two terms as well as the 
differences between the two categories. Therefore, it is important that a distinction 
be made between the two, at least for analytical purposes. Admittedly, both 
nationalism and ethnicity share a number of common features but ethnic identities 
are not the same as national identities. It cannot be denied that ethnic identities may 
and often do become national identities and that, at different points of time, the 
same individuals may respond to different identities, but it does not imply that all 
ethnic identities are ipso facto national identities. An ethnic identity may be 
translated into a national identity under a certain set of circumstances but they are 
not all necessarily potential national identities which often emerge as civic identities.
The two identities can also be differentiated in terms of the demands they 
make on the political process. Largely, national identities might be inclined to seek 
statehood whereas ethnic identities might seek autonomy and adequate 
representation within an existing State. Of course, examples like Czechoslovakia 
and Yugoslavia exist where erstwhile ethnic identities do aspire for nationhood and 
statehood but this is not the dominant phenomenon.
20 Quoted in A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World, New York, 1981, pp. 9-10.
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Another distinction may be made on the basis of sovereignty although it is of 
limited use.21 An identity that is articulated close to the point of time when it attains 
sovereign status (e.g. Pakistan) rapidly transforms itself into a broad-based civic 
national identity. If the same identity had failed in attaining sovereign status so 
rapidly, it would probably have ended up as another competing ethnic identity.
Furthermore, we may attempt an analytical distinction between ethnicity- 
oriented nationalism and a broad-based civic nationalism. In actual terms, such a 
distinction would be painfully difficult since all national identities, inevitably, 
contain a number of ‘sub-national’ identities. Such a distinction can be drawn only 
to underline the fact that some national identities depend more on the ethnic 
differences than others on account of the relative homogeneity of the population. It 
is likely that a largely ethnically homogeneous nation would rely more heavily on 
the ethnic component to knit a coherent identity. On the other hand, an ethnically 
plural national identity would try to underplay the ethnic differences and focus on 
the non-ethnic similarities.
The process of conversion of cultural differences into bases for political 
mobilisation occurs only under specific circumstances. Ethnic identities are formed 
under a particular set of circumstances and a number of factors like myths, symbols, 
perceived history, geographical identification, role of elite, etc. play an important 
role in shaping these circumstances. Three propositions are central to the 
articulation of ethnic identities. First, ethnic identities are variable rather than a 
fixed or ‘given’ proposition. They interact with their socio-political and economic 
context and are continuously in a state of flux which alters the nature of demand 
which it places on the political system. Second, elite from the ethnic groups and 
their relationship of alliance or opposition vis-a-vis the State plays a central role in 
the character and intensity of articulation. Finally, the process of ethnic identity
21 The formulation that “when a ‘mini-nationalism’ wins independence, it is transformed into a full­
blown nationalism” is relevant in some circumstances. Once an ethnic identity attains 
independence, it becomes a macro-nationalism which attempts to exert “nationalism on a wider 
political, economic, cultural, religious or ethnic grounds” , L. L. Snyder, Macro-nationalisms: A 
History o f Pan-Movements, London, 1984, pp. xv, xvii.
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formation may have important consequences for the very self-definition of the ethnic 
group in question and its ability to persist.22
An ethnic identity is therefore “a subjectively self-conscious community that 
establishes criteria for inclusion and exclusion from the group. This inclusion or 
exclusion from the group hence, involves explicit or tacit adoption of rules of 
endogamy or exogamy as well as a claim to status and recognition, either as a 
distinct group or as a group at least equal to other groups”.23 Thus, ethnicity 
emerges as “an alternate24 form of social organisation” but is a contingent and 
mutable status that may or may not be articulated in a particular context or time. 
Further on, ethnic groups may tend to seek a major say in the political system in 
order to protect, preserve and promote their interests. This may lead to an ethnic 
group aspiring for a national status and/ or political recognition, either within an 
existing State or as a new State.
A nation-state may be created by either the transformation of an ethnic group 
in a multi-ethnic State into a self-conscious political identity or by the formation of 
an inter-ethnic, composite and homogeneous civic national culture through the 
agencies of a modern State. A nation is “a particular type of ethnic community 
politicised, with recognised group rights in the political system” ,25
In the multi-ethnic national identity of India, the nationalism was articulated 
to act as a counter to a visible ‘opposition’, i.e. British colonial rule. This manifest 
‘opponent’ factor succeeded in creating an overarching national identity, which has 
been described in a rather cliched phrase as ‘unity in diversity’. However, the multi­
ethnic context of the Indian national identity began emerging with the demand for 
Pakistan which exposed the fact that an over-arching political identity does not 
subsume or hinder other political identities. Other political identities (such as the
22 Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison, New Delhi, 1991, p. 14.
23 ibid.
24 As an alternative to being subsumed by the mainstream social organisation.
25 Brass, op. cit., p. 20.
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one expressed in the articulation of the demand for Pakistan) had existed 
simultaneously with the Indian national identity throughout the nationalist struggle.
In modern times, most individuals have a number of identities that operate 
simultaneously. Under such circumstances, it is likely that an ethnic identity may be 
strongly articulated but remains a part of a larger national identity, as is the case in 
the Jharkhand region. In the independent Indian state, the various ethnic identities 
have articulated themselves at different points of time in different ways. However, 
these articulations were more like interest group politics for a better share in the re­
distributive potential of the State till the mid-seventies. From then on, the ethnic 
groups started to assert themselves and demand anything between more 
representation and complete autonomy. The bases of such articulation have been 
quite varied from language to region, religion, culture and tribal heritage. However, 
owing to the emphasis of the post-independence Indian state on development 
activities, most such identities have modified their bases of articulation to include 
the need for special development measures. Generally therefore, such articulations 
have focused on the demand for more political autonomy to efficiently implement 
the development policy. The thrust of the nationalist State on development has been 
utilised by the newly articulated political identities to redefine their mode of political 
articulation. They emphasise their ethnic features to demand a different approach to 
development, which in turn has meant a demand for more political and 
administrative autonomy and occasionally, at least rhetorically, complete 
independence.26
The resource capacity of the Indian state being limited, development policies 
tend to be target-group/region oriented. Not all regions and societal groups have 
been equal beneficiaries of the positive action of the State.27 Consequently, a number 
of region-specific or culture-specific identities have been thrown up by the grass 
roots. These identities have in some cases, been called ethnic identities and their
26 For instance the case of Khalistan and Nagaland.
27 It is not being implied that the State has attempted balanced development. It is merely being stated 
that developmental imbalances due to resource constraints and political reasons are a fact.
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demands are largely in the category of demanding a greater share in the benefits of 
positive action of the State or administrative autonomy.
Hence, the State and its policies or the lack of them play an important role in 
precipitating the articulation of ethnic identities. The argument of this study 
therefore, is that public “policy implementation as the site of tangible exchanges 
between State and society provides a strategic point of developing the analysis”28 of 
the role of the State in encouraging the crystallisation of ethnic identities.
Ethnicity and the State
In order to study the relationship between the State and society in the process 
of ethnic identity formation, differentiation must be made between three sets of 
struggles:
(a) The struggle within the ethnic group itself for control over its symbolic and 
material resources, which in turn involves defining the group’s boundaries 
and its rules of exclusion and inclusion.
(b) The second set of struggles takes place between ethnic groups as a 
competition for rights, privileges and available resources.
(c) The third takes place between the State and the groups that dominate it on 
the one hand and the population that inhabits its territory.29
These three sets of struggles inevitably intersect each other but it is possible 
to separate the three for analytical purposes to study the role of the State vis-a-vis a 
selected ethnic group. The State is always engaged in the differential distribution of 
resources among various categories in the population. The State is not merely a 
policy-producing mechanism that simply balances conflicting societal interests. 
Instead, the State tends to “support particular groups, to distribute privileges
28 J. Echeverri-Gent, The State and the Poor: Public Policy and Political Development in India and 
the United States, Los Angeles, 1993, p. 4.
29 Paul R. Brass, ed., Ethnic Groups and the State, London, 1985, p. 1.
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unequally, and to differentiate among various categories in the population”.30 Even 
when the State sets out to be "ostentatiously egalitarian”, it must choose between 
types of “equalitarian” policies that invariably favour some groups or categories in 
the population and discriminates against others.31 The State may also choose to stand 
neutral but neutrality can also mean supporting the status quo.
Most modern States adopt policies of selective discrimination for a variety of 
reasons. Equalising policies such as "affirmative action" or "protective 
discrimination" are often seen as precipitating formation of new identities amongst 
various categories of social groups. However, such policies never precipitate 
identity articulation and mobilisation amongst all relevant categories of population. 
For instance, not all sections of the population which are facing the ill effects of 
unbalanced development mobilise to assert a politically significant sub-national/ 
ethnic identity.
Thus, study of public policy as a site of tangible interaction between State 
and society can provide us with a valuable tool to interpret the processes by which 
public policy conditions the agency of societal groups and in turn is conditioned by 
them.
In the Indian context, a ‘politics of rationality’ exists under which a 
bureaucratic policy planning, implementing and monitoring apparatus operates. 
However, the rational policy planning by a centralised bureaucracy and 
implementation process often operates in a skewed manner owing to political 
considerations. Some scholars and planners argue for the insulation of the policy 
process from the political context to achieve an efficient policy implementation. 
Such opinions however, fail to note that the political context serves some very 
important functions:
30 ibid., p. 9.
31 D. Ray, quoted in Brass, op. cit., p. 7.
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(a) It provides an avenue for demand-making to the under-privileged societal groups 
who have no other avenue available to them for influencing the policy process;
(b) It provides a valuable channel to utilise the resources controlled by the societal 
groups which are salient in the development scenario of India; and
(c) Last but not the least, the political process in principle serves an important 
democratic function by limiting the predatory influences of the State as well as 
the dominant societal groups.
Thus, any study of the state society relationship needs a model that has 
enough flexibility to account for the political context of development programmes. 
The Modified Resource Dependence Model is a modest attempt towards developing 
such a framework.
Modified Resource Dependence Model
This model32 attempts to examine the State-society relationship (especially 
vis-a-vis ethnic identities) through analysing the dynamics of public policy as a 
tangible interaction between the two. The basic premise is that the State’s (and the 
political regime’s) paramount concern is survival. In order to further this objective, 
the State must acquire resources from its environment constituted of societal groups. 
Societal actors that control the relevant resource exert influence on the State and its 
policy activities. Such transactions between the State and societal groups constitute 
the relationship of mutual dependence.
The relative dependence of the State and the ethnic identity or societal group 
on one another is determined by the following factors:
(a) Importance of the resources controlled by the other;
(b) Concentration of control over the resources;
32 J. Echeverri-Gent, The State and the Poor: Public Policy and Political Development in India and 
the United States, Los Angeles, 1993 developed the Resource Dependence Model to study the 
State-society relationship. The Modified Resource Dependence Model draws upon this model to 
analyse die relationship between ethnic identities and the State.
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(c) Uncertainty of supply of the resources; and,
(d) Abundance of the resource.33
Feedback
Coercion Policy Initiatives
Political
Demand-making Exchange of Resources
Loss of Legitimacy and 
Declining State capacity
Ethnic Identities or other Societal Identities
Political Authorities 
State/ Government
Flow-chart of the Modified Resource Dependence Model
33 Echeverri-Gent, op. cit., pp. 22-4.
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Such factors do not constitute a relationship of dependence in itself. 
Dependence is a consequence of asymmetric exchange of resources. The importance 
of the resources controlled by the other goes a long way in determining the nature of 
State-society relationship. If the resources controlled by the societal actors (ethnic 
and other similar politically relevant societal identities) is paramount to the survival 
of the State, the State tends to be accommodative and weak. On the other hand, if 
the State is able to control most of the resources crucial to the societal actors, it 
tends to become dictatorial and can usually implement its will over the societal 
actors.
The concentration or dispersal of the resources and their relative abundance 
(or scarcity) also plays an important part in determining the relative positions of the 
State and societal actors. If the resources are concentrated in a relatively small 
number of societal actors and only they have access to such resources, the State- 
society relationship that emerges is quite different from the situation in which 
resources are widely dispersed and can be accessed by a number of societal actors. 
In the former case, the State may adopt policies of either co-opting or coercing 
(depending upon the size and political importance of the societal actor concerned) 
whereas in the latter case, the State is more likely to be a broad-based and 
consensual one.
The State usually has the capability to counteract any such dependence if it 
can control other resources that are important for the ethnic identity. However, the 
ethnic identities may also possess certain resources that are crucial to the State’s 
survival. Both the State and the ethnic identities thus attempt to use the resources 
that they control in a strategic manner to reduce the dependence on the other.
Three types of resources are important in any public policy oriented study of 
the State-society relationship: (a) Political resources, (b) Economic resources, and
(c) Information resources. In the context of the relationship of dependence between 
State and ethnic identities, the State in India (and developing countries in general) 
controls a vast array of goods and services crucial to the development and poverty
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alleviation of the ethnic identity or societal group concerned. The economic 
resources controlled by the State can determine the future development profile34 of 
the region or ethnic identity concerned. If the State chooses to ignore any one of 
them in its policy initiatives/ calculations, it would doom the prospects of the 
societal group or region concerned and if they are the targets of the State’s policy 
agenda, they are likely to prosper.
On the other hand, the ethnic groups control a vast potential of economic 
resources in terms of locally available and already exploited resources and 
traditional technology. The societal actors also affect the State’s control over the 
economic resources by extending their co-operation to enable the exploitation of 
local natural resources, the lack of which will seriously threaten the State’s control 
over economic resources.35 In view of the limited resource capability of the Indian 
state, such resources being under the control of ethnic identities can be of crucial 
importance to the future development scenario of India. The proponents of 
community-based participative development strategies have already recognised the 
potential of such resources. If the State is able to mobilise the economic resources 
controlled by the ethnic identities, it will lead to a better overall development profile 
and contribute to the legitimacy of the State. A failure to do so will intensify the 
competition for resources that may result in decreased legitimacy of the State/ 
regime and general political instability.
Political resources are also exchanged between the State and ethnic identities. 
These resources include the capacity of the State to exercise its authority, legitimacy
34 This study defines development as an improvement in the living standards of the population (see 
chapter IV) and therefore, the term ‘development profile’ has been used to refer to the patterns 
emerging from an analysis of all the indicators of development for a region at any given point of 
time. For instance, the development profile of Jharkhand in 1951 refers to the broad patterns of 
development that emerge from an analysis of the development indicators available for that year 
such as the figures for infant mortality, public health, employment levels, educational levels and so 
on. Besides, the analysis also takes account of the potential of economic growth reflected in 
indicators such as changes in irrigation potential and land under major crops and the changes in the 
pattern since the last available comparable data.
33 For instance, the lack of co-operation of the Jharkhandi population in exploiting the mineral 
resources of the region was expressed in the economic blockades during the 1980s and 1990s.
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of the regime and its capacity to mobilise political support. Ethnic identities need a 
share in this political resource controlled by the State to legitimise their own claims 
as well as to skew authoritative allocation of resources in their own favour. The 
ethnic identities on the other hand, control the resource of political support for the 
State and obedience to its authority which in turn, is crucial to the State for 
legitimising its own actions. In a scenario where large sections of the populace are 
unwilling to share the political resources that they control with the State, there 
emerges a situation when resort to widespread coercion is the only avenue left to the 
State for its survival. This in turn undermines the political stability and legitimacy of 
the State.
The third important resource available to both the State and the ethnic groups 
is that of information. Both need to share this resource to further their respective 
aims. The State, by virtue of the vast economic resources at its command, is able to 
generate crucial and enormous amounts of information (e.g. flood and drought 
forecast, underground water availability, potential threats by natural catastrophes, 
scope of exploiting yet unexploited resources, etc.). Such information is crucial to 
the ethnic identities in more ways than one.
The ethnic identities on the other hand, might possess information that could 
be crucial for the survival of the State. Examples of such information resources are 
traditional methods of utilisation of locally available resources, availability of such 
resources, extent and levels of mobilisation in reaction to State’s actions and 
policies, feedback on policy initiatives, potential unrest, etc. Such information 
enables the State to reorient its policies (or, probably frame new ones) and bring 
them closer to the target societal groups so as to contain social and political ferment.
The resources available with the ethnic identities appear microscopic when 
compared with the huge resource capability of the Indian state. However, it is not 
the case because the State needs the ethnic identities and other societal groups in the 
following manner.
Any State has two avenues available to it in order to enforce its will. These 
avenues are either coercion 01* policy initiatives. The State as the only actor having a 
monopoly over legitimate coercion (both physical and institutional), can very well
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resort to the same in order to implement its will in the face of societal and political 
challenges. However, the State cannot go on employing coercion to contain dissent 
or conflict indefinitely. This is so because greater the use of coercion by the State to 
contain societal conflict, the lesser is the legitimacy of its authority and hence a 
much reduced capacity to command obedience. Hence, in order to increase its 
legitimacy and rally a larger political support for the regime and its policies, the 
State is forced to use policy initiatives to control a larger share of the resources and 
thereby ensure its survival.
These policy initiatives cannot succeed until and unless the ethnic identities 
and other societal groups are willing to share the resources that they control. The 
ethnic identities use this compulsion on the part of the State to make strategic use of 
the resources under their control to further their interests and demand a better policy 
initiative for themselves from the State.
However, it is likely that a certain ethnic group is faced with a situation in 
which the State has not been giving it due political and economic space on the policy 
agenda. Under such circumstances, the ethnic group concerned may organise and 
mobilise on ethnic lines to augment the political resource under its control.
Advantages of Modified Resource Dependence Model:
The Modified Resource Dependence Model provides a valuable tool to 
analyse the relationship between State and societal groups. This model facilitates the 
understanding of the dynamics of this relationship by offering enough flexibility to 
include the operation of the political context and enables the replacement of point to 
point comparisons or common sense analysis with meaningful theoretical 
generalisations. This model is also useful because it focuses on the two-way 
interaction between the State and societal groups. The process of identity 
articulation can be examined with the help of this model since it takes into account 
the compulsion on the part of the State to try and evolve policy measures in 
response to the demands placed on it by the political system. A fine balance must
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exist between coercion and policy measures36 for any meaningful exchange of 
resources between the State and the political identity. The dynamics of this 
balancing act by the State and societal groups concerned can be understood and a 
coherent understanding of the pattern can be developed with the help of this model.
Since the strength of this model is its flexibility to include most kinds of 
political activity within its framework, it would enable the understanding and 
explanation of most cases of the interaction between the State and societal groups. 
However, other cases will have to be examined in detail to categorically state the 
advantage of this model. It certainly enables us to understand the dynamics of public 
policy implementation and the articulation of Jharkhandi sub-national identity over 
the last fifty years in a coherent fashion.
Sub-national Political Movements and Marginal Politics in India
The articulation of sub-national identities in India is generally premised on 
lingual, racial, ethnic, historical and geographical bases. Under the British colonial 
rule, “these local and regional identities were accorded a position of dignity by the 
nationalist leaders within the broad church of the anti-colonial struggle” .37 After the 
transfer of power into the hands of the national leaders, the sub-national imagined 
political communities38 began to assert themselves in order to generate political 
power to give concrete expression to their political aspirations. Apart from the 
cultural factors, “a feeling of deprivation, or neglect, resulting from the nature of 
national decision-making process . . . provide the logic for mass movement in most 
cases” .39 The feeling of neglect combines with the cultural factors to forge potent
36 Depending on the numerical size of the societal group concerned and the political importance of 
the resources that it controls as well as the intensity of political mobilisation amongst its members.
37 Subrata K. Mitra, ‘Introduction’ in Mitra, Subrata K. and Lewis, R. Alison, eds., Subnational 
Movements in South Asia, Oxford, 1996, p. 7.
38 Identities are imagined in the sense of being adopted by those who see themselves as marginalised 
by the State.
39 Madan P. Bezbaruah, ‘Cultural Sub-Nationalism in India’s North-east: An Overview ’ in Mitra, 
Subrata K. and Lewis, R. Alison, eds., Subnational Movements in South Asia, Oxford, 1996, p. 
175.
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sub-national political identities. The demands of these sub-national identities range 
from greater autonomy to complete independence.40
Cultural factors combined with developmental issues and a feeling of 
alienation from the State and its policies, have led to articulation of sub-national 
identities in many parts of India. The sub-national identity articulation in the Gorkha 
regions of West Bengal combines the underdevelopment of the population in the 
region with the lingual/ cultural bases to demand political recognition.41 Similar 
patterns can also be noticed in other parts of India such as the tribal autonomy and 
socio-religious movement amongst the Bhil, the Dang, the Dhodia, the Gamit, the 
Naik, the Kokna, the Warli and the Kathodi tribes in south Gujarat.42 Instances of 
sub-national identity articulation can also be noticed amongst the 83 tribal groups in 
south India which include the Koya, the Malayali, the Irula and the Paniyan tribal 
groups. These sub-national identity articulations draw upon cultural and historical 
factors and include socio-economic considerations born out of imbalances in the 
development process as additional bases of mobilisation.43
Other examples of such sub-national identity articulation in India are the 
cases of Khalistani44 identity in Punjab and Kashmiri identity in Jammu and Kashmir 
where religious and cultural factors have led to powerful articulation of identity. 
These sub-national identities are demanding complete independence. As in other 
sub-national identity articulation in India, the socio-economic factors have also 
played a role in the articulation and character of these identities.
40 ibid.
41 See A. R. Das, ‘The Language and Script Movement in the Darjeeling Himalayan Area’ in Singh, 
K. S. ed., Tribal Movement in India, vol. I, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 349-59.
42 See Desai, I. P., ‘The Tribal Autonomy Movement in South Gujarat’ in Singh, K. S, ed., Tribal 
Movement in India, vol. I, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 243-60 and R. B, Lai, ‘Socio-religious 
Movement Amongst the Tribals of South Gujarat’ in Singh, K. S. ed., Tribal Movement in India, 
vol. I, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 285-308.
43 P. K. Misra, ‘Tribal Mobilisation in Southern India’ in Singh, K. S. ed., Tribal Movement in 
India, vol. I, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 325-37,
44 See R. G. Fox, Lions o f Punjab: Culture in Making, Los Angeles, 1985 for the dynamics of sub­
national identity formation amongst Sikhs in Punjab.
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The fact that the sub-national identities in most part of India draw upon 
socio-economic factors in addition to their cultural bases of mobilisation has also led 
to their inclination to adopt a radical Leftist idiom of politics in some regions, 
particularly in the tribal regions of West Bengal and Bihar and in some parts of 
Andhra Pradesh. Such mobilisations have come to be known as ‘Naxalite’ politics, 
which advocates radical action such as execution of ‘exploiters’ after trial in a 
‘people’s courts’, forcible harvest of fields alienated from the tribal peasants and 
violent overthrowing of the existing administration.45
Amongst the many instances of such sub-national assertions in India, the case 
of the North-east is perhaps most significant due to the number as well as intensity 
of sub-national assertions.46 This region includes seven states -  Amnachal Pradesh, 
Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura and has an 
extraordinary diversity of cultural identities. It contains 209 tribes47 and the 
“linguistic diversity of the area contributes to the complexity of the nationality 
problem in the region” where “420 languages and dialects are spoken”48. As the 
region is multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious, language often provides the 
criterion for the articulation of these sub-national identities.
The articulation of sub-national identities in the North-east can be classified 
into three broad categories. The first category includes those types of conflicts that 
arise out of a concept of distinct and separate identity leading to a secessionist 
movement and the inevitable clash with the Indian state.49 Examples of this kind of
45 Edward Duyker, Tribal Guerrillas: The Santhals o f West Bengal and the Naxalite Movement, 
Delhi, 1987. Also see Ashim Kumar Adhikary and Ranjit Kumar Bhattacharya, ‘The Extremist 
Movement: An Appraisal of the Naxalite Movement with Special Reference to its Repercussion 
Among Tribes’ in Singh, K. S. ed., Tribal Movement in India, vol. I, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 119- 
28.
46 See N. K. Das, Ethnic Identity, Ethnicity and Social Stratification in North-east India, New Delhi, 
1989 for a full discussion of die dynamics of sub-national politics in North-east India.
47 Bezbaruah, op. cit., p. 172.
48 ibid.
49 ibid., p. 173.
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sub-national identity articulation in the North-east are the Nagas,50 some strands of 
the sub-national movement in Manipur and Tripura and the activities of the Mizo 
National Front.51
The second category of sub-national movement in the North-east is the 
demand of some groups for a distinct political identity, separate but within the broad 
framework of an existing one. Such sub-national movements in the North-east “are 
often professedly democratic, directed mostly against the central government who 
have the authority to bring in constitutional changes to give political recognition to 
sub-nationality aspiration.”52 However, the disruption to law and order leads to their 
clash with the state government as well. Instances of such movements in the North­
east is the Bodoland movement.53
The third strand of sub-national identity articulation in the North-east 
includes those groups who are not numerically dominant nor live in geographically 
compact areas but nevertheless, are apprehensive of their identity being subsumed 
into the dominant political and cultural identity. Hence, they assert themselves to 
seek protection of their culture.54
The States Reorganisation Commission had recognised the difficulty in 
drawing boundaries around such complex variety of cultural identities and seemed to 
have envisaged the state of Assam as a culturally mixed unit which would include all 
the seven states. However, the pressure exerted by the articulation of the above sub­
national identities has led to the acceptance of the principle of culturally-defined 
states in the region, although after much struggle and socio-economic conflict and in 
some cases long-drawn insurgency.55 For instance, the Naga Nationalist Council led
50 See N. K. Das, ‘The Naga Movement5 in Singh, K. S. ed., Tribal Movement in India, vol. I, New 
Delhi, 1982, pp. 39-52 for a discussion of sub-national identity articulation amongst the Nagas.
51 Bezbaruah, op. cit.
52 ibid.
53 ibid.
54 ibid.
55 ibid., p. 174.
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an insurgent movement between 1956 and 1966 leading to the creation of Nagaland. 
Similarly, the Mizo National Front led an armed rebellion from 1966 to 1986 when 
Mizoram was created as a separate state within the Indian Union. Similar examples 
can be found in all the states of the North-east. Manipur has been witness to 
extremist activities since 1947 whereas in Tripura the tribal population has been 
fighting to preserve their identity. Similar concerns of identity has led to a long- 
drawn insurgent movement in Assam spearheaded by ULFA. After Assamese was 
declared the state language of Assam in 1960, the hill tribes of Khasi, Jaintia and 
Garo hills fought for the creation of Meghalaya in 1971. However, the cultural 
complexity of the region ensures that socio-economic conflict and sub-national 
assertion continues.56
Amongst the many instances of assertion of sub-national identities in India, 
the case of the Jharkhand movement is unique in character. It draws upon the tribal 
cultural heritage of the Chotanagpur region57 but has evolved to include the socio­
economic problems of the region as one of the primary bases of articulation of a 
sub-national identity. This has led to a regional basis for political mobilisation. The 
dynamics of articulation of this sub-national identity has been analysed in this study.
The Jharkhand Movement
The Jharkhand region according to the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM)58 
consists of eighteen districts in the south Bihar,59 three in West Bengal, four in 
Orissa and two in Madhya Pradesh. However, over the last half century, by the 
avenue of political negotiation (exchange of political resources between the
56 ibid., pp. 174-5.
57 Rara Dayal Munda, ‘In search of a Tribal Homeland’ in Chaudhari, Buddhadeb, ed., Ethnopolitics 
and Identity Crisis, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 377-86.
58 Election Manifesto o f the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha for the Lok Sabha Elections 1996, Ranchi: 
JMM Ranchi Central Office, 1996, p. 3.
59 There has been a continuous reorganisation of districts in Bihar, ostensibly to improve 
development administration. The original 5 districts of Chotanagpur division have been divided 
and re-divided to lead to 18 districts by 1996.
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Jharkhandi groups and the State), the Jharkhand movement has come to concentrate 
on the eighteen districts of south Bihar (see chapter VII). These districts are Bokaro, 
Chatra, Deoghar, Dhanbad, Dumka, East Singhbhum, Garhawa, Giridih, Godda, 
Gumla, Hazaribagh, Koderma, Lohardagga, Pakur, Palamau, Ranchi, Sahebganj, 
and West Singhbhum. Jharkhandi political groups and parties still claim that all the 
districts in the four states are within the geographical scope of their demands. 
However, the recent creation of the JAAC with its jurisdiction over only the 
eighteen districts of the Jharkhand region that lie in Bihar and the softer tone of the 
Jharkhandi political groups about the other three states suggests that politically, 
Jharkhand has come to mean the districts in Bihar only (see Map 2). The majority of 
the geographical area and population of Jharkhand lies in Bihar and consequently the 
Jharkhand movement is most active in Bihar. There is almost no significant 
movement for autonomy in the other three states. Hence, the districts of Bihar are 
the focus of this study.
The districts of the Jharkhand region have a population of 21,848,860 (1991 
Census) living in an area of 79,732 square Kilometres. This represents 25.3 per cent 
of the total population and 45.85 per cent of the total land area of Bihar. There are 
30 notified tribes in the region with a total population of 6,044,010 (1991 Census). 
More than ninety-one percent of the total tribal population of Bihar lives in the 
Jharkhand region. Today, only 25 per cent of the total population of the Jharkhand 
region is of tribal origin. Furthermore, the ST population is not evenly dispersed 
throughout the region. The districts of Dumka, East Singhbhum, Gumla, Palamau, 
Ranchi, Sahibganj and West Singhbhum accounting for 79.38 per cent (1991 
Census) of the total ST population of the Jharkhand region. Besides, within these 
districts also, the ST population is not evenly distributed. Hence, there are only 
small pockets of high tribal concentration. Consequently, no political movement in 
Jharkhand can hope for success without the active co-operation of the majority 
component of the population of the region, i.e. the non-tribal residents.
The total Scheduled Tribes population of the whole of Bihar is 6,616,914 
and represents 7.66 per cent of the total population of Bihar (1991 Census). The 
tribal component of the population of Bihar is divided into thirty different tribes. 
They “generally belong to the Proto-Australoid stock though traces of Mongoloid
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strain have also [been] found . . .”60 The main tribal groups are the Hos, the 
Santhals, the Oraons, the Mundas, the Asurs, Korwas, Birjhias, Chick Baraiks, 
Loharas, Karmalis, the Mahalis, the Bhumij Kols, the Cheros, the Kharias, Hill 
Kharias, Sauria Paharias and the Pahariyas.61 “The tribals differ widely among 
themselves in level of socio-economic development. The number of people living 
entirely by hunting and food gathering is very small . . .  A few tribal communities 
[are] still devoted to shifting cultivation” (the main ones being the Asurs, Birjias, 
Hill Kharias and Sauria Paharias). “The rest of the tribes who form 95% of the 
tribal population are settled agriculturists . . . ”62
The tribes in the Jharkhand region of Bihar have a number of languages but 
most of them fall into either the Austric or the Dravidian families. None of them 
have a written script though efforts have been made to develop one.63 The tribal 
folklore has been communicated down the generations with the help of a strong oral 
tradition but the written form is increasingly popular with the help of the Devnagari 
or the Roman scripts. The interaction between tribals and non-tribals has been quite 
widespread and, consequently, most tribals also speak Hindi and a variety of related 
dialects.
The sub-national movement in the Jharkhand region in Bihar is a good 
example where the ascriptive features of the tribal heritage and culture have been 
combined with the poor development profile of the region to forge a politically 
significant ethnic identity. The movement began with the desire for the betterment 
of the tribal people and had a significant anti non-tribal component. However, the
60 Sachchidananda, ‘The Tribal Situation in Bihar’ in Singh, K. Suresh, ed., Tribal Situation in India: 
Proceedings o f a Seminar, Shimla, 1972, p. 168.
61 Ram Chandra Prasad, Bihar, New Delhi, 1983, p. 34.
62 Sachchidananda, op. cit., p. 170.
63 In October 1997, in a conversation with Ram Dayal Munda, Vice-chancellor of Ranchi University 
at SOAS, London, it emerged that there are numerous proposals for a new script for the various 
tribal languages. Munda indicated that, due to the multiplicity of languages in the Jharkhand region 
and numerous contending proposals for the script, it is likely that the Devanagari script will be 
adopted. The main reason for this is to facilitate communicability between the tribal languages as 
well as with the Hindi-speaking population.
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demographic reality of the region (only about a quarter of total population of the 
region today is of tribal origin, see chapter IV and V) forced the leaders to expand 
the rules of exclusion. Consequently, all people settled in the region came to be 
included within the definition of a Jharkhandi. The poor performance of the 
development bureaucracy in the region added to the tribal bases of mobilisation and 
popular support for the movement grew. The Jharkhand movement is demanding the 
creation of the state of Jharkhand within the Indian Union with all the federalist 
autonomous trappings of the Constitution. However until now, they have only been 
able to secure a development council for the region called the Jharkhand Area 
Autonomous Council (JAAC).
It is noteworthy that at the international level, some intellectuals and leaders 
of the Jharkhand movement have been projecting Jharkhandi identity in terms of a 
tribal identity premised on a forest culture. They seek recognition of the rights of 
indigenous people in forums such as the United Nations Working Group on 
Indigenous Population.64 However, this component is strongly underplayed in the 
Jharkhandi identity projected within the region. In fact, since 1950 the Jharkhandi 
leaders have been making great efforts to emphasise that a Jharkhandi is any person 
who resides in the region, irrespective of his/her tribal origins. The main reason for 
this gap is the political and demographic reality of the region where the tribal 
population is a declining minority.
The socio-economic condition of most tribals is poor with low literacy rates 
and employment (see chapters IV and V). Most tribal agriculturists have been 
engaged in subsistence agriculture. Since the colonial period, therefore, there has 
been a tradition of seasonal economic migration of the tribals as unskilled labourers 
to the tea gardens of Assam and to fields and construction projects in other parts of 
India. In the last few decades, growing industrialisation in the Jharkhand region has 
led them to unskilled jobs in the industries and mines of the region.
64 Conversation with Rain Dayal Munda in October 1997 at SOAS, London.
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The Jharkhand movement is rooted in the poor socio-economic condition of 
the region and draws its political symbolism from the tribal culture and tradition. 
The Jharkhandi leaders trace their struggle back to the tribal revolts of the 19* 
century which were sparked off by the oppressive land revenue arrangements under 
the Permanent Settlement. However, in a more analytical light, the Jharkhand 
movement can be traced back to the last two decades of colonial rule in India when 
socio-cultural organisations sought to bring about changes in the life of the 
Jharkhand region. The nationalist project of the creation of a community at the 
national level was repeated at a lower level in Jharkhand (as in many other parts of 
India). Just as the nationalists had used cultural factors to forge a national 
community, the leaders of the Adivasi Mahasabha (predecessor of the Jharkhand 
Party) tried to create a community in the Jharkhand region by throwing open its 
membership to all the residents of the Jharkhand region irrespective of their Adivasi 
origins or otherwise. The tribal heritage of the regions and its symbolism was 
construed to represent a geographical region instead of the social category of tribes. 
Thus, an ethnic identity was construed that was politically significant at the state as 
well as at the national level (see chapters II, III and VII).
Furthermore, by the time of independence, the Jharkhandi community thus 
created had already adopted the issue of poor development profile as a 
supplementary ground for popular mobilisation and was demanding an autonomous 
state of Jharkhand. In the integrationist-euphoric post-partition period after 
independence, the premise of an ethnic identity (tribal identity in the case of the 
Jharkhand region) would have sparked off fears of separatism and invited the State’s 
repressive wrath. The ‘secular’ premise of poor development under the system of 
exclusion during the colonial rule would have found support across the political 
spectrum.
Consequently, since the 1950s, the leaders of the Jharkhand movement have 
increasingly emphasised the declining development profile of the region as the 
ground for the demand of an autonomous state. Leftist input and influence into the 
movement in the 1960s again emphasised the primacy of economic factors and 
played down the cultural facets (see chapter II). The demographic profile of the 
region led to a political reality where the leaders could hardly afford to over-play
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the tribal-cultural attributes since it would have alienated non-tribal support. The 
emphasis on poor development in the region was also appropriated by the State. 
This in turn affected the character of the articulation of the demand by Jharkhandi 
societal and political groups. Over the past 50 years this development premise has 
almost completely displaced the cultural premise of the movement. As will emerge 
in the following chapters, the perpetually declining development profile of the 
region made the argument of poor scope for development under existing 
arrangements a convenient base for political mobilisation.
The Jharkhand movement suffered from perpetual divisiveness due to 
personality clash and political ambition amongst its leaders primarily. Their inability 
to forge a politically significant front meant that they were unable to engage in any 
meaningful exchange of resources with the State. The political resources required by 
the State to generate legitimacy for the regime were dispersed over a large societal 
space. Furthermore, the political resources controlled by the Jharkhandi groups 
were not of primary importance to the State since a relatively small number of 
Members of Parliament (MP) (out of the 54 Parliamentary seats in Bihar only 
fourteen are in the Jharkhand region) are elected from the region. Consequently, 
Jharkhandi political groups came to play only a marginal role in the project of 
legitimisation of the Indian state. Their dependence on the political, information and 
economic resources controlled by the State was much larger than that of the State on 
them. The result therefore, was that the Jharkhandi groups were unable to secure 
any meaningful exchange of resources. Faced with the political impotence of the 
Jharkhand political groups, the electorate (societal actors) began to experiment with 
other political parties in the hope of securing better resource allocation by the State. 
The failure of the public policy machinery (see chapters IV and V) contributed to 
the fluidity of the situation.
Beginning with the 1962 elections, the Jharkhandi electorate began to 
strategically use the political resources under their control and began to extend 
political patronage for the Parliamentary elections to the larger national parties 
which had some hope of forming the national government and thereby had the 
capability of fulfilling their demands. At the state level, electoral support has been
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extended to a regional party that can influence actual policy implementation (see 
chapter VI).
However, this strategic sharing of political resources yielded limited results. 
The electorate realised that if they are able to disrupt the State’s control over the 
economic resources of the region (mineral wealth) ,6S they might be able to pressurise 
the State to take cognisance of their demands. They could then utilise the political 
resources at their command to influence the public policy agenda. Consequently, 
apart from a strategic use of the political resources, the population of the Jharkhand 
region also extended their support to the agitational politics of the Jharkhandi 
groups. This involved a blockade of mineral transportation from the region in the 
late 1980s and 1990s which had a two-fold effect. On the one hand, it challenged 
the State’s control over the economic resources of the region and on the other it 
threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the State. The mineral wealth of the 
region is indispensable for the State in order to avoid societal conflict and preserve 
legitimacy of the regime in the rest of the country. Consequently, a threat to State’s 
control over the economic resources of the region made it more receptive to the 
political demands of the Jharkhandi political groups.
Such agitational politics of the Jharkhandi group was met by a degree of 
coercion by the State. This in turn undermined the legitimacy of the State since it 
reflected its inability to resolve conflict without resort to violence. A dual strategy 
of agitational politics and shifting political patronage thus yielded better results. The 
State became eager to respond to the demands of the Jharkhandi groups with policy 
measures. A more meaningful exchange of political and economic resources 
followed. The result eventually was the creation of the Jharkhand Area Autonomous 
Council (JAAC).
65 The Jharkhand region accounts for 48 per cent of coal, 48 per cent of bauxite, 45 per cent of mica, 
90 per cent of apatite and all the kyanite produced in India. Moreover, “almost every kind of 
mineral including gold and atomic minerals, is found in this region”, Victor Das, ‘Where 
Oppressed Tribals Await True Liberation’ in Chaudhari, Buddhadeb, ed., Ethnopolitics and 
Identity Crisis, New Delhi, 1992, p. 402.
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This process will be elucidated, explained and analysed in the chapters that
follow.
Chapter II will endeavour to locate the movement in its politico-economic 
context and document its trajectory over the last half-century. The effort in this 
chapter will be to highlight the fluidity of the Jharkhand movement in an effort to 
understand the patterns in its growth.
The tribal regions in India came under the integrationist thrust with the 
expansion and growth of the colonial enterprise. The economic potential or strategic 
importance of some of the tribal regions necessitated active direct administration by 
the colonial state. However, the unsettled political situation that emerged after the 
tribal revolts of the 18* and 19th centuries was hardly conducive to active economic 
enterprise. This, along with the ‘civilising mission’ of the colonial state, was the 
reason behind the emergence of a special system of administration in the tribal areas 
which came to be called the Excluded Areas. The main features of the system of 
exclusion are analysed in Chapter III. Moreover, since the colonial discourse had 
significantly affected nationalist discourse, some proclaimed goals of the colonial 
state were adopted by the nationalist discourse. Consequently, the independent 
Indian state went on to adopt the integrationist theme of the colonial state, especially 
with regard to the tribal regions. These issues have also been addressed in Chapter 
III in order to demonstrate the continuity of the colonial discourse into the 
postcolonial period.
The Jharkhand movement has conditioned the State’s policy response and has 
been conditioned by it. The exchange of resources between the governmental 
machinery and the Jharkhandi groups has affected the course of both the public 
policy agenda in the region as well as the nature of political demand-making by the 
Jharkhandi political groups. Popular support for different political parties has been 
quite fluid and has responded to the performance of the public policy 
implementation machinery. Within the framework of the Modified Resource 
Dependence Model, an attempt has been made to analyse the shifts in the electoral 
support for the various political parties in the Jharkhand region. It has been noticed 
that popular support has been shifting between political parties depending upon their
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capacity and promise to deliver better policy response. Chapters IV and V examine 
the dynamics of the changing development profile of the Jharkhand region. The 
effort in these chapters is to isolate patterns and trends in the development profile of 
the Jharkhand region in relation to Bihar as a whole. The trends and patterns thus 
isolated have been correlated to the electoral support for Jharkhandi political groups 
in Chapter VI. It has been noticed that the decline in the development profile has 
significantly affected the electoral support for Jharkhandi as well as other political 
parties.
The demand of autonomy for Jharkhand has been present ever since 
independence. By the 1970s, developmental issues had come to occupy the centre 
stage of political dynamics of the Jharkhand region. Faced with the ever-declining 
development profile, the issue of autonomy started to gradually find greater political 
support by the late 1970s and early 1980s. This demand for autonomy has changed 
character over the years, while the nature of political articulation around the demand 
for administrative autonomy has also been quite fluid. Various political groups have 
offered different options to the electorate. The dynamics of the demand for 
autonomy and its political context have been examined in Chapter VII. Conclusions 
have been summed in Chapter VIII.
Methodological Note:
A wide variety of sources have been utilised in the collection of material for 
this study. Apart from secondary works, the data used in this study have been taken 
from government sources including censuses, plan documents, statistical diaries, 
reports of the reviews of development programmes and district gazetteers. As the 
work covers the period 1951-91, the dependence on government data is inevitable. 
There is no other source which provides consistent and comparable data over such a 
long period of time as the volume of work required in collection and collation of 
such detailed data is beyond the capability of any other agency.
Keeping in mind the probable unreliability of governmental data, it must be 
pointed out that the patterns that emerge in the study are too stark to be affected by 
small errors in the available data. It must also be noted that the patterns of change 
which emerge in the analysis of the development profile of the Jharkhand region in
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this study have been confirmed by the reports of the various committees66 appointed 
to report on the state of development and by the experience during the field trip.
Moreover, as the government agencies are the only ones which generate this 
vast amount of data, it would be politically and administratively simpler for the 
government to alter the definition of the relevant category to hide its inefficiency 
than tamper with the collected data. This exercise of altering the categories can be 
noticed in the constant redefinition of the category of ‘workers’ since the 1951 
census (this issue has been dealt with in greater detail in chapters IV and V while 
discussing the employment profile of the Jharkhand region).
As far as the development profile of the Jharkhand region is concerned, an 
analysis of any unit of India smaller than a state is a difficult task because very little 
data is available at sub-state and district level. This is particularly true of the data 
related to the allocation of development funds. The centralisation of the development 
planning process in India has led to a situation in which financial allocations are 
made on the basis of development heads such as agricultural activities, irrigation and 
so on. This sectoral allocation has not been published for any area smaller than a 
state. Hence, in the case of Jharkhand, details of financial allocation are unavailable. 
The only exception is the financial allocation for the Tribal Sub-Plan that is 
earmarked exclusively for the tribal areas (all the tribal area of Bihar lies within the 
Jharkhand region).
It must be noted that allocation of funds or expenditure does not necessarily 
mean that all the funds have been used for the betterment of the target population/ 
region. The JMM leadership alleges that only four to six percent of the allocation is 
actually spent on developmental activities within the Jharkhand region. A 
government official in an interview during the fieldtrip confirmed this point of view. 
He privately estimated that only four to ten percent was all that was actually spent.67
66 The conclusions of the relevant committees have been discussed in chapters IV and V.
67 Interview with the Regional Development Commissioner at Ranchi in January 1996.
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The main reason for this is corruption, leakage of resources68 and transaction costs, 
as well as the inability of the developmental infrastructure to utilise the ever- 
increasing allocations. As will emerge in later chapters, a number of committees 
appointed to review the development policies have expressed their displeasure over 
this state of affairs.
Due to these constraints, the decadal patterns of change in the developmental 
indicators69 in the relevant category have been analysed to gauge the effectiveness of 
public policy. For instance, instead of the amount of money allocated or spent on 
literacy projects, the actual changes in literacy rates have been taken as an indicator 
of the development profile. Additionally, it can be argued with a substantial degree 
of accuracy that it is better to analyse the effect that a certain policy has had in 
changing the living standards of the population rather than an analysis of financial 
allocation and expenditures.
The Jharkhandi leadership and populace alleged during the field research that 
Jharkhand has emerged as an internal colony of Bihar and that there exists a north 
Bihar versus south Bihar divide as far as development activities are concerned. 
Hence, apart from calculating the percentage of persons in every category, the 
percentage share that the Jharkhand region represents in Bihar as a whole has also 
been calculated. This has been called ‘Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar5. Jharkhand 
total has been calculated by adding the figures for all the districts of the Jharkhand 
region. Therefore,
The total o f the relevant category in Jharkhand
Jharkhand Percentage =    X 100
The total o f all such categories in Jharkhand
68 A classic case of leakage of funds due to corruption is what has come to be known as ‘Animal 
Husbandry Scam’ in Bihar in which Rs. 950 crores (9500 millions) were siphoned off from the 
governmental revenues ostensibly for maintenance of non-existent cattle and poultry. The ex-Chief 
Minister of Bihar, Laloo Prasad Yadav, a number of other officials and ex-ministers are facing 
criminal proceedings over die matter.
69 Development indicators analysed include the pattern of employment, agricultural produce, 
irrigation potential, area under principal crops, educational standards of workers, availability of 
agricultural finances, infant mortality, birth and death birth rates, causes of deadi, revenue 
collection, etc.
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The total of the relevant category in Bihar
Bihar Percentage70 =  X 100
The total all such categories in Bihar
Jharkhand total
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar =  X 100
Bihar total
Thus, the data used in the study reflects the actual changes in the 
development profile of the population whose living standards are supposed to be 
improving due to the developmental policy initiatives.
The Field Study:
Perhaps the most enlightening and enjoyable aspect of this research was the 
field study during 1995-96. After a few months of library work at Delhi, field-study 
in the Jharkhand region was conducted in two phases during January and May 1996. 
The focus of the field research, apart from collecting available data from the 
relevant institutions,71 was on trying to meet and interview as many relevant persons 
as possible. In the process, the study was fortunate to benefit from interviews with 
many important political actors in the region across the political spectrum as well as 
from the opinions of a cross-section of general population in both urban areas as 
well as rural areas of the Jharkhand region. The purpose of interviewing was to
70 In order to achieve clarity, while comparing ‘Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar’ or ‘Jharkhand 
Percentage’ with ‘Bihar Percentage’, ‘Bihar Percentage’ has also been referred to as ‘Per cent in 
Bihar as a whole’.
71 Documents were collected from A. N, Sinha Institute of Social Sciences, Patna; Bihar Institute of 
Rural Development, Ranchi; the Bihar Tribal Welfare Research Institute, Ranchi; Sri Krishna 
Institute of Administration Library, Ranchi and Xavier Institute of Social Service Library, Ranchi 
during the field trip to Bihar.
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elicit the views of political actors and the general population in order to gain a first­
hand insight into the dynamics of development policy and the politics of identity in 
the region. It has enabled the utilisation of other material in a more accurate 
fashion.
The interviews were not framed with the objective of using them as a 
representative sample in the study owing to the fact that practical constraints 
precluded large-scale sampling. Since random sampling was not possible,72 a 
stratified sample was taken with a combination of snowballing and purposive 
methods. Purposive sampling was done to ensure that all important political actors 
in the Jharkhand region (such as the MP from Ranchi, Jharkhandi activists, office­
bearers of the JAAC, local office-bearers of the Indian National Congress (INC), 
the Janata Dal and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the officials of the 
development bureaucracy) were included in the sample. The interviews were 
stratified into three strata: government officials, political activists, and general 
population. The interviews with the respondents were conducted with the help of an 
open-ended interview schedule73 and the responses were recorded with the help of a 
tape-recorder which was later transcribed for use in the study.
In Patna, the purpose of the visit was to try and secure some statistical data. 
Hence, a senior civil servant was approached directly in the Directorate of Statistics 
and Evaluation, who was interviewed. He also suggested two of his colleagues in 
the Planning Department who agreed to be interviewed. A Director in the Planning 
Department gave part of his interview off the record during which he provided 
invaluable insights into the process of statistics tabulation in Bihar and gave reasons 
for the unavailability of comparable data over the years. He explained that complete 
data at the district level if published, would seriously threaten the stability and 
legitimacy of government of Bihar, as it would lay bare the enormous degree of 
inefficiency in the developmental administration in the state.
72 As time and resources available made it impossible to interview 10 per cent (the minimum 
sampling required for a true random sample) of the population of the region.
73 The interview schedule has been included as Annex 2.
In the Jharkhand region, the first place of attention was Ranchi where the 
Regional Development Commissioner (officer in charge of all development activity 
in the Jharkhand region and a long-serving career bureaucrat) was approached. 
After being interviewed, he kindly suggested three other officers with experience of 
development administration in the Jharkhand region. The Secretary to the Jharkhand 
Area Autonomous Council (JAAC), another senior officer with years of 
development administration in the region, was also approached and interviewed.
With regard to the political actors in the Jharkhand region, the local offices 
of the various political parties were approached and efforts were made to interview 
the senior-most office-bearer. At the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Central Office, 
Ranchi only two office-bearers could be interviewed. They were members of the 
Working Committee of the JMM and one of them was also a member of the 
Executive Committee. At the INC office, the District Head of the INC was 
interviewed and two more members of the District Congress Committee were 
interviewed. At the Janata Dal Office, only interviews with the JD candidates for 
the Assembly and Parliamentary elections could be managed. The BJP MP from 
Ranchi was also interviewed in his office. Other members of the BJP refused to be 
interviewed as they asserted that their MP had said everything that they may have to 
say. Efforts were also made to interview the JMM MPs from the region. Shibu 
Soren remained elusive until the end while Suraj Mandal flatly refused to be 
interviewed by a “PhD scholar or researcher”.
As far as the Jharkhand region was concerned, 37 interviews with the 
general population were collected in urban areas such as Ranchi, Chaibasa, 
Hazaribagh, Jamshedpur and Dumka. While visiting these places, the first person 
available was approached who mostly agreed to be interviewed. After the interview, 
he was requested to recommend the most politically active person of the locality in 
an attempt to locate the local level political actors. In this way 11 local level 
political actors were interviewed.
After sampling in the urban areas, the rural interior was criss-crossed on a 
scooter in an attempt to reach the most far-flung places in the Jharkhand region. In 
every hamlet that passed, the exercise of approaching the first person available was
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repeated in order to interview the general population as well as the local leaders. 
Apart from West Singhbhum and extreme south and north of the Jharkhand region, 
most places were covered in the sampling exercise. In the process, 42 members of 
the general population and 7 local village level political activists were interviewed in 
the rural areas.
While crossing block-headquarters, efforts were also made to locate the local 
level development actors. This effort did not always bear fruit, as very often these 
persons were unavailable for days at a time. However, three Block Development 
Officers and four Heads of local Panchayats were interviewed.
The sampling in the region was skewed in favour of the male population as 
the women were rarely willing to be interviewed. Only seven women in the urban 
areas and six women in the rural areas could be interviewed. Unfortunately, no 
women political workers were available for interview.
The sample thus collected cannot claim to be representative of the population 
but it served the purpose of providing valuable first-hand insight into the operation 
of the process of development as well as the dynamics of the politics of identity.
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Chapter II
Changing Dimensions of the Jharkhand Movement
Socio-political movements such as the Jharkhand movement are dynamic in 
nature and undergo a series of changes over the years. These changes are brought 
about by the compulsions arising from the nature of the movement itself as well as 
by the efforts of the other political parties and the State to undermine, co-opt and 
support the movement, depending on the political contingencies. In this chapter, the 
changing dynamics of the Jharkhand movement have been delineated to locate the 
movement in its political context.
I
The Jharkhand region, due to its dense forests, inaccessible terrain and wild 
animals “appear never to have been completely subdued”1 until the colonial period. 
Accounts of the Jharkhand region do not exist until the time of Hiuen Tsang who 
visited India around 645 AD. Hiuen Tsang talks of the kingdom of Kie-chu-u-khi-lo 
which seems to refer to the Jharkhand region. In the records of his travel, he 
mentions that the capital of this kingdom was about 117 miles from to the north­
west of Tamarlipti.2 The Mauryan Kingdom seems to have established its supremacy 
over the region but apparently, had never been able to completely subdue the 
region. Similarly, “it is debatable whether Chota Nagpur acknowledged the 
sovereignty of the Kushanas or the Guptas or it remained independent throughout . .
. Though the finds of gold coins of the Kushanas may not establish their lordship 
over it, it may be inferred that the region might have come under the pale of the 
Kushanas” .3 From mentions in inscriptions of the Gupta age, it can also be deduced
1 Bihar District Gazetteers: Ranchi, Patna, 1970, p. 42.
2 Bihar District Gazetteers: Santhal Parganas, Patna, n. d., p. 48.
3 Bihar District Gazetteers: Ranchi, op. cit., p. 41.
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that “the Chota Nagpur region might have submitted to the might of the Guptas” .4 
After the Guptas once again, there are very few records of the region until the 
medieval period.
During the medieval period, the great kingdoms of north India had not been 
able to establish their sway over the Jharkhand region. This inaccessible tract 
“remained independent throughout the Turko-Afghan rule (i.e., 1206-1526 A. D.) 
The fortress of Rohtas was the farthest limit of actual penetration . . .”5 In 1585, the 
Raja of Kokrah (as Chota Nagpur was known to the Mughals) was reduced to the 
nominal suzerainty of Akbar by an expedition under Sahbaz Khan and Ain-i-Akbari 
lists Kokrah as a part of the subah of Bihar. However, Kokrah “it seems regained 
independence during the disturbance that followed the death of Akbar in 1605 A. 
D .”6 There were repeated attempts by the Mughal Empire to re-establish its token 
suzerainty but the effective penetration was extremely limited. The “power of the 
Mughals was strictly limited in the hilly tracts of Chota Nagpur where their orders 
could not always be enforced”.7
In pre-colonial India therefore, the tribal groups of south Bihar had been 
leading a life of relative seclusion with limited contacts with the rest of the world. 
They had developed a certain level of competence in crafts such as weaving and 
pottery, metallurgy and a certain level of agriculture. They were organised on the 
lines of jati or tribes; each tribe maintained its own socio-religious and cultural life, 
economic activity and identity, although a close parallel existed between the tribal 
and non-tribal communities.
In the pre-colonial period, there had existed powerful tribal kingdoms in 
which the majority of tribal population
4 ibid.
5 Bihar District Gazetteers: Ranchi, op. cit., p. 42.
6 Bihar District Gazetteers: Singhbhum, Patna, 1958, p. 72.
7 Bihar District Gazetteers: Ranchi, op. cit., p. 44.
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lived comfortable lives, at least until the colonial period, having 
control over large areas of land, having armies, an aristocracy, tax 
collection, and judicial system of one sort or another, and often 
enjoyed lucrative trading relations with merchants (such as the 
Banjaras) and Hindu cultivators in the plains.8
These communities depended on an oral tradition and did not leave behind 
written records for the historians to analyse and document their glory. The colonial 
administration and its historians, with their dependence on written records and 
material remains as testaments to the bygone era of glory, often had a tendency to 
regard such communities as ‘backward' and at a lower level of historical evolution. 
The colonial sense of racial and cultural superiority and hierarchy added to the 
stereotyping of the tribal communities and regions as primitive.9
Chota Nagpur region had come under British rule in 1765 as a part of the 
grant of Diwani Rights over Bihar, Bengal and Orissa after the Battle of Buxar, 
1764. After a series of military expeditions and with immense difficulty, tribal 
chiefs were compelled to pay fixed revenue to the East India Company. These tribal 
chiefs were by and large, treated as zamindars made tributary by conquest.10 In 1789 
it was pointed out that the Permanent Settlement should not be extended to the Chota 
Nagpur area because revenue collections from this area were “more in the nature of 
a tribute than a revenue proportioned to the produce of the soil” .11 Nonetheless, in 
the late 18th century, the Permanent Settlement was gradually introduced in the 
region. This development was perhaps, the single most important factor that 
integrated it into the British Indian Empire and the colonial mode of production. 
This integration was incomplete and was the main contributory factor which led to 
the pauperisation of the population.12
8 Crispin Bates, ‘“Lost Innocents and the Loss of Innocence”: Interpreting Adivasi Movements in 
South Asia’ in Barnes, R. H., Gray, Andrew and Kingsbury, Benedict, eds., Indigenous Peoples 
of Asia, Michigan, 1996, p. 109.
9 ibid., pp. 109-10.
10 J. C. Jha, ‘History of Land Revenue in Chota Nagpur (c. 1770-1830 AD)’ in Sharma, R. S., ed., 
Land Revenue in India: Historical Studies, Delhi, 1971, p. 72.
11 L. S. S. O’Malley, District Gazetteer: Manbhum, Calcutta, 1911, quoted in ibid. p. 72.
12 Jha, op. cit.
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The first consequence of the introduction of a revenue settlement in the 
Chota Nagpur region was an increase in indebtedness and usury. The tribal 
peasants, who had been declared full proprietors of land, had the option to let their 
lands be auctioned off to recover overdue revenue or to borrow to pay the 
increasing revenue demand. The indebtedness of the tribal landowners worsened as 
their land was auctioned off to recover revenue arrears or outstanding debt. Thus 
the Permanent Settlement “tried to suddenly substitute contract for custom”.13 The 
sum result of this policy was that
indebtedness and the operation of usurious capital became one of the 
pivots around which the land market revolved, with the result that 
land started passing into the hands of moneylenders. With regard to 
adivasi peasantry, there was no room in the new provisions for the 
customary land rights of the original settlers and the village office­
holders. These omissions in the new system gave the zamindars 
increased power to evict peasants from their lands. Customary law 
was abruptly replaced by contract law.14
As the colonial administration entrenched itself, the increasing revenue 
demands began to affect all the rungs in the revenue collection ladder and gradually, 
the East India Company came to administer the region directly. With the 
establishment of judicial, military and administrative structures, the alienation of 
peasants’ land and their exploitation continued, albeit under the garb of legality.15 
The “introduction of an alien legal and tax system and administrative measures that 
aimed at attaining an effective system of economic exploitation”16 accelerated the 
process of land alienation and exploitation of the peasantry.
13 ibid.
14 Susana B. C. Devalle, Discourses o f Ethnicity: Culture and Protest in Jharkhand, New Delhi, 
1992, pp. 66-7.
15 For a full discussion of the process by which tribal population was incorporated into the colonial 
mode of production, see Jha, J. C., ‘History of Land Revenue in Chota Nagpur (c. 1770-1830 
AD)’ in Sharma, R. S., ed., Land Revenue in India, Delhi, 1971, pp. 71-9; Kumar, Purushottam, 
History and Administration o f Tribal Chota Nagpur (Jharkhand), Delhi, 1994 and Sengupta, 
Nirmal, ‘Background of Jharkhand Question* in Sengupta, Nirmal, ed., Fourth World Dynamics: 
Jharkhand, New Delhi, 1982, pp. 3-39.
16 Devalle, op. cit., p. 68.
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The pressures generated by a modern and little understood administrative 
system and new land relations17 did not go unprotested. The stirrings in tribal society 
took the form of revolts and disturbances in the 19th and 20th centuries. The Great 
Kol Insurrection 1831-32, the Santhal Rebellion 1855, and the Birsa Munda revolt 
1895-1900 are some of the most important. These uprisings and revolts led by the 
traditional elite were always agrarian in origin but often acquired social and 
religious overtones. The revolts often began with attacks on government property 
such as police stations and public offices and involved attacks on European 
population. However, the brunt of the tribal revolts against the introduction of the 
colonial system in the region was borne by the exploiter classes of landlords and 
moneylenders who were seen as local representatives of the exploitative system. 
“No matter which one of their three main oppressors -  sarkar, sahukar or zamindar 
[government, moneylender or landlord] -  was the first to bear the initial brunt of a 
jacquerie in any particular instance, the peasants often showed a remarkable 
propensity to extend their operations widely enough to include among their targets 
the local representatives of one or both of the other groups too”.18 The British 
administrative machinery always came down heavily on these revolts and 
insurrections and crushed them through sheer military superiority.19
The tribal unrest led to a series of legal enactments such as the Chota Nagpur 
Tenancy Act (Act II BC, 1869), Chota Nagpur Landlords and Tenants Act, 1879 
(Rent Law) and Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act 1908 (Bengal Act VI of 1908). 
However, by 1908 the process of land alienation was all but complete. The 
restriction on the transfer of lands from tribals to non-tribals in the Act of 1908
17 Similar situations existed in the other tribal areas as well as in large parts of rural India. However, 
the case of the tribal people was worse since they were quite different from the rest of the rural 
population in terms of the nature of their interaction with the rest of the people.
18 Ranjit Guha, Elementary Aspects o f Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, Oxford, 1983, p. 26.
19 L. P. Vidyarthi and K. N. Sahay, Dynamics o f Tribal Leadership in Bihar 1967-71, Allahabad, 
1976, pp. 49-50. Also see Ranjit Guha, Elementary Aspects o f Peasant Insurgency in Colonial 
India, Oxford, 1983.
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altered the situation only to the extent that some tribal farmers also became part-time 
moneylenders.20
The new system of revenue, judicial, and police administration went on to 
transform these tribal areas. “The pervasive effect of a money economy, the 
creation of a market in land, the emergence of a moneylending landed sector and the 
development of chronic peasant indebtedness, were instrumental in producing 
fundamental transformations in agrarian economic relationships”21 in the region. A 
new class of revenue intermediaries was established who, along with the Christian 
missionaries, went further to integrate the tribal areas into a modern system of 
administration. These social, economic and political structures that emerged 
according to the logic of British policy in the tribal areas went on to create 
conditions that suited the colonial state as well as the intermediaries but were against 
the interests of the tribal people of south Bihar.22
The integration of the tribal region into the colonial mode of production 
resulted in a restructuring that simultaneously undermined as well as preserved but 
distorted the pre-colonial system. The tribal regions became a subordinate part of 
the colonial state and the economy. Part of the dynamics was geared towards 
ensuring availability of a labour force at a subsistence level. The Chota Nagpur 
region (especially Hazaribagh and Ranchi) emerged as the best places for recruiting 
labour for the various economic enterprises in colonial India and abroad. One of the 
fundamental effects of the alienation of land rights of the adivasi peasants and their 
pauperisation was out-migration to the tea gardens of Assam and the fast developing 
coalfields of Bengal and Bihar and iron-ore mines elsewhere in the Chota Nagpur 
region.23
20 Devalle, op. cit.
21 ibid., p. 70.
22 Niharranjan Ray, ‘Introductory Address’ in K. Suresh Singh, ed., Tribal Situation in India: 
Proceedings o f a Seminar, Shimla, 1972, pp. 17-9.
23 For instance, the migratory indentured labourers for Mauritius and Fiji were recruited from this 
region in large numbers, see Bates, Crispin and Carter, Marina, ‘Tribal Migration in India and
Contd.
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Apart from the economic impact, the new economic and legal system also 
had socio-cultural repercussions. The large number of out-migrations from the 
region contributed to changes in the social profile. For instance, birth rates fell 
which in turn helped to change the proportion of population that was of tribal 
origin.24 Besides, the military operations launched to contain tribal protest 
movements generated a ‘culture of repression*. Coercion, physical and institutional, 
was utilised with the result of “reproduction of indebtedness and extensive forced 
labour. It also used native institutions and forms of social organization, putting them 
at the service of the colonial system” .25
An important feature of this process of integration of Jharkhand as a 
subordinate partner in the colonial enterprise was the creation of stereotypes of the 
tribes. The tribal people were construed as a mass of socially undifferentiated 
population that could be utilised to extract labour and revenue. This process was 
supposed to ‘civilise’ them. Also important was the reinforcement of the diku versus 
adivasi (outsiders versus tribal) contradiction. The series of legal measures already 
mentioned had this contradiction built into them. In a way, this official 
reinforcement of the perceived relationship between the adivasi peasants and the 
diku landlords and moneylenders contributed to identity formation in the Jharkhand 
region.
Another important factor in the socio-cultural dynamics of the region was the 
role of the Christian missionaries. The German Evangelicals, Lutherans, Anglicans 
and Roman Catholics had established missions in this region which are important, 
even today. As a part of the larger colonial discourse (see chapter III), the Christian 
missions attempted to carry the ‘civilising’ influence of the word of God and 
western rationalist thought to these areas. These missions had an important impact 
because they introduced western education as well as western values to the
Contd.
Beyond’ in Prakash, Gyan, ed., The world o f the Rural Labourer in Colonial India, Delhi, 1992, 
pp. 205-45.
24 ibid.
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population of the Jharkhand region. The result was what has been termed the 
‘deculturation’ of the tribes.26 Ironically, as will emerge more clearly in chapter III, 
some of these missionaries also subscribed to the adivasi versus diku dichotomy.
Moreover, the Christian missions had considerable prestige amongst the 
people due to their social work. Consequently, they were able to persuade the 
population of the Jharkhand region to take recourse to legal means for the redressal 
of their grievances. This contributed to the legitimacy of the colonial rule by 
containing violent revolt in the region. The influence of the Christian missionaries 
had another impact. The people who had come in contact with the missionaries 
gained some level of western education and began to understand the dynamics of the 
colonial state better. Consequently, there started efforts to generate greater social 
consciousness resulting in efforts to organise the peasantry against exploitative 
economic relations.27 This also contributed to the emergence of the Jharkhand 
movement. The nationalist thought in India had emerged due to the exposure of the 
Indian intelligentsia to western education (see chapter III). A comparable pattern can 
be discerned in Jharkhand as well.
Another strand in the complex set of factors that encouraged and facilitated 
the growth of the Jharkhand movement was more economic than cultural. As has 
been discussed, the integration of the Chota Nagpur region into the colonial 
economic system was such that it was incoiporated as a subordinate partner. The 
region supplied a large workforce for colonial economic enterprises but the 
exploitative conditions in agriculture over time went from bad to worse. More and 
more tribal people were finding it difficult to earn their living from agriculture due 
to increased pressure on land resulting from the alienation of agricultural land from 
tribal agriculturists to non-agriculturists such as moneylenders. The surplus labour
Contd.
25 ibid.
26 Vidyarthi and Saliay, op. cit., pp. 73-4.
27 Devalle, op. cit., pp. 73-4.
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thus generated began to look for other means of employment.28 This is where further 
exploitation of the region by industrial activity links up with the already bad 
conditions of livelihood.
The large mineral deposits in the region inevitably led to large-scale mining 
of coal, iron-ore, bauxite, limestone, etc.29 All these minerals were important in the 
expansion of industry which had started in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
The working class created in the whole country by this expansion of industry also 
extended to the Jharkhand region that was by now established as the labour reserve 
of India. However, there was one important difference between many other regions 
in India and the Jharkhand region. Owing to the lower levels of skills of the tribal 
population, most people who found jobs in the newly emerging economic enterprise, 
especially in the mining sector,
gained entry into the working class as lowly paid unskilled workers, 
on a hire and fire basis. Every technologically sophisticated industry 
has a core of highly skilled workers. In the case of Jharkhand this 
core has mostly been drawn from other regions of the country. The 
local people or the indigenous inhabitants, both tribal and non-tribal, 
have been relegated to a very special section of the proletariat: 
khalasis, peons, scavengers, etc.30
This resulted in serious socio-cultural implications. The dichotomy of diku 
versus adivasi was further reinforced. With the establishment of larger industries in 
the region beginning with the Tata Iron and Steel plant in the early part of this 
century, increasing numbers of skilled and managerial workers started to migrate to 
the region. The diku (outsider), who had until now been seen as the exploiter in the 
agrarian sector, was now seen as someone who cornered the more lucrative jobs in
28 Victor Das, ‘Where Oppressed Tribals Await true Liberation’ in Chaudhari, Buddhadeb, ed., 
Ethnopolitics and Identity Crisis, New Delhi, 1992, p. 403.
29 The first coal mine was started in the region in 1775 which was followed by a number of collieries 
such as Messers Bengal Coal Company which was established in 1843. The establishment of Tata 
Iron and Steel Company Limited in Jamshedpur in 1907 however, marked the beginning of large- 
scale industrial activity, ibid., p. 403.
30 Javeed Alam, ‘The Category of “Non-historic Nations” and Tribal Identity in Jharkhand’ in 
Chatterji, P. C., ed., Self-images, Identity and Nationality, Shimla, 1990, p. 158.
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the industrial sector as well, with only the lower level jobs being left for local 
inhabitants.31 This factor further reinforced the growth of a Jharkhandi identity and 
movement.
It may be remarked that the popular perception towards outsiders who are 
able to secure better jobs in the industrial sector has not changed much till date. In 
the interviews with the general population of the region during fieldwork in 1995- 
96, it emerged that they still complain about persons from outside the region being 
able to secure better jobs. The only difference is that now the Jharkhandi population 
has also been able to acquire skills and when an outsider gets a job instead of a local 
inhabitant, they smell a conspiracy against them by the government of Bihar.32
II
After independence, despite the adoption of a welfare State in India, the 
problems of the tribal population continued. The old problems of agrarian relations 
combined with those thrown up by a rapidly industrialising economy. The non- 
fulfilment of the aspirations of people in general and the tribal population in 
particular generated a sense of disillusionment which went on to sharpen differences 
and sense of identity in the Jharkhand region. The post-independence State in India 
could not offer a radically different framework for the treatment of the tribal 
population owing to its adoption of significant sections of the colonial tribal 
discourse and its emphasis on the same rationalist-bureaucratic model of 
administration and industry-led development (see chapter III for a full discussion of 
the colonial and nationalist discourses).
Moreover, a new type of political elite emerged in the Jharkhand region 
under a number of influences. The western-educated elites along with some 
concerned Britons who had settled in the region were the first to establish socio­
31 ibid. p. 159.
32 Interview conducted with a casual factory worker (educated till matic level) in the industrial 
suburbs of Ranchi and a foundry worker (holder of a diploma from a polytechnic institute) in 
Chaibasa in January 1996.
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cultural organisations which found instant support among the masses. The leaders 
thrown up by organisations such as the Lutheran Students Association and the Dacca 
Society can be called the first Jharkhandi leaders. These leaders were largely, the 
tribal youths who had been exposed to western education and values by the Christian 
missionaries.33 They did not start with a demand for administrative autonomy but 
with the aim of socio-cultural reform, not unlike the nationalist elite elsewhere in 
the country about a century earlier. The Jharkhandi community was created on the 
premise of the uniqueness of tribal culture and heritage.
Owing to the cultural premises of the Jharkhandi identity, the Indian state 
found (and still finds) it difficult to reconcile the demands of the Jharkhandi 
leadership with the nationalistic-rationalist-integrationist model of administration 
adopted in 1947. The Jharkhandi elite rejects the political space offered by the State 
in the form of a dichotomy between public and private, whereby the private is 
protected by way of constitutional provisions for the protection of the tribal 
population. They see the rules of political conflict resolution framed by the State as 
condescending benevolence.34 They are conscious of tribal rights and have 
demonstrated a capability of making shrewd and calculated moves to gain their 
acceptance. In places where such an elite is weak, national political parties exploit 
the plank of a Jharkhandi identity to gain popular support.35 Led by the vocal, 
educated and richer sections of the tribal population, the increased political activity 
in the tribal areas of south Bihar with an aim of securing better avenues for the 
tribal population has politicised all questions related to tribal development. Politics 
has emerged as the principal avenue through which the tribal people look forward 
for solutions to the numerous problems they have been facing.
The Indian state is faced with an impossible situation where it cannot ignore 
the Jharkhand movement due to the threat to its legitimacy from the political unrest
33 Sachchidananda, ‘The Tribal Situation in Bihar’ in Singh, K. S., ed., Tribal Situation in India: 
Proceedings o f a Seminar, Shimla, 1972, p. 175.
34 Jaipal Singh’s speech in the Constituent Assembly on 24 August 1947, see chapter III.
35 Ray, op. cit., pp. 21-2.
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born out of popular support for the movement. Besides, it cannot accede to the 
demands of the Jharkhandi political groups, since such demands go against the grain 
of its rationalist-bureaucratic model of administration and development.36 It has 
therefore, tried a number of avenues to resolve the politico-economic conflict. It has 
tried open physical coercion to suppress the more manifest demonstrations as well as 
to marginalise the Jharkhandi political opinion with its emphasis on poverty 
alleviation and development. The efforts by the State to co-opt the Jharkhandi 
leaders have been of limited use, as has the effort to arrive at a compromise 
formula. All such efforts by the State and dominant political opinion in India have 
however, met with little or no success.
The Jharkhandi leaders have adopted the State’s emphasis on poverty 
alleviation and development as even more reason for administrative autonomy. The 
shift in the Jharkhand movement in the 1950s from a movement that commanded 
only a tribal following to one that sought to bring all the residents in the region 
under its scope, further strengthened its political standing and helped it to create its 
own political idiom such as its slogan of Jai Jharkhandi, Jai Bharat [Glory to 
Jharkhand, Glory to India]37. This slogan represents the movement’s ability to 
combine the nationalist and ethnic idiom, something that has not successfully been 
tried elsewhere. The Jharkhand movement has successfully translated the academic 
issue of the unproblematic co-existence of multiple political identities into a 
successful political idiom.
The dynamics of this interplay between the process of autonomous 
community formation and integrationist efforts by the Indian state must be examined 
before undertaking an analysis of the role that development issues have played in 
sharpening the identity.
36 The Indian state is unable to accede to the demands of cultural identities for political recognition 
because it seeks ‘objective’ and ‘secular’ criteria for the any political reorganisation (although 
some cultural identities in the North-east have succeeded in gaining political recognition with the 
creation of states such as Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland).
37 Manifesto o f the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha for the Lok Sabha Election 1996, Ranchi, 1996, p. 1.
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Emergence and Growth of the Jharkhand Movement
There have been signs of vigorous political activity in the Jharkhand region 
since the beginning of the nineteenth century,38 manifesting itself in the spontaneous 
peasant uprisings and revolts against unjust agrarian relations led by members of the 
traditional elite.39 However, the beginning of a political movement in the modern 
sense of the term can only be traced back to the beginning of the 20th century. The 
Jharkhand movement and the related political developments began with the efforts of 
a student of St. Columbus College, Chaibasa -  an institution that remains an 
important centre of tribal political activity in the region. J. Bartholmen40 and some 
Anglican missionaries established the Dacca Students Union in 1910 to deal with the 
problems faced by poor tribal students. Early activity of this organisation was 
limited and ambiguous. It was a religious society, a cultural organisation, a 
discussion forum and students' union all rolled into one. The Dacca Students Union 
organised religious discourses, staged plays, and represented the interests of the 
students as well as organised discussions and seminars. After the success of a play 
staged to raise funds at Ranchi in 1912, a meeting of all Anglican and Lutheran 
students was called. In this meeting some degree of consensus was arrived at about 
the aims of the organisation. Consequently, the area of its operation was increased. 
A branch was established at Ranchi under the supervision of Peter Heward. Under 
the leadership of Bartholmen and Heward, the Union was successful in mobilising
38 For instance, the Chota Nagpur Uprisings of 1801 and 1817, Barasat Birodha of 1831, Kol 
insurrection (1831-32), Santhal hul (1855-57) and Munda ulgulan (1895-1902), Guha, op. cit., pp. 
2 , 10.
39 DN and GK, ‘Some Agrarian Questions in the Jharkhand Movement’ in Economic and Political 
Weekly, vol. XXIV no. 27, 8 July 1989, p. 1505.
40 It has not been possible to establish beyond doubt the origin of this person. I understand that most 
probably, he was a tribal student of the Anglican Missionaries at Chaibasa. The other important 
person who was active in the establishment of the Dacca Students’ Union, Peter Heward, seems to 
have been one of the many sympathetic Britons settled in the region, possibly a missionary.
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tribal students to demand better educational facilities, economic avenues, job 
opportunities, etc.41
When the question of constitutional reforms and protection and promotion of 
regional interests came up in 1918, the educated Christian tribal population with 
active help and encouragement from the Anglican Bishop of Ranchi, reorganised the 
Union and renamed it the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society. This new body 
championed the cause of adequate protection of the tribal population and their 
cultural identity and emphasised the pressing need to create avenues for rapid 
politico-economic advance of the region.42 In 1928, a deputation of this organisation 
met the Simon Commission and put forward what was perhaps, the first demand for 
the creation of a separate province in the Jharkhand area43 (see chapter III).
In 1928, the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society was renamed Chota Nagpur 
Unnati Samaj. The membership of this organisation was limited to the Christian and 
non-Christian tribal population and no non-tribal could become a member. The aims 
of the Samaj were to secure reservation for the tribal population in government 
service and legislatures and employment for the educated tribal people, work 
towards removal of backwardness in Chota Nagpur and make efforts towards 
finding avenues for the social, economic and political advancement of the Chota 
Nagpur area.44
Though the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society and the Chota Nagpur 
Unnati Samaj were not very successful in terms of mobilising the masses towards 
large-scale political activity, they represent the earliest political organisations in the 
Jharkhand region. The leadership of these organisations was unique in the sense that 
it was composed of a band of educated youth inspired by ideas which were radical
41 Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 86-7.
42 Upjit Singh Rekhi, Jharkhand Movement in Bihar, New Delhi, 1988, p. 135.
43 ‘Memorandum submitted by the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society’ in Report o f the Indian 
Statutory Commission, vol. XVI: Selections from the Memoranda and Oral Evidence by Non- 
Officials, Part 1, London, 1930.
44 Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 87.
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for their time such as the creation of a new state. The period of the activity of these 
organisations, along with their radical and progressive ideas, also saw the 
emergence of social reform amongst the tribal population on the lines of the Indian 
renaissance. It harked back to the bygone golden age of the tribes and stressed the 
need to restore that past although the need for eradication of undesirable features 
was also recognised. Educated tribal leaders such as Rev. Joel Lakra, Anand Mashi 
Topno, Theble Oraon, Paul Dayal and Bandi Oraon led the Samaj through its 
agenda of social reform.45
The leaders of the Samaj were dissatisfied with the urban and middle-class 
bias of their organisation and were eager to make it a broad based and unified 
platform for the uplift and advance of the tribal society.46 They realised that unless 
the land problem was made a central plank of their activities, the peasantry could 
not be mobilised. Some of them, like Theble Oraon and Paul Dayal, disassociated 
themselves from the Samaj and formed the Kisan Sabha in 193147. The Kisan Sabha 
and the Chota Nagpur Unnati Samaj differed on the means to be adopted for the 
amelioration of the problems faced by the tribal population. The Kisan Sabha 
believed in radical action by mobilising the peasantry to force the government to act 
whereas the Chota Nagpur Unnati Samaj sought deliverance through petitions and 
memoranda.48 The difference in their approach was akin to that between the 
Moderate and Extremist groups in the Indian National Congress Party (INC) in the 
early 20th century. Except for this major difference, the leadership of the two 
organisations was similar, again like the INC leadership. Most of them were well- 
educated middle-class people who were acquainted with the areas outside the tribal 
belt and were of a rational bent of mind. They had little patience with the 
superstitions of the tribal population and regarded them as signs of backwardness.49
45 ibid.
46 Rekhi, op. cit., p. 137.
47 Nirmal Sengupta, ‘Background of the Jharkhand Question’ in Sengupta, Nirmal, ed., Fourth World 
Dynamics, New Delhi, 1982, p. 30.
48 Rekhi, op. cit.
49 Shashishekhar Jha, Political Elite in Bihar, Bombay, 1972, pp. 108-9.
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One important feature that severely restricted the effectiveness of the two 
organisations was the fact that till the 1930s, both of them in practice were restricted 
to the Lutheran and Anglican Christians. The non-Christian tribal elements were not 
involved in their activities. In addition to these, Baniface Lakra and Ignes Beck 
created the Chota Nagpur Catholic Sabha with the encouragement and support of the 
Archbishop of Chota Nagpur. The proclaimed aim of this organisation was the 
promotion of socio-religious and economic advance but it also took an active interest 
in the politics of the area. Ignes Beck and Baniface Lakra both contested the 1937 
elections and were elected. The Kisan Sabha had also participated in the elections 
but was routed which resulted in its demise. Other tribal leaders like the candidates 
of the Chota Nagpur Unnati Samaj who had also contested the elections lost to the 
Catholic candidates, due to better organisation and popularity of the Catholic 
missions. Thus, the influence of the Christian missionaries on the early part of 
movement was sizeable.50
The legislative experience gained by Beck during his term in the Legislative 
Assembly convinced him that pan Indian parties like the INC would not be able to 
serve the interests of the tribal people. It was up to the tribal people themselves to 
look after then own interests. He also realised that organisations with a narrow 
support base like the Unnati Samaj and the Catholic Sabha would not be able to 
secure their interests. He therefore aspired to create a pan-denominational 
organisation in the Jharkhand region to effectively promote and protect the interests 
of the tribes and bring about social, economic and political advancement.51 Besides, 
the sweeping of the 1937 elections by the INC convinced the tribal leaders of the 
need for denominational unity and they decided to float a joint body to ensure it. 
Furthermore, the grant of political autonomy to the provinces and creation of the
50 ibid., p. 109.
51 Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 157.
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province of Orissa under the Government of India Act 1935 strengthened their 
resolve to struggle for a separate province of Jharkhand.52
However, creation of a pan-denominational body was a difficult task. Beck 
began by trying to convince the Chota Nagpur Catholic Sabha after persuading the 
Archbishop of Ranchi about the necessity of such an organisation. Then he tried to 
contact the leaders of other parallel organisations. After much debate they agreed to 
form a temporary alliance to contest the ensuing Ranchi Municipality elections. The 
preparations for this election were good and success in it prompted the leaders to 
maintain their alliances. This was the origin of the Adivasi Mahasabha created in 
1938 which aspired to create a pan-tribal solidarity to solve the tribal problems. A 
major plank of this organisation was to fight the diku rap  in order to improve the 
socio-economic and political conditions of the tribal people, with the final goal being 
the creation of a separate province of Jharkhand.54
At this time Jaipal Singh55 entered the arena of tribal politics. He was invited 
to chair the meeting of the Adivasi Mahasabha in March-April 1939. Later he joined 
the Adivasi Mahasabha and became its President.56
The Adivasi Mahasabha represented a substantial advance in the tribal 
politics of the Jharkhand region. It commanded a wider social support base and 
claimed to represent pan-tribal interests. This organisation was also supported by the
52 K. Suresh Singh, ‘From Ethnicity to Regionalism: A Case Study of Tribal Politics and Movement 
in Chota Nagpur 1900-1975’ in Mulick, S. C., ed., Dissent, Protest and Reform in Indian 
Civilisation, Shimla, 1977, p. 320.
53 Diku raj means rule by outsiders. The linkages between the tribal population and exploiters from 
outside, first in the guise of moneylenders who became landlords and later as skilled workforce in 
the industrial enterprises has been discussed earlier.
54 Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 158.
55 Jaipal Singh was born at Takara, a village near Ranchi, in a pahan (priest) family of the Munda 
tribe. He was adopted and converted by an Anglican missionary. He was educated at Oxford 
where he excelled in sports and obtained a ‘Full Blue’ in Hockey before going on to Captain the 
Indian Hockey Team in the Amsterdam Olympics. His achievements in foreign lands convinced the 
tribals of their own abilities and he soon came to acquire a legendary stature. He came to be 
looked upon as an incarnation of Birsa Bhagwan (leader of the tribal revolt in the 19th century, 
Birsa Munda) and was later accepted as Marang Gomke (Supreme Leader) by the tribal people.
56 Sachchidananda, op. cit., p. 175.
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Muslim League which in the 1940s, was hoping to secure a corridor to connect East 
and West Pakistan passing via the tribal areas of south Bihar. Jaipal Singh and the 
Adivasi Mahasabha however, did not become a part of the mainstream nationalist 
politics. They supported the British war effort in the World War II and Jaipal Singh 
contributed in the recruitment of soldiers for the war from the tribal area with the 
hope that it would induce the British to look at their demand in a sympathetic 
manner.57
Gradually, led by highly educated and articulate political workers, the 
Mahasabha became a pan-Chota Nagpur movement holding sway in both rural and 
urban areas. It now demanded a complete separation from Bihar and the creation of 
a separate state. At times it also became militant in pursuing its goals but lost 
popular appeal. It was defeated in the election to the Constituent Assembly in 1946 
in which INC performed well. It also lost the support of the Muslim League.58 
However, the Mahasabha did enjoy the support of the Forward Bloc and the 
Congress Socialist Party.59 In the INC dominated polity of the late 1940s, the 
Mahasabha was more eager to acquire the support of the INC and demanded 
representation in the Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee and the Congress Working 
Committee. This demand did not find favour with the INC. Further, the Mahasabha 
demanded reservation of seats for the adivasis in educational institutions and 
employment. This demand was extended to limiting all jobs in the industrial 
enterprises in the Jharkhand region exclusively for Chota Nagpuris.60 The grievance 
of dikus cornering all the plush jobs had by now become a political issue.
However, Jaipal Singh lost the 1946 election for the state legislature and 
subsequently, he raised a militant slogan: “We shall take Jharkhand, Jharkhand is
57 Rekhi, op. cit., p. 143.
58 By this time, the future administrative arrangements for India had been decided and Muslim 
League’s demand for a corridor to connect East and West Pakistan passing through the tribal areas 
of Bihar had been rejected.
59 Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 159.
60 K. L. Sharma, ‘Jharkhand Movement in Bihar’, in Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XI nos. 1 
& 2, 10 January 1976, pp. 41-2.
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the land of adivasis and non-adivasi exploiters will be turned out of the region even 
by violence.”61
The social base of the Mahasabha also changed over the years. Until the 
1950s, the membership of the Adivasi Mahasabha was restricted to the tribal 
(Christian and non-Christian) people of the south Bihar plateau. However, it was 
realised that if the support base of the movement was to be expanded and if the 
cause of a separate Jharkhand state was to be made a reality, non-tribal settlers in 
the region would have to be brought into the fold. This point of view was stressed 
by the organisation of a United Jharkhand Bloc by Justin Richard in 1948.62
The reason behind this realisation was the side effect of colonial policy in the 
region. Alongside tribal out-migration as labourers, there was a sizeable in- 
migration by skilled workers to work the rapidly growing industries. Soon these 
‘outsiders’ who had settled in the region outnumbered the tribals by almost two to 
one.63 The political importance of the in-migration is attested to by the fact that, 
until the mid-1960s, the Statistical Diary published by the government of Bihar, as 
also the 1951 Census, had a section on the new settlers in the region classified by 
their respective places of origin. Besides, the formation of a non-tribal organisation 
at Daltonganj to represent their points of view in the Constituent Assembly 
necessitated the broadening of the social base of the Mahasabha.64
It was not an easy task to accommodate the non-tribal population into the 
Adivasi Mahasabha because it meant the loss of a major plank of political activity 
and mobilisation. At the same time, without accommodating the non-tribal 
population, the prospect of a separate state of Jharkhand would remain a mere 
dream. Consequently, in its 1949-50 session at Jamshedpur, the Adivasi Mahasabha 
decided to rename itself the Jharkhand Party (JHP) and extend its membership to the
61 ibid.
62 Sachchidananda, op. cit., p. 175.
63 The demographic profile of the Jharkhand region in 1951 has been discussed in chapter IV.
64 Rekhi, op. cit., p. 144.
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non-tribal population as well. It also succeeded in securing the support of the Chota 
Nagpur Separation League that was powerful amongst the depressed classes, 
especially the Muslim depressed classes and the Miners Association of Santhals.65
The JHP became a full-fledged political party from 1950. The identity of the 
Adivasi Mahasabha was also preserved by retaining it as a cultural unit of the 
Jharkhand Party. Jaipal Singh became the President of the JHP and Ignes Beck was 
appointed its Secretary.66 The creation of a new idiom by the Jharkhandi leaders was 
thus underway. They succeeded in retaining the essential premise of tribal heritage 
as the basis of their identity and simultaneously managed to extend membership to 
the non-tribal elements.
The history of the JHP in some ways is the history of the translation of this 
essentially tribal identity into a regional identity that drew its uniqueness from the 
region’s tribal heritage. Its cultural aspects were successfully construed to represent 
a geographical region instead of a specific social group. All the supporters of the 
JHP, tribal as well as non-tribal, would soon come to see the tribal premise and 
symbolism as representing them all. It was able to bring together the various tribal 
denominations (Christian and non-Christian) within the region under a rather 
cohesive political platform.67 The Jharkhand movement gradually evolved into a full- 
fledged regional movement commanding support from all sections of the population.
The JHP was thus successful in combining aspects of tribal culture and 
broad-based politics to put forward a viable political agenda. It drew upon tribal 
symbolism by making the cock its symbol,68 which was able to achieve a great 
appeal in the tribal belt. It was a simple symbol to be used in elections and yet had a 
potent message for the Jharkhandi identity. Furthermore, the JHP insisted that all
65 Sachchidananda, op. cit., p. 175.
66 Rekhi, op. cit., p. 145.
67 Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 91.
68 The cock was a revered tribal symbol since it was not only the favourite sacrificial animal but also 
signified the dawn of a new day as well as the creative God and His all pervading power.
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tribal people were members of the party by birth and there was no membership fee 
for them.69 All this added to a larger mobilisation of the people.
The redefinition of the diku and their relationship with the movement by the 
leaders ensured that it was strengthened by support of the powerful money-lending 
communities70 as well as the dikus. The traditional opponents of the tribals, i.e., the 
diku moneylenders and skilled industrial workers, were now willing to support the 
Jharkhand Party, owing to the following broad reasons. Firstly, the JHP now 
underplayed its anti-diku stance because their political and monetary support was 
essential to emerge as a viable political opposition to the INC. This made it possible 
for the diku elements of Chota Nagpur to join the Party. Second, the diku, 
moneylenders and landlords on the other hand, were also keen to extend their 
support to the JHP because it offered them an avenue to emerge as the political elite 
of the region. Such a position would have enabled them to protect and promote their 
interests. Without any political association with the JHP, the diku moneylenders and 
landlords would have lacked any political legitimacy in the region and would be the 
target of opposition from the JHP that was going from strength to strength. Finally, 
In event of creation of a separate state of Jharkhand, this group owing to their better 
educational and financial station would have catapulted into the class of state level 
and even the national level elite. They would have been the first beneficiaries of the 
creation of a state in the Jharkhand region. Such a future necessarily required a 
gradual nurturing of their political association with the JHP.
The support of the dikus also had repercussions on the geographical scope of 
the movement. From being concentrated only in the tribal pockets of south Bihar, 
the movement now began demanding the creation of a new province from the areas 
once under the Chota Nagpur Division, i.e., parts of the provinces of West Bengal,
69 Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 91.
70 The financial position of the JHP improved with the contributions from the newly joined diku 
landlords, moneylenders and traders, (since no membership fee existed for tribal members to join 
the JHP). Consequently, it was able to extend its area of operation and found a sympathetic 
audience in other areas of the region that had been facing similar problems.
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Bihar, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh.71 The Jharkhandi leaders had been talking of the 
entire region that was covered by the Chota Nagpur Division during the British rule 
as being within the geographical scope of their demand. They advanced economic, 
socio-political and cultural grounds for the creation of a new state. They argued that 
linguistically, culturally and ethnically the whole region was separate from other 
regions. An important basis for this demand was also that the entire region had been 
under a similar kind of administration during colonial rule. Consequently, there 
were similar problems born out of alienation of land, out-migration of the under­
employed and unemployed labour, in-migration of skilled industrial labour and 
incomplete economic integration.
The redefinition of the geographical and societal scope of the movement 
resulted in a large following for the JHP. This expansion of the social base of the 
movement was an astute move since the Censuses of 1931 and 1951 showed that the 
tribal population were no longer the largest group in the region as a whole. In fact, 
over the years the tribal people had become a minority in the region due to 
economic and concurrent demographic developments that have been discussed 
earlier. The movement could not have lasted much longer without the inclusion of 
the various non-tribal groups onto the political platform.
IV
The Jharkhand Movement after Independence
During the early 1950s, Jaipal Singh campaigned for the creation of a 
province in Jharkhand as the only solution to the region’s problems. While 
endeavours were underway to woo the non-tribal residents of the Chota Nagpur 
area, simultaneously, the support of the tribal people was sought under the slogan: 
“Jharkhand abua, daku diku senoa” [Jharkhand is ours and all robbers (exploiters)
71 The area now demanded by the Jharkhandis included more than thirty districts between the four 
states including 9 (now 18 Districts created by the reorganisation of the earlier 9 Districts) of south 
Bihar.
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and dikus will have to leave].72 It marks a rather fractured ideology but the first 
General Elections in 1952 represented the peak of the popularity of the JHP when it 
was able to secure a large-scale tribal as well as non-tribal support.
1. 1950-Earlv 1960s: The Period of Ascendance of the Jharkhand Party
After the first election the JHP firmly established itself as the dominant 
political factor in the region. This strengthened the party’s bargaining power and it 
began an intensive campaign for the creation of a province in Jharkhand. The 
culmination of this campaign was a well-attended demonstration by the tribal 
population in 1955 at Ranchi and Dumka in the Santhal Pargana district to 
demonstrate the numerical support for a separate state before the States 
Reorganisation Commission (SRC).73 The SRC also had to face counter­
demonstrations that supported the integrity of Bihar and were against all talk of 
creation of a new state by hacking off a part of Bihar. The anti-Jharkhand camp 
accused the Jharkhandis of playing into the hands of foreign Christian missionaries.74
The Executive Committee of the JHP submitted a memorandum to the SRC 
stressing the economic, socio-political and cultural grounds for demanding the 
creation of a new state. It emphasised that linguistically, culturally and ethnically the 
tribal population was separate from the non-tribal people and hence geographical 
contiguity and administrative separateness was required.75 Here, it must be noted 
that while the JHP was trying to mobilise the people on the issue of the creation of a 
new state of Jharkhand and was eager to secure support of both tribal as well as 
non-tribal population, its memorandum to the SRC emphasised the tribal aspects 
(see chapter III). This fractured approach was to lead to its loss of large-scale 
support in years to come.
72 Rekhi, op. cit., p. 149.
73 States Reorganisation Commission was appointed in 1953 and it reported in 1955 on the principles 
of reorganisation of the states of the Indian Union.
74 Rekhi, op. cit., p. 152.
75 Report o f the States Reorganisation Commission, New Delhi, 1955.
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The SRC did not pay any heed to the cultural distinctness of the region and 
built its case on purely lingual basis of reorganisation.76 Hence, the claim of the 
Jharkhandis for a separate state was rejected on grounds that the multiplicity of 
tribal languages did not permit the creation of a new state in the Jharkhand region.
The failure of JHP in convincing the SRC surely reduced its popularity. 
Gradually the voters began to doubt the intentions of the JHP and its leaders, and a 
mood of disillusionment set in. The common perception began to view the slogan of 
Jharkhand as merely a device used by the leaders to gain power.77 Some allegations 
of corruption amongst the leaders also acted to the detriment of their popular 
image.78
However, during the period 1950-57, the JHP was able to set the agenda of 
politics in the Chota Nagpur region. It had the ability to gather thousands of people 
for rallies and processions at a short notice due to the remarkable unity amongst its 
leaders and virtually laid down the law for the region during this period.79
This was set to change in the years that followed. The effort by the political 
establishment to blunt the edge of the Jharkhand movement yielded some results. It 
succeeded in dividing the movement and as some respondents in the interviews in 
the region pointed out, the INC utilised the bait of ministerial office, financial gains 
and co-option to discredit the leaders amongst the masses.80 The effect of the modest 
successes of the development effort of the State in the region was also a contributory 
factor. A phase of ideological and political confusion in the Jharkhand movement 
was soon to set in.
76 Chapter VII discusses the SRC’s approach towards the creation of a separate state in the Jharkhand 
region in detail.
77 Sharma, op. cit., p. 38.
78 Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 99.
79 Singh, op. cit., p. 322.
80 Interview with a local schoolmaster and BJP political activist at Ranchi in January 1996.
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2. Decline of the Jharkhand Party and the Rise of Other Parties
The last quarter of 1950s and the beginning of 1960s marked a gradual but 
decisive decline in the influence and power commanded by the JHP. A number of 
factors were responsible for this but probably the most important was the greater 
exposure of the people of the region to the government’s developmental effort and 
the emerging split between the Christian and non-Christian sections of the tribal 
population.81 The ensuing competition for developmental resources led to a fracture 
in the unity of the tribal populace and sounded the death knell of the Jharkhand 
Party.
Many national parties such as the INC, Jan Sangh (JNS), Swatantra Party 
(SWA) and the Communist Party of India (CPI) became active in the region. These 
parties were able to successfully poach a section of the non-tribal voters from the 
Jharkhand Party.82 Moreover, the JHP leadership and the electorate, learning from 
the experience in other states where the INC was in office, realised that the interests 
of the tribal people could be better served by representation in the government and 
the Council of Ministers. This necessitated supporting, joining, or aligning with the 
INC.83
Additionally, the leadership of JHP was largely composed of urban 
professional and it had few agrarian-based programmes. The urban bias of the JHP 
was working to its detriment, as was the poverty eradication thrust of public policy 
under the INC government. There was a need to provide a radical agenda to the 
growing restlessness of the tribal masses and the JHP could not afford to do so due 
to its links with the Janata Party84 that represented the very class of people against 
whom it was to struggle, i.e. the zamindars and moneylender class.85
81 Rekhi, op, cit,, p. 155.
82 The changing electoral support for JHP and other Jharkhandi groups has been discussed in chapter 
VI.
83 Rekhi, op. cit., p. 155.
84 This Janata Party in Bihar was different from the national level Janata Party that was formed by an 
alliance between Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD), Indian National Congress (Organisation) (INC (0))
Contd.
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The influence of the JHP also declined due to its failure to convince the SRC 
of the necessity of creating the Jharkhand state as well as its failure to prevent the 
redefinition of the boundaries of the region by virtue of which a sizeable portion of 
the Jharkhandi area (the districts of Manbhum and Purulia) were given to West 
Bengal. This sparked off doubt in the ability of the leadership and internal 
dissension in the cadres of the JHP. Furthermore, the pressures of adequate funding 
for political activity had led the leadership of the JHP to align itself with the 
exploiters and diku. The party workers and the masses alike resented this.
Another factor that led to the loss of faith in the JHP was that the 
government policies and development activities were benefiting the Christian 
sections amongst the tribal people to a greater extent than the non-Christian ones. 
The Christian population was “on the one hand being properly educated in the 
different Mission schools, and on the other, enjoying the benefits provided by the 
government for the tribals” .86 Thus, there was emerging a kind of a ‘dominant 
section’ within the tribal society. The Christian sections who had benefited from 
government policies were evolving into a new landlord class and elite and 
consequently were able to almost monopolise the seats in the legislative assembly. 
These new elites were trying to divert the attention of the masses by pointing an 
accusing finger at the diku despite the fact that this new emerging elite was actively 
co-operating with the erstwhile dominant classes of the diku, Zamindars and money­
lenders.87 This elite was also trying to hijack the agenda of the creation of the new
Contd.
and Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS) in 1977. The Janata Party in Bihar was pre-dominantly a party 
representing the landed interests and had come to develop close links with the JHP. The JHP 
cherished its links with the Janata Party because the landed section offered it substantial financial 
support.
85 Rekhi, op. cit., p. 157.
86 Victor Das, Jharkhand: Castle over the Graves, New Delhi, 1994, p. 103.
87 Owing to the emerging dominance of the Christian tribal sections, two early organisations called 
‘Sudhar Sabha’ and ‘Parha’ was formed in 1947-48 with Theble Oraon and Somnath Oraon as their 
Presidents, respectively. Their purpose was to organise the non-Christian tribal population and had 
a distinctly anti-Christian thrust. These organisations did not last long but Parha was revived in 
1963.
state of Jharkhand since these sections, due to their better educational and material 
standing, would have been the prime beneficiaries of any such change.
The growing complacency of the leadership and their drift away from the 
actual tribal masses contributed to the downfall of the JHP. There was a growing 
impression, something that continues till today, that the leaders lived in luxury in 
Delhi and Patna and the only time they remembered the poor tribal people of the 
area was when another election was round the corner.88 The failure of the JHP to 
locate itself in any effective way in the growing labour unrest and trade union 
activities in TICSO and other industrial installations in the area also contributed to 
the loss of influence. After the 1957 election, JHP’s political activities started 
declining and the major outcome of this was its merger with the INC soon after the 
1962 elections.
3. INC-JHP Merger and the Emergence of Multi-Party Politics
The factors that were responsible for the decline in the influence of the JHP 
were also responsible for its merger with the INC in 1963.89 Additionally, some 
other important factors catalysed the merger. The INC realised that it could not 
hope to gain a firm electoral presence in the Jharkhand region without the support of 
the tribal population which in turn, traditionally voted for the JHP.
The leaders of the JHP on the other hand believed that they would be able to 
pursue the cause of tribal welfare and a separate Jharkhand state more effectively if 
they joined the government. The creation of the states of Andhra Pradesh (1953), 
Maharashtra (1960) and Nagaland (1963) led the leaders of the JHP to believe that 
the goal of a separate state would be easier to achieve from within the INC. The 
earlier ally of the JHP, the Janata Party, had also drifted away after its merger with 
the Swatantra Party and JHP was looking for new alliances.90 It was felt that the
88 Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 99.
89 ibid., p. 102.
90 Earlier talks for an electoral alliance with the INC had broken down because the JHP was not 
ready to concede any share hi the reserved seats in the area. The INC on the other hand, did not 
want to let the JHP influence the general seats in the region because such a move would have let
Contd.
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increasing influence of the Swatantra Party could be countered only with the help of 
the INC.
Moreover, tensions along religious lines were emerging amongst the tribal 
masses and it was thought that merging with the INC would contain them. The 
senior-most leaders of the JHP agreed to the merger since they were sceptical about 
the church’s role in the politics of the region and wanted the issues to be discussed 
and settled in a more overtly political arena. Hence, they decided to pass the ball 
into the court of the INC.91
All these factors combined led to the merger between the INC and the JHP. 
The then Chief minister of Bihar, Binodananda Jha, played a key role in persuading 
Jaipal Singh to agree to the merger agreement which was finalised on 20 June 1963. 
It stipulated that (a) a development Board for Chota Nagpur and Santhal Pargana 
and parts of Bhagalpur, Monghyr and Shahabad districts would be established to 
accelerate agricultural, economic, industrial and general development of the region; 
(b) the INC and Jharkhand Party would merge; and, (c) a sub-committee of the 
Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee would be set up to co-ordinate political and 
organisational activities in the region.92
The merger of the two parties was an act of political exigency and not 
common understanding on issues and goals. The merger survived only due to the 
political interests that it served. Hence, soon after the merger, several Jharkhandi 
factions within the INC emerged which were led by various leaders from the 
Jharkhand region. One was led by Jaipal Singh, another by S. K. Bage, while a
Contd.
down some members from the area who had taken considerable electoral risks by joining the 
Congress Legislature Party.
91 The inter-denominational and inter-tribal rivalries had always plagued Jharkhandi politics and the 
JHP itself was formed to contain such divisions. By this time, the individual leaders had started to 
patronise their own denomination/ tribe against the other in which the support of die Church was 
beginning to acquire a central role. A number of missionaries were also tribal leaders whose 
congregation provided a captive vote-bank to certain sections of the leadership. Allegations were 
also made that the Church was investing large amounts of money in die politics of the region to 
empower certain sections of the leadership, Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 100.
92 Rekhi, op. cit., p. 163.
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third faction wanted to revive the old JHP. The factionalism was also a result of the 
rise of younger and newer leaders who challenged the older leaders. The merger 
itself was also considered ineffective because the general body of the JHP had not 
ratified it.93 Jaipal Singh and others had announced the merger with the INC without 
consulting or asking for ratification of the General Body of the JHP. It also gives an 
indication of the kind of personalised politics that existed in the region.94
Most tribal people and leaders were unhappy with the merger and the leaders 
who had agreed to it faced a lot of criticism. There were speculations that the INC 
had bribed Jaipal Singh and that for a place in the government ministry he had sold 
the cause of the Jharkhandis to the INC.95 N. E. Horo, a senior and respected leader 
of the movement, had opposed the merger along with his supporters. The Christian 
tribal section also saw this merger as a threat to their influence and was therefore, 
not happy with it. The merger thus encouraged more factionalism than consensus.95
A result of the merger was that the Jharkhandis got their first exposure to 
actual governmental office and day-to-day administration. Jaipal Singh was 
accommodated as a cabinet minister in the Bihar government97 and all the other 
important leaders were appointed to various district and state level boards.
The Jharkhandi leaders, being in government, were also exposed to the logic 
of factional politics that operated in the INC. Along with this, factionalism within 
the Jharkhand movement threatened the movement itself to the point of 
disappearance in the following years. Far from promoting consensus, the merger 
encouraged further dissensions within the Jharkhandi groups as they tried to rally 
around the various chief ministerial candidates in the hope of political office. S. K. 
Bage emerged as an important tribal leader and challenged the leadership of Jaipal
93 Most of the electorate of tribal Bihar did not know of this merger until the next elections in 1967. 
They came to vote for their preferred JHP only to discover that it had merged with the INC.
94 Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., pp. 99-100.
95 ibid., p. 100.
95 Jha, Political Elite in Bihar, op. cit., pp. 110-1.
97 Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 100.
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Singh. Binodananda Jha, the erstwhile Chief Minister, was increasingly 
marginalised in the caste politics that ensued after the Kamraj Plan. He was forced 
to resign and being out of power it was no longer possible for his faction to keep the 
support of the faction led by Bage who defected to a more likely chief ministerial 
candidate, K. B. Sahay. He in turn was willing to oblige this section against Jaipal 
Singh. After K. B. Sahay was installed as the Chief Minister, the politics behind his 
election as the Chief Minister promoted further dissension in the Jharkhandi group 
within the INC. Sahay made Bage a minister against the express wishes of Jaipal 
Singh.98 In reaction Jaipal Singh, at a press conference at Patna in 1964, declared 
that “none of the terms and conditions of Jharkhand-Congress merger agreed upon 
in June 1963 had been implemented by the Congress [Party] in Bihar though the 
Congress President and Chief Ministers of Bihar, West Bengal and Orissa were 
party to it” ."
On the eve the general elections of 1967, the popularity of both Jaipal Singh 
and Bage was at low ebb. The creation of Haryana and Punjab in 1966 but not 
Jharkhand alienated the people further. Furthermore, Jaipal Singh and S. K. Bage, 
despite being in the government, had not been able to deal with the problems of the 
tribal people effectively.
Jaipal Singh’s image as a great leader was fading and he gradually became 
convinced that the powers that be would not yield control of the mineral rich area of 
Jharkhand. He thought that the time had come when “the days of begging are gone, 
we shall have to act in Birsa Munda fashion to get our legitimate demands. Tribals 
should raise their heads against wrongdoers and if necessary use bows and 
arrows”.100 There was also some talk of reviving the Adivasi Sabha but nothing 
concrete took place. Jaipal Singh is said to have told N. E. Horo shortly before his
98 ibid., p. 101.
99 Quoted in ibid., p. 71.
100 Singh, op. cit., p. 324.
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death in 1970 that he felt cheated by Nehru who had not created a separate state of 
Jharkhand.101
This exercise to co-opt the JHP and the willingness of its leaders to join the 
INC had far reaching consequences for the movement. The JHP was seen as having 
sold out to the INC, a calamity from which the Jharkhand movement never fully 
recovered. During the 1996 field study, many respondents quoted the JHP-INC 
merger as an example of the leadership being open to temptations, particularly that 
of ministerial office. Jaipal Singh, despite being a revered legend, was never 
forgiven for agreeing to the merger and the resulting fragmentation of the 
movement.
The supporters of the INC-JHP merger also began to have doubts about its 
effectiveness and necessity and this gave an impetus to the future course of action 
for the Jharkhand movement. Fresh efforts were made to revive the Jharkhand Party 
and secure it the recognition of the government and the Election Commission.102
The 1967 elections thus marked the end of an era in Jharkhandi politics. 
Since 1938, Jaipal Singh and the JHP had dominated the politics of the area and had 
fought for a separate province of Jharkhand. They did have substantial political 
legitimacy in the region but the movement was not organised enough in the rural 
area. It was not really a mass movement and hence the struggle for a separate state 
did not involve the masses in enough numbers.
The splintering within the Jharkhandi factions had begun with the merger of 
the JHP with the INC but after the 1967 elections it became overt. There emerged a 
number of ‘groups’ such as the ‘Sahdeo Group’, ‘Paul Dayal Group’, ‘L a ta  
Group’ and others. All such groups claimed to be continuing the JHP and some of 
them also approached the Election Commission, unsuccessfully, to allot them the
101 Rekhi, op. cit., p. 167.
102 Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., pp. 101-2.
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election symbol of the Cock. Since these groups were not parts or allies of any 
major political party, they were treated as independents in the general elections.103
These groups also realised that as long as multiple groups claiming to be 
working for the cause of a separate state of Jharkhand existed, none of them would 
be able to secure the effective support of the Jharkhandi people. Consequently, there 
began an effort towards unity. A conference of all the groups took place in 
November 1968 at Hazaribagh where important Jharkhandi leaders such as David 
Munzmi, S. K. Bage, N. E. Horo and Simon Tigga were present. At this 
conference sharp differences and allegations were levelled against one another. 
Notwithstanding the differences and divisions, one unified party called the All India 
Jharkhand Party (AIJP) was launched with Bagun Sumbrai as its President and N. 
E. Horo as its Secretary. The 1963 merger of the JHP with the INC was declared 
invalid because the general body had not approved it.104
However, the faction-based character of the Jharkhandi politics could not be 
undone and the new AIJP was soon divided into two internal factions under Horo 
and Sumbrai. After the 1969 split in the INC, the two factions supported different 
sections. The Horo led faction aligned itself with the new Congress (R) and the 
Sumbrai-led faction supported the old INC and Jan Sangh. This incompatibility 
amongst leaders of the AIJP continued till Horo resigned from it and revived the 
JHP which split again when the members belonging to the Santhal tribe, citing their 
grievance of under-representation despite being numerically larger than the Oraon 
tribe, split away from it to form the Hul105 Jharkhand Party. Factionalism in the 
Jharkhandi politics reached a new peak when another party was formed to represent 
the interests of the Jharkhandis called the Bihar Prant Hul Jharkhand Party which 
soon split further into two factions in 1972 that called themselves the Progressive 
Hul Jharkhand Party (PHJP) and the Rajya Hul Jharkhand Party (RHJP). This
103 ibid., pp. 102-3.
104 Rekhi, op. cit., p. 172.
105 This party called Hul Jharkhand Party was named after the Santhal insurrection of the 19th 
century. In the local parlance this insurrection was termed as ‘Hul’.
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division was again, due to the same factors which had caused the AIJP to split; 
namely, personality clash and political ambition amongst the leaders. The parties 
born out of the above splits and sub-splits had tribal particularism as their organising 
principle: AIJP was mainly supported by the Ho tribe with its headquarters at 
Chaibasa, the JHP was adhered to by the Munda tribe with Ranchi as their base, 
whereas the Hul Jharkhand parties were favoured by Santhal tribe centred in the 
Santhal Pargana,106
There was a widespread use of cultural factors by the leaders of these splits. 
They invoked ascriptive factors such as denominational,107 historical,108 cultural,109 
lingual110 and other differences to emphasise the differences between the Jharkhandis 
and the rest of the Indian people. However, the leaders were not able to avoid the 
logical danger inherent in the use of such symbols; i.e., someone else might use the 
same symbolism in a more potent fashion to split their new party. This is exactly 
what had been happening in Jharkhandi politics.
The factionalism that had became the hallmark of Jharkhandi Politics after 
the JHP-INC merger was the single most important factor in the undermining of 
popular support for the Jharkhandi political parties and shifting of electoral support 
to INC, CPI and Hul Jharkhandi parties111 (see chapter VI). This shift of popular 
support to the national parties also reflects a greater maturity of the electorate. The 
splintering of Jharkhandi parties also ensured that they lacked the organisational 
strength to expand their political base from over-dependence on urban mobilisation 
to rural areas. Consequently, urban politics came to play an important role in the 
Jharkhandi movement.
106 Singh, op. cit., pp. 324-26.
107 Christian versus non-Christians; Santhals versus Hos versus Mundas versus Oraon and so on and 
so forth.
108 Invoking the spirit of the Santhal rebellion by Jaipal Singh and later by the Hul Parties etc.
109 Invoking of the tribal totems and symbols such as the cock, the bow & arrows, etc.
110 There are as many languages in the Jharkhand region as tribes, although they are still evolving 
into written from. This has led some people to comment that they are not languages but mere 
dialects.
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4. The Rise of Urban and Industrial Factors in Jharkhandi Politics
After 1967, a new factor emerged on the political horizon of the Jharkhand 
region. This was the formation of what can be called urban pressure groups and 
industrial political bodies such as the Birsa Sewa Dal (BSD), Krantikari Morcha and 
Chota Nagpur Parishad. Amongst these, the BSD was the most important. It was 
formed under the tutelage of Jaipal Singh by a group of young men with the aim of 
acting as an independent tribal organisation working towards the unification and 
betterment of tribal society. It sought to secure better avenues for the tribal 
population in opportunities for employment, with the final goal being the creation of 
a socio-political consciousness amongst the tribal population. This section of the 
Jharkhand movement laid greater emphasis on social-reform and social service.112
The emerging divide between the Christian and non-Christian tribal 
population reached a new high when the non-Christian tribals demonstrated before 
the Study team of the Joint Committee of Parliament at Ranchi in 1968. The purpose 
of this demonstration was to ventilate their grievances in front of the Parliamentary 
Committee and seek exclusion of Christian tribals from the Scheduled category. It 
soon evolved into a memorandum war between the two groups. Against such a 
social background, there emerged two sections in the BSD, one that saw similarities 
with the viewpoints of the missionaries and the other that found greater concurrence 
with the arguments of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM). This created 
a very unstable leadership in the BSD and it soon split into two sections.113
However, the two factions did manage to work together for some time. The 
BSD stood for the common problems faced by most tribal people and aimed at 
ameliorating their condition. It attempted to bring about a greater consciousness 
amongst the tribals and to reduce their sense of fear, inferiority and isolation and 
sought to develop a sense of belonging and pride for their tribal cultural heritage and
Contd.
111 Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., p. 104.
112 Sachchidananda, op. cit., p. 176.
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tradition. It also aimed at organising the tribal people and using their collective 
strength to secure greater enjoyment of fundamental and democratic rights. The 
workers and students were organised to act as the primary political outfits. BSD 
wanted to ensure that the tribal people were given priority in employment in the 
governmental and private sector and in admission to the educational institutions and 
sought the reduction in the drain of resources from the tribal belt and the restoration 
of the land rights of the tribals. In reality however, the activities of the BSD were 
limited to efforts aimed at ensuring that the tribals were given preference in jobs and 
admission to educational institutions. It also did some sloganeering for 
‘regionalisation of administration’.114
The activity of the BSD can be roughly divided into two phases: the first 
phase (1967-69) was a rather extremist period in which violent means were 
advocated to secure the rights and better life prospects for the tribal people. During 
this phase, large processions guarded by tribal youths with bows and arrows were 
taken out and the celebration of Birsa Day was held as methods of mobilising the 
tribal masses. Slogans such as cfft:
%  [Jharkhand belongs to us and we will fight for it with arrows] were
raised in the region. The political situation in the region became unstable and law 
and order worsened. Some sections of the BSD also supported a Naxalbari115 type 
movement launched by ultra-leftist parties in south Bihar in 1969.116
The second phase of BSD activities began in the early 1970s when its 
extremist stance failed to generate any substantial following in the rural areas of the
Contd.
113 Rekhi, op. cit., p. 174.
114 ibid., pp. 174-5.
115 The Naxalbari movement was an ultra-left movement that held sway in most of the backward parts 
of eastern India in the late 1960s and 1970s. The subscribers to this movement and its philosophy 
were of the opinion that ‘class enemies’ (implied landed interests, money-lenders and entrepreneurs 
and government officials who seemed to be collaborating with these people) should be dealt 
summary justice in peoples’ courts (which were often manned by the cadres of the movement). 
They emphasised the idea of khatam (finish/ end) implying that all such people must be killed 
instantly.
116 Sachchidananda, op. cit., p. 102.
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region and the influence of the leftist parties waned. It therefore decided to restrict 
itself to more constitutional methods to pursue its demands. At this stage, a conflict 
ensued between the two factions of BSD whereby a split seemed to be unavoidable 
and one section aligned itself to the AIJP which was now operating from 
Jamshedpur.
This was a period when the BSD was the most important organisation in 
Jharkhandi politics but it was not actually a political organisation. It was more of a 
cultural organisation aimed at social reform but also had some political overtones. 
Effectively therefore there was almost no Jharkhandi political activity during this 
period.
5. Splintered Jharkhandi Politics and the National Political Agenda: 1969-80
During the period 1968-80, a number of Jharkhandi parties existed all of 
which claimed to be carrying on the true ideals of the Jharkhand movement. All of 
them commanded varying degrees of support in their respective regions of operation 
but none of them was strong enough to dominate the electoral agenda in the 
Jharkhand region as a whole. Consequently, these Jharkhandi political groups were 
collectively able to injure the prospects of the national and state level parties but 
were unable to offer a coherent alternative. This splintering resulted in extreme 
political instability in the Jharkhand region and Bihar, This phase also saw the 
increasing impact of national political events on the political dynamics of the 
Jharkhand region and the electoral performance of political parties was influenced 
more by events at the national level than regional issues.
A coalition government was formed in Bihar in 1969 in which the Jharkhandi 
splinter groups participated as a unified ‘Jharkhand Legislative Party’ to extract 
concessions in exchange of support to the coalition government. The Jharkhandi 
Parties had supported the government on the condition that a statutory board would 
be set up for Chota Nagpur and Santhal Pargana with complete powers to decide 
matters pertaining to the areas such as education, employment, welfare of people 
and development policies in the region. Their leader, N. E. Horo, briefly served as 
the Education Minister. However, no concrete policy emerged from this exercise 
because the government fell. In fact, the Jharkhandi groups were themselves
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responsible for its collapse because the Hul Jharkhand parties and some other minor 
Jharkhandi political groups crossed the floor during voting on the Budget. 
Thereafter, a series of coalition governments followed, in which the Jharkhandi 
splinter groups participated to make them even more unstable. This trend continued 
till the next general election in 1972.117
The Jharkhandi splinter groups failed to extract any major concessions from 
these unstable governments despite the fact that the government depended on their 
support for survival. The prime reason for this was the lack of unity amongst the 
Jharkhandi splinter groups which is quite typical of Jharkhandi politics. Hence, the 
popularity and influence of the splinter groups of the JHP now carrying a plethora 
of names, each claiming to be different from the other, continued to decline. The 
confusion generated by the multiplicity of names and parties did not add to the 
prospects of a unified Jharkhand movement.
The electoral and popular support of the Jharkhandi splinter groups was 
further injured by the fact that just before the 1972 elections, the INC saw a surge in 
its popularity after the successful conduct of the 1971 war with Pakistan and the 
subsequent formation of Bangladesh under the INC government led by Mrs. Gandhi. 
This had also given rise to a widespread feeling of nationalism which translated into 
substantial electoral gains in the 1972 elections for the INC in the whole country and 
the Jharkhand region was no exception.118
The year 1972 can also be interpreted as a shift in the political dynamics of 
the Jharkhand region from regional politics to an all-India one. Some analysts have 
also seen this as the final proof of the Jharkhand region having been integrated into 
the larger political life of the country, with the implication that it repudiated the 
demand for the formation of a separate state of Jharkhand.119
117 Vidyarthi and Sahay, op. cit., pp. 105-6.
118 This also supports the contention elsewhere in the thesis that ‘sub-national’ political identities that 
are equally strong, if not stronger, may not always be at cross-purposes with the Indian national 
identity.
119 Sachchidananda, op. cit., pp. 180-3.
Nonetheless, it must be noted that the politics of the region have always been 
quite unpredictable and the influence of an external factor (the Indo-Pak war of 
1971) may have yielded such a pattern only in the short term. The character of 
politics in a region cannot be altered by such short-term events. Moreover, to 
generate popular support, there was a heavy emphasis on region-specific factors 
(such as culture, tribal special needs and so on) by all political parties including the 
INC. Hence, the belief that the 1972 election had swept away all such particularistic 
factors was misplaced.
In the period of political turmoil that followed this election, the Jharkhandi 
groups/parties confined themselves to more passive forms of political activity. It 
was mainly due to the fact that the results of this election had made it more than 
evident that they did not enjoy the same political legitimacy and influence in the 
region as they used to. Their noteworthy efforts towards the goal of a separate state 
of Jharkhand at the national level were confined to the presentation of two 
memoranda to the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by N. E. Horo with little 
avail. At the regional level, the JHP continued its efforts to generate a political 
consensus towards a re-organisation of states by combining its efforts with those of 
the Maha Vidharba Samiti, and the Vishal Haryana Party. These three parties tried 
to organise a conference of all regional parties to draw up a plan for regional 
reorganisation based on an agenda of smaller states. According to these parties, 
larger states generated socio-economic imbalances and hence instability whereas 
smaller states were capable of achieving a balance in economic and political growth 
and ensured stability.120
In the 1977 election held after the period of Emergency, the Jharkhandi 
groups again did not perform very well. N. E. Horo had supported the INC and was 
affected by the anti-INC sentiment and lost his own seat although he was able to get 
two other members of his party elected to the state legislature. On the other hand, 
the AIJP despite having supported the Janata Party also did not do well. Clearly, the
120 Rekhi, op. cit., pp. 183-4.
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politics of the Jharkhand region had slipped out of the control of the Jharkhandi 
groups.
However, the arguments about the death of regional politics in Jharkhand 
cannot be conclusive. Just as it cannot be deduced from the results of 1972 elections 
that national politics had come to stay in the Jharkhand region because external 
factors were at play, similarly not much can be deduced from the results of the 1977 
elections. The operation of the Emergency from 1975-77 had alienated many people 
from the INC in the short-term.
By the time mid-term elections were held in 1980, all other Jharkhandi 
groups had disappeared over the past decade and only the AIJP led by Begun 
Sumbrai and the JHP led by Horo remained. However, both performed badly in the 
election. The JHP, even though it had contested the 1980 election, tried very little to 
organise and mobilise people in the region and had now restricted itself to 
memoranda and petitions. The INCI121 had rebounded as the leading and dominant 
party.
Other parties such as Janata Party (JP),122 CPI and BJS also picked up some 
of the lost influence of the JHP but none of them could gain the past pre-eminence 
enjoyed by the JHP. The JP was unable to cash in on its pro-poor image due to the 
factional politics that had plagued it. The INCI was the prime gainer in this state of 
affairs.
The issue of Jharkhandi identity and the creation of a separate state still 
enjoyed a considerable appeal with the masses but due to the multiplicity of parties, 
no single party had the political potential to exploit it and that included the JHP and 
AIJP. Failures to derive any substantial gains on this front had made the bonafides
121 Indian National Congress (Indira) (INCI) had emerged after splits in the original INC. However, 
in the electoral records, the acronym INCI has been used only in the 1980 elections. For all other 
elections INC has been used to refer to this party despite the fact that it retains the suffix ‘Indira’ 
because no other significant party of a similar name exists.
122 The national Janata Party, not the one that operated in Bihar in 1950s and the 1960s.
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of its leaders suspect.123 The electorate had lost their faith in the leaders and were 
unwilling to reinvest all their support in the Jharkhandi groups. By the early 1980s, 
the character of Jharkhand movement, as has been discussed below, was set to 
change yet again. Developmental problems that had become acute in the region 
sidelined the issue of autonomy.
6. Marxist. Radical and Leftist Components of Jharkhandi Politics
The Leftist industrial and urban pressure groups such as the BSD had already 
emerged in the late 1960s as a component of the larger Jharkhand movement. This 
increasingly Leftist orientation of the Jharkhand movement was helped by the 
weakening influence of the Jharkhandi parties in the region. In the early 1970s 
however, the independent Marxist and Leftist organisations that had not found much 
appeal with the masses until then, moved in to fill the political vacuum. Land related 
problems played a major role in helping Leftist inroads.124 Related issues such as 
growing unemployment amongst the tribal youth due to continuing alienation of 
agricultural land and poor job prospects in the urban industrial complexes also 
played an important role. With the growth of industrial enterprise in the region, an 
unprecedented in-migration of non-tribal staff into the more specialised jobs in 
industries like Bokaro Steel Plant, HEC, Ranchi, Tata Steel Plant, etc. occurred. 
This made competition for jobs stiffer for the tribal and local population. Moreover, 
the speed of development activity in the tribal region was very slow compared with 
the aspirations of the younger generations of the tribal people. The combined effect 
of these factors increased the appeal of radical political positions.
The Naxalite movement and Leftist politics altered the character of 
Jharkhandi politics to a considerable degree. Leftist politics, which had originated in 
the industrial centres in the region gradually, began to influence the tribal politics as 
well. Consequently, the tribal organisations and other forums on the political
123 Sachchidananda, op. cit., p. 176.
124 As discussed earlier, the JHP had never succeeded in creating a stable political base for itself in 
the rural areas of the region. Therefore, it had played down the issue of land alienation and other 
land-related problems which was exploited by the emerging Leftist organisations.
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landscape of the region began to be affected by more radical ideas. The result of this 
new trend was that there began to be greater stress on the political education of the 
political workers and the people at large about the Leftist analysis of land relations 
and other agrarian issues. This meant linking up local issues with all-India politics, 
violence and often militancy. Moreover, there began to be an emphasis on greater 
and better political organisation of the people of the region. Also important is the 
fact that the national Leftist parties saw the concept of tribal autonomy as different 
from that of a separate state.125
With the greater emphasis on tribal land relations and the general 
exploitation of the tribes, the demand for a separate state was pushed into the 
background and the foreground came to be occupied by the demand to end all kinds 
of exploitation, industrial or agrarian. The political activity centred on securing 
more opportunities for the tribal population in terms of places in educational 
institutions and the industrial enterprises, as also restoration of alienated land. All 
these new ideas being introduced in the region had some attraction for the 
Jharkhandi population because they seemed closer to their everyday existence.
The new factor of Leftist politics entered on to the stage of Jharkhandi 
politics at the end of 1960s and in early 1970s through the unlikely avenue of the 
caste politics of Bihar. Binod Bihari Mahto had emerged as an important kurmi 
leader in Dhanbad and Hazaribagh (both districts had shown little support for 
Jharkhandi politics before this time).126 He had established a social reform 
organisation to work amongst the kurmis called the Shivaji Samaj. It sought 
restoration of land to these communities which had been alienated during the process 
of industrialisation and highlighted the backwardness of the region. For this 
purpose, an alliance was forged with the Santhal population of the area that came to 
be known as the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM). There had been a rising influence 
of Left parties in neighbouring West Bengal and A. K. Roy and Immanuel Hai Khan
125 Singh, op. cit., pp. 323-4.
126 The Naxalite elements had been successful in forming joint fronts of kurmis (a caste group) and 
tribes to struggle against their common exploiters because the socio-economic conditions of both 
the kurmis and the tribal population were very similar.
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wanted the communities of the Jharkhand region to join the struggle and fight for a 
separate Jharkhand. The Marxist Co-ordination Committee (MCC) headed by A. K. 
Roy also supported the JMM. Therefore, under the leadership of the JMM and the 
MCC, the Jharkhand movement was successful in drawing in the support of a 
sizeable section of tribal and non-tribal population. The major leaders of the JMM 
were Shibu Soren, B. B. Mahto and Sadananda Jha. Under their leadership, the 
JMM combined a mixture of radicalism, social reform and cultural revivalism in its 
activities.127
On the socio-cultural front, the JMM organised a series of reform 
movements. It started a campaign to rid the region of the habit of liquor 
consumption since this habit was seen as the root cause of indebtedness and 
consequent alienation of land. It also repeatedly emphasised the tribal nature of the 
Jharkhandi politics and one of its most used slogan was ‘kallali Toro, Jharkhand 
chord* [break the bottles (of liquor), leave Jharkhand]. The first part of the slogan 
was aimed at the local population and the second part at the diku inhabitants of the 
area. This campaign forced the state government to declare prohibition in the district 
of Dhanbad in 1976, causing considerable loss of revenue to the state exchequer. 
Another aspect of socio-cultural activities was the frontal assault it led on illiteracy. 
It secured funds for this programme through donations collected from the masses 
and opened night schools. These night schools served the twin purpose of imparting 
knowledge about the 3Rs and facilitating political education.128
The JMM realised that the government credit institutions were not sufficient 
and that there was a need for credit institutions in the villages. It therefore began to 
implement an indigenous scheme of establishing golas [banks] for grain in each 
village from which needy peasants could borrow at a nominal rate of interest. The 
JMM also experimented in areas like reducing extravagant weddings and promoting 
collective farming.129 Another feature of the JMM’s agenda was its efforts at the
127 Singh, op. cit., p. 329.
128 ibid.
129 Rekhi, op. cit., pp. 193-4.
93
revival of old traditions. It revived tribal people’s courts130 where cases could be 
speedily tried and justice delivered. In these courts a number of local landlords were 
tried and punished.131
The JMM resorted to direct action and began a campaign to recover 
alienated land and organised a series of raids to forcibly harvest crops from the 
alienated fields all over the region, especially in the districts of Giridih, Dhanbad, 
and Hazaribagh. Consequently, there were large-scale clashes and disturbances 
during the harvests of 1974-75 and the movement spread to many areas of the 
region. This often led to situations in which the landlords retaliated with firearms 
and the peasants responded with tribal weapons. The landlords and moneylenders 
adopted the tactics of eliminating the leaders of the JMM and the MCC with the 
help of police and government officials. A. K. Roy and B. B. Mahto were arrested 
on pretexts and Sadananda Jha was killed by anti-social elements. These events 
sparked off the wrath of Jharkhandis and they fought pitched battles with the police 
parties and a number of people lost their lives. This period thus witnessed 
widespread violence and anarchy.132
Efforts were also made towards political mobilisation on the basis of Leftist 
ideology. The JMM and the MCC established the ‘Jharkhand Alliance’ between the 
workers and peasants since, according to them, a ‘Jharkhandi’ was anyone who 
worked and a ‘diku’ was any one who exploited. The effort was to unite all 
‘Jharkhandis’ against all ‘dikus’ to ensure the creation of a separate state of 
Jharkhand. The JMM led the alliance with the slogan “Jharkhand, Lalkhand” 
[Jharkhand is a red (implying Communist) area]. Processions and rallies organised 
under the joint leadership of the JMM and the MCC soon drew up to 50,000 people 
and the demand for a separate Jharkhand state again became stronger. These 
demonstrations were primarily aimed at bridging the differences between the
130 This practise of peoples’ courts was borrowed from the Naxalite practise and reflects the links 
which had developed between the Leftist parties and the Jharkhand movement.
131 Rekhi, op. cit., p. 194.
132 ibid., p. 195.
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workers and peasants so that a Lalkhand (communist area) could be established in a 
separate state of Jharkhand. February 4 every year came to be celebrated as 
Jharkhand Divas (Jharkhand Day) marked by large processions of armed peasants 
and workers. The mass following that the JMM had managed to generate led to its 
becoming more assertive.133
The Railway strike of 1974 and the nationalisation of collieries further 
provided a distinct Leftist leaning to the Jharkhand movement. Under the 
authoritarian regime of Mrs Gandhi, a large number of workers tribal and non-tribal 
were dismissed from work for minor or construed misdemeanour. This encouraged 
their participation in trade union politics and in turn, led to further dismissals from 
work. The leaders of the movement took part in all the democratic programmes of 
Jai Prakash Narain under the banner of Janvadi Sangram Samiti (Committee for 
Democratic War) but retained their political identity in the form of Jan Sangharsha 
Samiti (Committee for People’s Struggle). Faced with a challenge to the legitimacy 
of the regime, the Indian state came down heavily on the dissenters and Leftist 
politicians such as the Naxalites were suppressed. Coercion by para-military forces 
and the Bihar Military Police was widely used and the movement was crushed. 
Many of the Jharkhandi leaders like Shibu Soren and B. B. Mahto were arrested 
under provisions of preventive detention. Thus, this movement became a part of the 
larger movement that led to the proclamation of the Emergency in 1975. Like most 
non-INC political activity, the Jharkhand movement was undermined during the 
period of Emergency from 1975 to 1977.134
In a way, the militancy that had become a hallmark of the Jharkhand 
movement in the 1970s was partly responsible for the collapse and temporary 
disappearance of the movement. Its extremism in this phase may have been 
successful in mobilising a large number of people in the short term but it also 
invited State repression. The Leftist points of view may argue in terms of an
133 Devalle, op. cit., pp. 170-1.
134 Arvind N. Das, ‘Struggle of Workers and Peasants’ in Economic and Political Weekly, vol. X no. 
9, 1 March 1975, p. 384.
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imminent revolution but any movement that depends on mass following instead of a 
devoted cadre is not likely to succeed if it invites the full repressive force of the law 
enforcing machinery on itself. However, the contribution of this phase of the 
movement to the cause of a Jharkhandi identity was important because it was the 
first time that stress was laid on schooling and political education of the people at 
large as well as on explaining the oppressive land relations.
Simultaneously, the JMM supported the mainstream development 
programmes such as the 20-point Programme launched by the then Prime Minister, 
Indira Gandhi, and was successful in securing the support of the Hul Jharkhand 
parties. Thus, the JMM also tried to incorporate some degree of broad-based 
politics in its activities.
In 1976-77, efforts were made to revive political activity in the Jharkhand 
region. In this phase, the surviving leaders of the Jharkhand movement formed a 
United Front which included the JHP, the MCC, the JMM, the Communist Party of 
India (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI-ML), the Birsa Sewa Dal, the Jharkhand Muslim 
Morcha, the Hul Jharkhand Party and the Revolutionary Socialist Party. The united 
front drew upon the slogan of the national movement and proclaimed “Give me your 
blood and I will give you freedom” .135
The Jharkhand movement in this phase focused itself on the mobilisation of 
the population of the area, political efforts to pursue the goal of a separate 
Jharkhand state and efforts towards fighting the economic exploitation of the people 
of the area. The movement now aimed to secure urgent public policy measures to 
reduce the suffering of the masses pending the creation of a territorial state of 
Jharkhand. It tried to generate a mass movement based on processions, blockades, 
gheraos, public meetings, propaganda, sit-ins, and demonstrations.
These methods of mass mobilisation were used to reclaim land for cultivation 
by cutting forests, to oppose the new public sector enterprises being set up in the
135 Rekhi, op. cit., p. 198.
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region, to oppose the official forest produce purchase policy and to struggle for 
restoration of alienated land-rights to the tribal people. Under the leadership of the 
United Front, this phase of the movement was able to secure participation by a 
sizeable population. Once again, it faced severe repression by State agencies. At the 
same time, the State authorities tried to control the popular wrath with the help of 
public policy measures. They emphasised the need for integration of the tribal 
population and established autonomous development bodies for North Chota 
Nagpur, South Chota Nagpur and Santhal Pargana. Members of the Janata Party, 
which was in power at the state and national levels and not the local leaders, headed 
these bodies. Thus, a combination of integrationist and repressive measures was 
adopted to quell the tide of this phase of the Jharkhand movement.136
At this juncture, support for the Jharkhand movement came from an 
unexpected quarter. On 21 March 1979, the tribal people living in North Bihar 
formed an organisation called Uttaranchal Bharatiya Samiti. Despite the fact that the 
area of their residence did not fall within the territorial scope of the demand for a 
separate state of Jharkhand, this organisation opposed the exploitation of the tribal 
population by landlords and the police atrocities. They put forward a charter of 30 
demands at a rally and one of these demands was the creation of a separate state of 
Jharkhand. Another unexpected quarter from which the Jharkhandis found support 
was that of landlords when some of them, despite belonging to the class which had 
tried its best to fight the movement during the last few years, renewed their support 
for the JMM.137 The support of these groups added legitimacy to the movement. The 
Jharkhand movement had also started finding support not only in the areas outside 
the territorial boundaries of the proposed state but also in the quarters that had been
136 ibid., p. 199.
137 For instance, Basant Narain Singh, a landlord of Ramgarh joined the movement in 1979. The 
landed interests had supported the JHP at its inception and their financial contributions were vital 
to its activities. The radicalism of the JMM and its allies in the 1970s had alienated the landed 
interests but in the late 1970s, the landlords reaffirmed their support for the Jharkhand movement. 
The reasons behind their renewal of support in the late 1970s were much the same as in the early 
1950s.
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sceptical. It gave the movement a slightly larger base and a considerable degree of 
social and political legitimacy.138
While the movement was gaining strength from the increasing support base, 
other factors at work were to weaken it. The beginning of the 1980s saw the 
emergence of cracks in the Jharkhand Alliance that had earlier put forward 
ambitious programmes for forging unity between the peasant and workers to widen 
the social base of the movement. The rift began with a personality clash between 
leaders like Shibu Soren, B. B. Mahto and A. K. Roy. The Marxist leaders like Roy 
thought that the workers in the industrial towns like Jamshedpur, Dhanbad, Bokaro 
and others should take up the leadership of the movement, while the Jharkhandi 
leaders like Soren saw the workers as becoming increasingly middle-class and 
therefore the peasantry was the class which had to bear the mantle of liberating 
Jharkhand from the clutches of the landlords and the dikus.m
Soon, this rift took the form of suspicions in the minds of the rural 
population about the workers. There began re-emergence of slogans calling for 
driving out all dikus including the workers. It acquired an ideological undertone of 
Marxists versus the rest.
Faced with widening differences with its Leftist allies, the JMM entered into 
an electoral alliance with the INCI for the 1980 mid-term polls. It served the 
interests of the INCI to forge an electoral alliance with a party that had a regional 
presence and at the same time bolstered its image as a pro-tribal party. It also helped 
the INCI in neutralising the influence of Leftist Parties led by leaders like A. K. 
Roy. This new alliance with the INCI encouraged Soren to withdraw the more 
militant movement in the region. The violent activities of the JMM over the past 
few years had led to a massacre of people in many villages by the law-enforcing 
agencies. This also influenced Soren’s decision to reduce the extremism of the
138 AS, ‘Containing the Jharkhand Movement’ in Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XIV no. 14, 7 
April 1979, p. 650.
139 Hiranmay Dhar, ‘Split in Jharkhand Movement’ in Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XIX no. 
29, 21 July 1984, p. 1139.
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movement and he became almost Gandhian in his approach. The movement became 
quite low-key and fell into disarray due to another external factor. Huge amounts of 
development funds started to flow into the region under the Tribal Sub-Plan (TSP) 
in the form of developmental grants, foreign project assistance and relief operations.
The overtly Marxist phase of the movement thus practically ended with the 
electoral alliance between the JMM and the INCI in the 1980 elections. A formal 
split between the Leftist and Jharkhandi political groups was to follow soon.
7. The Jharkhand Movement: Recent Patterns
The cracks that developed in the Jharkhandi movement by the early 1980s 
were to lead to further splits in the movement in the years that followed. The split in 
the Jharkhand Alliance came into the open during the First Central Conference at 
Saraidhela in January 1983 presided over by Binod Bihari Mahto and inaugurated by 
its Secretary, Shibu Soren. There emerged a competition within the Jharkhandi 
political groups over the sharing and control of symbolic resources. The differences 
between the two factions were on the issues of the JMM’s relations with the MCC, 
the use of the Red Flag and about the Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union (BCKU). Soren 
emphasised the necessity of maintaining the separate political identity of the JMM 
whereas the Leftist factions argued that the JMM had become a handmaid of the 
INCI. The Leftists therefore, wanted to maintain and strengthen the Jharkhand 
Alliance between the JMM and the MCC.140
The two groups also differed over the dual membership of the BCKU and the 
Jharkhand Mazdoor Sangh. Soren and his groups were accused of supporting the 
exploiters’ party, i.e., the INCI, with the help of the BCKU. They were also 
accused of corruption. The Leftists also argued that due to the close relationship 
between the JMM and the INCI, the exploiters were almost glorified and that 
therefore the workers and not the peasants should lead a joint Jharkhand movement 
with guidance from Roy. Soren on the other hand, emphasised the final goal of a
140 ibid.
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separate Jharkhand state and not the principle of whether the movement should be 
led by one section or the other. Soren thus, accepted the alliance with the INCI as a 
useful short-term strategy.
Soren saw this conference as the perfect opportunity for launching the JMM 
as a new political party and did not see it as a breach of the political alliance with 
the MCC. It was also felt that there was a need to clarify the separate identity of the 
JMM and therefore, a new constitution was adopted on 6 April 1984.141 This 
constitution envisaged the role of the JMM as the leader in the all-round fight to 
drive out the dikus.H1 The conceptual relationships in Jharkhand were again 
redefined which was essential if the JMM was to participate in electoral politics. 
The changes in the demographic profile of the region had made the tribals a 
numerical minority. Consequently, electoral support of only the tribal population 
(even if seen as a monolithic political group, which they are not) was not sufficient 
to secure enough votes.
With the participation of the JMM in electoral politics and the effort of some 
of its MLAs to become ministers, all scope for political co-operation with the MCC 
ended because Roy and his supporters considered this unacceptable. The movement 
again became confused and divided. Jharkhand Alliance split into the pro-right JMM 
led by Shibu Soren, Suraj Mandal and Hakim Prasad and the pro-Communist MCC 
led by B. B. Mahto, A. K. Roy. Later, the JMM also split into two factions, each 
led by Soren and Marandi, respectively. The JHP had almost disappeared and N. E. 
Horo was the only candidate to contest and win the election in 1984. However, 
Soren emerged as the undisputed mass leader in the region with all others coming 
after him. The JMM maintained close alliance with the INCI and Soren probably, 
remains the symbol of the articulation of the aspirations of the masses.
During the mid-1980s once again, the Jharkhandi leaders realised the 
necessity of joint action if meaningful political presence was to be maintained.
141 ibid.
142 Dikus were now being defined as all exploiters including the tribal ones.
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Consequently in 1987, 62 cultural and political organisations such as the JMM 
(Soren), the JMM (Marandi), and a host of smaller organisations forged the 
Jharkhand Co-ordination Committee (JCC) to guide a unified agitation to realise the 
dream of a separate province of Jharkhand. The JCC was soon faced with threat to 
its survival from a students’ body formed in 1988 called All Jharkhand Students 
Union (AJSU). The AJSU since its inception, has been the most vocal constituent of 
the JCC. It has been giving out calls for blockading of all mineral mining and 
transportation in the Jharkhand region143 to force the union government to agree to 
the formation of the state of Jharkhand as well as to secure a better policy response 
to the development problems of the region. However, the response from other 
constituents of the JCC has been very varied.
The JMM continues to exist divided into two groups the Marandi and Soren 
groups. They exercise marginal roles in the Parliament and the state legislature 
along with some other even smaller Jharkhandi parties. The latest instance of such a 
role is their present support to the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) government in Bihar. 
In exchange for their support, Bihar Vidhan Sabha led by the RJD adopted a 
resolution recommending to the central government that a separate state of 
Jharkhand must be created.144 Since it is the prerogative of the central government to 
create new states, the resolution serves only political and symbolic functions. The 
Bihar government can now point to the central government as the culprit delaying 
the creation of a state of Jharkhand. The Jharkhandi groups once again, failed to 
capitalise on one of the rare instances when they actually had a position of 
influence. Instead of pressurising the Bihar government to transfer actual powers145 
to the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (JAAC) created about two years ago, 
the Jharkhandi leaders sought to play to the gallery with political and symbolic
143 There have been many economic blockades in the region organised by the AJSU and other 
constituents of JCC since late 1980s. The blockade in September 1992 is one such example, 
Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 2 September 1992.
144 Times o f India, Internet edition at http://www.timesofindia.com, 23 July 1997.
145 During the field-study interviews, Shailendra Bhattacharya, member of the Central Committee and 
Executive Committee of JMM complained that the purpose behind the creation of JAAC is not 
being fulfilled since Bihar government has not transferred powers to JAAC.
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gestures. Thus, the history of the Jharkhand movement is a chequered one. Like all 
movements seeking political recognition, it has had its peaks and troughs. Perhaps, 
it might have attained greater success if it had not been plagued by divisiveness, lost 
opportunities, ideological fluidity and inept leadership.
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Chapter III
Tribal Areas of Bihar in Independent India 
A Legacy of Colonial Discourse?
During British rule, the tribal population of India was by and large, 
concentrated in four major areas - North-eastern parts of the country (erstwhile 
province of Assam), the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Western Tribal 
region (in the Bombay Presidency i.e., south Gujarat and western Madhya Pradesh) 
and the Eastern Tribal Belt (in the province of Bengal and later that of Bihar and 
Orissa). The British rule in India could not ignore the tribal areas in India due to 
their strategic and economic importance. The tribal population in NWFP and Assam 
gained some attention from the colonial administrators owing to their frontier 
location. Control over these areas was essential for effective strategic defence of the 
Indian Empire. The Eastern Tribal Belt was also important to the colonial state due 
to its mineral wealth. The requirements of raw materials for emerging industries 
ensured that this region occupied an important place in the British colonial project.
The necessity of maintaining peace and order in the frontier provinces 
prompted the British administrators to develop a system of exclusion that to some 
extent incorporated the traditional tribal elite. The inaccessibility of these frontier 
regions combined with the relatively low levels of economic returns from them 
precluded the necessity of active direct rule. As long as the frontiers of British India 
could be effectively defended, the colonial state was willing to allow a degree of 
autonomy to the tribes in these regions.
Contrary to the case of NWFP, the Eastern Tribal Belt did not have the same 
strategic importance but its long-established mineral wealth made the region 
significant to the colonial state. Effective utilisation of the economic resources in 
this region required a far greater degree of direct rule. Consequently, in these 
regions a system of exclusion developed which did not allow for any significant role 
of the tribal elite. The system of exclusion in this region was premised on direct 
paternalistic rule by the Governor of the province through the district officers.
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The colonial policy of exclusion of the tribal areas operated within the larger 
colonial discourse. This policy carried within itself the twin ideas of protection and 
the ‘civilising effects’ of British rule. It was this model of exclusion that went on to 
significantly influence the tribal policy of later years as well that of the independent 
Indian state. This chapter seeks to analyse the colonial discourse and locate the 
policy of exclusion within it with the aim of unravelling the continuities and 
discontinuities of this policy in independent India.
The argument in this chapter is that the rationalist-integrationist paradigm of 
the dominant colonial discourse was carried into the administrative arrangements of 
post-colonial India. The colonial discourse was rationalist in the sense that it drew 
upon the theories of the Enlightenment to generate legitimacy for the colonial state 
and sought to organise administrative structures according to a Weberian model of 
bureaucracy. The post-colonial Indian state is a rationalist state in the sense that it 
continued the colonial state’s emphasis on a rationally organised Weberian 
bureaucracy. Moreover, it seeks to further its twin goals of development and 
integration with the help of a bureaucratic planning and delivery mechanism. The 
centralised development planning presupposes that a certain policy must ‘rationally’ 
work in all contexts and ignores the political and cultural factors.
I 
The Idea of Discourse and Hegemony
The view that a body of ideas generates and sustains the power and 
legitimacy of State structures has been seen to have its intellectual roots in the 
writings of Antonio Gramsci1 and in his concept of the hegemonic power of an 
ideology. Gramsci’s conception of the State as “coercion plus hegemony” led to a 
well-established intellectual tradition that explores the relationship between 
ideological structures and power. “Ideology operates as discourse, addressing or, as
1 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, tr. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith, 
London, 1971, pp. 44-120.
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Althusser puts it, interpreting human beings as subjects” .2 There are many strands to 
this area of enquiry. In the “Althusserian tradition, emphasis was laid, first on the 
science/ ideology demarcation, then on ideology ‘in general’ and the operation of 
‘ideological state apparatuses’”.3 The creation and organisation of ideological 
hegemony was examined by neo-Gramscian scholars while the Weberian strand of 
thought dwelt on the ‘crisis of legitimation’ in the social order. Marxist scholars 
studied the operation of political discourses in terms of the contradiction between 
material base and ideological superstructure.4
The study of hegemonic power of an ideology in colonial and post-colonial 
cases showed that the colonial states had been successful in exercising hegemony 
over the population of the colonising country as well as the colonised people.5 This 
stream of enquiry into the relationship between ideas and State power in colonial 
states has been called ‘colonial discourse analysis’ or ‘colonial discourse theory’. It 
is this strand of the study of hegemony which is relevant to this study. It can be seen 
to originate in Edward Said’s powerful writings. “It is perhaps no exaggeration to 
say that Edward Said’s Orientalism,6 . . . single-handedly inaugurates a new area of 
enquiry”7 -  that of colonial discourse. Said’s later book8 also expanded the 
boundaries of colonial discourse theory to the analysis of the linkages between 
culture and imperialism.9
2 Goran Therborn, The Ideology o f Power and Power o f Ideology, London, 1980, p. 15.
3 ibid., p. 31.
4 ibid., pp. 31-2.
5 For instance, Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative 
Discourse, London, 1986.
6 Edward Said, Orientalism, London, 1978.
7 Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, ‘Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: An 
Introduction5 in Williams, Patrick and Chrisman, Laura, Colonial and Post-colonial Theory, 
Cambridge, 1993, p. 5.
8 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, London, 1993.
9 The close relationship between colonialism and imperialism (also politics and economics) was 
enunciated by Lenin in his celebrated pamphlet on imperialism and highlighted by Marxist writings 
such as Eric Hobsbawm, Age o f Imperialism, London, 1987.
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Said’s work focused mainly on the variety of textual forms in which the 
West produced and codified knowledge about non-metropolitan areas and cultures, 
especially those under colonial control. Recent works in colonial discourse theory 
however, have tended to use a local rather than a global focus, as well as drawing 
from a wide variety of intellectual traditions. For instance, “psychoanalysis (Homi 
Bhabha) . . . deconstruction (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak), feminism (Chandra 
Mohanty), other forms of Marxism (Aijaz Ahmad)”10 and political psychology 
(Ashis Nandy).
Edward Said’s Imperialism was an important landmark in the acceptance of 
this area of enquiry as a formally recognised area of study but was “preceded by a 
German intellectual tradition which shared Said’s concerns with the historical and 
theoretical relations between the Western economic/ political global domination and 
Western intellectual production”. For instance, Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School, Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt11. 
Subsequently, Frenchman Michel Foucault’s work12 on the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries examined the construction of “man and his others” as objects of 
knowledge within this overall period with the implication that an ideological 
continuity exists into the twentieth century.
Arendt combined political, cultural and sociological theory with empirical 
investigation and offered what can be termed as “an eclectic and singularly 
Heideggerian-informed left-leaning cultural materialism” and in her analysis 
“aesthetic culture and philosophical idealism emerge as crucial components of 
imperialism’s political self-legitimation”.13
This intellectual heritage has led to a number of avenues of enquiry. The 
dynamics of ‘hegemonic consensus’ that emerged in India in the nineteenth century
10 Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, op. cit., p. 5.
11 Hannah Arendt, The Origins o f Totalitarianism, New York, 1986.
12 Michel Foucault, The Order o f Things: An Archaeology o f Human Sciences, London, 1970.
13 Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, op. cit., p. 7.
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is the strand that is crucial to this study. The debate about the relationship between 
ideology and power in the Indian context was conducted within the “ambit of 
Marxist theory, but more specifically within the relations between culture and 
politics suggested in the writings of Antonio Gramsci” . It has linked up with the 
Marxist approach to the ‘national and colonial question’ and “recent European 
discussions on Gramsci have highlighted the importance of his ideas not merely in 
the context of revolutionary politics of Europe, but for post-colonial state in the 
countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America” .14
Gramsci’s idea of the State as ‘coercion plus hegemony’ and of struggle for 
power as domination plus intellectual-moral leadership has enabled
Indian critics to examine afresh the so-called ‘renaissance’ in 19th 
century India in terms of the aspiration of a new class to assert its 
intellectual-moral leadership over a modernising Indian nation and to 
stake its claim to power in opposition to its colonial masters. But the 
examination also demonstrated how, under the specific conditions of 
the economy and polity of a colonial country, this domination 
necessarily rests on extremely fragile foundations and the intellectual- 
moral leadership of the dominant classes over the new nation remains 
fragmented.15
This study makes use of this stream of colonial discourse theory to examine 
the operation of the dominant strand of colonial discourse in India and the 
emergence of a nationalist and later a sub-national discourse.
II 
Colonial Discourse and the Nationalists
In order to understand the continuities between the tribal policy of the 
colonial state and that of the independent Indian state it is important to understand
14 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse, London, 
1986, p. 29.
15 ibid.
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how the nationalist discourse borrowed significant elements of the colonial 
discourse. Nationalist discourse in India emerged first as a reaction and later as an 
alternative to the colonial discourse.
The British colonial state in India was not only a set of institutions and 
structures but also a set of discourses. The success of these discourses was essential 
for the legitimisation of the colonial rule in the socio-political context so as to 
generate political stability. The colonial state was inextricably dependent on a set of 
discursive structures premised on the discourse of Enlightenment. Both, the 
functionaries as well as the critics of the colonial state believed that it drew its 
power from the “grand theories of European rationalism - its theories, self­
definitions, narratives, delusions and strategies . . . [which it used] to define and 
describe itself, to negotiate and bring under control the alien social world”16 it had 
entered. Those who had to deal with this colonial state, whether in a collaborative or 
contesting manner, recognised and respected the indivisibility and importance of the 
myth of invincibility of western rationality which was fundamental to understanding 
its institutions and logic of functioning. Therefore, while some tried to acquire 
western education in order to master the occult powers of invincible western 
rationality, others tried to adopt and adapt the ideals of English Utilitarianism into 
the figures of traditional Indian mythology. Yet others tried to avoid it completely 
by turning towards the traditional discourse.
In general however, the reaction against colonial discourse was muted 
because the colonial state adopted multiple levels of dialogue. It had to address three 
kinds of audience -  British public opinion, Indian western-educated intelligentsia 
and middle-class and the masses of India. With each of these, it adopted a different 
kind of language while always employing the concepts of the rationalist discourse. 
When addressing British public opinion it used the tone of reasonableness; that of 
education and legislation in its dealings with the Indian intelligentsia and the
16 Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘On the Construction of Colonial Power: Structure, Discourse, Hegemony’ in 
Engels, Dagmar and Marks, Shula, eds., Contesting Colonial Hegemony: State and Society in 
Africa and India, London, 1994, p. 21.
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indigenous middle-class; and that of force and power with respect to the large and 
distant masses of India. The language of discourse which the colonial state 
employed with the middle-class and Indian intelligentsia was most significant in 
generating and maintaining political hegemony in India. It generated a new kind of 
discourse which at once, consolidated the power of the colonial state’s power as 
well as undermined it in the years to come.17
The colonial discourse was a rationalist discourse in the sense that it drew 
upon the theories of the Enlightenment to generate legitimacy for the colonial state 
and sought to organise administrative structures according to a Weberian model of 
bureaucracy.
The colonial state’s projects of legislation and education led the Indian 
intelligentsia to view the colonial state in contrast to the pre-colonial state, as one 
that defended the rule of law, gave security to life and property and provided an 
opportunity to acquire knowledge of European arts and sciences. Furthermore, the 
vision of political future as projected by the colonial state was even more attractive 
to these intellectuals. The colonial state promised to fulfil their cherished ideals of 
democratic and constitutional governance accompanied with modern industrial 
development. Minor concessions in the form of a series of Council of India Acts 
encouraged them to believe in the colonial state. “In their conception, England 
which held out the ideals of parliamentary democracy, civil liberties and modern 
economic development, would act as the instruments for their dispensation to other 
countries of the world. England was a ‘mirror of their own future’ . . . British rule 
was, therefore, ‘welcomed as the chosen instrument’”18 to change the despotic
17 For a full discussion of the processes by which the nationalist discourse emerged, see Panikkar, K. 
N., Culture, Ideology, Hegemony: Intellectual and Social Consciousness in Colonial India, New 
Delhi, 1995; Kaviraj, Sudipta, ‘On the Construction of Colonial Power: Structure, Discourse, 
Hegemony’ in Engels, Dagmar and Marks, Shula, eds., Contesting Colonial Hegemony: State and 
Society in Africa and India, London, 1994, pp. 19-54; Kaviraj, Sudipta, ‘The Imaginary Institution 
of India’ in Chatterjee, Partha and Pandey, Gyanendra, eds., Subaltern Studies: Writings on South 
Asian History and Society, vol. VII, Delhi, 1992, pp. 1-39 and Chatterjee, Partha, Nation and its 
Fragments: Colonial and Post-colonial Histories, New Delhi, 1995.
18 K, N., Panikkar, Culture, Ideology, Hegemony Intellectual and Social Consciousness in Colonial 
India, New Delhi, 1995, p. 22.
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conditions of pre-colonial India into a bourgeois-democratic system. 
Notwithstanding the sharp criticisms of the colonial rule which were put forward by 
the intellectuals of the time, the belief that the transformation of India would occur 
within the colonial framework was clear. This belief had its roots in the false 
consciousness created by the ideologies disseminated by the colonial rulers and 
adopted by the intellectuals of the time.
Some intellectuals accepted a version of essentialism. A collaborative 
relationship developed amongst the colonial rulers and the colonised people in which 
the latter accepted the world view, apparatus of knowledge, criteria of judgement 
and ideology of the former. One strand of this discourse was particularly important 
in reinforcing this relationship as it suited the hegemonic consensus. This view 
accepted the separateness of Indian history in spiritual/ cultural matters but sought to 
retain British control over economic and political questions since in the latter the 
superiority of the British rationality was evident.
Apart from generating legitimacy for the colonial state, this project also went 
on to produce unintended and opposite results in the longer run. “By integrating 
society, introducing symmetric trends of social hierarchy, enumerating society, 
familiarising Indians with the theory of public power and democracy, placing before 
them the universality of reason and the great narratives of European nation- 
formation and introducing the skills of forming associations, this imperial discourse 
had also taught the Indians how rationalism could be turned against colonisers 
themselves” .19
Some western educated intellectuals, while employing the rationalist tools 
which they had learnt from western education, began to put forward an alternative 
historical narration that contested universalist imperial history. Thus, the nationalist 
view of history began by creating a dichotomy between the material and the spiritual 
domains as opposed to the dichotomy of public and private spheres offered by the 
colonial state. “Anti-colonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty
19Kaviraj, op. cit., p. 44.
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within colonial society well before it begins its battle with the imperial power. It 
does this by dividing the world of social institutions and practises into two domains 
— the material and the spiritual” .20 In the opinion of the nationalists, in the material 
domain of economy, state craft, technology and science, the West had proven its 
superiority and this superiority had to be acknowledged, studied and replicated.21 
However, the greater the success in adopting and imitating the material imperialist 
domain, the greater was the need to preserve the distinctness of the cultural domain 
as the essentials of the identity existed there.
This is perhaps fundamental to the trajectory of nationalism in India. It is 
reflected in the social reform efforts of the 20th century when the necessity of change 
in the social and cultural domain was acknowledged but intervention by the colonial 
state in the guise of legislation was sought to be excluded.22 It was within this 
domain that nationalists contested the imperialist history of India with a history of 
their own which although used the universality of rationality as a tool, endeavoured 
to construct a modern national culture that was not western. The ‘imagined 
community’ of the nation came into being in this domain where it was already 
sovereign. The major areas where this transformation of a colonised culture into a 
nationalist culture took place were those of language, literature, mass media such as 
drama, art, nationalist educational institutions, family and religion. Indian 
nationalism started by asserting its autonomy and sovereignty in these areas and 
constructing the ‘Indian’ identity with its historical, cultural and symbolic 
appendages.
In the domain of the material, nationalism was unable to emphasise the 
difference, as it was able to in the spiritual and cultural domain.23 Therefore, it
20 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post-colonial Histories, New 
Delhi, 1995, p. 6.
21 Although, some stands of nationalist discourse such as the Arya Samaj believed that classical
Indian drought and practises was superior in the material realm too.
22 Unlike the earlier period when social legislation was desired by most reformers.
23 Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments, op. cit. discusses why the cultural domain was more
amenable to the creation of the community than the material domain.
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began to assert itself in the public domain constituted by the modern/ colonial state. 
Its main task was to challenge colonial hegemony over the middle class, i. e. to 
contest the ‘rule of difference’. The growth of institutions in the country required 
that the ‘rule of difference’ be also institutionalised.24 Nationalism, utilising the 
rationalist thought and humanism that it had learnt from the colonists, contested this 
difference between the rulers and the ruled with the result that it became a force in 
the public domain as well. The public area occupied by nationalism expanded as 
nationalist politics grew stronger.
The nationalists thus created a dichotomy between the material and the 
spiritual/ cultural (nationalism having declared sovereignty in the latter realm). The 
rationalist colonial state on the other hand, operated within the distinction of public 
and private domains whereby it sought to ensure equality of all private domains (in 
terms of religion, caste etc.). The nationalist discourse operated in a set of 
contradictory domains. On the one hand, in the cultural domain it was able to 
construct a new discourse that was premised on the difference from the colonial 
discourse and on the other hand, it accepted and revered the colonial model in the 
realm of the material.
Therefore to some extent, parts of the public domain of the colonial state and 
the material domain of nationalism overlapped. Nationalist thought was not 
successful in constructing an alternate discourse in the material domain (partly 
because the nationalist leaders were convinced of the superiority of the western 
rationalist discourse within the material domain). Consequently, it also accepted the 
colonial model of economic and political development consisting of politico- 
economic and social integration and industrialisation.
24 The colonial discourse embodied the concept that there was an essential difference between the 
British rulers and the Indian subjects. This led to a ‘rule of difference’ that dwelt on the superiority 
of the Europeans race and their cultural practises over the Indian population and their practises. 
Examples of this include barring of all Indians from certain areas of Indian cities and the outcry 
from the European population living in India over the Ilbert Bill whereby an Indian judge could try 
European offenders.
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The acceptance of the essentials of the material domain of the colonial 
discourse by the nationalists had an important impact on the administrative and 
discursive structures of the postcolonial state in India. It will emerge in the 
subsequent discussion that there is a strong continuity of colonial discourse in the 
Constituent Assembly and hence, the Constitution.
Ill
Colonial Policy and the Tribal Areas of Bihar
British colonial discourse, since the earliest Orientalist versus Anglicist 
debates, had two distinct strands. Both viewed European cultural practices as 
superior to Indian and gave primacy to British power but differed over the future of 
Indian society. One strand, which was to become the dominant model, viewed the 
future in a Macaulayan trajectory in which European theory and practice was to lead 
the way towards an integrated and centralised Indian polity which would promote 
free trade within a global market. The other strand of British discourse saw the 
future of India as retaining its differences under a benevolent British suzerainty in 
alliance with the ‘natural’ leaders of the country (the native Princes and Rulers or 
the dominant caste/ tribal groups). In the context of the tribal regions, the two 
strands of colonial discourse was played out between the missionaries in which some 
(such as the Evangelicals) viewed all Indian practises as ‘corrupt and backward’ and 
sought its replacement by the ‘superior’ European practices. The other strand 
wished to work with what they saw as the ‘grains’ of Indian society such as the caste 
structure. Nonetheless, both the points of view concurred on the history of tribal 
society and viewed it as victim of the Hindu caste system (such as exploitation by 
the moneylenders) and assigned a pivotal role to the British rule. Under British rule, 
the future of tribal society was seen as either completing their transition to a market 
economy or enjoying an ahistoric future of rustic happiness.25
251 am grateful to Dr. David Taylor for his comments and suggestions on this formulation.
113
Within the broad framework of colonial discourse, ethnographers, 
anthropologists, sociologists, historians, administrators and Christian missionaries 
had actively investigated the tribal cultures of India from which emerged two broad 
approaches towards the tribal areas. The first conceptual framework which became 
the dominant model, was developed by the British administrator-ethnographer- 
anthropologists. This model treated the tribal communities as “isolates, tribals as 
Noble Savages, and the primitive condition was described as a state of Arcadian 
simplicity . . . These scholars overlooked the operation of the historical processes 
that led to the formation of the state, the emergence of a complex regional system in 
the wake of the migration of non-tribal communities and functional castes and the 
penetration of cultural influences . . . This led to the build-up of a myth that has 
bedevilled all historical writings on Chotanagpur and inspired all tribal 
movements” .26 Thus, a tribal was constructed as a person who was innocent of the 
operation of the socio-historical processes and therefore open to being duped by the 
non-tribals and moneylenders. This perspective served the purpose of justifying the 
continued presence of not only the colonial Raj but also that of missionaries.
The second point of view construed the tribes as members of a sub-system of 
Hinduism in the process of being absorbed into the Hindu Society.27 Both these 
points of view, despite their obvious difference in approach, viewed the tribal 
communities as waiting to be absorbed into the mainstream political and economic 
system -  either the market economy or the Hindu caste-system.
The central premise of the dominant strand of colonial discourse was that 
until the time when the tribal communities were integrated into the dominant 
politico-social systems, they required a great degree of protection. This formed the 
basis of the broad colonial policy towards the tribal areas. Once the structures of the 
colonial state were in place, it had the ability to choose between direct intervention
26 K. S. Singh, Tribal Society in India: An Anthropo-historical Perspective, New Delhi, 1985, p. 1.
27 With some modifications, this point of view is the foundation behind the BJP’s concept of 
Vanvasis.
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and a judicious veto. This capacity to exercise a veto was also central to the tribal 
policy of the colonial discourse.
The colonial state realised its inability to intervene in the spiritual/cultural 
domain of the tribals, as this area did not allow for rationalist reduction. The 
colonial state was content to control the economic life of the region by emphasising 
what was now broadly accepted by the intelligentsia of India: the rationalist 
discourse was superior in the material domain and therefore was worthy of 
emulation. The tribal regions were portrayed as primitive and backward and to bring 
them into the mainstream of material rationalist discourse was seen as desirable. The 
colonial state therefore, gradually adopted a policy of exclusion whereby the 
rationalist discourse would be furthered in the material domain by maintaining 
control with the help of a ‘judicious veto’. The rationalist dichotomy of 
public/private domains was invoked to guarantee the inviolability of the spiritual 
domain in the form of laws that guaranteed tribes the right to practise their customs 
and traditions.
The concept of protecting the tribal communities from the ill effects of too 
rapid an integration into the economy and polity was born out of the nature of 
British rule in India. Unlike elsewhere in the world where the traditional leaders 
played an important role as an intermediary between the colonial administration and 
the tribal communities, a system of direct rule (with varying degrees of active direct 
rule) evolved in India. This direct rule was integrationist in character whereby some 
of the tribal areas were incorporated into the general administration of the British 
provinces or the Indian Princely states. At the same time, in other areas of tribal 
concentration, a system of exclusion was developed where the concept of protection 
of the tribal population gradually developed. The main features of this system of 
exclusion were:
(a) paternalistic rule by district officers;
(b) exclusion of tribal areas from the operation of ordinary laws to preserve their 
ethos, laws, etc. with its logical corollary of limitation of the jurisdiction of 
ordinary courts and simple procedures to settle disputes;
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(c) restricted entry of non-tribals into tribal areas; and,
(d) strengthening of tribal leadership.
The tribal revolts and rebellions that occurred as a result of the gradual 
implementation of direct rule over the 19th century in turn, further reinforced the 
policy of direct rule. The necessity of establishing convenient lines of 
communication to facilitate administration and rapid deployment of the army in 
cases of rebellion was soon followed by cantonments, traders and a faster pace of 
urbanisation. Moreover, the operation of this policy of direct rule led to higher rates 
of in-migration of non-tribals into the region. Consequently, the tribal areas were 
integrated into the new economic and administrative set-up which ended the relative 
isolation of the tribes and their political dominance in the region.
In the tribal regions of Bihar (as in many other parts of the country), the use 
of military force formed the basis of early colonial policy. It was followed by 
legislation incorporating the fundamentals of the colonial discourse as an avenue to 
legitimise its power in the region. In the tribal areas which came to be called the 
Excluded Areas under the British rule, colonial intervention began by the 
organisation of structures aimed at maximisation of rent. It confined itself to the 
material domain. The colonial state utilised the military force it had at its disposal to 
create material structures aimed at a greater intervention in the economic life of the 
region.
In this initial phase, the colonial state was still expanding and efforts at 
legitimisation of the regime were not of primary importance. The earliest available 
instance of significant British activity in south Bihar was a militia force under 
Captain Camac in 1769 sent to subjugate the local chiefs and landlords. This step 
was taken to ensure regular payments of revenue by local tribal chiefs. Since then 
almost till the middle of the next century, the British activity in this area was limited 
to occasional military operations aimed at subjugating recalcitrant local chiefs, tribal 
heads, landlords and revenue intermediaries, and the collection of overdue revenue 
and war booty. This policy was geared towards maximisation of revenue without 
incurring the cost of a local administration. The introduction of contract rent
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collection by local chiefs, thikedctrs, ilakdars and landlords on behalf of the British 
brought about a fundamental change in the agrarian relations of tribal south Bihar.
It was only after the Kol Insurrection of 1831-32 and the Santhal Rebellion 
of 1855 that the contradictions in such a policy of maximisation of rent from the 
land through the intermediaries were noticed. Although the erstwhile officers28 
would like us to believe that the local rent-collectors were responsible for the 
numerous tribal revolts and insurrections in the late eighteenth and first half of the 
nineteenth centuries, the British administration cannot escape responsibility since it 
was their efforts at maximisation of revenue that passed down the line until it 
became unbearable for the tribal peasant of south Bihar.
The tribal revolts of the mid-19th century signified that the policy of 
minimum administration with maximum rent collection had outlived its utility. If 
British rule was to benefit from this mineral-rich region, the colonial discourse had 
to move on to the level of legitimisation from the level of the use of force. The 
hegemonic discourse of British rule was already emerging in the rest of India in the 
shape of projects of legislation and education. The tribal areas were to become a 
part of the larger colonial discourse after the rebellion by the tribes had been 
crushed by sheer military superiority. It is at this point of time that the colonial 
discourse on the tribal areas was articulated in a nascent form.
Gradually, a regular administration and police force were established in the 
area. A number of laws were enacted such as the Wilkinson Rules, Chota Nagpur 
Tenancy Act and others, incorporating the fundamentals of the colonial discourse. 
As already pointed out, the colonial discourse carried within it the concept of 
protection that was now implemented vis-a-vis the tribal population. Hence, the 
colonial intervention in the region was justified by the colonial discourse on the 
benefits that it offered to the local population in terms of protecting them from two
28 For instance, the Report of Joint Commissioners Dent and Captain Wilkinson dated 4 September 
1833 regarding the disturbances in Barabhum and neighbouring Parganas during the Kol Rebellion 
blamed the local ilakdars, zamindars, and thikedars for increasing the rent by 35% over a few 
years as the primary cause of the disturbances, Bihar District Gazetteers: Ranchi, Patna, 1970, pp. 
52-3.
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dangers; namely, the loss of agricultural land owned by the tribal people to ‘more 
civilised sections of the population’ and the ‘wiles of the moneylender’. 
Consequently, a policy of protection and exclusion was adopted towards these areas 
since colonial discourse portrayed the tribal people as ‘primitive people, who were 
simple, unsophisticated and frequently improvident’.
For this purpose, initially, a number of individual laws were enacted and 
enforced in various parts of British India, including tribal Bihar. The Scheduled 
Districts Act 1874 was the first enactment to treat the tribal areas as a separate 
category. This enactment empowered the executive branch of the government to 
extend any enactment in force in any part of British India to a ‘Scheduled District’ 
with such modifications as might be considered necessary and by implication, 
excluded the scheduled areas from the operation of any ordinary law of British 
India. This concept of protecting the tribes by excluding them from the operation of 
ordinary laws was an integral part of the colonial discourse and continued in the 
Montagu-Chelmsford Report and the subsequent Government of India Act, 1919.
The Montagu-Chelmsford Report contained a brief reference to such areas 
and suggested that the political reforms being contemplated for the rest of British 
territories in India could not be applied to the scheduled areas because “there was no 
political material on which to found political institutions” .29 Hence, the typically 
backward tracts were excluded from the scope of reformed legislatures in the 
provinces of British India.
The Government of India Act, 1919 introduced a new element in the 
administration of these areas. It divided the ‘Backward Tracts’ into two types: the 
first included those areas that were considered so backward that they were 
completely excluded from the scope of the reformed legislatures and the 
constitutional reforms.30 With respect to these areas, neither the central nor the
29 Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms 1918, para 199.
30 This arrangement of exclusion applied to tribal areas in the backward regions: Amindivi and 
Laccadive Islands and Minicoy Islands in the erstwhile province of Madras (now the Union 
Territories of Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshwadeep Islands), the Chittagong Hill Tracts
Contd.
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provincial legislatures were given any powers. The Governor-General-in-Council 
was the sole legislator for such areas and the elected ministers had no responsibility 
for them. The proposals for expenditures in these areas were not subject to voting 
approval of the Legislatures and no questions could be asked or discussions entered 
into about such areas. The second type of Backward Areas were those in which the 
reserved half of the diarchical government exercised the powers of extending or 
restraining any provincial law or enactment. Such areas were represented in the 
legislatures but the representation was neither adequate nor effective.31 The 
protectionist strand of the colonial discourse had evolved to ensure that Governor 
operating through the district administration was the sole arbitrator in the tribal 
regions. The use of education to ensure a wider social base for the colonial 
discourse (and to generate sympathetic support for it in the minds of emerging 
middle-class Indian intelligentsia) generated legitimacy for this system of exclusion.
After independence, the Constituent Assembly adopted not only the basic 
structure of governance but also some fundamentals of the colonial discourse. 
Owing to the nationalist belief in the desirability of western rationality in the realm 
of the material, the Constituent Assembly tried to implement an integrationist policy 
with a development model premised on industrialisation and a rationally organised 
bureaucracy as the delivery mechanism for public policy. In some ways, the 
protectionist strand of the colonial discourse also survived in post-independence 
India. No doubt, significant new ground was broken when the Constituent Assembly 
sought to remove the ‘rule of difference’ and granted full political status to the tribal 
population. However, with regards to other matters, the paternalistic and 
integrationist discourse vis-a-vis the tribal population continued.
Contd.
in Bengal (now in Bangladesh), the area of Spiti and Lahaul in the Kangra district of the province 
of Punjab (now in Himachal Pradesh) and Angul in the province of Bihar and Orissa (now in 
Orissa).
31 The Statutory commission reported in 1930 that the whole of the Assam backward tracts (an area 
of approximately 50,000 square miles) was represented by one nominated member in the 
Provincial Legislature, who for a considerable length of time was a Welsh Missionary.
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Creation of Autonomous ‘Sub-national’ Community and Colonial Tribal Policy
The nationalist project had begun with an autonomous form of imagination of 
the community in the spiritual/cultural domain, which was not amenable to 
rationalist reductions. The nation was first imagined in this domain and declared 
sovereign. “The result is that autonomous forms of imagination of the community 
were, and continue to be, overwhelmed and swamped by the history of the 
postcolonial state. Here lies the root of our postcolonial misery: not in our inability 
to think out new forms of the modern community but in our surrender to the old 
forms of the modern state. If the nation is an imagined community and if nations 
must also take the form of states, then our theoretical language must allow us to talk 
about community and the state at the same time . . . ”32 The Jharkhandi community 
like numerous other communities premised on various cultural lines (for instance, 
the Oriya identity premised on a distinctive language) employed the autonomous 
method of imagination of community that the nationalists had used vis-a-vis the 
colonial state. The leaders in the tribal areas of Bihar, who were also western- 
educated, were quick to learn from the nationalist leaders. They employed a version 
of local history, glorified the tribal revolts and utilised the uniqueness of the tribal 
heritage to engender a process of such autonomous forms of imagination of the 
community that soon started to desire political recognition. Proto-Jharkhandi identity 
was articulated in the early 1930s in a Memorandum to the Simon Commission. 
Consequently by 1947 the tribal regions, supported by the protection of their 
cultural life under the system of exclusion, had acquired an ‘imagined community’ 
premised on tribal uniqueness and culture. It was helped by the fact that the 
Jharkhand region was on the fringes of both British colonial administration (in terms 
of it being an Excluded Area) as well as the nationalist discourse.
32 Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments, op. cit., p. 11.
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The ‘sub-national’ communities employed the same avenues which the 
nationalists had employed vis-a-vis British colonial rule to invent and declare their 
political identity in the spiritual/cultural realm. Once such a community was created, 
it began to seek political recognition from first the colonial state and then the post­
colonial Indian state.33 These ‘sub-national’ or ‘regional’ identities also shared with 
the nationalists a belief in rapid rationalist development. Consequently, the 
community thus created employed the poor performance of the development policy 
of the Indian state as an additional reason to demand political autonomy.
During the colonial period, the colonial discourse of paternalism, 
protectionism and integration in the tribal regions of India, especially in Bihar, was 
able to secure almost a consensus on the tribal policy as evident in the lack of 
dissent in the reports and debates of the period (elements of this also continued into 
the post-colonial period). The colonial project of legitimisation under the project of 
legislation continued with the appointment of the Indian Statutory Commission (The 
Simon Commission) in 1928. The Commission which considered wide-ranging 
constitutional powers for the provinces, chose not to include the tribal areas in the 
new arrangements. Perhaps, the relatively poor growth of education in the region 
and the large-scale presence of missionaries had some bearing on this decision. 
Unlike the rest of India, the colonial state was not able to generate the same degree 
of legitimacy in the region since the educated middle class was still very small in 
number. The superiority of the colonial rationalist discourse, at least in the material 
domain therefore, could not be stressed upon. As will emerge in the following 
discussion, the missionaries as well as some proportion of the local populace 
portrayed the tribal regions as ‘requiring civilising influence’.
To add to the persistence of the hegemony of the colonial discourse with 
respect to the region, the relatively low place of the tribal question on the nationalist
33 In the colonial state, the demand for greater political recognition (as will be seen later in this 
chapter) took die form of a demand before the Simon Commission for greater democratic 
administration (including the demand for the Chota Nagpur region to be converted into a Chief 
Commissioner’s or a Governor’s province) in the Excluded Areas. In the post-colonial state this 
demand crystallised into a demand for an autonomous state.
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agenda did not help matters. Although individual leaders such as Gandhi and 
Thakkar Bapa were alive to the tribal population and their problems, Indian National 
Congress as an organisation was surprisingly unconcerned.34 Moreover, the broad 
acceptance of the colonial discourse with respect to the material domain by the 
nationalist leadership also implied the acceptance of desirability of greater social and 
economic integration of the tribal population.
In its report, the Simon commission took notice of the ‘Backward Tribes’ 
and commented that if Burma was excluded, “they are to be found in five of the 
eight provinces, and the total extent of the backward tracts in these five provinces is 
no less than 120,000 square miles, containing a population of IIV4 millions”.35 It 
further on pointed out that “the province of Bihar and Orissa, . . .  is the most 
artificial unit of all the Indian provinces. It was formed by bringing under a single 
administration three areas which differ markedly, not only in physical features, but 
in many racial, linguistic, and cultural characteristics”36 (emphasis added). 
Notwithstanding these observations, the report of the Simon Commission did not 
lead to any significant change in the policy orientation towards the tribal areas.
When the Report of this Commission was being discussed in the House of 
Commons, the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (as the ‘Backward Areas’ 
came to be called in the Simon Commission Report) were conspicuous by the 
brevity of reference to them. While introducing the Bill, the then Secretary of State 
for India, Sir Samuel Hoare, in dealing with the subject of special responsibilities, 
made a brief reference to these areas: “Again, with the backward districts and 
aboriginal tribes, . . . every hon. member will agree that we must keep in reserve 
powers to prevent these tribes and these remote districts from being exploited” .37
34 “The tomes of the Congress resolutions did not contain a word about the tribal issue; probably 
there was no attempt to identify the issues in the times of the all-consuming struggle for 
independence, when the tribal issue was considered a minor part of the wider social and economic 
challenge”, Singh, op. cit., p. 177.
35 Report o f the Indian Statutory Commission, vol. II, London, 1930, para. 127.
36 ibid., vol. I, para 87.
37 Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Fifth Series, vol. 296, House of Commons, 10 December 
1934, col. 53.
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The colonial discourse is quite clear in this excerpt with the language of 
reasonableness in use. In line with the strength of the colonial discourse, there was 
no dissent. The hon. members agreed with his point of view. There was no further 
debate or discussion on the issue except for a brief reference by Wing-Commander 
James who while referring to the Backward Tracts and Excluded Areas observed: “I 
welcome the proposals . . . [which] appear to be a great improvement . . . ” over 
the existing provisions. He wanted the Government to clearly demarcate the 
Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas. Referring to such areas, he observed that 
“more than mere powers kept in reserve are required . . . The trouble is that they 
[reform and demarcation of the Excluded Areas] have always been left for further 
consideration . . . What I should like to hear from Secretary of State, if possible, is 
how and when he proposes that the survey, . . .  be carried out because I hope the 
inquiry is going to be independent, unfettered . . .”38 The protectionist element of 
the colonial discourse that the nationalist leadership also agreed with by default 
(since they did not have opinions that opposed it) was mirrored in the House of 
Commons. The House of Commons, in accordance with the accepted rationalist 
colonial discourse and its corollary of protectionist administration in the tribal areas, 
whole-heartedly supported the continuance of the system of exclusion.
The underlying discourse in which the Simon Commission functioned is 
evident when it quoted from the Memorandum on Backward Tracts prepared by the 
Bihar and Orissa Government39 in order to emphasise the need for special provisions 
and special protection for the aboriginal population:
They cannot compete against the subtler minds of the Aryan races 
that have in the past two or three centuries penetrated slowly into the 
country; their improvidence lays them open to the wiles of the 
moneylender; their lack of education and their distinctive languages 
place them at a great disadvantage in the Courts. When roused to
38 Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, Fifth Series, vol. 296, House of Commons, 11 December 
1934, col. 307-11.
39 ‘Memorandum on Backward Tracts presented by the Bihar and Orissa Government’, Report o f the 
Indian Statutory Commission, vol. XII: Selections from the Memoranda and Oral Evidence by 
Officials, London, 1930, pp. 332.
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action by real or fancied grievances their tribal organisation, where it 
survives, and elsewhere the solidarity of kinship make for a rapid 
spread of disaffection, while their childlike outlook makes the duty of 
restoring order a peculiarly distasteful one.40
Evidently, the colonial officials saw ample justification for the continuance 
of the protectionist policy in the tribal region. Furthermore, the official view of a 
tribal hardly seemed to have evolved since the late 19th century. The tribals were 
still viewed as a race inferior to the ‘relatively more civilised Aryan races’ without a 
sense of history or understanding of the results of their actions and were prone to 
revolts on imagined grounds. The Commission took note of the 1855 Santhal 
rebellion and observed that it was marked by “looting and violence” and “a large 
punitive force was required to restore order. After the rebellion, the district was 
excluded from the operation of the general regulations . . .”41 Their distinctive 
cultural features such as language and social organisation were portrayed as in need 
of civilising influence of the rationalist paternalistic administration.
The Simon Commission in its report, referring to the tribal population, 
observed that
these backward races are commonly supposed to be remnants of pre- 
Aryan autochthonous people into whose strongholds in the hills and 
forests the invader found it difficult and unprofitable to penetrate.
Some of them live by hunting, and by a type of shifting cultivation . .
. In the valley, the tribes have with great labour terraced isolated 
fields, producing abundant crops, but at no time before the 
establishment of British rule were these plots coveted by the 
plainsman, for he could not have collected rent from the occupiers.
But the moneylender and the trader took advantage of the new reign 
of law to reduce the aboriginal owners to practical serfdom42 
(emphasis added).
This statement demonstrates the entrenched and dominant colonial discourse 
in the approach of the Commission towards the tribal population. It considered the
40 Report o f the Indian Statuary Commission, vol. I, op. cit., para 88.
41 ibid,
42 ibid.
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tribal population to be ‘remnants’ of some pre-historic people with the undertone 
being that these remnants should have ‘Aryanised’ by now but somehow historically 
it did not work out that way. Therefore, unless they were ‘civilised’ under the 
paternal British rule, would be perceptually in need of protection. The Commission 
saw the tribal population as wild people who spent their time hunting and copying 
‘more civilised’ people in trying out some agriculture in terraced fields. The 
‘civilised Aryans’ had no great use of such people. It was only after some 
agriculture developed (‘civilising effect’) under the British rule that these areas 
became attractive to the outsiders (‘more civilised people’). The Commission had 
implicit belief in the goodness of the colonial administration and saw no difficulty 
with the facts that money-economy came into that area with British rule and that the 
same money-economy was making the tribal population dependent on the 
moneylenders. However, the dominant colonial discourse was performing its 
function of allowing awkward realities to be subsumed as exceptions or anomalies 
and this was not seen as incongruous.
The colonial discourse continued when the Commission observed that
. . .  the Chota Nagpur plateau, which formed part of the inaccessible 
forest tract which the Aryan invaders called ‘Jarkhand’ . . . These 
primitive tribes amount to 58 per cent, of the population, and they 
nurse a resentment against the Hindu immigrants who, as they 
consider, have robbed them of their ancestral lands. Unrest, usually 
arising from agrarian causes often assuming a religious complexion, 
is still endemic . . , [the tribal] remains credulous and excitable and 
almost as much as ever in need of special protection . . .  43 (emphasis 
added).
In this quotation, the Commission not only carried forth the colonial 
discourse but also reflected an inadequate understanding of the area. Unrest in South 
Bihar has always been agrarian, arising out of the new revenue system imposed 
between 1769 and 1855. Furthermore, in saying that the unrest is “still endemic”, 
the undertone of the Commission is, again, patronising. It implies that civilised
43 ibid.
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people do not have such unrest and only the “under-civilised” societies were prone 
to such problems.
In volume II of the Report (Recommendations), the Commission suggested
that
they should be known in future not as ‘Backward Tracts’ but as 
‘Excluded Areas’. The state of development reached by inhabitants of 
these areas prevents the possibility of applying to them methods of 
representation adopted elsewhere. They do not ask for self- 
determination, but for security o f land-tenure, freedom in pursuit of 
their traditional methods o f livelihood, and the reasonable exercise of 
their traditional customs. Their contentment does not depend so much 
on rapid political advance as on experienced and sympathetic 
handling, and on protection from economic subjugation by the 
neighbours44 (emphasis added).
In this statement, the Commission completely divorced economic 
development and social well being from political advancement and emphasised the 
desirability of British rule. It continued the protectionist approach as a means of 
justifying the colonial rule when it observed that
. . .  the principal duty of the administration is to educate these 
people to stand on their own feet, . . .  It is too large a task to be left 
to the single-handed efforts of missionary societies or individual 
officials. Co-ordination of activities and adequate funds are 
principally required. The typical backward tract is a deficit area, and 
no provincial legislature is likely to possess either the will or the 
means to devote special attention to its particular requirements . . .
Only if responsibility for the backward tracts is entrusted to the 
Centre, does it appear likely that it will be adequately discharged.45
The integrationist approach of the Commission was also clear when it 
observed that “ . . .  the bulk of the inhabitants of a backward tract are so little 
advanced that representative institutions cannot be provided” and hence should be 
treated as excluded but " . . .  where backward tracts are more developed, though
44 Report o f the Indian Statuary Commission, vol. II, op. tit., para 128.
45 ibid., para 129.
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still unfitted to take their full share in the normal constitutional advance, different 
arrangements may have to be made . . .”46 The Commission seemed to be of the 
view that once a certain proportion of the population of an excluded area had 
acquired a level of western education and industrial development there would be 
greater legitimacy for the colonial regime and consequently, “political material” for 
the creation of self-governing political institutions.
The relative inability of the colonial discourse to legitimise the colonial rule 
in the tribal areas owing to poor progress of western education in the region ensured 
that the threat of another tribal revolt loomed large. The superiority of the colonial 
discourse in the material domain, which had been accepted by the Indian 
intellectuals, had also not progressed in the region. The operation of the concept of 
protection had further reduced the scope of this kind of intervention. Since the 
legitimisation of the British rule in the tribal areas was still evolving at this stage, 
one of the reasons for the exclusion of these districts from the operation of the 
ordinary laws and enactment may have been fear of another difficult to control tribal 
uprising. The erstwhile Governments of India and Bihar & Orissa could not risk 
such an action on the part of the tribal population in the mineral rich belt. 
Moreover, another uprising would have required the deployment of a large punitive 
force. Such a scenario would have meant that efforts at legitimisation of the regime 
by the use of legislation and western education would have to start from scratch 
again, not to mention the disruption caused to the mining of minerals.
Hence, it may not have been seen as desirable to interfere in the delicate 
balance that existed in the tribal areas under the system of exclusion. This 
conclusion is also borne out by the fact that even after the Government of India Act 
1935, the functions of the government in this area remained what can be termed as 
the negative functions of the State. The missionaries and other social service 
organisations did whatever little development work (both economic and social) was 
undertaken.
46 ibid., para 132.
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The Statutory Commission also drew upon inputs from the non-officials. 
These non-official viewpoints are also important since they not only exercised some 
influence in shaping the perception of the Simon Commission but also enable us to 
understand the prevailing elements of the colonial discourse vis-a-vis the Excluded 
Areas and the challenges that it faced. Amongst the documents presented before the 
Indian Statutory Commission at Patna, the memorandum submitted by the Catholic 
Bishop of Ranchi47 is noteworthy. It emphasised that the “land laws and customs 
should remain untouched what ever the measure of self government granted to other 
parts of India” and that “adequate safe guards should be provided”. Further, this 
Memorial observed that self-government “would be a distinct disadvantage to the 
aboriginal races” because the “degree of civilisation attained by the aboriginals of 
Chota Nagpur is still so far below the degree attained by other races of Bihar and 
Orissa, that the aboriginals are unable to meet these other races on an equal footing 
. . .  As the matters stand now, an illiterate Bengali is more aware, more wide 
awake, more civilised than an aboriginal who has completed the primary course of 
schooling - or even the secondary course. The illiterate Bengali indeed obtains all 
the advantages arising out of his civilised surroundings; the educated aboriginal 
loses much of the fruits of education on account of the backward society in which he 
lives. The aboriginal society is still in the primitive stage . . . ”
The memorial went on to argue that the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act which 
admitted tribal law as Laws would be ignored or bypassed if self-government was 
granted to the tribal areas because “ . . . these privileges would be inevitably 
considered as a mere obstacle by the more clever races who desire to obtain a 
footing in their ancestral land . . . Their simplicity leaves them open to the wiles of 
other races . . .”48 (emphasis added). Further, it quoted instances like the tribal 
peasants mortgaging crops of numerous years to pay off a minuscule debt to 
highlight their plight and need for special treatment without recognising that similar
47 ‘Memorial by the Catholic Bishop Representing the Aboriginals of Chota Nagpur’, Report o f the 
Indian Statutory Commission, vol. XVI: Selections from the Memoranda and Oral Evidence by 
Non-Officials, Part 1, London, 1930, p. 432.
48 ibid., p. 433.
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conditions existed all over rural India and were not peculiar to tribal South Bihar. 
Similarly, other arguments in support of the claim for special administration in tribal 
south Bihar such as inadequate knowledge of technicalities of courts and poor 
literacy levels were all identical to the rest of rural India. Hence, either the whole of 
rural India required special administration or there was no need to exclude the tribal 
areas from general administration. Arguments on similar lines were put forward in 
Memoranda submitted by Rev Kenneth Kennedy, the Bishop of Chota Nagpur49 and 
the Bishop of Calcutta and Metropolitan of India, Burma and Ceylon.S0
These documents clearly underlined the operation of the colonial discourse 
vis-a-vis the tribal population. They carried the presumption that the concepts of a 
tribal society (such as communal property) were in need of ‘civilising influence’ of 
western rationality.
The autonomous form of community formation that was seen at the national 
level was replicated at the level of the Jharkhandi community and it threw up an 
alternative discourse to contest the dominant colonial discourse. This is reflected in 
the Memorandum51 submitted by the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society.52 This 
document not only tried to break away from the colonial typecasts but also 
suggested an alternative framework for looking at the problems of tribal Bihar.
It began by portraying the standard bleak picture of the tribal people, their 
ignorance and their exploitation by outsiders but went on to propose an entirely 
different set of remedies. The Memorandum argued for abolition of the prevailing 
system of laws of tenancy as according to it, under the existing conditions “ . . . to  
all intents and purposes, the aboriginal people are serfs and village organisation is 
‘feudalistic’. The Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act has only confirmed these unjust
49 ibid., p. 434.
50 ibid.
51 ‘Memorandum submitted by the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society’, Report o f the Indian- 
Statutory Commission, vol. XVI: Selections from the Memoranda and Oral Evidence by Non- 
Officials, Part 1, op. cit., p. 435.
52 See chapter II for the importance of the Chotanagpur Improvement Society.
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divisions of lands and aggravated the lifelong grievances of the aboriginals” .53 The 
Chota Nagpur Improvement Society broke new grounds when it demanded that .
. each village should have its own Corporation for self-government in civil matters 
and judicial panchayat in certain matters and executive body in dealing with village 
lands.”54 It also dealt in detail with the basis of franchise, divisions of existing 
provinces, and law and judiciary. Further on, with regard to education, the Chota 
Nagpur Improvement Society demanded that “. . . compulsory primary education be 
introduced . . .  the education at primary stage be imparted through the medium of 
languages spoken in the area”, a local board of education and recurring grants.
This Memorandum demonstrated a dual approach to the tribal areas of south 
Bihar. In accordance with the established colonial discourse, it sought the 
implementation of policies that would further the ‘desirable5 aspects of western 
rationality. In seeking education and self-governance, it was echoing similar 
demands elsewhere. However, it also sought allowances to be made to the cultural 
distinctiveness of the region in terms of promotion of local languages, preservation 
of local laws and customs. In sum, the deputation wanted a system of government 
that recognised the tribal identity (and did not exclude them from the operation of 
ordinary laws) with variations to suit local needs. They observed that “our judicial 
system should be quite different, our educational system should be different. The 
Government must concentrate its attention on the development of our people . . . ”55
A deputation of this Society also called on the Simon Commission on 17 
December 1928 at Patna in which one of the members, Mgr. Van Hoeck, stated that 
the question was “whether we would insist on more safeguards or whether we 
should like the area put under a separate administration, under a Chief 
Commissioner or a Governor as head of Province, I would prefer the latter”. He 
also observed that “I believe that really no insistence is sought to be placed on going 
back to old customs . . . ”
53 ‘Memorandum submitted by the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society’, op .cit., p. 436.
54 ibid.
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To a question by the Commission whether the deputation favoured a paternal 
or a popular government, the deputation spokesman responded that they were in 
favour of a popular government in the sense that it must be a “representative 
government, by an elective method, and a paternal one in the sense that the 
Governor and other officials of the Government should be in more direct and 
sympathetic touch with the people”.56 He added that “we want not only protection of 
our lands but we want to be treated as quite a separate people by ourselves” . This is 
perhaps, the oldest articulation of a tribal identity in the Jharkhand region.
Thus, in the plethora of statements and Memoranda depicting the 
helplessness of the tribal peoples in a way that portrays them as entities without any 
intelligence or will, the Memorandum by the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society, 
comes as a breath of fresh air. While others tried to entrench a paternalistic 
administration, this Memorandum demanded self-governance and greater effort at 
education. It also emphasised although implicitly, that the tribal people were 
competent enough not to need the ‘civilising influences of a paternalistic 
government’ but what was essentially required was a concerted effort at providing 
them with avenues to learn and improve their life-prospects. This is perhaps, the 
only document to question the system of special administration and to suggest a new 
approach to the tribal areas. Although this document did not completely discard the 
colonial discourse, it does go on to articulate a ‘proto-Jharkhandi’ identity in 
whatever imperfect way it deemed fit. Despite the fact that this point of view did not 
find much favour with the Simon Commission, it marked the beginning of a ‘sub­
national discourse’ for political recognition of an identity that was premised on 
cultural attributes, not unlike the nationalist leaders at the national level.
In its report, the Indian Statutory Commission did not refer to the rather 
progressive recommendations made by the Chota Nagpur Improvement Society.
Contd.
55 ibid., p. 455.
56 ibid., p. 454.
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This by default means that the Commission was in agreement with the views of the 
majority that tribal people were primitive and backward and required ‘protection’.
Although a proportion of the Indian intelligentsia had helped the Commission 
in its investigation, they had accepted the broad premises of the colonial discourse, 
especially in the material domain. Therefore, there was little disagreement with 
respect to the continuance of excluding certain areas from ordinary administration. 
Moreover, the intellectuals and nationalists were vigorously engaged in the creation 
of an alternative discourse in India. The tribal issue was considered a part of the 
larger question of socio-economic change. Further, it may be assumed that even if 
the tribal issue was given substantial political space, it is unlikely that the 
nationalists, given their integrationist leanings would have been happy to consider an 
autonomous administrative system for the tribals.
Y
Colonial Discourse and ‘Sub-national’ Discourse in the Constituent Assembly
Before discussing the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, some space 
must be devoted to the tribal question during the transfer of power. Owing to the 
absence of any major intellectual exercise about the tribal issue in the INC and other 
nationalist forums, the transfer of power papers had no major reference to the tribal 
issue. Sir Olaf Caroe, ICS, Secretary in The External Affairs Department, 
Government of India, pointed out in 1947 that “Hitherto there had been an almost 
absence of recognition of the important place the tribes . . . generally must take in 
the India of the future” .57 Although he had made this observation with reference to 
the NWFP tribes, it reflects the general situation of the tribal issue.
There were deliberations about the tribes in the NWFP and Assam but the 
general theme of the discussions and debates was focused on those aspects of the
57 ‘Minutes of First Day of First Governors’ Conference’, 15 April 1947, L/PO/6/123:ff 372-4.381- 
92, reproduced in Mansergh, Nicholas, ed., Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India; 
The Transfer o f Power 1942-47, vol. X, London, 1981, p. 252.
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tribal areas which affected the transfer of power and the partition. Furthermore, 
most references to the tribal question were overshadowed by the communal question 
that was exercising the government of the time. During its last few years, the 
colonial government was more concerned with containing the communal riots, arson 
and looting rather than dwelling upon the future administration of the tribal areas. 
That was to be the task of the Constituent Assembly.
The intellectual baggage that was carried into the Constituent Assembly drew 
heavily on the colonial rationalist-integrationist model. The post-colonial Indian state 
is a rationalist state in the sense that it continues the colonial state’s emphasis on a 
rationally organised Weberian bureaucracy. It seeks to further its twin goals of 
development and integration with the help of a bureaucratic planning and delivery 
mechanism. The centralised development planning presupposes that a certain policy 
must ‘rationally5 work in all contexts and ignores the political and cultural factors. 
The Constituent Assembly adopted more of a melting-pot model and not a ‘salad- 
bowl’ approach in which all the different communities would retain their identity 
and still be a part of the national community. One may venture the opinion that such 
an approach was a direct result of the adoption of the colonial integrationist 
approach. The experience of partition seemed to vindicate the nationalists’ 
integrationist approach. One is not quite sure if the trend of integration of peoples 
different from the mainstream communities and political groups is desirable, or even 
safe, in a democratic system of governance. Here again, the dilemma of the political 
system to choose between the integrationist and salad-bowl approach towards such 
socio-political groups is evident
Owing to the acceptance of the material domain of the colonial discourse, the 
Constituent Assembly employed a number of colonial concepts and presumptions. 
The integrationist approach of the colonial discourse was reinforced in the minds of 
the nationalist leaders by the experience of partition and formed the basis of the 
political reorganisation of India. Moreover, politics and economics were two areas 
where the nationalists had accepted the desirability of the colonial rationalist 
discourse. Therefore, the Constituent Assembly sought to implement the ideals that 
the nationalist leaders had learnt to cherish such as industry-led development and 
political democracy and a complete break from the colonial approach could not be
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expected. Further, the integrationist approach of the Constituent Assembly was 
perhaps, reinforced by its desire to remove the ‘rule of difference’ which the 
nationalists had contested during the freedom movement. Consequently, while a 
number of colonial concepts prevailed, some new ground was broken.
The Government of India Act 1935 provided a model for the new 
Constitution of independent India. Inputs into the constitution making process such 
as the Cabinet Mission statement of 16th May 1946, which mentioned the Excluded 
Areas and Partially Excluded Areas as being of particular importance for the 
Constituent Assembly,58 added to the already accepted integrationist model.
The Cabinet Mission statement directed that the Advisory Committee on 
Fundamental Rights and Minorities should be established at the preliminary session 
of the Constituent Assembly with representation of all the interests affected 
(including all religious minorities and Excluded Areas). One of its functions was to 
report to the Constituent Assembly on a scheme for the administration of the tribal 
and the Excluded Areas.59 Consequently, the Advisory Committee in its meeting on 
27 February 1947 set up three Sub-committees.60 One was to report on the future 
administration of the Excluded Areas in Assam while another was to consider the 
future administrative arrangements in the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas 
(other than Assam). The latter thus, considered the tribal areas of Bihar. The 
Chairperson of the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights, Minorities and 
Tribal and Excluded Areas suggested that a joint meeting of the two Sub- 
Committees should be held in August 1949. The Report of the Joint Subcommittee 
exercised a profound influence in shaping the approach of the framers of the 
Constitution of India towards the tribal population or ‘problem5 which noted that
58 Statement o f the Cabinet Mission 16 May 1946, para 19 (iv), reproduced in B. Shiva Rao, The 
Framing o f India’s Constitution, vol. I, New Delhi, 1966, pp. 209-18.
59 ibid., para 20.
60 One of the three Sub-Committees was entrusted with the task of considering the tribal areas in the 
North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. After partition therefore, only two Sub-Committees 
functioned chaired by A. V. Thakkar and G. N. Bardoloi.
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the areas inhabited by the tribes, . . .  are difficult to access, highly 
malarial and infested also in some cases by other diseases like yaws 
and venereal disease and lacking in such civilizing facilities as roads, 
schools, dispensaries and water supply. The tribes themselves are for 
the most part extremely simple people who can be and are exploited 
with ease by plainsfolk resulting in the passage of land formerly 
cultivated by them to moneylenders and other erstwhile non­
agriculturists. While a good number of superstitions and even harmful 
practices are prevalent among them the tribes have their own customs 
and way o f life with institutions like tribal and village panchayats or 
councils which are very effective in smoothing village administration.
The sudden disruption o f the tribal customs and ways by exposure to 
the impact o f a more complicated and sophisticated manner o f life is 
capable o f doing great harm. Considering past experience and strong 
temptation to take advantage of the tribals’ simplicity and weaknesses 
it is essential to provide statutory safeguards for the protection of the 
land which is the mainstay of the aboriginal’s economic life and for 
his customs and institutions which, apart from being his own, contain 
element of value61 (emphasis added).
This statement by the Sub-Committee at the helm of affairs vis-a-vis the 
tribal population is quite important in deciphering the then prevailing discourse with 
regard to the tribals. In a number of ways, this approach is direct continuation of the 
colonial discourse. The statement continues the colonial stereotype of the tribal 
people as savage and intellectually weak who have no understanding or capabilities 
to protect themselves from being exploited. References to superstitions and harmful 
practices also reflect a similar point of view. This creation of a ‘them’ versus ‘we’ 
dichotomy resulted in a paternalistic, almost patronising attitude in the mind of the 
Constituent Assembly which reflected a heavy dependence on the colonial discourse.
The above approach also meant that the concept of protection as witnessed in 
the colonial period was carried on in the postcolonial period, albeit in a somewhat 
different form. In its Interim Report, the Sub-Committee on Excluded and Partially 
Excluded Areas (other than Assam) was also of the view that the people of the
61 Enclosure in Joint Report o f the Excluded and the Partially Excluded Areas (other than Assam) and 
the Northeast Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded Areas Sub-Committees, 25 August 1947, New 
Delhi, 1947, para 2, reproduced in B. Shiva Rao, The Framing o f India's Constitution, vol. Ill, 
New Delhi, 1967, pp. 770- 779.
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Excluded Areas have no experience in local self-government 
institutions of the modern or statutory type and are of course not 
represented in the legislature. The management of a local board is 
perhaps likely to be a much bigger undertaking for the people of 
these areas than the mere election of a representative to the 
Legislature and the establishment of such bodies needs perhaps a 
period of official guidance and control. . ,62
This Sub-Committee thus emphasised that it was not prudent to leave the 
solution of the tribal problem to the provincial governments with limited financial 
resources and competing claims. The protectionist element of the colonial discourse 
continued without any major modification.
In its sincerity to explore alternative administrative arrangements for the 
tribal population, the Sub-Committee questioned the desirability of continuing the 
policy of exclusion of the tribal areas. It pointed out that the system of exclusion 
despite being in force for a number of years, had not yielded many benefits. It laid 
the blame for this at the doors of erstwhile Governors since such areas were outside 
the realms of legislative voting. It pointed out that “no definite programme for the 
development of the Excluded Areas with the view to removing the disability of 
exclusion has been followed”.63 It blamed the system of shared responsibility for the 
ills in the administration of tribal areas. It stressed the point that
the representatives of the partially Excluded Areas have not been 
capable of bringing sufficient pressure and influence to bear on the 
Ministry. Further, some of the Partially Excluded Areas which 
constitute small pockets in large districts and constituencies could 
apparently be lost sight of and their interests subordinated to those of 
larger areas in which they were contained.64
It summed up the operation of the Excluded/ Partially Excluded Areas in the 
following words: the “partial exclusion or exclusion has been of very little practical
62 Interim Report o f the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (other than Assam) Sub-Committee, 
August and September 1947, New Delhi, 1947, para 4, reproduced in Shiva Rao, vol. Ill, op. cit., 
pp. 733-763.
63 ibid., para 5.
64 ibid.
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value. There has been neither educational nor economic development on any 
appreciable scale. The object of special administration has thus not been achieved, 
and it is clear that if the hill tribes are to be brought up to the level o f the rest of the 
population the strongest measures are now necessary”65 (emphasis added). The Sub- 
Committee saw the final solution to the problems of backward areas in development 
as defined by the mainstream and consequent assimilation. The rationalist model of 
development therefore, remained the central plank of the Sub-Committee’s 
recommendations.
There appears to be a degree of contradiction in the point of view of the Sub­
committee. On one hand, the Sub-Committee expressed its doubts on the necessity 
of having a system of special administration whereas on the other hand, it 
recommended a special administration to ‘bring’ the tribal people up to the level of 
the rest of the population.66 This inconsistency is perhaps, due to the centripetal pull 
to unify all the peoples of India under one administration in which there is no 
exception of any kind (integrationist approach), the desire to end the ‘rule of 
difference’ and also the underlying belief in the protection of ‘lesser developed 
communities’. The Sub-Committee did not find it desirable for the administrative 
arrangements to reflect cultural identities and emphasised the necessity of a fast- 
track rationalist development and industrialisation in the future administrative 
arrangement for the tribal areas.
On the question of representation in the legislatures also, the Sub-Committee 
favoured reserved seats in a joint electorate. By advocating a joint electorate with 
reservation of seats for the scheduled tribes, the Sub-Committee tried to politically 
unify all the communities with adequate safeguards for the more backward sections. 
Here, the unifying and integrationist approach of the Sub-Committee is evident.
65 ibid.
66 ibid.
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Interestingly, despite earlier references by the Sub-Committee to the unique 
cultural characteristics of the tribes, their case was identified with that of Scheduled 
Castes. It pointed out that the tribal population was
in fact more backward in education and in their economic condition 
than the Scheduled Castes. Representation in proportion to their 
numbers in the Legislatures, even if some of them are not vocal or 
able to argue their case will emphasise the importance and urgency of 
their problems. And it is to the interest of the country to see that 
these original inhabitants of the Indian soil are brought up to the level 
of the rest so that they can contribute in due measure to the progress 
of the country rather than be a drag on the rest . . .The aboriginals 
have to take part in direct elections sometime and the sooner their 
training for this starts the better 67 (emphasis added).
In comparing the cases of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, no 
reference is made to the specific tribal culture and way of life (although this is 
acknowledged elsewhere in the report). There was also an underlying element of 
integrationist and unifying approach - all communities have to become one and 
contribute to national progress. It carried a dangerous thread of uniformity and 
assimilation. Besides, the tribal people in their present state were considered a drag 
on the national life and their contribution as labourers in mines, tea gardens and 
elsewhere was not taken into account.
In the years immediately after independence, nationalist euphoria and the 
trauma of partition emphasised the need for a manifestly integrationist approach. 
The national community was perceived to subsume all other identities. We now have 
the benefit of hindsight to point out that this was only a fond hope. Perhaps, the 
nationalist leaders who formed the Sub-Committee believed that by vigorously 
promoting an ‘Indian’ identity supported by a uniform economic and administrative 
system, local identities would be subsumed into the national identity. The 
desirability of a unifying and uniform model of development as defined by the 
majority community thus permeated the report.
67 ibid., para 9.
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The recommendation to de-Schedule the districts of Manbhum, Hazaribagh 
and Palamau derived from this belief. According to the Sub-Committee, these 
districts had attained a level of development that did not require special treatment. It 
may be pointed out that these districts were more urbanised due to mining and other 
industrial activities. In these districts the tribals were working in industrial 
enterprises where conditions of exploitation were similar to the ones in the 
agricultural sector. It implies that the Sub-Committee did not consider there to be a 
scope of exploitation in industrial occupations. The undertone of the Sub-Committee 
was that the ‘civilising’ affects of industry were a remedy to all problems associated 
with the tribal regions. The colonial rationalist model with its dependence on 
industrialisation can be seen clearly. Moreover, the colonial approach of ending of 
exclusion in areas where industry and education had progressed to a certain level 
was continued.
Although the Report of the Sub-Committee did not generate much debate, 
Jaipal Singh, the tribal leader from the Jharkhand region, put forward a Minute of 
Dissent in the Report in which he argued against the de-Scheduling of the districts of 
Manbhum, Hazaribagh and Palamau. He pointed out that according to 1941 Census 
this area was inhabited by 1,479,485 adibasis (tribal population). He held that “I 
cannot see how I can agree to the demolition of the economic, geographical and 
ethnic unity and entity of the Chota Nagpur Division. It is not right that we should 
give an ex parte verdict and change the status quo of these three districts” .68
He was in effect, raising the question of tribal identity. His statement also 
implied the importance of considering the needs, opinions and aspirations of the 
tribal people. He emphasised the need to collect the views of the tribal population on 
this new arrangement. In some ways, Jaipal Singh was utilising the same arguments 
which the nationalists had advanced to the British administration. He was 
emphasising the same rationalist arguments for the recognition of the tribal 
community as the campaigners for popular government had done vis-a-vis British 
rule in the 19th and 20th centuries.
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Such autonomous form of creation of political identities by the ‘sub-national’ 
community in the Jharkhand region was already emerging during the last decade of 
British rule in India. By 1948-49, the sub-national community thus formed was 
beginning to demand political recognition by the Indian state. The Final Report of 
the Sub-Committee took note of discontent in the Chota Nagpur region and said:
the feeling [is] common among educated tribals and shared by non- 
tribals in considerable measure that Chota Nagpur has little share in 
the administration commensurate with its area, population and 
industrial importance and is being neglected by the Government which 
is made up o f elements interested mostly in the rest o f Bihar. Certain 
aboriginal witnesses have expressed their views about the neglect of 
Chota Nagpur in no uncertain terms and suggested that the 
ameliorative measures claimed by the Government are purely 
defensive action prompted by the separation movement . . . The 
extreme expression o f the discontent prevalent in Chota Nagpur is the 
separatist movement which demands the formation o f a new province 
of Jharkhand out o f the partially excluded area69 (emphasis added).
This section of the final report negates the observations made in the interim 
report that the Adivasis were not politically conscious and were incapable of 
expressing, protecting and promoting their interest. A politically passive community 
cannot be conceived to demand a better share in the products of economic activities 
of the area, a better administration and general well-being or upliftment. The 
common people of the area might not have been as vocal as their educated tribal 
brethren but the fact that some kind of separatist movement was observed by the 
Sub-Committee implies that the tribal people were not so passive as the Sub 
Committee had presumed. This again brings out its paternalistic bias. It was also 
forced to admit that “the problem of administration in this tract must be dealt with 
not only by economic and educational improvements but also by remedies which
Contd.
68 ibid., Appendix D, Minute o f Dissent by Jaipal Singh, 19 August 1947.
69 Final Report o f the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (Other than Assam) Sub-Committee, 
September 1947, New Delhi, 1947, para 2, reproduced in Shiva Rao, vol. Ill, op. cit., pp. 763- 
770.
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recognised its political and psychological aspects; and we would lay the maximum 
emphasis on the urgency of action in both these directions” .70
Jaipal Singh again recorded a minute of dissent in the final report on the 
lines of the one in the interim report arguing against the de-scheduling of certain 
areas in south Bihar. However, what is pertinent here is the fact that the 
Chairperson of the Sub-Committee, A. V. Thakkar, decided to record a Note of 
Comment on this Minute of Dissent. This expressed the view that “‘Scheduling’ has 
a certain special meaning which was not explained to nor known by the witnesses at 
all, not even to Dr. Sachchidananda Sinha. Therefore they could not distinguish 
between Scheduled and non-Scheduled areas in which tribes reside . . . ”71 This again 
reflected a strangely deep-rooted belief about the lack of understanding amongst the 
tribals, despite evidence to the contrary. The above discussion highlights that the 
Sub-Committee drew heavily on the practices and typology of the preceding colonial 
government.72
Despite its heavy dependence on the colonial discourse, the Sub-Committee 
broke new ground when it recommended the creation of Tribes Advisory Councils. 
It observed that
Taking into account the past history of these tracts, the needs and 
susceptibilities of the people . . .  it appears desirable . . . that 
Provincial Governments should be advised to take such actions as the 
establishment of District Councils and Tribes Advisory Councils as 
may be possible immediately to give effect to the policy
70 ibid.
71 Note by the Chairman on the Minutes o f Dissent by Shri Jaipal Singh, 25 September, 1947 in ibid.
72 The Sub-Committee on the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (other than Assam) made some 
further observations which show that it was not only heavily dependent on the colonial discourse 
but also had an inadequate understanding of the actual needs of the areas concerned. It 
recommended that shifting cultivation “should be eliminated as soon as possible” (Interim Report, 
op. cit., para 23) without taking into account whether an alternate strategy was valid for such 
areas. It seems that the members found it difficult to create new frames of reference for the tribal 
population. The only new additions were the emphases on the unity of India, democratisation and 
universal franchise. The emphasis on these areas owes its origin to the material realm of the 
colonial discourse that the nationalists had enthusiastically adopted.
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recommended by us and to make such statutory regulations for this 
purpose as may be necessary.73
The Sub-Committee’s recommendation that vacant land in tribal areas should 
be allotted for cultivation after consulting the Tribes Advisory Councils to be set up 
in all states having tribal population was another step that sought greater 
democratisation of government decisions. Here the Joint Sub-Committee expressed 
an eagerness to implement democratic institutions of some kind and was not ready to 
wait till the time the new Constitution came into force. This proves that the Sub- 
Committee found indications of the tribals being able to handle democratic 
institutions although they had not been much exposed to the modern ones.
The recommendation of the Sub-Committee on land alienation also marks a 
break with the past. The Sub-Committee observed that “Alienation of any kind, 
even to other tribals, may have to be prohibited or severely restricted . . .”74 This 
observation reflects the fact that the Sub-Committee addressed the need to treat the 
tribal agriculturists as akin to poor peasants elsewhere and acknowledged the 
possibility of some tribals becoming exploiters (despite their tribal origins) of other 
tribal people.
The Report of the two Sub-Committees did not generate much debate in the 
Constituent Assembly. Curiously, several references were made to clause 20 of the 
Cabinet Mission statement dated 16 May 1946 under which Advisory Committees 
on Excluded and partially Excluded Areas were set up. One gets the impression that 
had the Cabinet Mission not made such reference, the Constituent Assembly would 
have perhaps ignored the issue of the tribal population altogether. In its zeal to unify 
India under one kind of administration and to bring about effective integration of all 
areas and people, the Constituent Assembly might have not devoted any time and 
attention to this question.
73 Joint Report, op. cit., para 1.
74 Interim Report, op. cit., para 25.
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The members of the Constituent Assembly by and large shared the attitude of 
the Sub-Committee. Yudhisthir Mishra (Orissa General) opined: “I cannot but 
strongly press for the protection of these tribal people . . .  by bringing these tribal 
areas under the scope of the Fifth Schedule”75 (emphasis added). Further, he was of 
the opinion that the “tribal areas according to the proposed Constitution will no 
longer be treated like the excluded or partially excluded Areas in the present 
Constitution . . . The scheduled areas specified in the Fifth Schedule will not be 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Legislature or executive” and that “the Tribal 
Advisory Committee, . . . will only work as a sort of check on the executive power 
of the provinces as far as tribal matters are concerned.”76 This statement reflects the 
presumption that once the tribal areas were brought under general administration 
albeit with checks, the problems of all such areas would be solved.
The Constituent Assembly’s approach on this issue also reflects a belief in 
the mainstream industry-led model of development as a panacea for all ills in the 
tribal areas. The framers of the Indian Constitution believed that the problems and 
discontentment in the tribal areas existed due to their exclusion from the mainstream 
development patterns. By implication it was perhaps felt that no need existed for 
special administration or development programmes in the tribal areas. This attitude 
is summarised in H. V. Kamath’s statement:
It will be agreed . . .[by all] that we do not contemplate the 
continuance of these various tribal scheduled areas in the same 
condition as they are today. I am sure that all of us visualise the day 
when they will be brought up to the level o f the adjoining 
neighbouring provinces and will be integrated with the Provinces and 
States that lie contiguous to them. We do not contemplate a 
permanently differently type of administration for them from what is 
obtaining or might obtain or will obtain in the rest of India . . .77 
(emphasis added).
75 Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. IX no. 1, 19 August 1949, New Dellii, 1949, p. 494.
76 ibid.
77 ibid.
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The use of the terms like ‘brought up’ and not alternatives such as ‘come up’ 
for the tribal population certainly reflects a patronising attitude. The underlying idea 
was that the tribal people were somehow, incapable of looking after themselves and 
if the goal of assimilation of the tribal population into the national mainstream was 
to be achieved, the ‘superior civilised people’ -  that is the non-tribals -  would have 
to make deliberate efforts to ‘civilise them’. It seems to be an indigenous corollary 
of the ‘white man’s burden’ and elements of the colonial discourse are quite evident.
This perception although shared by the majority, did not signify an absolute 
consensus on the issue. Jaipal Singh differed on a number of issues. In the debates 
on the Draft Constitution on 24 August 1949, Jaipal Singh delivered a lengthy 
political speech. His remarks are relevant and useful for this study since this is one 
of the few places in the Constituent Assembly debates where an effort was made to 
divorce the case of Scheduled Tribes from that of the Scheduled Castes. Jaipal Singh 
also raised the issue of the existence of a tribal community in Jharkhand. He pointed 
out that the Constituent Assembly had not had the opportunity to discuss the 
recommendations made by the two Tribal Areas Sub-Committees and wanted more 
time to be devoted to the issue. He emphasised that the tribal people were the true 
and original inhabitants of India and as such had a claim to the whole of India and 
yet emphasised that the reservation of seats for the tribal people in the legislatures 
was necessary. Referring to the fact that the Muslims and Christians had given up 
their claim for such reservation, Jaipal Singh observed that
Adivasis are not giving up anything because they never had anything.
It seems very surprising that people talk of democracy when their 
whole conduct has been undemocratic in the past, [he implies the past 
centuries] . . .  It is essential that these people be compelled to come 
out of their jungle-fastness. It is for that reason reservation is very 
necessary. If you want unity in this country, we must all get 
together.78
He did not find a contradiction in ‘all the people getting together’ and 
reservation of seats for the tribals. On the one hand he emphasised the unity of India
78 Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. IX no. 17, 24 August 1949, New Delhi, 1949, p. 651.
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and at the same time demanded reservation of seats for the tribal people. He thus 
implied that the tribal identity was a part of the Indian identity and yet separate from 
it. The claim of a Jharkhandi ‘sub-national’ identity for political recognition was 
thus underway.
Further on, Jaipal Singh emphasised that the tribal people no longer lived in 
jungles and interaction between the tribal population and the rest of the people was 
common place. He thus underlined the capability of the tribal people to cope 
successfully with the different conditions of the rest of the world. Contradicting 
himself in the very next statement he went on to state that the tribals had always 
been exploited by the dikus (outsiders) which the “Adivasi rightly resents.”
A noticeable feature of this speech is that he underlined the capabilities of 
the tribal people to take on the world but at the same time asked for concessions for 
them based on their economic and political isolation and consequent backwardness. 
He was almost prophetic when he said that “I am not at all optimistic that in the 
short space of ten years, which means two general elections, Adivasis will have 
come to the level of rest of India . . . ”79 Simultaneously however, he supported joint 
electorates:
I welcome the fact that the Adivasis will be elected from the joint 
general electorates . . .  I also welcome the fact that the House, as a 
whole, is unanimous that Adivasis must be compelled to come into 
the Government of the provinces as well as at the Centre . . . There
must be 51 [MLAs] because there will be 51 seats reserved for them .
80
His support for joint electorates was probably due to unitary influences so 
common in those days as well as the integrationist colonial discourse that still held 
its sway. However, he was quick to point out that the tribals, being one of the most 
backward sections of the society, required special treatment. He was of the opinion 
" . . .  that any section of our society that is economically and politically backward
79 ibid.
80 ibid., p. 652.
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must have safeguards and provisions that will enable it to come up to the general 
level” .81
On similar lines, Yudhisthir Mishra pointed out that the ten-year restriction 
to the reservation for Scheduled Castes and Tribes would not be enough to serve the 
interests of Scheduled Tribes. He was of the opinion that Scheduled Tribes were far 
more backward compared to the Scheduled Castes. He declared that:
I hold that the standard of education and material well-being of the 
Scheduled tribes are lower in most cases than even those of the 
Scheduled Castes. This is clear from the representation of the 
scheduled tribes in this House in comparison with the representation 
that the Scheduled Castes have been able to secure. Even the 
representative character of this House has been challenged by some 
people . . ,82
He used these words to emphasise the need for reservation for Scheduled 
Tribes but also, in a way not quite like Jaipal Singh, differentiated between the 
needs of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. His ground for such a 
distinction was that the tribal people would require a greater amount of time to be 
able to play on a level field with other communities. Nonetheless, he was aware of 
the need for difference of treatment for the tribal population. Although his was a 
minority opinion in the Constituent Assembly, it certainly was a departure from the 
dominant discourse.
Speaking on the occasion, Brajeshwar Prasad opposed the extension of 
representation to the tribal areas and pointed out that “by giving them a few seats 
here and there, their economic condition and their educational level will in no way 
be improved” .83 He was one of the few members of the Constituent Assembly who 
dwelt on the need for direct support to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes in terms of 
their actual needs. However, he was opposed to tribal representation in the
81 ibid., p. 653. 
82.ibid., p. 675. 
83 ibid., p. 664.
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legislatures, as he was unsure if “representation in legislatures will in anyway alter 
the material and moral levels of these people” .84 The continuation of the colonial 
discourse of ‘sympathetic and experienced handling’ and not self-determination of 
the tribal population is quite clear.
Jaipal Singh outlined though not in detail, the existence of an identity 
amongst the tribal peoples as different from the non-tribal population. He pointed 
out that it does not befit the rest of India to tell the tribals what was democracy 
because
Adibasi society is the most democratic element in this country. Can 
the rest of India say the same thing? . . .  In Adibasi society all are 
equal, rich or poor. Everyone has equal opportunity and I do not 
wish that people should get away with the idea that by writing this 
Constitution and operating it we are trying to put a new idea into the 
Adibasi society. What we are actually doing is you are learning and 
taking something . . . Non-Adibasi society has learnt much and has 
still to learn a good deal. Adibasis are the most democratic people 
and they will not let India get smaller or weaker . . .  I would like the 
members . . . [to] not be so condescending.85
During the debates, Jaipal Singh underlined the lingual aspect of tribal 
identity. He pointed out that the outsiders were treated suspiciously because of their 
ignorance of the tribal languages and proclaimed that they would be “treated with 
less of suspicion than they are now”86 if they knew some of the tribal languages.
Also pertinent is the fact that this kind of articulation of tribal identity was 
not seen as clashing with the Indian identity in any way. According to him, the 
dominant viewpoint of working towards a pan-national identity which would 
subsume all sub-identities, might not be a desirable option but pointed out that these 
identities are not necessarily at cross-purposes with the national identity, (this 
position survives till today). Jaipal Singh stated that
84 Ibid., p. 663.
85 ibid., 653-54.
86 ibid., pp. 990-1.
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What is necessary is that the backward groups in our country should 
be enabled to stand on their own legs so that they can assert 
themselves. It is not the intention of this Constitution, nor do I desire 
it, that the advanced community should be carrying my people in 
their arms for the rest of eternity. All that we plead is that the 
wherewithal should be provided . . .  so that we will be able to stand 
on our own legs and regain the lost nerves and be useful citizens of 
India . . .  I may assure non-Adibasis that Adibasis will play a much 
bigger part than you imagine, if only you will be honest about your 
intentions and let them play a part they have a right to play.87
The above quoted speech carries a claim of the adivasis for better treatment 
as well as an articulation of an autonomous community. It is not yet a clear demand 
for recognition as a separate identity, but is definitely an underlining of such an 
identity. Another stark point is the fact that this is the only place where there is no 
undertone of pity for the poor state of the tribal people but a demand from the rest 
of India to give the tribals their due. It was a nascent expression of tribal identity in 
terms of their difference from the rest of India. The point that is important here is 
that they were not in any way -  politically, culturally or socially -  inferior from the 
mainstream but only different. This strain of tribal identity survives till date, as was 
revealed in the field trip.
In the debates on 5 September 1949, Jaipal Singh insisted that there should 
be a provision obliging the Governors of the states having Scheduled Tribes 
population to report on the state of their development every year and not at the 
discretion of the President as envisaged. According to him, the motive behind such 
an amendment was that without such a provision the Government of India would not 
be aware of the state of affairs in the tribal areas. Further, he was critical that a 
merely advisory status was envisaged for the Tribes Advisory Councils and not an 
actively political one (as had been recommended by the Joint Sub-Committee on 
Tribal areas). He asserted that “Tribes Advisory Council should be effective and
87 ibid., p. 654.
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have a real say in what is being done . . . ”88 and not mere advisory powers subject 
to the pleasure of the Governors or Rulers of a province or state.
This speech generated only a lukewarm response from other members of the 
Constituent Assembly. The debate on this issue continued on the lines of the 
dominant discourse. Shibban Lai Saksena, speaking on the same day, probably 
summed up the majority view of the Constituent Assembly, which drew upon the 
colonial discourse:
The existence of the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled areas are a 
stigma on our nation just as the existence of untouchability is a stigma 
on the Hindu religion. That these brethren of ours are still in such a 
sub-human state of existence is something for which we should be 
ashamed. Of course, all these years this country was a slave of the 
British, but we cannot be free from blame. . . . these scheduled tribes 
and areas must as soon as possible become a thing of the past . . .  I 
only want that these scheduled tribes and scheduled areas should be 
developed so quickly that they may become indistinguishable from 
the rest of the Indian population and that this responsibility should be 
thrown on the Union Government and on the Parliament.89
This statement reflects the continuation of the approach developed by the 
colonial official-scholars that the tribal community was waiting to be absorbed and 
integrated into either the Hindu community or the mainstream communities. Until 
such time, there is a necessity to protect the tribes and make efforts to facilitate their 
speedy integration.
The dominant nationalist discourse in the Constituent Assembly also 
undermined any suggestion of a separate tribal identity. Reacting to the possibility 
of the existence of a ‘sub-national’ tribal identity that does not clash with the 
national identity as raised by Jaipal Singh, K. M. Munshi pointed out:
. . . which he called Adibasis collectively form part of a single 
community . . .  is . . .  an entirely incorrect statement of facts. Each 
province has many scheduled tribes of its own. Each of these tribes is 
different from the other ethnically as mellas [well as (sic)] from the
88 Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. IX no. 26, 5 September 1949, New Delhi, 1949, p. 976.
89 ibid., p. 979.
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point of view of language, . . . [and] social and religious customs.
There is nothing common between one tribe and another . . .  To call 
them Adibasis and group them together as one community will not 
only be an untruth in itself but would be absolutely ruinous for the 
tribes themselves. Therefore it is necessary that in order to give them 
a proper place in the society, different sets of activities would have to 
be adopted. This is the cardinal difference between the attitude of my 
friend, Mr. Jaipal Singh, and the rest of us. The Adibasis are not one 
conscious, corporate, collective whole in this country, that somebody 
can speak in its name or can lead a movement combining them into a 
single unit . . . We want that the Scheduled Tribes in the whole 
country should be protected from the destructive impact o f races 
possessing a higher and more aggressive culture and should be 
encouraged to develop their own autonomous life; at the same time 
we want them to take a larger part of the country adopted. They 
should not be isolated communities or little republics to be 
perpetuated for ever90 (emphasis added).
Continuing the dominant integrationist nationalist discourse, Munshi saw no 
merit in Jaipal Singh’s and Yudhisthir Mishra’s efforts at seeking greater powers 
and role of the Tribes Advisory councils. He opined that “. . . Tribes Advisory 
Council should . . .  aid and advise the Governor in all matters” regarding the 
administration of scheduled areas and found it “an utter absurdity” that the 
Governor be obliged to act on such advice. Munshi also observed that . . I am 
sure they [tribals] would say that they do not understand a word of it [Moneylenders 
Act], The word ‘consulted’ therefore has been put in the place of ‘advice’ 
purposely” . He saw it as impossible that the Tribes Advisory Council of a small 
tribe would come to a conclusion with regard to an elaborate Act of Parliament “as 
to what provisions of it should or should not apply.” Hence, it has been provided 
that “. . . with regard to the regulations of transfer of land and other things relating 
to the welfare of the tribes, the tribal assembly will have to be consulted. Naturally 
their interests will be placed before the government in the course of consultations. 
But to make decision depend upon the advice of this assembly, would in the end 
lead to disaster to the tribes themselves”.91
90 ibid., pp. 997-8.
91 ibid., pp. 998-9.
150
Other members shared this paternalism, integrationist thrust and reluctance 
to delegate powers to local bodies. Kuladhar Chaliha (Assam General) was of the 
opinion that if tribes are allowed to run administration then it will be a negation of 
justice or administration due to the practice of summary justice for a grievance 
prevalent amongst some tribes. He apprehended separatist tendencies at work if 
delegation of powers was resorted to and feared that ‘tribalistan’ would be created 
just as “you have created Pakistan.” Therefore, he was in favour of central and 
provincial governments keeping ample reserve powers.92
To summarise, the main current of the debates in the Constituent Assembly 
was assimilation of the different sections of a very varied tribal population, as was 
the case with other minorities. The members of the Constituent Assembly seemed to 
be of the opinion that all identities should merge into the Indian identity as soon as 
possible. They did not conceive of a multi identity, multi-faceted India in which all 
the sub-identities combine together to form a larger Indian identity. The salad bowl 
approach was clearly absent in the Constituent Assembly debates.
Another notable point in the debates was that people from across the political 
spectrum spoke on the question of reservation of seats for the Scheduled Castes and 
Tribes. Their main line in supporting this issue was the exploited past of the tribes 
and the members who argued against it dwelt by and large, on the fissiparous 
tendencies which they saw built into the logic of granting reservation of seats.
It is also interesting to note that despite an attempt on the part of Jharkhandi 
leaders to create an autonomous community premised on tribal cultural uniqueness, 
the issue of speedy development of the tribal population was repeatedly emphasised. 
The integrationist view could not conceive of any challenge to the national 
community from any lesser community and development was seen as the remedy to 
whatever dissatisfaction that existed in the region. In the years to come, the identity 
aspects of the Jharkhand movement came to be increasingly dominated by the 
developmental aspects.
92 Constituent Assembly Debates, vol. IX no. 27, 6 September 1949, New Delhi, 1949, pp. 1007-8.
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Hence, although the Constituent Assembly continued a number of elements 
of the colonial discourse into the Constitution, it also broke new ground with its 
emphasis on universal adult franchise for the tribal population and welfare policies 
for a speedy development in the region. It must be pointed out that the material 
domain of the colonial discourse had been at the root of a number of such issues. 
Once the nationalist government had taken office, it sought to implement all the 
elements of colonial discourse that the nationalists saw as desirable. The creation of 
the nationalist state was seen as the fulfilment of the national community and the 
Indian state was not left with much intellectual use for the autonomous community 
that had been imagined by the nationalists. The independent Indian state left this 
aspect of the nationalist thought to the regional communities to experiment with and 
in some cases, achieve political recognition from the Indian state. For instance, the 
lingual reorganisation of Indian states in 1956 was an acceptance by the State that 
some degree of political recognition to ‘sub-national’ communities was required.
VI
Tribal Policy in Independent India
After the new Constitution came into force in 1950, under Article 339,93 The 
Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes Commission was appointed in 195994 under 
the Chairmanship of U. N. Dhebar. In defining the problem before it, the 
Commission observed that “the term ‘tribe’ is nowhere defined in the Constitution .
. .”95 which merely states “that the Scheduled Tribes are ‘the tribes or the tribal 
communities or parts of or groups within tribes or tribal communities’96 which the
93 Article 339 stipulates that: “The President may at anytime and shall at the expiration of ten years 
from the commencement of this Constitution by order appoint a Commission to report on the 
administration of the Scheduled Areas and the welfare of the Scheduled Tribes in the States . . . 
Constitution o f India, 1950.
94 Vide Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs notification no. 11/6/59-SCT.IV DT.
95 Report o f the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes Commission, vol. 1 1960-61, para 1.1.
96Constitution o f India, op. cit., Article 342.
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President may specify by public notification”.97 It has a different meaning for 
different people in different contexts. This state of affairs as far as the definition of 
tribes is concerned continues till date.
The Commission drew upon the majority points of view of the Constituent 
Assembly and held that “everyone who has had something to do with the tribal 
problem can bear witness to the burning desire of these unspoilt children of Mother 
India for advance and progress consistent with their notion o f culture and civilized 
existence”98 (emphasis added).
Thus, ten years after the new Constitution came into force, when referring to 
the tribal people, the colonial discourse survived in some form. Moreover, the 
Indian state seemed to have become totally engrossed with the issue of speedy 
implementation of developmental policies. As far as the Indian state was concerned, 
the question of the nature of the administrative arrangements for the tribal areas had 
been addressed and resolved by the Constituent Assembly. Consequently, the 
subsequent SC/ST Commissions did not question the suitability of the industry-led 
model of development and instead devoted their attention to the factors that hinder 
the implementation of the industrialisation-integration model of development.
Hence, the Dhebar Commission observed that “there is the problem that the 
tribals belong to varying and widely different stage of development . . .”"  and in 
that context highlighted “the problem of integration and development” .100 It went on 
to declare that “our objective is advancement and integration of tribals [;] . . . our 
aim has been . . .  to secure to the tribal people, along with all other people of India, 
a social order based upon equality of status and opportunity and a fraternity . . . ” 
Thus, it carried on with the integrationist point of view which was the mainstream 
view at that time and harped upon the “great awakening” of the tribal people by
97 ibid., para 1.2.
98 ibid., para 1.20.
99 ibid., para. 1.20.
100 ibid., para. 1.23
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means of massive developmental activities carried out by the State machinery. This 
perception neither questioned the logic of integrating the diverse identities into one 
nor challenged the soundness of implementing development programmes that have 
little relevance to the poor people and their lives, leave alone tribals.
In light of the above, it is no surprise that the subsequent reports of the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Commission have become more or less 
statistical diaries concerned mainly with the performance of the public policy 
machinery. They do not analyse the rationale behind a certain government policy. 
For instance, The Report of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
Commission 1966-67, Report of the Study Team on Tribal Development 
Programmes 1969 and The Report of the Advisory Committee on the Revision of 
the List of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 1965, all treated the tribal issues 
as aspects of the larger problems of efficient implementation of development 
policies. The Report on the Development of Tribal Areas by National Committee on 
the Development of Backward Areas, 1981 continued with the same approach.
Over the years there is thus no noticeable difference in the approach of the 
Indian state from that of the Constituent Assembly; i. e. (a) the tribal people need to 
be 'civilised*, (b) the development as defined by the mainstream is extremely 
desirable, (c) the tribal groups need to be integrated and assimilated into the 
mainstream, and (d) the tribal customs need ‘protection’ of the majority community. 
The thread of emphasis on the efficient implementation of the development model to 
resolve all socio-economic and political conflict continues unbroken. In that sense 
the colonial discourse continues in contemporary India as well.
Here it may be observed that various tribal communities did not see the issue 
from the point of view of the Indian state. The autonomous forms of creation of a 
community continued in post-independent India. The lessons that the nationalists had 
learnt from the colonial discourse were also internalised by the smaller 
communities. These communities started using the same tools which the nationalists 
had used and began demanding greater political autonomy. The State, premised on 
the rationalist assumptions, could do little to contain such mobilisations. 
Consequently, the various sections of the population, especially the non-mainstream
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ones like the tribes, started demanding political recognition and a share in the 
largesse of State’s development funds. Although one cannot find a document that 
redefines the policy towards such sections in terms of accommodation of the 
demands of various identities, in practice there has been such a trend, although 
within the bounds of the Constitution. The marginalised identities have benefited 
from greater availability of educational and economic avenues and there has 
emerged an idea which is quite unique and new in India in particular and the world 
at large. The newly articulated identities now lay a claim to better economic 
prospects and demand State’s response. These groups are no longer content to 
gratefully accept whatever the State machinery is able to deliver. They demand that 
the State machinery should perform well or else concede administrative powers to 
local arrangements.101 Since these groups are unable to influence the central policy 
agenda making, they resort to a typical Indian avenue: ‘agitate first, demand later’.
The Indian state when pressed hard by these highly mobilised and articulated 
groups, has been making important administrative concessions in the form of 
delegated and de-centralised administration. This aspect of the Jharkhandi case shall 
be discussed at length in chapter VII.
1011 am grateful to Dr. Sudipta Kaviraj for his valuable comments on this line of argument.
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Chapter IV
Changing Patterns in the Development
Profile of the Jharkhand Region -  I
The post-colonial Indian state, as discussed in chapter III, depended heavily 
on a rationalist-integrationist and bureaucratic model of administration due to the 
nationalist discourse’s dependence on the essentials of the colonial discourse. As a 
result of this rationalist model of administration, the primary concerns of the State 
have been integration and development with the development programmes intended 
“not only to achieve certain tangible economic ends . . . [but also to be] a step 
towards the goal of integration”.1 The State’s emphasis on development was also 
appropriated by the ‘sub-national’ identities to pursue and legitimise their claims and 
this emphasis on development has affected the character of articulation of ‘sub- 
national’ or ethnic identities as well as the State in a profound way. The State was 
unable to respond to the challenges from the ethnic identities with adequate political 
measures owing to its dependence on the integrationist-rationalist paradigm. It 
continued to emphasise the need for a faster pace of development as a means to 
remove all allegiance to any other political identity, save the nationalist Indian 
identity. It appears that, as far as the State is concerned, better administration of 
development programmes is the only possible reason to re-orient the administrative 
boundaries now. Consequently, the ethnic identities have also taken on board this 
factor (in addition to whatever factors that they invoke to mobilise the people into a 
politically significant identity) to demand political recognition. Development and 
identity have thus became inextricably linked, as evident in the following:
RhTI A t w  Iw re r  ^ r= r \-w cn  %: ? s h k i  1 w
1 ]%At At w  iwrcr w  f^fr At ^r^At
1 Kanchan Mukhopadhayay, ‘The Tribal Policy of Jawaharlal Nehru’ in Singh, K. S., ed., Jawaharlal 
Nehru, Tribes and Tribal Policy, Calcutta, 1989, p. 21.
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i 1%KfV *fr w r - ^ r r  %: ^ r
^r=rr w  ^ r  ^praT iT zrfvrw  ^ fr#  ^ p t^ t
^ntr xy«+idi i ^ p raT  3 p p rr  R«*>i<h ^ p r  ^ : ,  a p p ff  f ^ r c r  ^ff 
n h I3fr  srq^r R ^ i u  %  f ^ r  m^ h ^ : ,
f ^ W  %  ^ r p ^ P T  3 tp : f W F  %  R t *T ^ T P jt^ T  TP7PT
^ : ,  ^ngr ~f=nw w r  ^  i . . . ^ p p t t  ^ r  ^ mh i
w?^r ^  f^nc <5T f^t %: Rt 3Tf^prp: I R~
■ s tR r tr :  '^ I'M cci i %  s t R p t r :  ^  i ^ r  3 rf^> T ?r ^t \ j t  
R tR  jp c rrR c r j tp c t  # r  R r^r ^  %
^p 3T 'CT^fr £NT %  Rr^r ^PxT ^  i . . . w r q ^ r r  ^ffr
t t p t  R rR  x^pprr %  arrf^qr IW m * %  R R r ^nff 
ci^^-M t^ ft w rR r R r  <^y£l ^iiRt %- RRrur ^  ^ r t  
*ff %: i2
[Who can bring about development in an area? In our opinion, only 
the public of that region can develop an area. What are the problems 
of a region, how should they be solved -  no one can understand this 
better than the people of that area. The only avenue is that the people 
must develop themselves, take interest in the problems of 
development of their area, take initiatives for their development, 
chalk out developmental programmes and make efforts for their 
collective development. . . but for the people to develop themselves, 
it is essential that they have some rights. This right is the right to 
autonomy. We do not demand this right only for the proposed 
Jharkhand state but for the whole country . . . The reason for 
demanding autonomy is not only for economic development but the 
aim for this demand is to save one jati [here the term jati has been 
used to mean community and very loosely, tribes] from exploitation 
by another jati. ]
This extract from one of the writings of Sibu Soren3 clarifies the Jharkhandi 
leadership’s views about the inter-linkages between poor development profile of the 
region and their demand for autonomy. Soren appears to stress the drawback of 
weak local development institutions and poor linkages between communities and the 
larger policy mechanism as an important factor in the poor performance of 
development policy in the region. Additionally, the quote also raises a number of
2 Sibu Soren, “* u i^ u s r  W  ^rm^T1’ [The Question of Jharkhand State], in Narayan, S., ed., 
Jharkhand Movement: Origin and Evolution, New Delhi, 1992, p. 19.
3 President of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (Soren).
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other issues that link up with the issues of alternative delivery mechanisms for 
development policy. However, the Jharkhandi leadership does not clarify what it 
means by ‘development’.
It is an elusive task to define development. The meaning of development is 
highly context-specific and changes according to the point of view and ideological 
orientation of the person concerned. Some people may define development as 
change but it can be argued that not all change constitutes development. One point 
of view may regard development as the removal of poverty while another may go on 
to define development as an increase in the societal groups’ capacity to organise and 
utilise their resources and implement their agenda. Still others may define 
development in social, political, economic and/ or cultural terms.
Apart from the difficulty of defining ‘development’, the understanding of 
what it means can differ between the State and the beneficiary population. Presently, 
irrespective of their points of view, development for both the State and the 
population of the Jharkhand region, means similar things such as greater avenues for 
employment and education, improved health facilities, etc. However, if there is any 
substantial degree of decentralisation of power under the JAAC or any other such 
body, the meaning of development for the Jharkhandi population may change.
For the purpose of this analysis, development may be defined as 
improvements in the living standard of the population. It involves better availability 
of health and educational facilities as well as improvement in the availability of the 
opportunities of gainful employment. It also consists of improvement in the 
economic conditions of the population. Consequently, this analysis will utilise 
available data to evaluate the development profile of the Jharkhand region and Bihar 
as a whole in terms of improvements in health, education and employment 
opportunities. Some supplementary data such as agricultural output of the region 
and irrigated area will also be utilised (wherever available) to chart out the changes 
in the potential for economic improvement.
During the field-study, respondents were eager to point out that the Bihar 
government in Patna was not concerned about the development profile of the 
Jharkhand region. They alleged that there exists a north versus south Bihar divide as
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far as developmental activities are concerned and that the persons from north Bihar 
dominate the government. For instance, a Panchayat head in Sonahatu block of 
Ranchi district alleged that “w u s '  fW rmr w r  ^irrr
w nrr sfR: w  [IWr  w ] Rw rt W tt [There is a
conspiracy against the Jharkhand region, the wealth from here goes out and it is 
used for the development activities there (in the rest of Bihar)].4 Consequently, the 
resources from south Bihar (the Jharkhand region) were utilised for developmental 
activities elsewhere and inadequate attention was given to the region. Therefore, the 
analysis that follows also compares the development profiles of the Jharkhand region 
with that of Bihar as a whole.
An effort to define the term ‘development profile’ is not unproblematic as it 
is directly related to the definition of development. Since this study defines 
development as an improvement in the living standards of the population, the term 
‘development profile’ has been used to refer to the patterns emerging from an 
analysis of all the indicators of development for a region at any given point of time. 
For instance, the development profile of Jharkhand in 1951 refers to the broad 
patterns of development which emerge from an analysis of all the development 
indicators available for that year such as the figures for infant mortality, public 
health, employment levels, educational levels and so on. Besides, the analysis also 
takes account of the potential of economic growth reflected in indicators such as 
changes in irrigation potential and land under major crops (whenever available) and 
the changes in the pattern since the last available comparable data.
The changing development profile of Bihar as a whole and the Jharkhand 
region have been analysed in this chapter and chapter V to find out whether there 
has been any change in the developmental profile of the Jharkhand region. A 
comparison with the development profile of Bihar as a whole will indicate if the gap 
between the two (if any) is real or imagined which will clarify whether the
4 Interview with a panchayat head in the Sonahatu development block in Ranchi in May 1996.
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developmental issues in the articulation of the Jharkhandi identity are real or 
perceived.5
I
As far as the development profile of Jharkhand in 1951 was concerned, the 
state of the population was poor, but slightly better than that of Bihar as a whole. In 
1951, the area now known as the Jharkhand region in Bihar accounted for 42.4 per 
cent of the total land area of Bihar and had a population of more than 9 million.
Table 1: Population in Jharkhand 1951
Area 
(Sq. Miles)
Total Population Males Females
Jharkhand Total 29,821 9,318,792 4,753,241 4,565,551
Bihar Total 70,330 40,225,947 20,223,675 20,002,272
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of Bihar 42.40 23.16 23.50 22.82
Source: Census o f  India 1951, vol. V, Bihar Part E-A (Tables A, C, D & E series) -  General Population Tables, Patna: Government 
Printing Press, n. d.
Table 2: Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1951
Total Population Males Females
Jharkhand Total 3,430,599 1,707,521 1,723,051
Bihar Total 4,049,183 2,017,414 2,031,769
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of Bihar 84.72 84.63 84.80
Jharkhand
Percentage
36.81 35.92 37.74
Source: Census o f India 1951, vol. V, Bihar Part E-A (Tables A, C, D & E series) -  General Population Tables, Patna: Government 
Printing Press, n. d.
Approximately 23.16 per cent of the total population of Bihar lived there (Table l).6 
Within the Jharkhand region, the Scheduled Tribes accounted for 36.81 per cent of 
the total population of the region (Table 2).
5 Real developmental problems also need to be perceived by the population and articulated into 
political demand making. However, here attention is being drawn to the fact that a situation can 
exist where the population or an ethnic identity perceives that there is deterioration in the 
development profile of the region (or feels discriminated against) without there actually being such 
a deterioration (or discrimination),
6 In the interests of the continuity of the text, only short abstracts of the tables have been included in 
the text. The relevant district-wise detailed tables have been included as Statistical Annex to the 
thesis.
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Clearly, the tribal people were a numerical minority but still constituted one 
of the most cohesive social groups in the region. Consequently, both the tribal 
people as well as the non-tribal people were significant in the electoral politics of 
the Jharkhand region in independent India.
The development indicators of the area at that time offer us a mixed picture. 
In 1950, the condition of the Jharkhand region was better than the average for Bihar 
as a whole as far as infant mortality, birth and death rates are concerned. Infant
Table 3: Infant Mortality and Birth & Death Rates in Jharkhand 1950
Total 
number of 
Live Births1
Total 
number of 
Deaths1
Infant
Mortality2
Infant
Mortality
Rate2
(per 1000 
live Birth)
Birth Rate3 
(per 1000 of 
Population)
Death Rate3
(per 1000 of 
Population)
Jharkhand 
Total/ Average
158,257 109,280 9,691 62.77 17.08 11.54
Bihar Total/ 
Average
714,376 461,335 57,945 81.11 19.01 12.36
'■ Registered.
2- Provisional Figures.
3-Based on 1941 calculations.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 46.
mortality was significantly lower (62.77 per 1,000 live births) in the Jharkhand 
region compared with that of the Bihar average (81.11 per 1,000 live births) 
(Table3). Even after making allowances for the poor recording of deaths of infants 
in a not too-conducive terrain (compared to the plains of north Bihar) such as the 
Jharkhand region, the difference in the figures indicates a better health profile in the 
Jharkhand region. In the case of birth and death rates, the difference between the 
rates of the Jharkhand region and Bihar as a whole is not significant. The Jharkhand 
region still had a better health scenario than Bihar as a whole.
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However, the same proportional share of the Jharkhand region does not 
continue in other development indicators. As Table 4 points out, as far as 
agricultural production is concerned, the Jharkhand region contributed a significant 
share to the output of all the major crops in the whole of Bihar. It produced as much 
as 42.28 per cent of the total paddy, 25 per cent of the maize and 20 per cent of 
arhar (a variety of lentils) produced in the whole of Bihar.
Table 4: Output of Principal Crops in Jharkhand (in thousands of tons) 1949-50
Paddy Wheat Gram Barley Maiz
e
Masoor Arhar Khesri Peas Sugar
cane
Potato Tobacc
o
Jute Chilli
Jharkhand
Total 1583 10 29 19 105 1 27 27 4 7 20 0 1 0
Bihar 3744 357 296 213 ■ 412 87 129 468 71 265 219 12 76 15
Jharkhand
as
Percentage 
of Bihar
42.28 2.80 9.79 8.92 25.48 1.14 20.93 5.76 5.63 2.64 9.13 0 1.31 0
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 22.
Table 5: Land Improvement Loans Advanced to Agriculturists in Jharkhand 1950-51/
Loans Advanced (Rupees)
Jharkhand Total 2,268,922
Bihar Total 13,826,343
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 16.41
*Under tlte Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, Agriculturists’ Loans Act, 1884, Natural Calamities Loans Act and Gratuitous Relief. 
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 116.
Nevertheless, as far as the availability of agricultural finance is concerned, 
the share of the Jharkhand region was not high (Table 5). The area of Jharkhand 
comprised approximately 42 per cent of the total land area of Bihar with about 23 
per cent of the total population. Moreover, the landscape of the Jharkhand region is 
hilly and most agriculture was rain-dependent. In such a scenario, it was 
unsatisfactory that only 16.41 per cent of the total money advanced to agriculturists 
in Bihar as a whole was spent in the Jharkhand region in 1950-51 (Table 5). 
However, this did not reflect any systematic neglect of the region as development 
planning was still emerging in India.
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Another related point that would have a bearing on the region’s 
developmental profile is that of wasteland development because the Jharkhand 
region is composed of a rather hilly terrain and wasteland development is of far-
Table 6: Loans Disbursed for Reclamation of Wasteland and Area of Wasteland Reclaimed in
Jharkhand 1951-52
Land Improvement 
Loans Disbursed
(Rupees)
Area of Waste Land Reclaimed
(Acres)
By Manual Labour By State Tractors
Jharkhand Total 1,361,488 7,976 -
Bihar 2,804,286 37,208 3,602
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of Bihar
48.55 21.43 -
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 27.
reaching consequence to the region. In this area, one can notice that a fair share was 
being spent in the Jharkhand region. In the year 1951-52, 48.55 per cent (Table 6) 
of the total amount spent on wasteland development in the whole of Bihar was spent 
in the Jharkhand region. However, more than 48 per cent of funds yielded only 
about 21 per cent of the total area reclaimed by manual labour. State tractors were 
not employed in the Jharkhand region. This is indicative of a trend in the Jharkhand 
region where a large amount of investment leads only to a modest improvement in 
the development profile.
The figures available for public medical institutions (Table 7) also express
Table 7: In-door and Out-door Patients Treated in Public Medical Institutions Owned, 
_________ Subsidised or Aided by Public Authorities in Jharkhand 1947_________
Number Indoor Patients 
Treated
Number Outdoor Patients 
Treated
Jharkhand Total 27,768 1,191,301
Bihar Total 127,844 5,620,869
Jharkhand as Percentage of 
Bihar
21.72 21.19
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 70.
Table 8: Expenses of Public Medical Institutions Owned, Subsidised or Aided by Public
Authorities in Jharkhand 1947
Income (Rupees) Expenditure (Rupees)
Jharkhand Total 1,033,483 958,998
Bihar Total* 10,797,502 4,712,237
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 9.57 20.35
’ Figures for Saharsa are not available.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 70.
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the same scenario. In 1947, approximately 21.72 per cent of the total indoor and 
21.19 per cent of the total outdoor patients treated in Bihar as a whole in all medical 
institutions owned, subsidised or aided by public authorities were in the Jharkhand 
region. These figures are proportionate to the percentage of total population of Bihar 
living in the Jharkhand region. Therefore, the health system in the Jharkhand region 
was not drastically inferior to that of Bihar as a whole.
However, health facilities in the Jharkhand region depended more heavily on 
governmental aid than in Bihar as a whole. The figures for income and expenditure 
incurred by the medical institutions publicly owned, aided or subsidised indicate that 
there was a larger expenditure in the Jharkhand region (Table 8). The income of 
such institutions in the Jharkhand region accounted for a mere 9.5 per cent of the 
total income whereas the expenditure accounted for more than 20 per cent of the 
total spent on such institutions in Bihar as a whole which was lower than the 
proportion of population living in the Jharkhand region.
Table 9 shows that the Jharkhand region was fairly urban since 29.48 per 
cent of the total population living within municipal limits in Bihar as a whole
Table 9: Municipal Councils’ Income and their Expenditure on Primary Education in Jharkhand
1949-50
Number of 
Municipalities
Population
within
Municipal
Limits
Total Income
(excluding
opening
balance)
(Rupees)
Total
Expenditure
(Rupees)
Percentage of 
Expenditure on 
Primary Schools 
to Total Income
Jharkhand 
Total/ Average 19 487,408 2,920,680 2,690,107 35.92
Bihar Total* 58 1,653,346 * 12,399,875 10,284,678 24.97
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
32.7 29.48 23.55 26.15 -
* Excludes Dehri Notified Area Committee.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 75.
resided in the Jharkhand region. The same table also indicates a rather equitable 
expenditure on primary education in the Jharkhand region. It is noteworthy that 35.9 
per cent of the income of municipal councils in the Jharkhand region was spent on 
primary education whereas the corresponding figure for the whole of Bihar was 24.9 
per cent. This indicates the importance attached to primary education in the 
Jharkhand region by the policy machinery in 1951. The percentage of total
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municipal expenditure on primary schools in the Jharkhand region as percentage of 
total such expenditure in Bihar as a whole is 26.15 per cent whereas the 
corresponding percentage of income is 23.55 per cent. Clearly, there is more 
expenditure than income from primary schools in the Jharkhand region.
Moving on to overall revenue generation, agricultural income tax collection 
from the Jharkhand region contributed only 7.14 per cent to the total agricultural tax
Table 10 Collection of Agricultural Income Tax in Jharkhand 1950-51
Tax Collected (Rupees/
Jharkhand Total 498,978
Bihar Total 6, 986,079
Jharkhand as a Percentage of Bihar 7.14
#Provisional figures.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 101.
collected in Bihar as a whole in 1950-51 (Table 10). This is despite a high 
proportion of agricultural produce in the region at that time (Table 4).
On the other hand, taxes collected on electricity consumption show a high 
figure. This indicates the large-scale industrial installation in the region due to the 
vast mineral deposits. The Jharkhand region contributed 53.41 per cent to the total
Table 11: Collection of Revenues under Electricity Act 1948 in Jharkhand 1950-51
Tax Collected (Rupees/
Jharkhand Total 579,808
Bihar Total 1,085,565
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 53.41
1 Provisional figures
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 109.
Table 12: Collection of Sales Tax in Jharkhand 1950-51
Tax Collected (Rupees/
Jharkhand Total 15,026,418
Bihar Total 40,814,811
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 36.81
1 Provisional figures
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 103.
revenues collected in Bihar as a whole from taxes on electricity (Table 11). This 
translated into a higher percentage of non-agricultural employment (discussed in the 
subsequent pages). Sales tax collection also indicates a similar high figure as higher 
industrial employment indicates higher consumption rates which in turn, leads to 
higher sales tax collection (Table 12).
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An important issue in the politico-economic dynamics of the Jharkhand 
region has been that of land alienation (see chapter II). The high and unreasonable 
rates of interests charged by the moneylenders were one of the reasons for the 
numerous tribal revolts during the British period. The Jharkhandi leaders have 
asserted that there is a high rate of money-lending business in the Jharkhand region 
and consequently more and more land was being alienated from the tribal 
cultivators.
Table 13: Number of Moneylenders’ Licenses Issued and Moneys Advanced in Jharkhand
1950-51
Number of 
Licenses Issued
Amount of Loan Advanced
(Rupees)
With Security Without Security Total
Jharkhand Total 1128 8,215,177 1,532,486 9,747,663
Bihar Total* 4,996 153,090,492* 5,792,081 158,882,573
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
22.57 5.36 26.45 6.13
’Figures from Muzzafarpur and Darbangha include the figures for loans advanced without security as well.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 130.
However, the figures for the year 1950-51 do not show a drastically high 
number of money-lending licences in the Jharkhand region (Table 13). Only 22.57 
per cent of the total number of licenses issued in Bihar as a whole were for the 
Jharkhand region. The same table also indicates that only 5.36 per cent of secured 
loans and 26.45 per cent of the unsecured loans were disbursed by moneylenders in 
Bihar as a whole were in the Jharkhand region. Clearly, more unsecured loans were 
disbursed in the Jharkhand region than secured ones. Frequently, land is the item 
offered as security in rural India. The significantly lower amount of secured loans 
advanced in the Jharkhand region seem to reflect some degree of effectiveness of the 
legal provisions which forbid such transfers of land from tribal to non-tribal 
persons. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out danger of moneylenders becoming de 
facto (as opposed to de jure) owners of land on which interest payment had 
defaulted.
Other indicators for the region’s level of advancement reinforce the above 
picture. The region of Jharkhand had better conditions than the average for Bihar as 
a whole. In a way, it seems natural that an area that has greater non-agricultural
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activities should yield better results as far the indicators of socio-economic well 
being are concerned.
The indicators that will now be discussed; namely, the livelihood classes and 
educational patterns cross-tabulated with livelihood classes merely confirm this 
deduction for 1951. The category of ‘Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar’ in Table 14 
shows that the proportion of population that depended on non-agricultural 
occupations and resided in the Jharkhand region was higher than the percentage of
Table 14: Livelihood Classes in Jharkhand 1951
Agricultural and Related Activities Non- Agricultural Activities
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
22.55 22.68 22.42 26.91 28.11 25.50
Jharkhand
Percentage
83.78 82.04 85.58 16.21 17.95 14.41
Bihar
Percentage
86.04 84.99 87.10 13.95 15.00 12.89
* The 1951 Census differed from the earlier ones because "the 1941 table gave distribution of population of each district by die main 
communities, this table gives distribution of population of each district according to . . livelihood classes. . Census o f India 1951, 
vol. I - India, Patna, n. d., p.333. It classified the population according to Self-supporting, Non-earning Dependent and Earning 
Dependent in Agricultural and Non-agricultural sectors. This figure is for the total population and not workers only as in later years. 
Source: Census o f India 1951, vol. V, Bihar Part II-B Tables - Economic Tables, Patna, Government Printing Press, 1953.
people who lived in the region. Approximately 22.5 per cent of the total number of 
people who depended on agricultural activities in the whole of Bihar resided in the 
Jharkhand region whereas the same figures for those in non-agricultural occupations 
was slightly higher at almost 27 per cent. Clearly, a greater proportion of the 
industrial workforce of Bihar lived in the Jharkhand region which indicates a greater 
level of industrial activity in the Jharkhand region. The same conclusions can be 
reached by looking at the proportion of population dependent on the two kinds of 
occupation. In the Jharkhand region, 83 out of every 100 persons depended on 
agricultural activities whereas in whole of Bihar the same figure was 86 out of every 
100.
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The patterns that emerge from the analysis of livelihood classes in 1951 are 
reinforced by those emerging from an analysis of the occupational patterns.7 The 
category of ‘Jharkhand as percentage of Bihar’ in Table 14A shows that 24.82 per
Table 14A: Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1951*
Agricultural and Related Activities Non- Agricultural Activities
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Jharkhand as 
a Percentage 
of Bihar
24.82 23.54 27.69 31.67 32.10 30.09
Jharkhand
Percentage
33.17 42.62 23.33 6.43 10.04 2.67
Bihar
Percentage
30.95 42.55 19.22 4.70 7.35 2.02
*The 1951 Census differed from the earlier ones because "the 1941 table gave distribution of population of each district by die main 
communities, diis table gives distribution of population of each district according to . . livelihood classes. . Census o f  India 1951, 
vol. I - India, Patna, n. d., p,333. It classified die populadon according to Self-supporting, Non-earning Dependent and Earning 
Dependent in Agricultural and Non-agricultural sectors. This figure is for the total population and not workers only as in later years. 
Therefore, diese figures have been arrived at by subtracting Non-earning Dependants from die figures for die categories of Agricultural 
and Non-agricultural classes. This is die closest figure diat can be calculated for die category of workers in die two sectors in die year 
1951.
Source: Census o f India 1951, vol. V, Bihar Part II-B Tables - Economic Tables, Patna: Government Printing Press, 1953.
cent of those in agricultural and related activities in the whole of Bihar lived in the 
Jharkhand region. This is not substantially different from the proportion of 
population that lived in the Jharkhand region. The same figures for the non- 
agricultural activities were 31.67 per cent, which was significantly higher. The 
Jharkhand region had a predominant place in the industrial activities of Bihar.8
Within the Jharkhand region, 33.17 per cent of the population worked in 
agricultural activities compared with only 6.43 per cent in non-agricultural 
activities. It adds up to about 40 per cent of the population being gainfully
7 The 1951 Census differed from the earlier ones because “the 1941 table gave distribution of 
population of each district by the main communities, this table gives distribution of population of 
each district according to . . livelihood classes . . .”, Census o f India 1951, vol. I - India, Patna, n. 
d., p. 333. The 1951 Census classified the population according to Self-supporting, Non-earning 
Dependent and Earning Dependent in Agricultural and Non-agricultural sectors. Therefore, the 
figures for Livelihood Classes are classification of the entire population and not workers, as in the 
later years. The figures for workers for this year (Table 14A) have been arrived at by subtracting 
the Non-earning Dependants from the figures for the categories of Agricultural and Non- 
agricultural Livelihood Classes. These are the closest figures that can be calculated for die category 
of workers in the two sectors for 1951.
8 These figures also indicate a higher work-force participation rate in the Jharkhand region and 
therefore, a better employment scenario.
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employed. For Bihar as whole, the same figure adds up to roughly 35 per cent. 
Evidently, there were greater employment opportunities in the Jharkhand region 
than Bihar as a whole in both the sectors. As would be expected in the mineral-rich 
Jharkhand region, non-agricultural employment was higher than Bihar as a whole. 
However, in itself, the Jharkhand region was no island of industrial activity within 
Bihar. Within the region, employment levels still showed a heavy dependence on the 
agricultural activities.
As far as the advancement in the educational levels amongst livelihood 
classes is concerned, an examination of Table 15 indicates that there existed a mixed 
picture. As a percentage of Bihar, the Jharkhand region seems to have been a 
repository of literate personnel who depended on the non-agricultural sector for 
their livelihood. More than 54 per cent of the total literate persons in the non- 
agricultural livelihood class resided in the Jharkhand region. In Bihar as a whole, 
merely, 20.18 per cent of the non-agricultural population was literate while the 
corresponding figures for the Jharkhand region was 40.57 per cent. This stark 
difference in the figures when read with the pattern emerging from other 
development indicators indicates that most probably, it was the skilled workforce, 
often from other regions of India that had inflated the numbers of literate people in 
the Jharkhand region. It is therefore, unwise to attach much significance to these 
figures.
In the agricultural livelihood classes, the average literacy in the Jharkhand 
region was 6.90 per cent compared with 8.82 per cent in Bihar as a whole. The 
figure of female literacy in the agricultural classes in both Bihar as a whole and the 
Jharkhand region was only about 2 per cent. Male literacy in the same category was 
also significantly lower in the Jharkhand region than average for Bihar as a whole. 
Thus, overall, the state of literacy in the Jharkhand region left much to be desired. 
While literacy rates amongst the non-agricultural population in the Jharkhand region 
were substantially better than the average for the whole of Bihar, amongst the 
majority of the agricultural workers, they were worse. However, as is evident from 
Table 15, a discussion of the various educational levels attained by persons in the 
two livelihood classes is of extremely limited value. The proportion of educated 
population is too small to be of consequence.
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The general development indicators in the region at the time of the first 
general elections do not seem to be very poor vis-a-vis Bihar as a whole. Unlike 
what the Jharkhandi leaders projected at that time, there is no indication of an 
extremely poor development profile in the Jharkhand region relative to Bihar as a
Table IS: Livelihood Classes by Educational Standards in Jharkhand 1951s
Educational
Standards
Agriculture-Related Activities Non- Agricultural Activities
Person Male Female Persons Male Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar
Literate 17.64 16.89 22.92 54.11 62.13 29.27
Middle School 19.09 16.80 36.86 23.03 22.64 24.93
Matriculate 17.27 16.29 29.52 36.82 36.59 38.70
Intermediate 12.32 11.59 22.58 23.27 22.80 26.94
Graduate and 
Others #
10.00 10.20 7.36 21.66 21.11 27.32
Jharkhand Percentage
Literate 6.90 11.56 2.24 40.57 62.39 12.29
Middle School 0.64 1.01 0.28 3.13 4.54 1.31
Matriculate 0.12 0.21 0.03 2.30 3.60 0.61
Intermediate 0.01 0.02 0.004 0.40 0.62 0.12
Graduate and 
Others' '
0.03 0.06 0.003 0.71 1.13 0.18
Bihar Percentage
Literate 8.82 15.53 2.19 20.18 28.23 10.71
Middle School 0.76 1.36 0.17 3.66 5.64 1.34
Matriculate 0.15 0.29 0.02 1.68 2.76 0.40
Intermediate 0.03 0.05 0.003 0.46 0.76 0.11
Graduate and 
Others r'
0.07 0.14 0.01 0.89 1.50 0.17
*The 1951 Census differed from the earlier ones because "the 1941 table gave distribution of population of each district by the main 
communities, this table gives distribution of population of each district according to . . livelihood classes. . Census o f India 1951, 
vol. I, India, Patna, n. d., p.333. It classified tire population according to Self-supporting, Non-earning Dependent and Earning 
Dependent in Agricultural and Non-agricultural sectors. This figure is for the total population and not workers only as in later years. 
This Table has therefore, used the Tables on Livelihood Classes 1951 to calculate die proportion of populadon in various educational 
categories amongst die Agricultural and Non-agricultural Livelihood Classes. Therefore die cross-tabulation for Educational Levels is 
available only for the endre population and not the working populadon, as in later Censuses.
1 Includes Graduate, Postgraduate, Teaching, Engineering, Commerce, Agriculture, Veterinary, Legal, Medical and other 
qualificadons.
Totals for the Jharkhand region have been arrived at by adding the relevant categories for each district of die region,
Source: Census o f  India 1951, vol. V, Bihar Part H-A Tables (A, C, D, & E series), Patna: Government Prindng Press, n. d.
whole. An equitable and proportional share of resources was allocated to the region. 
Nonetheless, the fact that different socio-economic and geographical conditions in 
the Jharkhand region required a different and more intensive approach was not 
acknowledged. However, this could hardly be expected in a province of a newly de­
colonised India. The pattern which emerges from the above analysis also underlines 
the fact that only a very small proportion of persons had benefited by the expansion 
of industrialisation in the region. On a comparative level thus, Bihar as a whole and 
the Jharkhand region offered a similar development profile.
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Against the backdrop of such developmental profile, the first general election 
was conducted in 1952. In chapter II, it was noticed that by this time the Jharkhand 
movement had acquired mass appeal and Jaipal Singh and his Jharkhand Party were 
highlighting the question of an autonomous territory for the Jharkhandis. The 1952 
elections were dominated by the issue of Jharkhandi identity and the demand for the 
creation of an autonomous state in Jharkhand based on the tribal identity. Owing to 
the fact that the development profile of the Jharkhand region was marginally better 
than that of the whole of Bihar, the developmental issues were not considered 
politically significant - a situation that was set to change in the years to come.
II
Before the Census of 1961 was conducted, certain developments on the 
national political stage exercised a profound impact on the scope and planning of 
development in the Jharkhand region. The States’ Reorganisation Commission 
(SRC) had reported on the principles of reorganisation and the government had 
implemented most of its recommendations. Consequently, a number of new states 
had been created and the boundaries of other had been considerably altered.
This had some effects on the Jharkhand regions as well. The hope of Jaipal 
Singh and other Jharkhandi leaders of being able to contribute directly to the 
development activities in the region were belied. The SRC had not recommended 
the creation of the state of Jharkhand. This injured the legitimacy of the Jharkhand 
Party and led to a gradual decline in its popular support (see chapter II).
Efforts to involve local level initiative and participation in development 
activities were started on 2 October 1952 in Bihar with the formation of four 
Community Development Areas and one Community Development Block under the 
Community Development Movement (CDM). Over the next Five-Year Plan, the
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entire state was divided into 591 Community Development Blocks.9 There were very 
few instances of the CDM being able to effectively implement the development 
agenda of the government. This marked a watershed in the development planning in 
India. Due to the lack of success of the CDM, beginning in the mid-1950s, there 
was an increasing dependence on government line agencies to implement 
development programmes. This heavily bureaucratic model of development turned 
out to be inefficient and incompetent and failed to accelerate the pace of 
development in the Jharkhand region and elsewhere.
By 1961, two Five-Year Plans had already been implemented and the third 
plan was underway. However, as far as the Jharkhand region was concerned, the 
achievements of a decade of centralised planning and bureaucratic implementation 
had been quite modest.
Reorientation in the administrative layout between 1951 and 196110 had 
affected the Jharkhand region. The immediate result was that it emerged as an even
Table 16: Population in Jharkhand 1961
Area (Sq. Miles) Total Population Males Females
Jharkhand Total 30,763 11,606,489 5,921,901 5,684,588
Bihar Total 67,196 46,455,610 23,301,449 23,154,161
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
45.78 24.98 25.41 24.55
Source: Census o f India 1961, Paper I of 1962 - Bihar, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.
Table 17: Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1961
Total Population Males Females
Jharkhand Total 3,938,065 1,953,019 1,985,046
Bihar Total 4,204,770 2,087,994 2,116,776
Jharkhand as Percentage 
of Bihar 93.65 93.53 93.77
Jharkhand Percentage 33.92 32.97 34.91
Source: Census o f India 1961, Paper I of 1962 -Bihar, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.
9 This approach to development administration by making a block as the smallest unit for 
implementation of development policy formed the basis for the Tribal Development Blocks under 
the Tribal Sub-Plan (TSP) from die Fifth Five-Year Plan onwards.
10 This administrative reorientation was the result of the implementation of the SRC’s 
recommendations as well as the internal reorganisation of the districts of Bihar.
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larger percentage of the total land area of Bihar. It now comprised of 45.78 per cent 
of the total land area of Bihar. Accordingly, there was also a slight increase in the 
percentage of population within the Jharkhand region, which now accounted for 
24.98 per cent of the total population of Bihar (Table 16).
Another significant factor in the development planning and political texture 
of the region was the diminishing percentage of the tribal population in the area. 
From 36.81 per cent in 1951, the ST component of the population of the Jharkhand 
region diminished to only 33.92 per cent. Although 93.65 per cent of the total 
Scheduled Tribes (ST) population of Bihar resided in the Jharkhand region in 1961 
(up from 84.72 per cent in 1951), their relative percentage in the total population of 
the Jharkhand region declined (Table 17).
As far as the development profile of the region was concerned, an 
improvement can be noticed in the period 1951-61. This improvement is at a rate
Table 18: Infant Mortality and Birth & Death Rates in Jharkhand 1961
Total 
number of 
Live Births
Total 
number of 
Deaths
Infant
Mortality
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate (per 
1000 live 
Birth)
Birth Rate
(per 1000 of 
Population)*
Death Rate
(per 1000 of 
Population)*
Jharkhand Total/ 
Average
117,387 54,036 7,157 58.95 10.61 4.83
Bihar Total/ 
Average
458,442 229,442 39,891 87.01 9.86 4.94
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Biliar/ Average
25.60 23.55 17.94 - - -
’ Mid-year population.
Source; Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 96.
that is better than Bihar as a whole. In 1961, the infant mortality rate in the 
Jharkhand region fell to 58.95 per 1000 live births from 62.77 in 1950, whereas the 
average for the whole of Bihar increased from 81.11 in 1950 to 87.01 in 1961 
(Table 18). This probably indicates a better availability of primary health facilities 
in the Jharkhand region than in Bihar as a whole. By 1961, the death rate in Bihar 
as a whole had fallen to 4.94 whereas in the Jharkhand region it had fallen further to 
4.83. Birth rate also fell in both Bihar as a whole and the Jharkhand region. The 
family planning campaign of the government seemed to be showing results, and
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indicates a gradual improvement in basic health facilities during the operation of the 
first two Five-Year Plans in the region.
However, it seems that the improvement in the availability of health facilities 
had not progressed beyond the basic and primary health care. Table 19 indicates that 
there was a need for improvements in the health facilities in the Jharkhand region as 
well as in Bihar as a whole. Admittedly, the overall death rate had fallen 
considerably by 1961-62. However, the causes of death indicate that there was 
scope to limit it further by improving the available health facilities. With the 
exception of cholera, the share of the Jharkhand region in all the causes of death in 
Bihar as a whole is significant (Table 19).
Considering the fact that in 1961, the Jharkhand region accounted for only 
about 25 per cent of the population of Bihar, its share in the number of deaths in all
Table 19: Causes of Death in Jharkhand 1961-62
Cholera Small
Pox
Plague Fever
Dysentery
&
Diarrhoea
Respiratory In.jury
All
other
Causes
Total
Jharkhand 
Total / 
Average
610 278 40 37,886 1,889 1,623 1062 12,612 49,648
Bihar Total 8,883 786 78 158,155 5,101 5,189 3,246 48,004 229,442
Jharkhand
as
Percentage 
of Bihar
6.86 35.36 51.28 23.95 37.03 31.27 32.71 23.34 23.55
Jharkhand
Percentage
1.12 0.51 0.07 70.11 3.49 3.00 1.96 23.40 -
Bihar
Percentage
3.87 0.34 0.03 68.93 2.22 2.26 1.41 20.92 -
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Biliar, n. d., p. 97.
the categories is disproportionate. The Jharkhand region accounted for 37.03 per 
cent of deaths due to dysentery and diarrhoea which indicates that more than 
primary health centres was required. Public health services such as ensuring safe 
drinking water and sanitation appear to be in a poorer state in the Jharkhand region 
vis-a-vis Bihar as a whole.
However, in Bihar as a whole as well as in the Jharkhand region, the single 
largest killer was unspecified fever causing 68.93 per cent and 70.11 per cent of 
deaths, respectively. None of the other causes of death form a significant percentage
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in the total number of deaths in 1961-62. Therefore, as far as health facilities were 
concerned, the decade of 1951-61 saw some improvements in both the Jharkhand 
region as well as in Bihar as a whole but a lot of improvement was still required.
Another good indicator of the developmental profile of a region is 
achievements or failures of the government delivery mechanism in improving the 
level of education/ literacy. The available data for 1951 and 1961 are constructed 
quite differently and hence meaningful comparisons cannot be made.
However, Table 20 lists the number of children at school in 1961-62. It 
shows that 25.40 per cent of the total number of children at school in Bihar as a
Table 20: Number of Children at School in Jharkhand 1961-62
Total Males Females
Jharkhand Total 1,055,126 817,711 237,315
Bihar Total 4,152,641 3,324,292 828,349
Rest of Bihar 3,097,515 2,506,581 591,034
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of Bihar 25.40 24.59 28.64
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 118.
whole were in the Jharkhand region with a slight skew in favour of female students, 
which is quite rare in Indian conditions. The figure for children at school is roughly 
the same as the percentage of population in the Jharkhand region. Hence, all we can 
deduce from this data is that there is no imbalance in the allocation of resources to 
the Jharkhand region.
A more detailed educational profile cross-tabulated with the occupational 
pattern is provided in Table 21. This shows that in 1961, 20.75 per cent of the 
literate persons employed in agricultural activities and 33.84 per cent of those in 
non-agricultural activities in Bihar as a whole were in the Jharkhand region. The 
same figures in 1951 were 17.64 per cent and 54.11 per cent. However, this 
comparison is not entirely reliable because the data available for 1951 cross­
tabulated livelihood classes with educational standards whereas the 1961 figures lists
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occupational patterns cross-tabulated with educational standards.11 Therefore, the 
changes in the educational profile of workers are misleading and meaningful 
comparisons with the 1951 figures cannot be arrived at. The 1961 educational 
profile has therefore, been analysed independently.
In 1961, the proportion of literate agricultural workers in the Jharkhand 
region is substantially lower than the proportion of the population that resided in the
Table 21: Occupational Patterns by Educational Standards in Jharkhand 1961
Educational Standards Agriculture-Related Activities3 Non- Agricultural Activities4
Person Male Female Person Male Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar
Illiterate 32.75 26.33 41.42 31.52 33.02 28.42
Literate1 20.75 20.12 39.70 33.84 34.53 14.48
Middle School2 24.33 22.94 75.90 37.19 37.50 29.32
Matriculate and Above 10.76 10.62 40.89 37.11 36.88 47.48
Jharkhand Percentage
Illiterate 88.17 78.66 98.39 63.30 55.37 95.22
Literate1 9.41 17.04 1.21 23.44 28.66 1.74
Middle School2 2.28 4.04 0.38 8.29 9.98 1.25
Matriculate and above 0.14 0.28 0.005 7.85 9.46 1.13
Bihar Percentage
Illiterate 82.75 73.99 98.51 63.91 55.45 93.16
Literate1 13.94 20.98 1.26 22.04 27.45 3.34
Middle School2 2.88 4.36 0.21 7.09 8.80 1.18
Matriculate and above 0.42 0.66 0.005 6.73 8.49 0.66
L Without Educational Level.
2 Primary or Junior Basic.
3- Includes Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers,
A' Includes those in Mining, Quarrying, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and Allied activities; Household 
Industry; Manufacturing other than Household Industry; Construction; Trade and Commerce; Transport, Storage and Communication; 
and Other services.
Source: Census o f  India 1961, vol. IV, Bihar Part II-B (i) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I to B-IV & B-VII), Patna: 
Government Printing Press, n. d.
region. On the other hand, the share of literate population in the non-agricultural 
category is skewed in favour of the Jharkhand region. The percentage of illiterate 
workers who lived in the Jharkhand region was also substantial with more than 30
11 The concept of ‘Work5 was introduced in the 1961 Census in accordance with the recommendations 
of International Labour Organisation. This Census enumerated regular workers as well as seasonal 
worker. A regular worker was a person who was employed in his/her main activity for “any of the 
fifteen days preceding the day” of enumeration. A seasonal worker was enumerated as employed if 
he had more than one hour of work for the “greater part of the working season”, Census o f India 
1951, vol. I, India, Patna, n. d., p. 333.
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per cent of such workers in both the sectors of the economy living in the region. 
Furthermore, 88.17 per cent of the agricultural workers and 63.30 per cent of the 
non-agricultural workers in the Jharkhand region were illiterate.
The literacy percentage amongst workers in the Jharkhand region was 
marginally better in the non-agricultural sector compared with Bihar as a whole and 
was worse in the agricultural sector. Female literacy levels were poor in both the 
regions, with non-agricultural literate women in the whole of Bihar being almost 
double than women in any other category in the two regions (although the absolute 
numbers are still quite small) (Table 21).
Despite the large-scale illiteracy amongst workers in 1961, there seems to 
have been some progress in the attainment of middle-level education in the 
Jharkhand region. Percentage of workers employed in non-agricultural occupations 
and educated till middle school was 8.29 per cent. However, the percentage of 
similarly educated persons in agricultural occupations was still quite low at 2.28 per 
cent. The progress of further education was still quite poor with only 0.14 per cent 
of the agricultural workers in the Jharkhand region educated beyond matriculate 
level. This figure was better amongst the non-agricultural workers at 7.85 per cent. 
Non-agricultural women also demonstrate a better proportion of education at 
matriculate level and above. Overall, the population in non-agricultural activities 
was better educated than the agricultural workforce in the region. This indicates that 
more and more educated persons preferred to go into non-agricultural occupations.12 
On the whole, the performance of the education policy did not show many signs of 
success in the Jharkhand region. It is true that the Jharkhand region is not in a very 
poor state compared with the average for Bihar as a whole and that some
12 Although it is common for matriculates in most countries to seek non-agricultural employment, the 
situation in Jharkhand attains salience because these matriculates frequently do not find any non- 
agricultural work. Nonetheless, they are reluctant to take up agricultural employment as it is seen 
below the dignity of a matriculate to work on the land. There is almost an absence of public policy 
effort to provide incentives for educated persons to work in agricultural activities. This middle- 
level education combined with prejudice against agricultural activities has thus made a large section 
of the youth ‘non-workers’, adding to rising unemployment.
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improvements can be noticed in the region. The overall pattern of education in the 
region however, does not point to successful policy implementation.
Similarly, the occupational pattern of the region indicates some progress 
(Table 22). The Jharkhand region seems to be offering more employment 
opportunities than Bihar as a whole. 30.74 per cent of the agricultural workforce 
and 31.82 per cent of the non-agricultural workforce in the whole of Bihar resided 
in the Jharkhand region in 1961. Significantly, 41.47 per cent of women employed 
in agricultural activities in the whole of Bihar lived in the Jharkhand region. This 
indicates that more women worked in the Jharkhand region than Bihar as a whole as 
well as a higher work participation rate in the former.
The figures in Table 22 also point to a better occupational scenario in the 
_____________________ Table 22: Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1961___________________
Agricultural and Related Activities1 Non- A ^ricultural Activities2
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
30.74 24.77 41.47 31.82 33.07 27.81
Jharkhand
Percentage
39.14 39.74 38.74 12.21 19.29 4.88
Bihar
Percentage
31.81 40.77 22.80 9.58 14.82 4.31
'■ Includes Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers
2- Includes those in Mining, Quarrying, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and Allied activities; Household 
Industry; Manufacturing other than Household Industry; Construction; Trade and Commerce; Transport, Storage and Communication; 
and Other services.
Source: Census o f India 1961, vol. IV, Bihar Part II-B (i) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I to B-IV & B-VTI), Patna: 
Government Printing Press, n. d.
Jharkhand region, particularly in the non-agricultural sector. Whereas only 31.81 
per cent of the total population was employed in agricultural activities in the whole 
of Bihar, the same percentage for the Jharkhand region went up to 39.14 per cent. 
The difference in employment opportunities between Bihar as a whole and the 
Jharkhand region is further evident in the figures for non-agricultural activities. In 
Bihar as a whole, only 9.58 per cent of the population were employed in non- 
agricultural activities, while in the Jharkhand region, 12.21 per cent of population 
worked in such occupations. In sum, almost 52 per cent of the population were 
gainfully employed in the Jharkhand region whereas only about 41 per cent of 
population in Bihar as a whole were so employed. Also noteworthy is the fact that 
more women were gainfully employed in the Jharkhand region. About 44 per cent
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of the women in the Jharkhand region had employment whereas in the whole of 
Bihar the same percentage was almost half at about 27 per cent. However, one must 
not ignore the fact that men found more occupational opportunities in non- 
agricultural activities than women, who were still largely concentrated in 
agricultural employment.
Other indicators of development again yield a mixed pattern. Since most of 
the population was still engaged in agricultural occupations, the output of principal 
crops in the region is significant to this analysis. As Table 23 tells us, the Jharkhand
Table 23: Output of Principal Crops in Jharkhand (in thousands of tons) 1961-62
Paddy Wheat Gram Barley Maize Masoor Arhar Khesri Peas Sugar
cane
Potatoes Tobacco Jute # Chilli
Jharkhand
Total
1,708 17 34 21 121 2 17 25 3 257 26 * 7 *
Bihar 4,335 513 296 253 826 75 89 521 54 6,229 219 13 1,264 14
Jharkhand
as
Percentage 
of Bihar
39.40 3.31 11.48 8.30 14.64 2.66 19.10 4.79 5.55 4.12 11.87 0 0.5 0
# In thousands of bales of 400 pounds each.
* Less than 1,000 tons.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 49.
region continued its large contribution in the total output of paddy of Bihar. 
However, the share of the Jharkhand region in the total agricultural produce of 
Bihar went down. In 1949-50, the region contributed more than 42 per cent to the 
total paddy/rice production of Bihar but by 1961-62 the same fell to 39.4 per cent 
despite a 591 thousand tons increase in the total production of paddy in Bihar as a 
whole. The share of the region in maize production in Bihar as a whole decreased 
significantly from 25.48 per cent in 1949-50 to 14.64 per cent in 1961-62. Although 
there was a doubling in the total output of maize in Bihar as a whole, the growth 
rate of the Jharkhand region was slower than Bihar as a whole.
There was a marginal increase in the share of the Jharkhand region in the 
total wheat produced in the whole of Bihar. From 2.80 per cent of the total wheat 
production in Bihar as a whole in 1949-50, the Jharkhand region now produced 3.31 
per cent. However, the actual increase (from 10 thousand tons to 17 thousand tons) 
was quite small when compared with the growth in the total wheat output in Bihar as 
a whole (from 357 to 513). Sugarcane production in the Jharkhand region grew 
from 7 thousand tons in 1949-50 to 257 tons in 1961-62 (a 35 times hike) compared
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with a 23 times rise in the sugarcane output in Bihar as a whole. Despite being a 
substantial improvement in the output of this cash crop in the Jharkhand region, the 
absolute figure is not significantly large enough compared with the output of 
sugarcane in Bihar as a whole and accounted for only about 4 per cent of the total 
sugarcane output in Bihar as a whole. Such marginal improvements in the 
production of other crops can also be noticed, the prime examples being gram, 
barley, masoor, (a variety of lentils) and potatoes. Some increase in the production 
of jute can also be noticed which rose from 1,000 bales in 1949-50 to 7,000 bales in 
1961-62. Overall, there was a modest growth in the agricultural output of the 
Jharkhand region but it was outstripped by the overall growth of agricultural output 
in the whole of Bihar.
Closely related to agricultural output is the question of availability of 
agricultural finance. Tables 24 and 25 show the amount of money advanced to 
agriculturists for the development of agriculture and reclamation of wasteland in 
order to further the agricultural production of the region. As Table 24 shows, of the 
total money advanced to agriculturists in Bihar as a whole, only 4.26 per cent was
Table 24: Land Improvement Loans Advanced to Agriculturists in Jharkhand 1959-60'
Loans Advanced (Rupees)
Jharkhand Total 1,392,843
Bihar Total 32,663,478
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 4.26
* Distributed under Land Improvement Loan Act 1883,and Agriculturists’ Loans Act, 1884.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 267.
spent in the Jharkhand region in 1959-60. This figure had fallen drastically from the 
1950-51 level of 16.41 per cent. A comparison of Tables 5 and 24 shows that the 
total money advanced to agriculturists in the Jharkhand region in 1959-60 had fallen 
not only in terms of the percentage of the money spent in Bihar as a whole but also 
in actual terms. In 1950-51, Rupees 2,268,922 were spent in the Jharkhand region 
whereas by 1959-60, the figure had fallen to Rupees 1,392,843. Moreover, this 
decline occurred when the total money spent in Bihar as whole for this purpose had 
more than doubled. It increased from Rupees 13,826,343 in 1950-51 to 32,663,478 
in 1959-60. Clearly, there was much less investment in agriculture in the Jharkhand 
region during this decade which was reflected in the poor rate of growth of 
agricultural production in the region.
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Poor availability of agricultural finance in the Jharkhand region is also 
shown in Table 25. The total money spent on wasteland recovery loans in the 
Jharkhand region in 1959-60 was only 36.25 per cent of the total amount spent in
Table 25: Loans Disbursed for Reclamation of Wasteland and Areas of Wasteland Reclaimed
in Jharkhand 1959-60
Land Improvement 
Loans Disbursed
(Rupees)
Area of Waste Land Reclaimed
(Acres)
By Manual Labour * By State Tractors/ 
Private Enterprise/ 
Other Means
Jharkhand Total 132,909 1392.12 510.59
Bihar 366,597 7,638.70 510.59
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of Bihar
36.25 18.22 100
’ With assistance of Land Improvement Loans.
Totals may not tally due to rounding off of figures to the nearest thousands in the source.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 55.
the whole of Bihar. The same figure in 1951-52 was 48.55 per cent (Table 6). The 
money spent on wastelands in the Jharkhand region had thus declined in real as well 
as proportional terms.
Consequently, wasteland recovery in the Jharkhand region also suffered. The 
total area of wastelands recovered by manual labour in 1959-60 (Table 25) is only 
one-sixth of the total wasteland recovered in 1951-52. The decline in the area of 
wasteland recovered is such that the total wasteland recovered in Bihar as a whole in 
1959-60 was only slightly higher than the total wasteland recovery in the Jharkhand 
region only in 1951-52. Furthermore, wasteland recovered by manual labour in the 
Jharkhand region was only 18.22 per cent13 of the total so recovered in Bihar as a 
whole. The redeeming feature is that while there was no help from governmental 
tractors in wasteland recovery in the Jharkhand region in 1951-52, in 1959-60 all 
the land recovered by these agencies lay in the region (Table 25).
Keeping in mind the hilly terrain of the Jharkhand region, wasteland cannot 
always be easily recovered. In such circumstances, a steady if not increasing
13 The plateau geography of the Jharkhand region requires greater efforts at wasteland development 
rather than a proportional effort. While the rest of Bihar is largely plains and have been under the 
plough for centuries, the terrain of Jharkhand is hilly and overgrown and there is plenty of scope 
for agricultural extension.
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financial allocation in wasteland recovery can be expected and not a declining 
allocation, as is the case. The same applies to irrigation potential. There is a limit 
for extension of irrigated area in the region but there has been an overall decline in 
the total irrigated area in the Jharkhand region. This indicates a poor developmental 
effort by the governmental machinery.
The irrigation potential of the region is quite poor. A mere 11.87 per cent of 
the total irrigated area in Bihar as a whole was in the Jharkhand region (Table 26). 
Also noticeable is the fact that more than 43.15 per cent of this meagre area is 
irrigated from ‘other sources’. Since all the major sources of irrigation are listed 
separately, this heading in effect means that such areas are irrigated by seasonal 
rainfall.14 The second largest source of irrigation is tanks (39.12 per cent). During 
the field trip it was noticed that these tanks are seasonal tanks replenished by 
rainwater.
The third largest source of irrigation, wells (12.10 per cent), also depend on 
rainfall and their water levels fall during the years with poor rainfall making 
irrigation from them difficult. Interestingly, the dependence on rainfall for irrigation
Table 26: Area Irrigated from Different Sources in Jharkhand (in Hectares) 1961-62
Government
Canals
Private
Canals
Tanks Wells Other
Sources
Total Area 
Irrigated
Jharkhand
Total
10,926.75 2,023.47 90,246.87 27,923.91 99,554.84 230,675.87
Bihar Total 528,531.02 32,375.56 223,391.36 236,993.16 831,647.20 1,942,938.30
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
2.06 6.25 40.39 8.53 11.97 11.87
Jharkhand
Percentage
4.73 0.87 39.12 12.10 43.15 -
Bihar
Percentage
27.20 1.66 11.49 16.82 42.80 -
Totals may not tally due to rounding off of figures to the nearest thousands in the source and due to conversion of figures from Acres 
in the source to Hectares for comparative purposes. Factor used is 2.471 Acres equals 1 Hectare.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 44.
14 Rainfall has a bearing on all irrigation sources of irrigation. However, there is a difference between 
the farmers depending exclusively on rain to irrigate their fields and the water level in canals, 
reservoirs etc. falling due to poor rainfall. The low level of irrigation from man-made means such 
as canals, etc. indicate a poor development policy effort in the Jharkhand region..
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is equally heavy in Bihar as a whole (42.80 per cent). However, the most important 
irrigation source in Bihar as a whole is government canals accounting for 27.20 per 
cent of irrigation potential. In the case of the Jharkhand region however, only 4.73 
per cent of such irrigation is available. The marginalisation of the Jharkhand region 
in the scheme of planned development as far as irrigation potential was concerned, 
is evident.
A related issue which indicates the developmental level and tests the claims 
of the Jharkhandi leaders that dikus (outsiders) have gradually usurped all land in 
the Jharkhand region is the transfer of agricultural land. Table 27 shows the 
registered deeds of sale of rayati holdings with occupancy rights. Two trends are
Table 27: Figures for Registered Deeds of Sale in Respect of Rayati Holdings Having Occupancy
Rights in Jharkhand 1961
Entire In Part
Number
Area
Transferred
(in Acres)
Annual 
Payable to 
Landlord
(Rupees)
Consideration
Money
(Rupees)
Number
Area
Transferred
(in Acres)
Aiuxual 
Payable to 
Landlord
(Rupees)
Consideration
Money
(Rupees)
Jharkhand
Average
187.50 349.66 325.8 1,961,395 9,008.50 7,867.50 58,997 4,895,026,20
Bihar
Average
6,623.36 5,489.81 13,423 3,550,159.5 42,511.09 23,251.81 72,848.54 21,349,641.81
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 239.
evident. Firstly, there have been fewer transfers of lands (both entire as well as part 
holdings) in the Jharkhand region than in Bihar as a whole. The average number of 
transfers of entire holdings per district in the Jharkhand region is 187.5 compared 
with the Bihar average of 6,623.3. Similarly, the average area transferred in each 
district of the Jharkhand region is also far less.
However, the partial transfers in the Jharkhand region are far greater in 
number. Also salient is the fact that the average consideration money paid for both 
partial as well as entire transfers is far less in the Jharkhand region than similar 
average payment for similar transfers in the whole of Bihar. This indicates a certain 
degree of distress selling of land holdings in the Jharkhand region. It is likely that 
the poorer farmers in Jharkhand region transferred a part of their holdings to 
generate funds for paying off interest overdue on earlier borrowings from the 
moneylenders or for current needs. It is also equally likely that they were 
constrained to transfer parts of their lands when faced with a debt called in by the
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moneylender. However, these statistics cannot be taken as wholly accurate since the 
transfer of land to non-tribal people has been forbidden in the Jharkhand region 
since the colonial times. At the same time, it is equally likely that these statistics 
reflect merely the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Any moneylender who calls in his 
loan can become de facto owner of the land without going in for the actual legal 
transfer of land title deed to his name (to avoid exposing himself to the questions of 
the official who will register his ownership), unless the moneylender himself is also 
a tribal. Consequently, these statistics need to be treated with caution.
As far as the issuance of moneylender’s licenses the Jharkhand region was 
concerned, a total of 1,048 new licenses were issued in 1961-62 compared with 
1,128 in 1950-51. The percentage of such licenses issued for the rural areas of the 
Jharkhand region represented about 10 per cent of the rural area licenses issued in 
the whole of Bihar and more than 15 per cent of such licenses were in force at the 
end of the year (Table 28). This is not a very high proportion for an area where a 
quarter of the population lived.
As far as disbursal of secured loans by moneylenders was concerned, there is 
a decline in the share of the Jharkhand region in all such loans disbursed in Bihar as
Table 28: Number of Moneylenders’ Licenses Issued, Number of Licenses in Force and Moneys
Advanced in Jharkhand 1961-62
Number of 
Licenses 
Registered for 
the First Time
Number of 
Licenses in 
Force at the End 
of the Year
Amount of Loans Advanced
(Rupees)
With Security Without Security
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Jharkhand
Total
471 577 4,003 5,422 9,522,932 69,735,778 885,851 10,058,307
Biliar
Total
2,264 5,396 15,574 35,254 1,600,528,478 1,046,522,741 47,147,432 66,277,446
Jharkhand
as
Percentage 
of Bihar
20.80 10.69 25.70 15.37 0.59 6.66 1.87 15.17
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d,, p. 241.
a whole from 5.36 per cent in 1950-51 to about 3 per cent in 1961-62. This pattern 
is also accompanied by a decline in the proportion of unsecured loans in the 
Jharkhand region from 26.45 per cent in 1950-51 to about 9 per cent in 1961-62. 
However, the actual amount of loans secured advanced in the Jharkhand region had
184
increased substantially from Rupees 8,215,177 in 1950-51 to 79,258,710 Rupees -  
almost a ten times rise. Keeping in mind the fact that land is most often the item of 
security in rural India, there may have been a serious threat of de facto alienation of 
tribal land. The decrease in available governmental agricultural finances surely had 
a role to play in this matter.
Other developmental indicators in the region of Jharkhand show a similar 
picture. The developmental profile had improved over the last decade but whenever 
the responsibility had fallen on the shoulders of the policy apparatus (such as 
construction of canals, making agricultural finance available at favourable terms, 
etc.) the performance had left much to be desired. The government’s policy 
implementation machinery had not been performing well in the Jharkhand region.
Agricultural tax collection from the region of Jharkhand fell further due to 
poor performance of the agricultural sector compared with 1950-51. From 7.14 per
Table 29: Collection of Agricultural Income Tax in Jharkhand 1961-62
Tax Collected (Rupees)
Jharkhand Total 326,665
Bihar Total 5,284,369
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 6.18
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 213.
Table 30: Collection of Sales Tax in Jharkhand 1961-62
Tax Collected (Rupees)
Jharkhand Total 32,297,604
Bihar Total 74,443,528
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 43.38
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p, 215.
cent of the total agricultural income tax collected in 1950-51, the share of the 
Jharkhand region fell to 6.18 per cent (Table 29).
Sales tax collection however, increased in the Jharkhand region. While in 
1950-51, the region contributed 36.81 per cent to the total sales tax collection in the 
whole of Bihar, in 1961-62 this rose to 43.38 per cent (Table 30). Clearly, the non- 
agricultural sector was doing better than the agricultural sector. However, there was 
not much contribution of governmental policy machinery in this aspect.
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Admittedly, the mineral extraction from the region and some heavy industry 
was largely the result of governmental effort but apart from this, no major policy 
initiative was directed towards the development of non-agricultural activities in the 
region. This is reflected in the fact that despite comprising 45.78 per cent of the
Table 31: Length of PWD Roads in Jharkhand 1960
Total Mileage of PWD Roads (Kilometres)
Jharkhand Total 2,609
Bihar Total 6,951
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 37.53
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n, d., p. 244.
total land area of Bihar and being at the centre of the state’s non-agricultural 
activity, the Jharkhand region had only 37.53 per cent of PWD Roads (Table 31). 
Had the region not been so salient in the mineral policy of the government, the 
policy initiatives would perhaps have performed even less efficiently in this field as 
well.
Thus, after two Five-Year Plans, two general elections and a decade of 
independent Indian governance, the Jharkhand region was relatively worse off in 
many developmental profile indicators and showed only modest improvements in 
others. Clearly, the state of affairs had been improving but all the indicators that 
demonstrate a vibrant and efficient public policy in operation had not performed 
well in the Jharkhand region.
It is also noteworthy that the development profile of the Jharkhand region 
compared with the whole of Bihar had worsened over the first decade of 
independent Indian governance. It has been observed that the Jharkhand region had 
a better development profile in 1951 which worsened over this period. Some 
development indicators continued to be better than Bihar as a whole in 1961 but the 
rate of improvement in the decade of 1951-61 was faster in Bihar as a whole than 
the Jharkhand region.
This was also a period that saw the best popular support for the Jharkhand 
Party which virtually laid down the law in the region during the decade of 1951-61. 
The disillusionment with the party began with their failure to convince the SRC of 
the necessity of creating a state of Jharkhand and manifested itself in declining
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electoral support in the 1957 and 1962 elections. After this decade, the sway of the 
Jharkhandi parties in the region declined and ended with the Jharkhand Party 
merging with the INC. This merger marked not only the nadir of the Jharkhand 
Party but also signalled the entry of national parties into the region.
I l l
The year 1967 marked a break in Indian politics in more ways than one. It 
was the time when the hegemony of the INC at the national level began to be 
challenged and a true multi-party system started emerging. The reflections of this 
trend can also be noticed in state level politics. Undoubtedly, the stranglehold that 
the INC had over national and state level politics did not simply disappear 
overnight, but the lines of dissension within the INC began to come in to the open. 
The INC started losing its umbrella character which had enabled it to tower above 
its opponents in the past. The states began to throw up new regional and other 
grassroots political organisations. Leftist politics that had hardly survived under 
Nehru began finding roots in various pockets in the country. The “Congress 
System”15 began to disintegrate.
Such profound political changes hardly left the Jharkhand region untouched. 
Apart from the fact that a multi-party system started to emerge in the area, there 
also emerged strong support for the leftist parties. These independent Marxist 
political organisations swiftly moved in to fill the political vacuum which had been 
created by the collapse of the Jharkhandi political formations. The period also 
noticed a rise in civil unrest in the industrial centres of south Bihar. Support for the 
Naxalite movement in the area also led to widespread lawlessness and disorder (see 
chapter II). Consequently, President’s Rule was invoked in Bihar in June 1968. 
Soon after, a committee16 was appointed to enquire into the causes of growing unrest
15 Rajni Kothari, Politics in India, New Delhi, 1970.
16 It was made up of the secretaries to the Departments of Welfare, Labour & Employment, 
Education, Appointments and Political and submitted its report in November 1968.
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in tribal Bihar. This committee cited the declining development profile as a major 
cause of the unrest. However, the committee was also of the opinion that the role 
played by the planning process in improving the developmental profile of the 
Jharkhand region as a whole and that of the Adivasi inhabitants in particular, could 
not be evaluated conclusively because:
the statistics in regard to the plan progress have not been kept on 
regional basis, . . . Therefore, it is difficult to make a precise 
estimate, . . .  of the extent to which the tribal people have benefited, 
or failed to benefit, from the implementation of the three plans. 
Significant developments have, no doubt, taken place in the plateau 
region . . .17
The committee18 observed that the unrest in the Jharkhand region was rooted 
in the poor growth of opportunities for employment, vocational/ technical training, 
and education. The impact of these problems was accentuated, according to the 
committee, by “factors such as industrial development, educational advancement, 
rising prices, growth of political awareness, etc.” The committee also noted the 
continual neglect by the government machinery and underlined the need for planned 
development of the area and improvement of facilities such as irrigation, drinking 
water supply, etc.
Further, the report acknowledged that the tribal people had the poorest levels 
of literacy in Bihar. Nevertheless, it also pointed to higher employment in the 
Jharkhand region compared with the rest of the state. It took particular note of the 
relatively greater employment level of women but was equally concerned about the 
continued over-dependence of the population on agricultural occupations in the 
Jharkhand region. These deductions of the committee are in consonance with the 
analysis of the development profile of the Jharkhand region in 1961 in the last 
section.
17 A Report on the Situation in the Tribal Areas o f Bihar, Patna, 1968, p. 37.
18 ibid., pp. 8-9.
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The committee drew attention to the large-scale land-alienation near the 
industrial townships in the Jharkhand region and regarded it with concern. It was 
observed that inadequate governmental agricultural credit facilities in the Jharkhand 
region ensured that diku moneylenders thrived which resulted in land alienation and 
resultant unrest. It was critical of the policy of the government in this regard and 
recommended the extension of better agricultural credit facilities.
The absence of “responsive and responsible” leadership in the Jharkhand 
region was considered to be another important cause of unrest. The committee noted 
that the political vacuum had enabled “a number of political parties and individuals 
to fish in troubled waters of Chotanagpur”. Commenting on the demand for an 
autonomous state of Jharkhand, the committee felt that better educated persons in 
the region (a very small minority of them being Adivasi) would be the greatest 
beneficiaries of the creation of the state of Jharkhand or greater reservation for STs 
in jobs or educational institutions.
Hence, the conclusions of the Committee in 1968 attest to the conclusions 
arrived at in the last section. The next section examines the changes in the 
development profile of the region in terms of the number of people benefited during 
1961-71.
IV
Although the political climate of the region had changed drastically between 
1961 and 1971, the developmental profile hardly showed any sign of accelerated 
growth. The population of both Bihar as a whole and the Jharkhand region had 
grown since the 1961 Census. The decadal growth in the population of the 
Jharkhand region was 34.42 per cent whereas that of Bihar as a whole was 21.30
Table 32 Population in Jharkhand 1971
Area (Sq. Kms.) Total Population Males Females
Jharkhand Total 91,545 15,601,509 8,009,919 7,591,590
Bihar Total 173,876 56,353,369 28,846,944 27,506,425
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of Bihar 52.64 27.68 27.76 27.59
Source: Census o f  India 1971, Series 4, Bihar Part n-A  - General Population (Tables A-I, All, AIII and PCA), Patna: Government 
Printing Press, n. d.
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per cent. By 1971, 27.68 per cent of the total population of Bihar resided in the 
Jharkhand region (Table 32). Moreover, owing to the administrative reorientation of 
the districts which formed the Jharkhand region, the total land area of the Jharkhand 
region represented 52.64 per cent (up by approximately 7 per cent since 1961) of 
the total area of Bihar. The proportion of people living in the Jharkhand region 
increased by only 3 per cent. Thus, it is not possible to determine the relative 
growth rates of the population of the Jharkhand region and Bihar as a whole,
Besides, the Jharkhand region was gradually and increasingly becoming 
more cosmopolitan in character. The diminishing percentage of tribal population 
noticed earlier continued in this decade as well. In the decade 1961-71, the tribal 
component of the population of the Jharkhand region reduced from 33,92 per cent to 
29.29 per cent (Table 33). This reduction cannot be attributed to the traditional
Table 33: Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1971
Total Population Males Females
Jharkhand Total 4,569,889 2,277,084 2,292,805
Bihar Total 4,932,767 2,462,265 2,470,502
Jharkhand as a 
Percentage of Bihar
92.64 92.47 92.80
Jharkhand Percentage 29.29 28.42 30.20
Source: Census o f India 1971, Series 4, Bihar Part V-A SC -IIV  (Part A & B) and SCI-V (Part) - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.
seasonal economic migration of tribal males to the rest of the country because there 
is an almost equal decline in both male and female ST population.
Moreover, the tribal population of Bihar still predominantly resided in the 
Jharkhand region. 92.64 per cent of the total tribal population of Bihar lived in the 
Jharkhand region in 1971 (Table 33) as compared with 93.6 per cent in 1961. This 
can be attributed to a substantially lower growth rate for the ST population during 
the last decade.
While in the period 1961-71, the demographic profile of the region had 
altered to some extent, the developmental profile of the region with a few noticeable 
exceptions, was not significantly different. An important indicator of the 
developmental profile is an analysis of the occupational pattern. This indicator 
attests to a mixed picture of development in the Jharkhand region. However, before
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embarking on an analysis of this indicator, it must be pointed out that the figures for 
1971 are artificially deflated owing to a redefinition of categories:
In the 1971 Census every person was asked what his main activity 
was . . .  On the basis of this question, the population was divided 
into two broad streams of main activity as ‘workers’ and ‘non- 
workers’ . . .  If the person had participated in any such regular work 
on any one of the days during this reference period [one week prior 
to the date of enumeration] and this had been his main activity, the 
person was categorised accordingly. In the case of seasonal workers, 
a person’s main activity was ascertained with reference to such work 
in the last one year . . . The 1971 Census registered a sharp decline 
in the work participation rate . . .  as compared to the 1961 Census.19
Therefore, a comparison of actual percentages of workers in agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors in 1961 and 1971 is of little value.20 The best that can be 
done is a comparison of the changes in the percentages of workers in Bihar as a 
whole that resided in the Jharkhand region. This will indicate if the availability of 
employment opportunity in the Jharkhand region had improved relative to Bihar as a 
whole.
Table 34 represents the distribution of workers in the two sectors. It shows 
that the total population gainfully employed in the Jharkhand region was only about 
29 per cent of the total population whereas the same percentage for the whole of 
Bihar was approximately 31 per cent. In consonance with other development 
indicators, the availability of employment in Bihar as a whole was marginally better 
than in the Jharkhand region. Moreover, this table also confirms the industrial 
predominance of the Jharkhand region. Non-agricultural employment in the
19 Census o f India 1991, Series 1, Paper 3 of 1991, Provisional Population Tables: Workers and their 
Distribution, New Delhi, 1991, para 2.3-2.5. As noted earlier, the 1961 Census had enumerated 
individuals as workers if (a) they were employed for one day over the past 15 days and (b) in case 
of seasonal work, if they found at least one hour of work over the “greater part of the ‘working 
season”’. This reduced the number of workers enumerated in the 1971 census compared with the 
1961 Census.
20 The higher number of workers enumerated by the 1961 Census leads to a misleading picture as the 
figures fell significantly when the category of workers was re-defined in 1971. However, the 
comparative analysis of the Jharkhand region and Bihar as a whole still holds true as the same 
definition was applied to both the regions.
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Jharkhand region is higher than that in Bihar as a whole, as is the share of women 
employed in such activities.
Further, as far as the agricultural activities were concerned, 23.67 per cent 
of those employed in agricultural activities in Bihar as a whole resided in the 
Jharkhand region. This figure is slightly smaller than the percentage of population
Table 34: Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1971
Agricultural and Related Activities1 Non- Agricultural Activities2
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Jharkhand
as
Percentage 
of Bihar
23.67 23.26 25.94 37.96 37.47 43.87
Jharkhand
Percentage
22.08 35.79 7.62 7.14 13.90 1.22
Bihar
Percentage
25.82 42.72 8.10 5.20 10.17 0.77
1 Includes Cultivators; Agricultural Labourers and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and allied 
activities.
2 Includes those in Mining & Quarrying; Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing & Repairs; Construction; Trade & Commerce; 
Transport, Storage & Communications and Other services.
Source: Census o f India 1971, Series 4 Bihar, Part II-B (i) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I Part A and BTI), Patna: 
Government Printing Press, n. d,
that resided in the Jharkhand region. In the non- agricultural sector, the percentage 
of persons residing in the Jharkhand region increased from 31.82 per cent in 1961 to 
37.96 per cent in 1971. Despite a sharp decline in the numbers of workers 
enumerated (owing to the redefinition of categories), the fact that the percentage of 
non-agricultural workers rose indicates a greater industrial vitality in the economy 
of the Jharkhand region. Clearly, the region of Jharkhand was consolidating as the 
industrial region of Bihar. Thus, a very mixed picture emerges about the 
occupational patterns in the Jharkhand region in 1971, but overall there were as a 
lower number of job opportunities in the Jharkhand region than Bihar as a whole in 
1971. However, as pointed out earlier, owing to redefinition of categories, these 
deductions from this indicator are of limited use.
As far as the educational level of the working population of the Jharkhand 
region was concerned the picture is not very different (Table 35). In 1971, 81.27 
per cent of the persons employed in agricultural activities and 44.00 per cent of the 
non- agricultural workforce was illiterate. The figures for female illiteracy in the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors alike were still higher at 98.48 per cent and
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84.45 per cent, respectively. Although the level of female illiteracy in Bihar as a 
whole is quite similar, the figures for total illiteracy in the whole of Bihar are 
slightly better. In Bihar as a whole, 78.41 per cent of the agricultural and 42.28 per 
cent of the non-agricultural workforce was illiterate.
As is evident from Table 35, the patterns of education in Bihar as a whole 
and the Jharkhand region were poor. However, overall, Bihar as a whole offered a 
better picture of educational levels amongst the working population. In fact, as far 
as educational levels in non-agricultural activities in the whole of Bihar were
Table 35: Occupational Patterns by Educational Standards in Jharkhand 1971
Educational
Standards
Agriculture-Related Activities4 Non- Agricultural Activities5
Person Male Female Person Male Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar
Illiterate 24.53 24.21 25.86 39.51 38.56 45.34
Literate* 20.07 19.88 38.41 29.88 29.85 32.92
Middle School1 20.56 20.38 42.23 36.95 36.98 35.24
Matriculate 12.44 12.38 34.96 38.29 38.08 46.01
Intermediate2 17.34 17.25 41.66 42.55 43.23 28.62
Graduate and 
Others3
9.07 9.07 0 38.28 37.80 40.81
Jharkhand Percentage
Illiterate 81.27 77.79 98.48 44.00 40.36 84.45
Literate* 6.69 7.89 0.77 11.63 12.54 1.81
Middle School1 10.21 12.06 1.03 23.58 25.20 6.02
Matriculate 0.89 1.06 0.04 14.31 15.13 5.44
Intermediate2 0.05 0.06 0.002 0.95 1.01 0.35
Graduate and 
Others3
0.06 0.07 0 5.49 5.67 3.62
Bihar Percentage
Illiterate 78.41 74.72 98.80 42.28 39.22 81.71
Literate* 7.89 9.23 0.52 14.78 15.74 2.41
Middle School1 11.75 13.76 0.63 24.23 25.54 7.49
Matriculate 1.70 2.00 0.03 14.19 14.89 5.18
Intermediate2 0.06 0.08 0.001 0.85 0.87 0.55
Graduate and 
Others3
0.15 0.18 0.0004 5.45 5.62 3.25
* Without Educational Level.
1 Includes Primary and Middle School.
2 Includes Technical or Non-technical Diploma or Certificate not equal to Degree.
1 Includes those who hold a University Graduate or Postgraduate Degree or an Engineering and Teclmology, Medical, Agricultural, 
Veterinary and Dairying or Teaching Degree.
4 Includes Cultivators; Agricultural Labourers and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and allied 
activities.
5 Includes those in Mining & Quarrying; Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing & Repairs; Construction; Trade & Commerce; 
Transport, Storage & Communications and Other services.
Source: Census o f  India 1971, Series 4, Bihar Part H-B (ii) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I Part B, B-II & B-VII to B-IX), 
Patna: Government Printing Press, n, d.
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concerned, a better picture emerges. In all the categories, Bihar as a whole has a 
better educational profile than the Jharkhand region.
Clearly, the performance of public policy in the region of Jharkhand was 
poorer than in the whole of Bihar. Keeping in mind the fact that in 1951 the 
Jharkhand region had better educational levels of its population, it appears that in 
the last two decades there had been no concerted implementation of public policy in 
the region of Jharkhand with regard to the educational/ literacy policy component of 
policy planning. The education policy of the government was not able to even 
maintain the earlier standards, let alone improve the educational level of the 
workforce.
It is quite disturbing to find that after two decades of policy planning and 
implementation, approximately, two-thirds of the workforce21 was still illiterate. 
This cannot but significantly affect the economic opportunities available to the 
people in the region as well as retard the rate of economic growth. Other 
developmental indicators for the region do not paint a picture that would redeem the 
neglect of the region in the components of policy agenda that have already been 
discussed.
The falling share of the Jharkhand region in the total agricultural production 
of Bihar as a whole has been noticed earlier. However, no further comparisons of
Table 36: Area under Principal Crops in Jharkhand (in thousands of Hectares) 1974-75
Paddy Wheat Gram Barley Maize Masoor Arliar Khesri Peas Sugar
cane
Potato Tobacco Jute s Chilli
Jharkhand
Total 1,687 74 53 25 191 6 36 15 2 9 23 * * 1
Bihar 5,228 1,478 248 192 881 146 107 622 28 141 115 9 105 11
Jharkhand
as
Percentage 
of Bihar
32.26 5.00 21.37 13.02 21.67 4.10 5.78 2.41 7.14 6.38 20.0 0 0 9.09
* Nil or less than 500 Hectares
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 46-7, 49.
21 Notwithstanding the redefinition of categories in 1971, even if the new categories are analysed 
without reference to the last Census, the conclusions hold true.
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the agricultural output of the region can be made since the data available in the 
decade of 1970’s does not provide the agricultural output of the districts concerned. 
Instead, the available data provides the total hectares under a specified crop (Table 
36). It must be pointed out that a higher acreage under a certain crop does not 
necessarily mean a higher production level. This is particularly true in the case of 
the Jharkhand region where the majority of farmers continue to depend on rainfall 
alone. It seems that the government of Bihar was guilty of trying to cover up for the 
falling agricultural output of the Jharkhand region and Bihar as a whole by simply 
not publishing the relevant data.
However, this table makes it clear that there was little effort to produce cash 
crops in the Jharkhand region. The proportion of cropped area in the Jharkhand 
region under marketable crops such as sugarcane, jute, tobacco and potato is much 
smaller compared with subsistence crops like rice, gram/ paddy, barley or lentils. 
This indicates that the nature of agricultural activities in the Jharkhand region 
continues to be that of subsistence farming dependent on seasonal rainfall for its 
water requirements. This fact underlines the observations made during the fieldwork 
that a number of peasants have given up farming owing to minimal produce. They 
have not been able to find jobs elsewhere and therefore have no employment at all. 
This pattern of declining employment opportunities in the agricultural sector is not 
matched by an increase in employment in non-agricultural sector.
With an aim to compare the relative agricultural performance of the 
Jharkhand region and Bihar as a whole, another type of statistic available for 1974- 
75 has been used. The acreage under High Yielding Varieties (HYV) of crops
Table 37: Area under High Yielding Variety Crops in Jharkhand (in Acres) 1974-75
Rice Wheat
Jharkhand Total 176,449 91,754
Bihar Total 1,506,974 2,152,963
Jharkhand as Percentage of 
Bihar
11.70 4.26
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 44.
would indicate the relative efforts undertaken by the planning machinery to increase 
agricultural production. As demonstrated in Table 37, the Jharkhand region, despite
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producing a high percentage of the total paddy/rice production of Bihar in 1951 and 
1961, in 1974-75 accounted for only 11.7 per cent of the total area under HYV of 
rice in Bihar as a whole. Since all HYVs require an efficient and plentiful irrigation 
system, it is pertinent to examine whether there were any improvements in the total 
irrigated area of the Jharkhand region and the sources of irrigation.
As Table 38 illustrates, in 1973-74 the Jharkhand region accounted for only 
7.59 per cent of the total irrigated area of Bihar whereas in 1961-62 its share had 
been 11.87 per cent. There was in fact an actual decline in the total irrigated area in
Table 38: Area Irrigated from Different Sources in Jharkhand (in Hectares) 1973-74
Government
Canals
Private
Canals
Tanks Wells/
Tube-wells
Other
Sources
Total Area 
Irrigated
Jharkhand
Total
34,000 2,000 33,000 45,000 60,000 176,000
Bihar Total 896,000 4,000 82,000 717,000 621,000 2,316,000
Jharkhand
as
Percentage 
of Bihar
3.79 50 40.24 6.27 9.66 7.59
Jharkhand
Percentage
19.31 1.13 18.75 25.56 34.09 -
Bihar
Percentage
28.68 0.17 3.54 30.95 29.81 -
Total may not tally due to rounding up of figures to the nearest 1,000 in the source.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook, 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 40-1.
the Jharkhand region from 230,675.87 hectares in 1961-62 to 176,000 hectares in 
1973-74. This reduction in the irrigation capacity is noticeable across all the sources 
of irrigation with the exception of government canals and wells/tube-wells.
The percentage of land area irrigated in the Jharkhand region by government 
canals increased from 4.73 per cent in 1961-62 to 19.31 per cent in 1973-74. 
However, this four-fold increase in the percentage was not very significant in actual 
terms since only 24,000 more hectares were irrigated by government canals and the 
total irrigated area had fallen in real terms. Tanks formed a large source of 
irrigation in 1961-62 but by 1973-74, the extent of irrigation from tanks had also 
fallen considerably and formed only 18.75 per cent (compared with 39.12 per cent 
in 1961-62) of an already reduced total irrigated area. The fact that the total area 
irrigated in the Jharkhand region by government canals actually went up in real
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terms is the only indicator of any efforts to improve the irrigation capacity of the 
region and thereby agricultural output.
The patterns for Bihar as a whole show a rather different picture. The area 
irrigated from all sources declined in Bihar as a whole except the area irrigated by 
government canals, yet there was net increase in the total irrigated area of Bihar 
with the result that over the last 13-14 years, the total irrigation capacity of the 
whole of Bihar had increased considerably. Thus, there seems to have been a greater 
success in the implementation of irrigation programmes in Bihar as a whole but 
quite the reverse in the Jharkhand region. This indicates a gross failure of policy 
implementation and a reduced effectiveness of public policy initiatives in the 
Jharkhand region.
Another related factor which has a bearing on the performance of public 
policy with regard to agriculture in the region is the availability of governmental
Table 39: Land Improvement Loans Advanced To Agriculturists in Jharkhand 1972-73,y
Loans Advanced (Rupees)
Jharkhand Total 9,223,910
Bihar Total 57,918,086
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 15.92
# Under the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, Natural Calamities Loan and Agriculturists’ Loans Act, 1884.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 152.
agricultural finance. The Committee on the Situation in Tribal Areas of Bihar in 
1968 singled out this area for its critical remarks. Table 39 shows that a greater 
volume of governmental agricultural finance was available in the Jharkhand region 
in 1972-73, compared with the earlier period. From only 4.26 per cent in 1959-60, 
the percentage had risen to 15.92 per cent by 1972-73. This was a substantial rise in 
both actual as well as relative terms. However, it was still far below the amount 
required to improve agriculture in the region. The region of Jharkhand accounted 
for 52.6 per cent of the total land area of Bihar and more than a quarter of the total 
population of Bihar but the total agricultural finances disbursed by the government 
in the region was only about 15 per cent of the total. The figure becomes even more 
insignificant when the plateau landscape of Jharkhand is taken into account.
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Despite the poor efforts at improving agricultural production in the region, 
the contribution of the Jharkhand region to the total agricultural income tax 
collection in Bihar as a whole had risen. By 1975-76, the agricultural income tax 
collected from the Jharkhand region formed 9.56 per cent (compared with 6.18 per 
cent in 1961-62) of the total. In fact, the actual figures had increased by almost two 
and half times (Table 40). Despite the modest amount of money involved (which is 
even smaller in real terms when inflation is taken into account); the above figures
Table 40: Collection of Agricultural Income Tax in Jharkhand 1975-76
Tax Collected (Rupees)
Jharkhand Total 170,000
Bihar Total 1,778,000
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 9.56
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 159.
indicate a better realisation of agricultural revenues from the Jharkhand region 
compared with Bihar as a whole.
The high share of the Jharkhand region in the revenues collected in Bihar is 
also shown in Tables 41 and 42. Only 16 per cent of the total number of electrified 
villages in the whole of Bihar were in the Jharkhand region (Table 41). The
Table 41: Number of Electrified Villages in Jharkhand 1973*
Total Number of Electrified Villages
Jharkhand Total 1,485
Bihar Total 9,280
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 16.00
* As on 31 March 1973.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 234.
Table 42: Collection of Revenues under Electricity Act 1948 1975-76
Tax Collected (Rupees)
Jharkhand Total 60,686,000
Bihar Total 86,256,000
Jharkhand as Percentage of 
Bihar
70.35
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 159.
electrification of a village is pertinent in the developmental profile of the region 
because availability of electricity increases the access of the farmers to underground 
water for irrigation purposes.
As Table 38 shows, 6.27 per cent of the total irrigated area irrigated by 
wells/tube-wells in the whole of Bihar was in the Jharkhand region. This can be
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explained by the low percentage of electrified villages that lie in the region. 
However, despite this poor level of electrification of villages, the contribution of the 
Jharkhand region to the tax collected on electricity was quite high. In the year 1975- 
76, the Jharkhand region contributed more than 70 per cent of the total taxes on 
electricity (Table 42). Due to poor scope of consumption of electricity for irrigation, 
most of the tax must have been collected from the industrial sector. However, in 
view of the fact that there was no substantial rise in the jobs in non-agricultural 
sector in the last decade or so, a chequered picture emerges. It seems that the region 
of Jharkhand had not only become the predominant industrial region in Bihar but 
had also become an internal colony of Bihar where there were poor public policy 
efforts at developmental investment, agricultural development and employment 
generation but high level of tax realisation.
This pattern of declining public policy performance in the Jharkhand region 
can also be noticed in the rate of expansion of the PWD road network. There was 
indeed, a larger network of roads in the Jharkhand region in 1977-78 (Table 43) but 
the region accounted for only 33.3 per cent of the total road length in Bihar as a
Table 43: Length of PWD Roads in Jharkhand 1977-78
Total Length of PWD Roads* (in Kilometres)
Jharkhand Total 5,005
Bihar Total 15,026
Jharkhand as percentage of Bihar 33.30
* Includes State Highways, Major District Roads and other Divisional Roads. National Highways’ district-wise break-up is unavailable. 
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 197.
whole (compared with 37.5 per cent in 1960). The rate of growth of road network 
in the Jharkhand region was slower than in Bihar as a whole.
Another facet in the maze of developmental problems in the Jharkhand 
region that had also deserved significant mention by the 1968 committee, is that of 
rayati transfers and the rate of land alienation amongst the tribal peasants of the 
Jharkhand region. Compared with 1961, there were a greater numbers of partial 
transfers of land in the Jharkhand region (Table 44) whereas in Bihar as a whole the 
number of partial transfers declined by 1974. This indicates a pattern of sale of a 
part of a landholding to secure resources to buy agricultural inputs for the rest of the 
land or possibly distress selling for current needs in the Jharkhand region.
199
In 1974, the average area of land transferred, as far as the partial transfer of 
land was concerned, was smaller in the Jharkhand region (Table 44) than in Bihar as 
a whole. The same pattern is repeated in the cases of transfers of the entire 
holdings. Keeping in mind the low amount of average rent payable to the landlords
Table 44: Figures for Registered Deeds of Sale in Respect of Rayati Holdings Having Occupancy Rights in
Jharkhand 1974
Entire In Part
Number
Area 
Transferred 
(in Acres)
Annual 
Rent 
Payable to 
Land-lord
(Rupees)
Consideration
Money
(Rupees)
Number
Area 
Transferred 
(in Acres)
Annual 
Rent 
Payable to 
Landlord
(Rupees)
Consideration
Money
(Rupees)
Jharkhand
Average 183.14 192.85 264.28 * 25,619.71 11,907.14 18,634.57 *
Bihar
Average 3,036.14 1,417.48 5,711,90 * 26,359.06 26,347.45 36,949.74
8 Figures for very few districts are available.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d ., p. 192.
and the general state of agricultural development in the region, it is more likely that 
there were not many buyers of the land. There is a likelihood that more peasants 
wanted to sell their holdings than those who wanted to buy agricultural land in such 
a region. In such a situation, alienation of land,22 whether legal or illegal, cannot be 
ruled out. Unfortunately, the statistics for moneylenders are not available for this 
period but keeping in mind the general pattern of the region till now and the 
declining state of agriculture in the region, it is quite plausible that there was a rise 
in distress selling or forced transfers. Many impoverished peasants were likely to 
sell part or whole of their holdings for current expenses or to pay for forced 
economic migration to other parts of India.
In sum, the decade of the 1960s saw almost an all round deterioration in the 
development profile of the Jharkhand region, both in itself as well as a proportion of 
Bihar as a whole. During the earlier decade, there were some indicators which had 
performed better than the others in Jharkhand. However, during this decade, most
22 It hardly matters whether this alienation is de facto or de jure as by now some tribal persons had 
also become rich moneylenders. The effect of any alienation is the same in the development profile 
of the Jharkhand region: some more tribal persons begin to look for the non-existent industrial 
employment.
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development indicators worsened. The earlier scenario of the Jharkhand region 
contributing more than its fair share to the state exchequer but not receiving an 
equally high investment of development funds from the public policy machinery 
continued. As noted earlier, the Jharkhand region appears to have emerged as an 
internal colony of Bihar.
V
In the development scenario of the Jharkhand region, a brief analysis of the 
changes in the development profile of the ST population is important.23 Although the 
ST population in the Jharkhand region was only about a third of the total population, 
the tribal people were still the most cohesive political group in the region. 
Furthermore, since the Jharkhand movement was premised on (and still draws upon) 
tribal history, culture, heritage and symbolism, it is pertinent to trace the 
developmental profile of the tribal people.
The Census of 1961 was the first to enumerate detailed socio-economic 
statistics for the tribal population. Hence, there is no detailed comparable data from 
1951 apart from basic population figures. In 1961, more than 93 per cent of the 
tribal population of Bihar resided in the Jharkhand region which was an increase 
over the 1951 figures of 84.72 per cent (Tables 2 & 17). This indicates that the 
tribal population was increasingly concentrated in the Jharkhand region. The 
administrative reorganisation of the districts of the Jharkhand region also had a part 
to play in this concentration.
Besides, more than 90 per cent of the ST persons employed in agricultural as 
well as non-agricultural occupations in Bihar as whole were resident in the 
Jharkhand region (Table 45). As far as the ST males in the Jharkhand region were 
concerned, only 47.61 per cent of them (compared with 52.18 per cent of the ST 
women) worked in agricultural activities. The figures for women’s occupational
23 Since an overwhelming majority of the ST persons lived and worked in the Jharkhand region, it is 
of very little value to dwell on die employment patterns of ST population in the whole of Bihar.
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patterns are higher in agricultural occupation. Presumably, more ST men had by 
now ventured out of the Jharkhand region in search of jobs leaving behind their 
families. Seasonal economic migration of tribal men to the rest of the country to 
work as labourers was nothing new. The higher non-agricultural employment of ST 
males also indicates that they were also looking for industrial employment in greater 
numbers than ST females.
As far as their occupational pattern in the Jharkhand region is concerned, 
Table 45 tells us that 49.47 per cent of the ST population was still working in 
agricultural occupations and a mere 7.03 per cent found non-agricultural 
employment. More ST women depended on agricultural occupations than men and
Table 45: Scheduled Tribes Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1961
Agricultural and Related Activities1 Non- AjE>ricultural Activities2
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
90.51 85.67 95.34 90.47 89.96 91.55
Jharkhand
Percentage
49.47 47.61 52.18 7.03 9.56 4.54
Bihar
Percentage
51.65 51.98 51.33 7.27 9.93 4.65
'■ Includes Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers.
z  Includes those in Mining, Quarrying, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and allied activities; 
Household Industry; Manufacturing other than Household Industry; Construction; Trade and Commerce; Transport, Storage and 
Communication; and Other services.
Source: Census o f  India 1961, vol. IV, Bihar Part V-A - Special Tables for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Patna: 
Government Printing Press, n. d.
women’s employment level in non-agricultural occupations was almost half than that 
of men. In sum, it is clear that the hopes expressed in the Constituent Assembly that 
within a decade aided by reservations and positive discrimination, the ST population 
would come up to the level of the rest of the population were belied.
The matters were not to change drastically during the next decade. The 
occupational pattern of Scheduled Tribes in the Jharkhand region in 1971 again 
indicates a pattern of a lesser number of occupational opportunities in the Jharkhand 
region. More than 92 per cent of the total ST population of Bihar and more than 96 
per cent of those employed in agricultural or non- agricultural activities resided in 
the Jharkhand region (Tables 33 & 46). In the Jharkhand region, the over­
dependence of the ST population on agricultural activities was once again, very 
evident. In 1971, 31.38 per cent of the ST population was engaged in agricultural
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activities whereas only 3.12 per cent were employed in non- agricultural activities. 
Despite the redefinition of categories, this overwhelming pattern testifies to the 
above conclusions as it indicates that the ST population was not getting even the 
unskilled jobs in the industrial sector.
Table 46: Scheduled Tribes Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1971
Agricultural and Related Activities Non- Agricultural Activities
Total Male Female3 Total Male Female
Jharkhand
as
Percentage 
of Bihar
96.71 92.14 0.17 96.29 97.45 91.90
Jharkhand
Percentage
31.38 50.66 12.23 3.12 5.02 1.24
1 Includes Cultivators; Agricultural Labourers and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and allied 
activities.
2 Includes those in Mining & Quarrying; Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing & Repairs; Construction; Trade & Commerce; 
Transport, Storage & Communications and Other services.
Source: Census o f India 1971, Series 4, Bihar Part V-A SC-HV (Part A & B) and ST I-V (Part A & B), - Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes, Patna: Government Printing Press, n, d.
Table 47: Scheduled Tribes Educational Levels in Jharkhand 1971
Illiterate Literate1 Middle School2 Matriculate and 
Above
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
Jharkhand
as
Percentage 
of Bihar
92.02 91.39 92.56 95.24 94.65 97.36 95.67 95.08 98.02 94.76 94.25 97.06
Jharkhand
Percentage
87.76 80.59 94.89 5.74 8.93 2.57 5.52 8.81 2.26 0.71 1.17 0.26
1 Without Educational Level
2 Primary or Junior Basic
Source: Census o f India 1971, Series 4, Bihar Part V-A (SCI-IV Part A & B; SCI-V Part) - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, 
Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.
The lack of success of the developmental policies for the ST population is 
also reflected in the figures for their educational levels (Table 47). Despite more 
than two decades of the operation of reservation and positive discrimination to 
secure rapid educational improvement amongst them, the majority of STs were still 
illiterate. In 1971, the figure was 87.76 per cent. The situation was worse in the 
case of women where 94.89 per cent were illiterate. Moreover, amongst the 12.24 
per cent of the ST population that was thus literate or educated, 5.74 per cent were 
only literate without any further education level. It is likely that many of this group 
had acquired literacy by their own individual efforts and not because of successful 
implementation of the education policy component of the overall policy initiatives.
203
It is noteworthy that only 0.71 per cent of the total ST population was 
matriculate or above and 5.52 per cent was educated till the middle school. Further, 
only 2.57 per cent of ST women were literate and another 2.26 per cent were 
educated till the middle school. Only 0.26 per cent of the ST women were educated 
to matriculate level or higher. This indicates an extremely modest success of the 
policy of positive discrimination in favour of the ST population. The pattern that 
emerges from the above data indicates that not only there was a small improvement 
in the availability of employment opportunities for the STs, their educational levels 
had also shown only a modest improvement.
In the overall analysis, many development indicators had deteriorated in the 
Jharkhand region. Amongst the few that did show an improvement, the rate of 
growth was much slower than that of Bihar as a whole. The public policy machinery 
had failed to implement a sustainable and balanced development programme in the 
region during the period 1951-71.
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Chapter Y
Changing Patterns in the Development
Profile of the Jharkhand Region -  II
The meagre impact of the operation of the developmental policies in the 
Jharkhand region during the period 1951-71 led to a heightening of socio-economic 
conflict and unrest in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see chapter II). Such societal 
and politico-economic unrest was undermining the legitimacy of the regime and the 
State was increasingly resorting to institutional and open coercion to implement its 
will. Consequently, the government realised the pressing need to ameliorate matters 
in the Jharkhand region. Consequently, beginning with the Fifth Five-Year Plan, 
there was a reorientation in the planning process which significantly affected the 
developmental profile of the ST population of the Jharkhand region. This 
reorientation of the development strategy began with the appointment of the Study 
Team on Tribal Development Blocks headed by Shilo Ao in 1969 to review the 
strategy for tribal development. The Study Team was scathing in its report about the 
state of tribal development in the country and its conclusions along with those 
reached by the committee on Situation in the Tribal Areas of Bihar, 1968 (see 
chapter IV) led to a reorientation in the strategy of development for the tribal 
population of Bihar.
I
The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1976-77 to 1980-81) accordingly sought to alter 
the approach to developmental activities in the Jharkhand region. A new method of 
delivery was adopted which sought to concentrate on the tribal population. This 
approach came to be called the Modified Area Development Approach (MADA). 
Under MAD A, a predetermined percentage of the Plan expenditure outlay for Bihar 
was earmarked for the areas of high tribal concentration. This came to be called the 
Tribal Sub-Plan (TSP).
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Under TSP, the districts of Ranchi and Singhbhum, Latehar subdivision and 
Bhandaria block of Garhwa subdivision of Palamau district, Dumka, Pakur, 
Rajmahal and Jamatra subdivisions and Sunarpahari and Boarijore blocks of Godda 
sub-divisions of Santhal Pargana districts were identified for the implementation of 
MADA. The idea behind MAD A was to identify the pockets of these districts which 
had a tribal population concentration of more than 50 per cent and to undertake 
concentrated efforts to accelerate development in these areas. In all, 112 blocks 
were included, covering 43,792 square kilometres (25.18% of total area of Bihar), 
and were grouped into 14 Integrated Tribal Development Programmes (ITDP). Each 
ITDP was placed under a Project Officer. Advisory Committees made up of local 
officials and non-officials were set up to aid the Project Officers in the formulation 
and implementation of developmental schemes.
Another 43 pockets of tribal population concentration were identified in 41 
blocks in Palamau (Non-TSP area), Santhal Pargana (Non-TSP area), Hazaribagh, 
Giridih, Dhanbad, Monghyr, Bhagalpur, Kathiar, Rohtas, and West Champaran 
districts to be brought under MADA. Between them, these areas covered 
approximately 4,255,000 tribal persons (86.25 per cent of the total tribal population 
of Bihar).
Efforts were also made to streamline the administration of the new approach 
to tribal development. A branch secretariat under the control of the Regional 
Development Commissioner was set up at Ranchi to ensure expeditious sanctioning 
of Sub-Plan schemes. This was applicable to 29 decentralised departments such as 
agriculture, animal husbandry, dairy, education, health, water supply, etc. 
Furthermore, additional heads of departments were posted to Ranchi to ensure 
speedy and efficient implementation of the programmes under the TSP. Originally, 
14 per cent of the State Plan outlay was earmarked for the funding of the TSP 
schemes. In 1977-78 this was raised to 17 per cent. Table 48 shows the outlay and 
expenditure1 incurred under TSP during the Fifth Five-Year Plan.2
1 The plan allocation and expenditure figures are in lakhs of Rupees. One lakh equals 100,000.
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While the Fifth Five-Year Plan was underway, a committee was appointed 
by the Planning Commission to evaluate the development policies and their 
effectiveness in the backward areas of the country called the National Committee on 
the Development of Backward Areas. It reported on the eve of the sixth plan in 
1981 and its report on the Development of Tribal Areas is pertinent for our analysis
Table 48: Tribal Sub-Plan Component of the Bihar Fifth Five-Year Plan 1976-81
Outlay (lakhs of Rupees) Expenditure (lakhs of Rupees)
Year State Plan TSP Outlay
Per cent of 
the State 
Plan
State Plan TSP Outlay
Per cent of 
the State 
Plan
1976-77 25,514 3,627.15 14.0 24,945.91 3,236.86 13.0
1977-78 28,232 4,916.91 17.0 26,558.48 4,029.82 15.0
1978-79 34,285 6,000.00 17.0 31,346.10 3,764.93 12.0
1979-80 37,652 6,628.00 18.0 31,879.50 4,387.86 14.0
1980-81 47,661 9,008.90 19.0 Not
Available
Not
Available
Not
Available
1976-77 to 
1980-81
Total/
Average
173,344 30,180.96 17.0 114,729.99 15,419.47 10.8
Source: Draft Sixth Five Year Plan 1980-85, Patna: Planning Department, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. xix.
not only in what it recommended but also in what it chose to say on the state of 
development till then. The National Committee concurred with the report of the 
Study Team on Tribal Development Blocks headed by Shilu Ao which had led to the 
TSP/ MADA approach to tribal development in the Fifth Plan and observed that
while it cannot be denied that much work has been done and 
considerable sums of money have been spent in the field of tribal 
welfare during the three plan periods, it is difficult to assess the 
success achieved . . . [due] to the absence of the data regarding per 
capita income or the indebtedness of tribal communities . . . .  what 
does appear clear to the Team after a study of the tribal development 
programmes, . . .  is that progress is to be judged by what remains to 
be done to bring the tribals on par with the rest of the population, the 
leeway to be made up is still considerable and the delay in the 
implementation of considered recommendations . . .  in the past . . . 
has. worsened the position which these recommendations were
Contd.
2 Draft Sixth Five-Year Plan 1980-85, Patna, n. d., p. xix.
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intended to correct while the failure to pay attention to and profit by 
their advice on matters pertaining to the formulation and 
implementation of tribal development programmes has resulted in the 
failure of ambitious schemes and consequent wastage of valuable 
resources.3
The National Committee was also critical of the way in which the evaluation 
and implementation of development programmes for such areas was treated. It 
commented that
under the Constitution, the Union Government’s responsibility for 
administration of the Schedule [Scheduled (sic)] Areas extends not 
only to supplementing of funds for their development but also in 
guiding the State Governments and giving directions to them. The 
Union Government have so far not issued any directive to the State 
Governments. They have relied only on persuading the State 
Governments to adopt appropriate policies for the development of the 
tribal areas. Further, the Governor is also required to submit to the 
President of India a Report annually regarding the administration of 
the Scheduled Areas in his State. These Reports, however, are rather 
irregular in submission. Also in course of time, they have tended to 
become routine administrative reports. The Governors in the light of 
the Constitutional provision have to act on the advice of the Council 
of Ministers. Thus, these annual reports are like ‘State Reports’.4
Clearly, the Committee was unhappy with the way in which the development 
of tribal areas had been sidelined in the past Five-Year Plans leading to worsening 
of an already poor situation.
Moreover, the Committee was also critical of the approach of the TSP which 
aimed at tribal families. It was of the opinion that with regard to “programmes like 
agriculture, horticulture, forestry, soil conservation, minor irrigation, etc. Social 
Welfare Services, drinking Water, appropriate infrastructural programmes, etc.” 
such an approach held little value. It opined that “the approach has to be an
3 Report o f the Study Team on Tribal Development (Chairman Shilu Ao), quoted in the Report on 
Development of Tribal Areas, National Committee on the Development of Backward Areas, New 
Delhi, 1981, para 1.5.
4 Report on Development o f Tribal Areas, National Commission on the Development of Backward 
Areas, New Delhi, 1981, para 1.3.
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‘Integrated area Development Approach’”.5 On the performance of government’s 
agricultural and allied programmes it commented that such programmes “in these 
areas have so far followed the pattern adopted for the developed areas. Therefore, it 
has not touched even the fringe of the problem in these areas” .6 About educational 
improvements in the tribal areas, the National Committee pointed to the lacunae in 
the methods, content, organisation and implementation of the policy delivery 
mechanism. It was of the opinion that “the educational authorities and others 
sometimes tend to over simplify the issue by partial analysis of the problem and 
generally conclude the discussion with solutions which may be too idealistic or too 
expensive. There are no short cuts to effective administration and situation of 
organisational failure cannot be corrected by providing higher capital investments”.7
It was also critical of the administrative inability of the state governments to 
invest the relatively modest allocations which were made for development activities 
in such areas and pointed out the failure of the public policy mechanism to adapt the 
programmes to suit the individual tribal areas and an over-dependence on the 
sectoral allocation of programmes. It observed that “there have been savings even in 
the limited resources allocated for the Sub-Plan areas and funds have not been fully 
utilised.” Besides, the Committee was critical of the rate and method of 
disbursement of agricultural credit and the rate of land alienation. The Committee 
therefore, recommended administrative overhaul to ensure efficient and urgent 
utilisation of resources.
Hence, the Committee blamed the public policy delivery mechanism for the 
worsening developmental profile in the tribal areas. It almost called the entire public 
policy towards the tribal areas a failure. The authoritative conclusions of this 
Committee were broadly similar to the ones arrived at in chapter IV.
5 ibid., para 4.20.
6 ibid., para 4.21-4.27.
7 ibid., para 191.
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However, the impact of this rather radical review of the policy has yet to 
emerge. Without doubt, there was a declining development profile and whatever 
improvements have been noticed proved temporary and piece-meal in the long run. 
Despite the critical report, the TSP and MADA approach to tribal development 
continued unabated. A complete reorientation of the policy planning and delivery 
mechanism for development in the tribal areas was required but government chose 
to pump in more money despite the modest success of the MADA. The socio­
political dimensions of the defects in development policy implementation in the 
Jharkhand region were not taken into account. Hence, the modest success rate 
achieved by the MADA and the TSP were not in consonance with the high levels of 
financial allocations.
The reorientation in the method of delivery by the public policy mechanism 
to this target group approach under the MADA did yield some results as far as the 
development profile of the region was concerned (details of the improvement in 
development profile due to operation of MADA have been discussed in the 
subsequent section of this chapter). In fact, the Tribal Sub-Plan was the only 
component of developmental planing that was yielding noticeable results. However, 
as has been discussed earlier, the tribal population was increasingly becoming a 
numerical minority in the Jharkhand region. Hence, these policy efforts to target the 
ST population only did not serve the developmental purpose of benefiting the 
majority of the population of the Jharkhand region. What was required perhaps, was 
an effort aimed at development of the entire Jharkhand region and all its population 
irrespective of their tribal origins or otherwise.
The TSP resulted in significant improvements in the tribal population’s 
educational and employment standards in the period 1971-81 (examined in the next 
section of the chapter). Subsequently, owing to the noticeable success in addressing 
at least some of the problems of the tribal people in the Jharkhand region, the Sixth 
Five-Year Plan (1980-85) tried to reach out further under TSP. The allocation of 
funds for the TSP rose from 17 per cent of the Bihar State Plan in the Fifth Five-
210
Year Plan to 20.80 per cent in the Sixth Plan.8 The outlay under the Sixth Five Year 
Plan in Bihar and the outlay for the TSP under broad heads of development are 
listed in Table 49.
The largest allocation under the TSP in the Sixth Plan was made to irrigation 
and power which was clearly crucial for agricultural production and generation of
Table 49: Bihar State Plan Outlay and its Tribal Sub-Plan Component in Sixth Five-Year Plan
1980-85
Head of Development
Sixth Five Year Plan 1980-85
(lakhs of Rupees)
TSP Outlay as 
Percentage of Bihar 
Plan Outlay
State Plan Outlay Flow to TSP
Agriculture & Allied 
Activities
55,588.38 16,169.50 29.08
Co-operation 2,675.00 875.00 32.71
Irrigation, Flood 
Control and Power
198,312.33 32,239.32 16.25
Industry and Minerals 16,025.06 3,313.50 20.67
Transport and 
Communication
39,519.00 7,385.25 18.68
Social and Community 
Services
58,347.75 17,154.45 29.40
Economic Services 380.00 67.00 17.63
General Services 4,550.00 898.00 19.73
Total 375,397.52 78,102.02 20.80
Source: Draft Sixth Five-Year Plan 1980-85, Patna: Planning Department, Government of Bihar n. d,, pp. Lxvi - Lxix.
employment in both the agricultural as well as the non-agricultural sectors. Under 
this head, the majority of the funds were allocated to increasing irrigation potential 
which reflected the centrality of agricultural activities in the economic life of the 
TSP area and the poor availability of assured irrigation in the previous decades.
The second largest allocation of funds was for Social and Community 
Services.9 Under its sub-heads, the largest allocation was made to Education (more 
than 6,000 lakhs Rupees). The educational levels of the ST had been improving
8 Draft Sixth Five-Year Plan 1980-85, Patna, n. d., pp. xix-xx.
9 The head of Social and Community Services included the sub-heads of General Education, Art and 
Culture, Technical Education, Medical, Water Supply, Housing, Police Housing, Urban 
Development, Information and Publicity, Labour and Labour Welfare, Welfare of ST, SC and 
Other Backward Classes, Social Welfare and Nutrition.
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significantly during the previous sub-plan and it seemed logical to invest in the area 
where the policy implementation apparatus had made some inroads. The second 
largest allocation was to the sub-head of water supply and the third largest to that of 
SC, ST and backward classes. The analysis of developmental profile till the 1971 in 
chapter IV reflected the dire need to provide safe drinking water in order to improve 
public health and hygiene and prevent the spread of curable diseases such as 
dysentery and diarrhoea which had a significant share in the total number of deaths 
in the Jharkhand region. Some improvements had been made in this area but a lot 
was left to be achieved. Thus, the largest financial allocation was being concentrated 
on those heads of development which had responded positively to the efforts of the 
TSP and were crucial in the development profile of the region (Table 49).
The third largest allocation in the flow to the TSP was to the head of 
agriculture and allied activities. The policy planners had realised the need to 
concentrate on agricultural activities since it still provided the largest source of 
employment to both tribal and non-tribal people in the Jharkhand region. Amongst 
the numerous sub-heads of allocation under this head,10 the largest sub-head in terms 
of money allocated was that of Minor Irrigation (more than 8,000 lakh Rupees). As 
has been noted earlier, the region of Jharkhand had been deteriorating in this area. 
The worsening of irrigation potential had meant poorer agricultural output as well as 
the remoteness of the possibility of using HYV seeds. This area was recognised as a 
thrust area by the planners. The second and third largest sub-heads were Forest and 
Crop Husbandry with an allocation of more than 1,270 and 1,180 lakhs Rupees, 
respectively. Both these sub-heads were also salient in the economic life because the 
occupations under this sub-head fall within agricultural occupations which employed 
most people in the Jharkhand region.
10 The sub-heads under ‘Agriculture and Allied Activities’ were Research and Education, Crop 
Husbandry, Land Reform, Minor Irrigation, Soil and Water Conservation, Animal Husbandry, 
Dairy Development, Fisheries, Forest, Investment in Agricultural Financial Institutions, 
Marketing, Storage and Warehousing, Special Programmes for Rural Development [Small Farmers 
Development Agency (SFDA), Drought Prone Areas Programme (DPAP) and Integrated Rural 
Development Programme (IRDP)], Community Development and Panchayats,
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Development planning in Bihar as a whole and the Jharkhand region 
continued within the framework of MADA in the Seventh Five-Year Plan. Whether 
it was able to effect substantial changes in the development profile of the region is 
another matter. The observations made by the National Committee on the 
Development of Backward Areas had very little effect on the pace of development in 
the region. By this time, 42 such pockets spread over 38 development blocks had 
been identified for the implementation of the MADA, covering 83.1 per cent of the 
total tribal population of the state.11 As far as development indicators such as 
educational and literacy levels of the tribal and general population, occupational 
patterns and demographic profile of the region were concerned, the Draft Seventh 
Five-Year Plan quotes from the Census of 1981 which presents a dismal picture.
Commenting on the infrastructural level of the region, the Draft Seventh 
Five-Year Plan points to the fact that only 20 per cent of the villages in the region 
had been electrified till 1984-85 and that “this position compared very unfavourably 
with the State as a whole where 48 per cent of the villages have already been 
electrified”. Moreover, the Draft Plan points out that although the per capita level 
of the consumption of electricity in the region was highest in the state, “it is mainly 
because of consumption by several large and medium industries and mining 
complexes. As such the per capita consumption rate is not a correct indicator of the 
relative poverty or prosperity of the region. More attention is required to be paid to 
rural electrification in the tribal areas”.12 Clearly, one cannot hope for much 
development to have occurred in the region.
The Draft Plan does not provide detailed comparative data on the irrigation 
potential of the region. It merely points out that about 2.48 lakhs hectares of 
irrigation potential had been created by the Sixth Five-Year Plan in the TSP area. It 
also lists four irrigation projects which were launched under the Sixth Plan and
11 Bihar Tribal Sub-Plan 1985-90, Mimeo, n. d., para 1.3.
12 ibid., para 1.24.
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informs us that out of 24 minor irrigation projects that were under way, about 10 
were completed.13
As far as health facilities are concerned, the Draft Seventh Plan lists the 
minor advances made in the existing and new health centres but acknowledged that 
“except at Jamshedpur the bed-strength in all Sub-Divisional hospitals is below 
norm”.14 About education, the Plan speaks of achieving the enrolment targets but 
does not enlighten us about student retention rates and the educational levels 
achieved by them.
The planned outlay under the TSP during the Seventh Five-Year Plan is 
tabulated in Table 50. The TSP component of the Bihar State Plan in terms of 
percentage of plan outlay was increased substantially from 20.8 per cent in the Sixth
Table 50: Outlay under various Development Heads for the TSP area in the Bihar Seventh Five-
Year Plan 1985-90
Head of Development Seventh Five-Year 1985-90 TSP Outlay as 
Percentage of Bihar 
Plan OutlaySector/ Group
State Plan Outlay
(lakh of Rupees)
State Plan’s 
contribution to TSP
(lakh of Rupees)
Agriculture and Allied 
Activities (including 
Minor Irrigation)
99,940.00 23,096.50 23.11
Co-operation 3,200.00 972.00 30.37
W ater and Power 
Development 251,400.00 65,146.80 25.91
Industrial and 
Mineral Development 21,600.00 4,844.50 22.42
Transport and 
Communication 40,310.00 6,853.00 17.00
Social and Community 
Service 86,685.00 21,628.05 24.95
Miscellaneous 6,865.00 1,427.00 20.78
Total 510,000.00 123,967.85 24.30
Source: Bihar Tribal Sub-Plan 1985-90, Mimeo, n. d., para 6.4.
Five-Year Plan to 24.3 per cent in the Seventh Five-Year Plan (Tables 49 & 50). 
The reason for this rise cannot be ascertained conclusively although the better
13 ibid., para 1.25-1.26,17.77
14 ibid., para 1.29.
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performance of development policy (discussed in the next section of this chapter) 
amongst the tribal population under the MADA certainly had a role to play.
Like the last Plan, largest amount of money was allocated to the development 
of power and irrigation projects (Table 50). These projects were of prime 
importance to the region in encouraging both agricultural as well as non-agricultural 
economic activity. The second and the third largest allocation were to agricultural 
and allied activities and social & community services, respectively. These were the 
heads where expenditure was required to encourage agricultural production and 
thereby improve employment levels as well as to promote literacy, education and 
socio-economic development of the region.
The effect of this increased percentage allocation to developmental activities 
in the TSP area cannot be known due to absence of the detailed indicators for the 
later years. On the basis of available data, it can be inferred that the operation of the 
Seventh Plan did not alter the development profile of the region to a substantial 
extent. This has been confirmed by the data that has been published for the decade. 
The detailed socio-economic indicators of the region in 1991 have not yet been 
published but a preliminary pattern can be discerned.
Thus, despite the tall promises of the development policy planners and the 
policy machinery itself, the brief interlude of slightly faster growth in developmental 
indicators during 1971-81 was quickly reversed. By 1991, the development profile 
of the Jharkhand had all but returned to pre-1971 levels. It was clear that the success 
of public policy initiatives in the region was restricted to a very few sectors.
However, the policy planning mechanism showed a remarkable lack of 
ability to respond to the situation. It continued the old approach under the Eighth 
Five-Year Plan by allocating more money in an attempt to reverse the slowdown in 
the growth of development indicators (discussed in the next section of the chapter) 
during the Seventh Plan. The TSP approach continued during the Eighth-Five Year 
Plan (1990-95). A comparison of Tables 50 & 51 shows a small rise in the 
allocation of resources to the TSP. However, in its review of the Seventh Plan, the 
Draft Eighth Five-Year Plan does not overcome the deficiencies pointed out in such 
reviews earlier. It provides us with details such as the hike in scholarships for ST
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students, the enrolment targets met at schools, number of hospitals established etc., 
but gives us no clue about the functioning of these schemes. It is not very useful to 
dwell on the details of the Draft Eight Five-Year Plans since it has been noticed 
earlier and also commented upon by the committees appointed to review the 
implementation of development programmes that higher allocation of resources does 
not automatically lead to a faster rate of change in the development profile.
However, the percentage of allocation and the increase or decrease in them 
may reflect the thrust areas of the State’s policy machinery. Since detailed data is 
not yet available for the year 1991, it is not out of place to examine the percentages 
of allocation in the Eighth Plan.
Table 51: Outlay under various Development Heads for the TSP area in the Bihar Eight Five-
Year Plan 1990-95
Head of Development
Total State Plan 
Outlay
(lakh of Rupees)
Flow to TSP
(lakh of Rupees)
TSP as percentage 
of State Plan 
Outlay
Agriculture and Allied Activities 91,136.00 32,654.00 35.82
Special Programmes for Rural 
Development
129,960.00 27,350.90 21.04
Special Area Programmes 8,046.00 2,180.00 27.09
Irrigation and Flood Control 329,110.00 109,260.00 33.19
Energy 222,550.00 26,468.72 11.89
Industry and Mineral 63,056.00 18,766.00 29.76
Transport 136,273.00 34,550.00 25.35
Science, Technology and 
Environment
5,140.00 1,384.00 26.92
General Economic Services 44,465.00 11,348.75 25.52
Social services 246,540.00 65,684.95 26.64
General Services 23,724.00 7,436.00 31.34
Total 1,300,000.00 337,083.32 25.92
Source: Draft Eight Five Year Plan, 1990-92, Patna: Mimeo, n. d., pp. xLvi- Liii.
As enumerated in Tables 50 and 51, a rise can be noticed in the percentage 
of State Plan Outlay that was to be invested in the TSP area under all the major 
heads of development. There was a particularly large rise in the percentage of 
agricultural funds earmarked for the TSP area. In the Seventh Plan, only 23.11 per 
cent of the Bihar State Plan’s outlay for agriculture and allied activities was 
earmarked to be invested in the TSP areas. This figure had risen to a massive 35.82 
per cent in the Eighth Plan. This indicates that as far as the public policy planners 
were concerned, they considered agriculture in the TSP regions to be reaching a
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crisis point which is in consonance with the analysis in chapter IV and later in this 
chapter. Hence, more and more money was being allocated to this component of 
development planning for the Jharkhand region.
The ever increasing allocation of money has not yielded the corresponding 
results. The enormity of this failure of the public policy to put the money allocated 
to good use is reflected in the fact that only 4-10 per cent of the allocation is 
actually spent on development programmes in the Jharkhand region. In sum, the 
public policy machinery had shown a lack of ability to affect the development 
profile of the region. The modest improvements in some development indicators 
during one decade are soon squandered away in the next (see next section of the 
chapter). A coherent and efficient development policy is lacking. Very little 
improvement can be noticed in the development profile of the Jharkhand region over 
the last half-century, and even fewer can be attributed directly to the public policy 
machinery.
II
By the time the 1981 census was conducted, the Tribal Sub-Plan had been 
under way for nearly six years. The government was already drafting the Sixth 
Five-Year Plan of which the TSP was an important component. However, the TSP 
was the only component of public policy implementation that had resulted in some 
degree of improvement in the development profile of the Jharkhand region during 
the previous decade.
By 1981, the population of the Jharkhand region had increased to 17,612,069 
or 25.19 per cent of the total population of Bihar (Table 52). Once again, the 
administrative boundaries of districts of Bihar had been re-oriented with the result
Table 52: Population in Jharkhand 1981
Area (Sq. Kms.) Total Population Males Females
Jharkhand Total 79,714 17,612,069 9,080,444 8,531,625
Bihar Total 173,887 69,914,734 35,930,560 33,984,174
Jharkhand
Percentage
45.84 25.19 25.27 25.10
Source: Census o f India 1981, Series 1, India Part II-B (i) - Primary Census Abstract, General Population, Pauia: Government 
Printing Press, n. d.
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that the percentage of land area that formed districts of the Jharkhand region now 
represented only 45.84 per cent (compared with 52.64 per cent in 1971) of the total. 
Due to the reorientation of district boundaries, it is not possible to compare the 
relative decadal growth rate of population during the period 1971-81. However, it 
can deduced that the population of the Jharkhand region grew at a fairly fast rate 
since a reduction of about 7 per cent in the land area of the districts of Jharkhand led 
to a reduction of only a little over 2 per cent in the population.
The Scheduled Tribes component of the population of the Jharkhand region 
increased marginally to 30.25 per cent in 1981 from 29.29 per cent in 1971 (Tables 
33 & 53). However, the percentage of the ST population which resided in the
Table 53: Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1981
Total Population Males Females
Jharkhand Total 5,329,283 2,669,825 2,659,458
Bihar Total 5,801,867 2,915,492 2,895,375
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of Bihar 91.85 91.57 91.85
Jharkhand Percentage 30.25 29.40 31.17
Source: Census o f  India 1981, Series 4, Bihar (Part II-B) - Primary Census Abstract, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d. and 
Bihar Through Figures 1981, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1984.
Jharkhand region fell from 92.64 per cent in 1971 to 91.85 per cent in 1981. There 
seems to have been a slight increase in the ST mobility although more than 91 per 
cent of the ST population still resided in the Jharkhand region. The ST male 
population of the Jharkhand region, as in the earlier years, was lower than the ST 
females which indicates a significant level of seasonal economic migration of ST 
males.
As far as the developmental indicators of the region are concerned, very few 
are available for the year 1981. The government of Bihar has chosen not to publish
Table 54: In-door and Out-door Patients Treated in Public Medical Institutions Owned, 
___________ Subsidised or Aided by Public Authorities in Jharkhand 1979*___________
Number Indoor Patients Treated Number Outdoor Patients Treated
Jharkhand Total 103,206 1,290,433
Bihar Total 448,098 5,861,169
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of Bihar
23.03 22.01
'  Figures are not available for Dhanbad, Ranchi and Singhbhum.
Source: Bihar Through Figures 1981, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1984, pp. 164-5.
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the infant mortality and birth and death rates after the mid-1970s. A similar case 
exists with regard to the causes of death. Consequently, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to analyse the state of health services in Bihar in 1981. The only figures 
that have been published are those of the number of patients treated in the various 
government aided medical institutions in the state in 1979 (Table 54). Of the total 
number of patients that were treated as indoor patients in Bihar as a whole, 23.03 
per cent were in the Jharkhand region. Also, only 22.01 per cent of the total number 
of outdoor patients treated in Bihar as a whole resided in the Jharkhand region. 
Since the total population of the Jharkhand region was 25.19 per cent of the total 
population of Bihar, the figures for the patients treated reflect a relatively 
proportionate availability of health facilities in the region.15
As far as the other socio-economic indicators of development are concerned, 
some data is available. However, once again the picture that may emerge from a 
comparative examination of occupational patterns for 1971 and 1981 is not wholly 
accurate, as there was another redefinition of the category of workers in the later 
years. The 1981 Census divided the population firstly into workers and non-workers 
and then went on to divide the workers into main workers and marginal workers. 
Thus, “a trichotomy of persons into mutually exclusive groups of ‘main workers’, 
‘marginal workers’ and ‘non-workers’ was introduced in the 1981 Census. A 
uniform reference period of ‘one year’ preceding the enumeration was adopted for 
recording activity status in the 1981 Census, irrespective of whether the activity was 
‘seasonal’ or ‘regular’.16 However, while formulating the economic questions for the 
1981 Census, it was considered desirable to “obtain . . .  a detailed profile of the 
working characteristics of the population without losing much of the comparability 
with 1961 and 1971 results . . . ”17 On account of this and the fact that the figures for
15 Since the figures for Dhanbad, Ranchi and Singhbhum are not available, this reflection on the 
health services vis-a-vis Bihar as a whole must be treated with caution. However, the comparison, 
largely, holds true for the rest of the Jharkhand region since these figures are not included in the 
total for Bihar as a whole as well.
16 Census o f India 1991, Series -1, Paper 3 of 1991 - Provisional Population Totals: Workers and their 
Distribution, New Delhi, 1991, para 2.6.
17 ibid.
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marginal workers in the 1981 Census represent a minute percentage of the working 
population, the figures for ‘main workers’ have been utilised to examine the 
occupational pattern in the Jharkhand region in 1981.
As far as the relative position of opportunities of employment between the 
Jharkhand region as Bihar as a whole was concerned, there had been a small but 
significant change (Table 55). In 1981, approximately 37 per cent of the population 
of the Jharkhand region was employed in the agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors together compared with 29 per cent in 1971. In Bihar as a whole, the same 
figure was approximately 32 per cent in 1981 compared with about 31 per cent in 
1971. Hence, the opportunities of employment in the Jharkhand region as well as in 
Bihar as a whole increased over this period. Notably, the non-agricultural 
employment in the Jharkhand region had doubled from 7.14 per cent in 1971 to 
15.61 per cent in 1981. There was a small decline in the agricultural employment in 
the Jharkhand region but not enough to indicate a shift from agricultural sector to 
non-agricultural sector.
As is demonstrated in Table 55, there was a slight decline in the percentage 
of persons who worked in the agricultural sector and lived in the Jharkhand region. 
In 1971, 23.67 per cent of such persons in Bihar as a whole resided in the
Table 55: Occupational Patterns of Main Workers in Jharkhand 1981
Agricultural and Related Activities1 Non- Agricultural Activities2
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Jharkhand
as
Percentage 
of Bihar
23.27 21.85 30.34 44.30 39.63 55.27
Jharkhand
Percentage
21.68 32.91 9.72 15.61 19.01 12.00
Bihar
Percentage
23.47 38.05 8.04 8.87 12.12 5.45
l* Includes Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers,
2 Includes those in Household Industry, Processing, Servicing, Repairs and Other workers.
Source: Census o f India 1981, Series 1, India Part II-B (i) - Primary Census Abstracts, General Population, New Delhi: Census 
Commissioner of India, n. d,
Jharkhand region whereas in 1981 only 23.27 per cent did so. However, the 
proportion of women agricultural workers as a percentage of such workers in Bihar 
as a whole increased from 25.94 per cent in 1971 to 30.34 per cent in 1981. There 
seems to have been a higher employment rate for women. By 1981, in the non-
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agricultural occupations, 44.30 per cent women workers in the whole of Bihar 
resided in the Jharkhand region, an increase over the 1971 figure of 37.96 per cent. 
This increase was in both male and female non-agricultural workers. In Indian 
conditions, this generally means poorer economic conditions. The higher rate of 
employment amongst women in the Jharkhand region relative to Bihar can also be 
attributed to the sociological factors such as the absence of a tradition of purdah 
amongst the women of the Jharkhand region. Also pertinent is the existence of a 
tradition of working women in the region which is perhaps a by-product of seasonal 
economic migration of the male population since the colonial period (see chapter II).
Table 56: Occupational Patterns of Main Workers by Educational Standards in Jharkhand
1981'
Educational
Standards
Agriculture-Related Activities7 Non- Agricultural Activities8
Person Male Female Person Male Female
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar
Illiterate 24.21 22.58 30.07 43.22 41.98 49.62
L itera te2 22.27 21.98 35.20 35.89 35.94 34.10
Middle School3 23.22 22.74 54.35 42.22 42.26 40.57
Matriculate 4 14.71 14.54 51.31 38.24 38.15 40.98
Intermediate5 11.64 11.57 28.05 37.12 36.93 40.44
Graduate and 
Others6
11.37 11.26 46.57 33.44 32.69 48.51
Jharkhand Percentage
Illiterate 78.19 72.87 97.36 37.82 33.99 74.63
Literate2 6.87 8.47 1.12 8.42 9.10 1.95
Middle School3 12.83 15.80 2.13 21.20 22.95 4.42
Matriculate4 3.08 3.87 0.22 16.86 17.97 6.17
Intermediate5 0.33 0.41 0.01 5.60 5.82 3.46
Graduate and 
Others6
0.13 0.17 0.008 6.81 7.00 5.00
Bihar Percentage
Illiterate 75.15 70.54 98.22 34.78 31.63 71.58
Literate2 7.18 8.43 0.96 9.33 9.89 2.72
Middle School3 12.86 15.19 1.19 19.95 21.22 5.18
M atriculate4 4.87 5.82 0.13 17.52 18.41 7.16
Intermediate5 0.66 0.79 0.01 5.99 6.16 4.07
Graduate and 
Others6
0.27 0.33 0.005 8.09 8.37 4.91
1 Excludes Marginal workers
2 Without Educational Level
3 Primary or Middle School.
4 Matriculation or Secondary
5 Includes Higher Secondary, Intermediate, Pre-University and Technical/ Non-technical Diploma not equal to Degree
6 Includes those who hold a University Degree, and above.
7 Includes Cultivators, Agricultural Labourers, and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting, Plantations, Orchards and allied 
activities.
8 Includes those in Mining & Quarrying, Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing, Repairs, Construction, Trade & Commerce, 
Transport, Storage, Communication and Other services.
Source: Census o f India 1981, Series 4, Bihar Part m -A  & B (i) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I to B-VI), Patna: Government 
Printing Press, n. d.
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A similar, though less significant improvement can be noticed in the overall 
level of education in the Jharkhand region (Table 56). As far as the agriculture- 
related occupations were concerned, the percentage of illiterate persons fell from 
81.27 per cent i n i  971 to 78.19 per cent in 1981. It is a small decrease compared to 
the almost 8 per cent decrease in the decade of 1961-71.
The percentage of illiterate women had shown very little change from the 
1961 and 1971 levels of more than 98 per cent to 97.36 per cent in 1981. This does 
not indicate a very effective public policy in the region as far as overall educational 
standards were concerned. In fact, the improvement in the percentage of illiterate 
persons in agricultural occupations was due to the rise of the percentage of persons, 
particularly male, who were either literate without educational level, middle-school 
qualified or matriculates. However, one cannot be too critical since it cannot be 
expected that a large percentage of the illiterate population will become graduates in 
a decade. Moreover, there was a small but significant level of improvement in all 
categories (Table 56).
As far as the literacy amongst the non-agricultural occupations was 
concerned, the pattern of the agricultural population is repeated. The percentage of 
illiterate persons in the non-agricultural workforce of the Jharkhand region fell 
slightly from 44 per cent in 1971 to 37.82 per cent. The decrease in the percentage 
of illiterate persons in non-agricultural occupations showed one major difference 
from the pattern among the agricultural population. There was a significant decline 
in illiteracy percentage of the male as well as female components of the non- 
agricultural workforce. The male illiterate figure fell from the 1971 figure of 40.36 
per cent to 33.99 per cent in 1981 while the female illiteracy percentage decreased 
from 84.45 per cent in 1971 to 74.63 per cent in 1981.
Clearly, there was a greater availability of avenues of education in the 
Jharkhand region in this decade. Unlike the earlier decades, the decade of 1971-81 
showed a significant improvement in almost ail categories of education (Table 56) 
and not only in the literate category. It can be deduced that public policy was able to 
implement a small component of its proclaimed goals. It should be noted that the 
implementation of this policy was more efficient in the urban areas than the rural
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since there is a more significant improvement in the educational levels of the non- 
agricultural workforce, especially in women’s educational levels.
The patterns for the whole of Bihar follow this broad trend (Table 56) with 
the difference being that the population of Bihar as a whole was better educated than 
that of the Jharkhand region. The percentage of illiterate persons is lower in all 
categories of workers except for women in agricultural occupations. There are slight 
variations across categories but overall, the educational scenario was better in Bihar 
as a whole than the Jharkhand region.
Hence, although the education policy component of public policy showed 
signs of increased vigour in this period in both the Jharkhand region and Bihar as a 
whole, there was better performance in Bihar as a whole than the Jharkhand region. 
As far as the Jharkhand region was concerned, policy implementation with regard to 
improvement of educational levels was better in the case of STs (because of the 
operation of TSP) (discussed later in the chapter) and those in non-agricultural 
occupations. This would mean that the vast majority of the population of the 
Jharkhand region that resided in the rural areas and was not tribal was only 
marginally affected by the newly found vitality of public policy implementation in 
the Jharkhand region.
Among the indicators of agricultural produce, again the figures for 
agricultural production are not available for the period under analysis. The 
government of Bihar has only published the area under various crops and provides 
no details of agricultural production. However, rough estimates can be made of 
whether the government policy of maximising the available acreage under various 
crops was working. It can be noted from Table 57 that it was not the case. In 1974-
Table 57: Area under Principal Crops in Jharkhand (in thousands of Hectares) 1985-86
Paddy / Rice Wheat Gram Barley Maize
Jharkhand
Total
1,591 73 32 15 137
Bihar 5,335 1,835 191 83 669
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
29.82 3.97 16.75 18.07 20.47
Source: Bihar Through Figures 1991, Patna: Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 90-3.
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75, 32.26 per cent of the total land area under rice/ paddy was in the Jharkhand 
region (i.e. 1,687 thousand hectares in the Jharkhand region). This decreased to 
29.82 per cent in 1985-86 (i.e. 1,591 thousand hectares in the Jharkhand region). 
Similarly, 5 per cent of the total area under wheat lay in the Jharkhand region (74 
thousand hectares) in 1974-75; this declined to only 3.97 per cent (73 thousand 
hectares) in 1985-86 as did the proportion of land under gram and maize which fell 
from 21.37 per cent and 21.67 per cent, respectively in 1974-75 to 16.75 per cent 
and 20.47 per cent, respectively in 1985-86. However, the proportion of land under 
barley showed an increase from 13.02 per cent in 1974-75 to 18.07 in 1985-86. This 
increase in the percentage of land in the Jharkhand region under barley as a 
proportion of Bihar as a whole is due to decline in the total cropped area under 
barley in Bihar as a whole. In actual terms, the land area under barley in the 
Jharkhand region fell from 25 thousand hectares in 1974-75 to 15 thousand hectares 
1985-86. A similar pattern was present in Bihar as a whole as well (Table 57).
The probable fall in agricultural production is also indicated by a pattern of 
shift from agricultural occupations to non-agricultural occupation in this period. In 
such a scenario, the probability of a rise in agricultural production was extremely 
remote. The other data about agricultural finances, land transfers and moneylenders 
in this period has also not been published.
As far as the performance of public policy over the effort to secure irrigation 
facilities and thereby increase in agricultural production was concerned, the 
Jharkhand region seems to be of marginal importance (Table 58). There was a
Table 58: Area Irrigated from Different Sources (in thousands of Hectares) 1980-81
Government
Canals
Private
Canals
Tanks Wells/
Tube-wells
Other
Sources
Total Area 
Irrigated
Jharkhand
Total
56 _» 22 62 47 186
Bihar Total 1,094 96 96 994 767 2,953
Jharkhand
as
Percentage 
of Bihar
5.11 - 22.91 6.23 6.12 6.29
Jharkhand
Percentage
30.10 - 11.82 33.33 25.26 -
Bihar
Percentage
37.04 3.25 3.25 33.66 25.97 -
9 Nil or less than 500 Hectares in each district.
Source: Bihar Through Figures 1981, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1984, pp. 110-1.
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modest increase of about 10 thousand hectares in the total irrigated area in the 
Jharkhand region, which increased from 176 thousand hectares in 1973-74 to 186 
thousand hectares in 1980-81 (Table 58). Significantly, over the same period, there 
was an increase of more than 600 thousand hectares of irrigated area in Bihar as a 
whole. Clearly, there seemed to be little effort at securing larger irrigated potential 
for the Jharkhand region. Moreover, the Jharkhand region with an area of more than 
45 per cent of the total, accounted for only 5.11 per cent of the total area irrigated 
by government canals in Bihar as a whole in 1981 (compared with 3.79 per cent in 
1973-74).18
In fact, there was some growth in this source of irrigation over the last 
decades but the new figure was even lower than that of 1961-62. Moreover, the 
growth rate was too slow to be of much consequence as far as agricultural output 
was concerned. This is especially so in light of the fact that other sources of 
irrigation had significantly diminished. The proportion of wells showed a small rise 
but the small area that was so irrigated makes this rise insignificant. Moreover, the 
area irrigated by wells was larger than that irrigated by government canals. Overall 
there was a very small increase but the total area irrigated in the Jharkhand region 
was still lower than the 1961 levels. The agricultural output in the Jharkhand region 
would have fallen due to poor irrigation potential.
The shift in the occupational pattern also was probably the consequence of 
this declining ability of agriculture to support existing levels of employment. The 
overall growth of job opportunities was in fact, the contribution of the non- 
agricultural sector. Further, this growth in the non-agricultural sector was likely to 
be born out of private initiative rather than out of significant policy impetus. 
Therefore, the policy mechanism was able to deliver only limited results. Overall, 
there was no significant change in the level of effectiveness in public policy
18 It must be noted that in 1961-62, the Jharkhand region had a potential to irrigate 230,675 hectares, 
i.e., 11.87 per cent of the total irrigation capacity in Bihar as whole.
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implementation in the Jharkhand region - a pattern that holds true for the decade 
1981-91 as well.
I l l
The political dynamics of the Jharkhand region in the period 1981-91 was 
marked by economic blockade of mineral transportation under the leadership of the 
AJSU, demonstration and agitation led by the JCC and other politically effervescent 
activities. This ensured that the issue of Jharkhand came on to the national agenda 
and the national press vigorously pursued the poor state of affairs in the Jharkhand 
region. However, all the hectic political activity resulted neither in an accelerated 
pace of development in the region nor in any new reorientation of public policy 
initiatives. The developmental profile of the Jharkhand region therefore, was not 
much better in 1991. The issue of an autonomous state therefore, started finding 
greater popular support resulting in the creation of the JAAC in 1995.
The detailed socio-economic distribution of the population as enumerated by 
the 1991 census is yet to be published. However, on the basis of available data, 
broad patterns about the progress of the developmental indicators in the period 
1981-91 can be discerned. There has been very little progress in the developmental 
profile in this decade as well.
As far as the demographic profile of the region is concerned, the 
demographic balance between Bihar as a whole and the Jharkhand region remained
Table 59: Population in Jharkhand 1991
Area (Sq. Kms.) Total Population Males Females
Jharkhand Total 79,732 21,848,860 11,354,210 10,494,650
Bihar Total 173,877 86,338,853 45,147,280 41,191,573
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
45.85 25.30 25.14 25.47
Source: Census o f  India 1991, Series 1, Paper 2 of 1991 - Provisional Population Tables: Rural- Urban Distributions, New Delhi: 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 1991.
unaltered. Table 59 shows that the Jharkhand region continued to represented about 
45 per cent of the land area and made up 25.30 per cent of the total population of 
Bihar. Only a very small rise in the proportion of population that resided in the
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Jharkhand region can be discerned. The decadal growth rate of the population of the 
Jharkhand region during 1981-91 was 24.05 per cent whereas the same for the 
population of Bihar as a whole was slightly lower at 23.49 per cent.
More importantly, the ST component of the population of the Jharkhand 
region declined substantially. From 30.25 per cent in 1981, the ST component of 
the population of the Jharkhand region fell to only 27.66 per cent in 1991. As 
opposed to 24.05 per cent decadal growth rate of the total population of the
Table60: Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1991
Total Population Males Females
Jharkhand Total 6,044,010 3,059,715 2,984,295
Bihar Total 6,616,914 3,357,563 3,259,351
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of Bihar
91.34 91.12 91.56
Jharkhand Percentage 27.66 26.94 28.43
Source: Census o f  India 1991, Series 1, vol. I, India Part II-B (i), - Primary Census Abstract, General Population, New Delhi, 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, n. d.
Jharkhand region, the ST population grew at the rate of only 13.41 per cent over the 
decade of 1981-91 (Table 60). This substantially altered the balance between the 
tribal and non-tribal population of the Jharkhand region. The concentration of ST 
population within the Jharkhand region continued with 91.34 per cent (91.85 per 
cent in 1981) of the ST population of Bihar as a whole residing in the Jharkhand 
region.
As far as the occupational patterns of the Jharkhand region and Bihar as a 
whole are concerned, the share of the Jharkhand region in the total agricultural 
workers in the whole of Bihar remained more or less static. There were 23.47 per
Table 61: Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1991
Agricultural and Related Activities1 Non- Agricultural Activities2
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
23.47 21.68 31.32 40.10 39.79 43.23
Jharkhand
Percentage
22.22 32.12 11.50 9.12 15.83 1.87
Bihar
Percentage
23.95 37.26 9.36 5.75 10.00 1.10
’• Includes Cultivators & Agricultural Labourers.
2' Includes all other workers including Marginal workers.
Source: Census o f India 1991, Series 1, Paper 3 Of 1991 - Provisional Population Totals: Workers and their Distribution, New Delhi: 
Ministiy of Home Affairs, Government of India, 1991.
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cent of the agricultural workers of Bihar as a whole residing in the Jharkhand region 
(compared with 23.27 per cent in 1981), which was the equitable percentage since 
about 25 per cent of the total population resided in this region. The percentage of 
women agricultural workers increased slightly from 30.34 per cent in 1981 to 31.32 
per cent in 1991 (Table 61).
As far as the Jharkhand region itself was concerned, about 31 per cent of the 
population was employed altogether in 1991 compared to over 37 per cent in 1981. 
There was, therefore, a lower availability of jobs in the Jharkhand region as was the 
case in Bihar as a whole. From about 32 per cent of the population working in 
1981, by 1991 a little more than 29 per cent of the population was employed in the 
whole of Bihar. There seems to be an all round loss of job opportunities in Bihar as 
a whole as well as the Jharkhand region. Non-agricultural employment in the 
Jharkhand region declined from 15.61 per cent in 1981 to 9.12 per cent. A small 
increase in agricultural employment indicates that some people, those few who 
could, shifted back to agricultural occupations to earn a living. This would have 
shifted the load back to an already over-burdened agricultural sector. There is also a 
pattern of increasing industrialisation in Bihar as a whole. There were 44.3 per cent 
of non-agricultural workers of Bihar as a whole living in the Jharkhand region in 
1981. By 1991, only 40.1 per cent of them lived in the Jharkhand region. The 
Jharkhand region was also losing its industrial edge over Bihar as a whole that had 
made it important to the policy planners at Patna. After a small but significant 
improvement in the employment scenario in 1971-81, the availability of jobs started 
to go downhill again in 1981-91.
Table 62: Literacy in Jharkhand 1991
Literacy Percentage of Literacy
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Jharkhand
Total
7,352,215 5,168,378 2,183,806 33.65 45.51 20.80
Bihar Total 26,854,389 19,176,364 7,678,025 31.10 42.47 18.63
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
27.37 26.95 28.44 - - -
Source: Census o f India 1991, Series 5, Paper 1 of 1991 - Provisional Population Totals, Patna: Director of Census Operations, 
Government of Bihar, n. d.
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The literacy rate19 of the Jharkhand region showed a slightly better rate of 
growth than Bihar as a whole. In 1981, the literacy rates for the Jharkhand region 
and Bihar as a whole were 27.87 per cent and 26.2 per cent, respectively. By 1991, 
the literacy rate of the Jharkhand region had increased to 33.65 whereas that of 
whole of Bihar was 31.10. Female literacy in the Jharkhand region increased from 
14.97 to 20.80 per cent while in the whole of Bihar it rose from 13.6 to 18.63 per 
cent (Table 62). The education and literacy component of the public policy 
implementation was delivering what it had taken upon itself in a more efficient 
fashion in the Jharkhand region than Bihar as a whole.
Moving on to the question of agriculture, we are again constrained to analyse 
the area under principal crops rather than the actual production.20 Table 63 attests to 
the fact that total area under principal crops in Bihar as a whole increased
Table 63; Area under Principal Crops in Jharkhand (in thousands of Hectares) 1988-89
Paddy / Rice Wheat Gram Barley Maize
Jharkhand
Total
1,518 53 12 106 23
Bihar 5,308 2,112 58 693 148
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
28.59 2.50 20.68 15.29 15.54
Totals may not tally since the figures have been rounded up to the nearest thousand in the source.
Source: Bihar Through Figures 1991, Patna: Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Government of Bihar, n. d,, pp. 90-3.
marginally from 8,113 thousand hectares in 1985-86 to 8,319 thousand hectares in 
1987-88 where as in the Jharkhand region it declined from 1,848 thousand hectares 
in 1985-86 to 1,712 thousand hectares in 1988-89. Thus, despite agriculture being a 
target area under the TSP since the Sixth Plan, the total cropped area in Jharkhand 
had declined. Hence, it is unlikely that there would have been a rise in agricultural 
output, especially in view of the falling irrigation potential.
19 The cross-tabulation between workers and educational levels for 1991 is not yet available. 
Consequently, the literacy figures for the entire population in 1991 have been compared with 
similar figures for 1981. Source: Census o f India 1991, Series -5, Paper 1 of 1991 - Provisional 
Population Totals, Patna, n. d. The literacy figures for 1981 have been taken from Bihar Through 
Figures 1981, Patna, 1984, p. 48-9.
20 Bihar government had not published the area under principal crops at the districts level in the 
statistics published after 1989.
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Detailed data about irrigation potential is also unavailable. The Seventh Five- 
Year Plan sought to make a large investment and effort in increasing the irrigation 
potential of the region. However, in the absence of published data, only the
Table 64: Area Irrigated from Different Sources (in thousands of Hectares) 1988-89
Government Canals Private Canals Total
Jharkhand Total 39 Not Available 39
Bihar 1,262 Not Available 1,262
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of Bihar
3.09 - 3.09
Totals may not tally since the figures have been rounded up to the nearest thousand in the source.
Source: Bihar Through Figures 1991, Patna: Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 149-51.
performance of government canals as a source of irrigation can be examined. In 
1980-81, 5.11 per cent of the area irrigated by government canals in the whole of 
Bihar lay in the Jharkhand region. By 1988-89, this too had fallen to only 3.09 per 
cent. From 56 thousand hectares of land irrigated in the Jharkhand region by 
government canals in 1980-81, by 1988-89, only 39 thousand hectares were so 
irrigated in the Jharkhand region (Table 64). Despite the public policy effort at 
creation of additional irrigation potential by construction of minor and major power 
and irrigation projects as reflected in the plan allocation for the Seventh Plan, the 
irrigated area in the Jharkhand region actually declined. However, the irrigation 
potential in the whole of Bihar using government canals increased from 1,094 
thousand hectares in 1980-81 to 1,262 thousand hectares in 1988-89. Hence, it 
might be said that the public policy efforts to create additional irrigation potential in 
the Jharkhand region had failed whereas it showed some signs of relative success in 
Bihar as whole.
It may be concluded that policy efforts in the Jharkhand region had not 
shown many results in the decade 1981-91. The public policy delivery machinery 
had not been able to make itself effective in its thrust areas such as agriculture and 
irrigation. It had relative success in areas such as education but it had already been 
successful in these areas in the earlier plans. There was actually a decline in some 
sectors such as employment and irrigation potential over the previous decade. The 
efforts to reorient the policy delivery mechanism to arrive at greater efficiency and 
effectiveness had not been successful in the Jharkhand region.
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IV
It has been noticed that the ST component of the population of the Jharkhand 
region had declined during the decades 1981-91 after a modest increase during 
1971-81. However, the development profile of the ST population in the Jharkhand 
region improved as a result of the concentrated efforts undertaken since the late 
1970s under the TSP.
In the ST occupational levels there were some notable improvements. The 
TSP had sought to concentrate on the tribal population in predetermined pockets in 
the region of Jharkhand and this strategy had yielded some results. Table 65 shows
Table 65: Scheduled Tribes Occupational Patterns 1981
Agricultural and Related Activities1 Non- Agricultural Activities2
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
91.07 91.17 90.78 94.28 90.67 96.64
Jharkhand
Percentage
32.20 47.31 17.02 13.88 9.43 18.34
1 Includes Cultivators, Agricultural Labourers and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantation, Orchards and allied
activities.
2 Includes those in Mining & Quarrying, Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing & Repairs, Construction, Trade & Commerce, 
Transport, Storage & Communications and Other services and Marginal workers.
Source: Census o f  India 1981, Series 4, Bihar Part IX (iii) - Special Tables for Scheduled Tribes (Tables ST-1 to ST-3), Patna: 
Government Printing Press, n. d.
that in 1981, most of the ST workers in Bihar as a whole (91.07 per cent of the 
agricultural ST workers and 94.28 per cent of the non-agricultural ST workforce) 
continued to work in the region of Jharkhand. In 1981, roughly 46 per cent of the 
ST population of the Jharkhand region was employed which is much better than the 
general level of employment in the region. It is also a significant improvement over 
the 1971 figure of about 35 per cent. Clearly, at least the TSP component of public 
policy had benefited the tribal population as far as availability of employment was 
concerned.
There was a shift in the concentration of tribal males from agricultural to 
non-agricultural occupations. That would have significantly reduced the pressure on
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the declining agricultural production.21 There were 50.66 per cent of the tribal males 
in agricultural occupations in 1971 whereas only 47.31 per cent of them worked in 
agriculture-related jobs in 1981. The decline in the percentage of ST males in the 
agricultural sector did not mean a loss of job opportunities because of the fact that 
firstly, there was also a rise in ST males employed in the non-agricultural sector 
from 5.02 per cent in 1971 to 9.43 per cent in 1981. Secondly, there was a marginal 
increase in the total percentage of ST males who were employed from about 56 per 
cent in 1971 to about 57 per cent in 1981 (Table 65).
Furthermore, there was a significant improvement in the percentage of ST 
women who were employed from approximately 13 per cent in 1971 to more than 
35 per cent in 1981. The concerted effort to generate employment amongst the ST 
population under the MAD A/ TSP was delivering results. The level of employment 
amongst the ST population in the Jharkhand region was far outstripping the overall 
employment level in the Jharkhand region.
The improvement in the employment levels of the ST population in the 
Table 66: Scheduled Tribes Educational Levels in Jharkhandl981
Illiterate Literate1 Middle School2 Matriculate and Above3
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
Jharkhand
Total 4,193,368 1,952,457 2,443,366 334,073 249,786 84,287 442,627 345,416 97,211 195,895 121,990 73,905
Bihar Total
4,823,470 2,152,519 2,670,951 356,388 268,018 88,370 474,773 370,323 104,450 162,242 129,640 32,602
Jharkhand
Percentage 78.68 73.13 91.87 6.26 9.35 3.16 8.30 12.93 3.65 3.67 4.56 2.77
1 Without Educational Level, including figures for Educational Level not classified.
2 Primary, Middle or Junior Basic.
3 Higher Secondary, Intermediate/ Pre-University or Non-technical/ Non-technical Diploma or Certificate not equal to Degree and those who hold a 
University Degree, Postgraduate Degree, Technical Degree, Agriculture and Dairying, Veterinary Engineering and Technology, Medicine or an 
equivalent qualification.
Source: Census o f  India 1981, Series 4, Bihar Part IX (iv) - Special Tables for Scheduled Tribes (Tables ST-4 to ST-7), Patna: Government Printing 
Press, n. d.
21 Another interpretation of this pattern can be that the falling agricultural employment potential in the 
Jharkhand region was forcing the ST population to look for non-agricultural employment. In that 
event, it is more than likely that the non-agricultural employment which they would have found 
would be ill-paid unskilled jobs or highly dangerous jobs such as deep or open-cast mining. 
Therefore, these patterns must be treated with caution.
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Jharkhand region was also accompanied by an improvement in the literacy and 
educational levels of the ST people in the region22 (Table 66). The overall illiteracy 
of ST population fell from 87.76 per cent in 1971 to 78.68 per cent This was a 
major decrease and is also significant in the light of the fact that the overall 
percentage of persons educated to matriculate level or above increased from 0.71 
per cent in 1971 to 3,67 per cent in 1981. The percentage of persons who were 
literate without any educational qualifications also increased from 5.74 per cent in 
1971 to 6.26 per cent in 1981 as did the percentage of ST persons educated up to 
middle school level from 5.52 per cent in 1971 to 8.30 per cent in 1981. The 
educational level of ST women was still very poor with more than 91 per cent of the 
women still illiterate but at the other end of the spectrum; namely, the ST women 
who were matriculate or above, increased from 0.26 per cent in 1971 to 2.77 per 
cent. An improvement across all the categories can be noticed.
The development policy reoriented to target the ST population under TSP/ 
MADA had shown signs of success during 1981-91. However, on account of the 
fact that just over a quarter of the total population in the Jharkhand region was of 
tribal origin, the public policy efforts were benefiting only a minority of the 
population. Consequently, this approach may have been successful in ameliorating 
some of the problems faced by the ST population of the region but the patterns of 
underdevelopment amongst the non-tribal population in the region were becoming 
more acute. The modest advances made in one decade were quickly reversed in the 
next. This intermittent public policy implementation no doubt, marginally improved 
some of the development indicators and has yielded some degree of betterment in 
the overall developmental profile of the Jharkhand region. However, the rate of 
improvement in the development profile of the Jharkhand region has been fast out­
stripped by a faster improvement in the development profile of Bihar as a whole. 
Hence, there is firm ground behind the popular perception in the Jharkhand region
22 The rising literacy and education levels amongst the ST population in the Jharkhand region would 
have probably led to better opportunities of employment in the non-agricultural sector.
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that there is a north Bihar versus south Bihar divide as far as developmental profile 
is concerned.
The public policy machinery failed to benefit a significant majority of the 
population of the Jharkhand region. The remarkable insistence of the policy planners 
on investing an ever-increasing amount of money without examining the 
inefficiencies in the policy delivery mechanism contributed to the lack of success in 
the implementation of balanced plans.
This lack of growth in the developmental profile of Jharkhand, both as a 
region and in relation to the average for the whole of Bihar has fundamentally 
altered the dynamics of the political process in the Jharkhand region. The 
correlation between the political process in the region and the declining development 
profile has been analysed in the next chapter.
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Chapter VI
Politics of Development, Identity and Autonomy
in the Jharkhand Region
. . . s* h rt fen  (sic)] w  qRvici ^rr Tr^qr 
^PTT cfr . . - q ^ T T ^ T  %  . . ^TST
caq^^r 3TTWT I ^HKT [*kH 1^ . (sic)] TTOT ^iT
^TPq^T %, ^TRT [Q H ft (sic)] -qT^ T ^fT ^  . .
. 3T3T^T ^T^q-PT ^TcIT 'eft STT^ T [^T] R^ fT -Fq*
s t ir  q^ : ^ ftrt cfh- q~ q f  qTNr ^tpft 
[fqqrra-] q ^  cT^ r . . . 1
[. . . if we have a council or a separate state, this area will be counted 
as first amongst the number one regions. The mineral wealth that we 
have, the labourers that we have . . .  if they had been utilised 
properly, this area would have been number one and if we are given 
our separate state we will develop the region within five years . . . ]
qfrr fT ^ ftrt ^ t s r  q i w  r ^ i  ^ r r  %: i 
^ fW q : -^frrr fqqn^r ^  . . . 2
[In terms of the rate of development, our Chota Nagpur is very 
backward. That is why the people have come up with Jharkhand 
movement. . . ]
The above quotes from interviews held with some of the politically aware 
individuals in the Jharkhand region indicate that the issues of autonomy for the 
region and the development profile are intertwined. The popular perception has
1 Interview with Shailendra Bhattacharya, Member of the Central Committee and Working Committee
and Officer In-charge of the Central Office of the JMM (S) at the JMM (S) Central Office, Ranchi 
in January 1996.
2 Interview with a local schoolmaster and BJP activist at Ranchi in May 1996.
235
come to accept that a better rate of development activity in the region is possible 
only if adequate devolution of powers is made.
It has been noticed in chapters IV and V that there is almost a continuous 
decline in the major indicators of development of the Jharkhand region. There is a 
positive correlation between this decline in development indicators and the electoral 
support for the Jharkhandi parties, but the situation is in fact much more complex. 
The Modified Resource Dependence Model enables us to understand this correlation 
in a more accurate manner.
The leadership of the Jharkhand movement definitely sees a correlation 
between the progress of developmental programmes and political and administrative 
autonomy. However, the Jharkhandi political groups lack a concrete agenda for the 
developmental policies and programmes in the region. This is clear from their 
literature, which has no clear outline to be followed for a more speedy development 
of the region. It has also emerged in interviews conducted during the field-study. 
When asked if they had a plan or framework for developmental activities if and 
when a state of Jharkhand is created, Shailendra Bhattacharya, Member of the 
Central Committee of the JMM (S), responded that the government must first hand 
over the administration to them. The Jharkhandi political groups will then decide 
what to do. When pressed further, he responded: ^  i p^ t
[^ncii %] ^  i
. . . w& t - h i^ h  I w r a r  %  w r  . . . i ”3 [We will utilise the
resources available here for their (people’s) development . . .  we will work for 
development through this medium . . . ].
In light of Jharkhandi leadership’s emphasis on poor developmental profile 
of the Jharkhand region, the relationship between poor policy performance and 
electoral support for the political groups which demand autonomy must be analysed.
3 Interview with Shailendra Bhattacharya in January 1996.
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This chapter therefore, maps out the patterns which indicate that failure of the 
State’s policy delivery mechanism in the region has contributed to the crystallisation 
of the Jharkhandi identity. The conclusions reached will be of important policy 
relevance since there is an actual failure of the delivery mechanism (chapters IV and 
V) which has encouraged the resurgence and crystallisation of the nascent 
Jharkhandi identity.
I
In democratic developing countries such as India, the policies and 
programmes for the development of a region/ social group must address two related 
issues. First, they must endeavour to raise the living standard of the population of 
the target region/ social group. Secondly, there needs to be an effort to generate a 
popular feeling of betterment of living standards. Any achievements on the front of 
development policy implementation will not serve the purpose of containing socio­
political conflict and the generation of increased legitimacy for the regime unless 
society views it as such. This leads us to a crucial issue in the relationship between 
articulation of ethnic identity and public policy implementation in India, particularly 
in the Jharkhand region.
It would be difficult to defend a contention that there has been no noticeable 
improvement over the last half-century in the overall living standards of the 
population as a direct result of the development policy of the Indian state. 
Respondents interviewed in the Jharkhand region4 during the fieldwork in 1996 
agreed that over the past few decades, there has been a marked improvement in the 
living standards of most persons in the Jharkhand region. They also recognised the 
central role played by the government’s development policy. Notwithstanding, they
4 For instance, the MP Ranchi, an INC party worker in Chaibasa and a woman forest produce 
collector in the rural interior of Dumka district, all agreed that cfr ^rarr ”
[There has definitely been some development. . . ”], interviews in the Jharkhand region in January 
1996.
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also expressed their stark disappointment with the slow pace and inefficiency of the 
State’s development efforts. Evidently, the feeling of betterment amongst them was 
marginal. The successes of the development policy could have, and to some extent 
did generate a certain degree of legitimacy for the regime. However, this process 
has gradually been undermined over the last two decades. Thus, an effort to 
understand the reasons for this failure of the government to harness the legitimising 
effect of the improvement in general living conditions of the population is required. 
This leads us to another malaise in the model of development adopted in India.
“All plans of development have greater chances of success if the relevant 
cultural and social factors are integrated into planning . . . social and cultural factors 
must be so presented that they are plainly appropriate to the problem at hand and are 
clearly useful to the makers of development decisions . . ,”5 The model of 
development adopted in India after independence had no place for socio-cultural 
factors because it did not have avenues for the involvement of local communities. 
The development model premised on centralised rational bureaucratic planning and 
implementation of industry-led development was hardly suited to the development 
requirements of the tribal and more backward regions. The absence of meaningful 
contributions by the local communities in the policy process in terms of addressing 
the local needs and utilising locally available resources led to plans being drawn that 
were unsuitable for a sustained development effort. Also pertinent in such a model 
of development are the high ‘transaction costs’ of the development effort. Since 
locally available resources were hardly utilised in the planning and implementation 
of development programmes, it was too expensive to sustain a long-drawn, coherent 
and vigorous development effort of the State, not to mention the possibilities of 
corruption that it engendered.6
5 S. Narayan, Movements Development: Police and Judiciary in Tribal World, New Delhi, 1988, p. 
81.
6 ibid.
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The overall consequence of this model of development was that the local 
communities became passive beneficiaries of the State’s development policy instead 
of being an active partner. There were very few efforts, if any, to involve the local 
communities in the generation and maintenance of development programmes and 
projects. Consequently, there was no feeling of betterment and whenever matters 
worsened, the population simply looked up to the State for more hand outs instead 
of making joint efforts with the development policy machinery to ensure better 
availability and management of resources.
Consequently, there emerged a ‘politics of development’. The political 
resources at the command of the local communities were channelled to secure an 
increasing amount of development funds as relief or short-term programmes and not 
as an investment into sustainable developmental activities.
An exchange of resources which could have occurred at an early stage 
between the local communities or identities and the State to generate a long-term 
development plan as well as legitimacy for the regime was delayed. An absence of 
due credence to the socio-cultural factors and participative local development 
structures in the State’s policy mechanism meant that locally sustainable plans were 
relatively unknown. Consequently, the local communities gradually began to resort 
to agitational politics in order to generate some meaningful exchange of resources 
with the State.
The Jharkhand movement has therefore emerged as one of the avenues for 
this exchange of resources between the electorate of the region and the State. Since 
the Jharkhandi groups do not, for many reasons, command enough political 
influence in the executive and legislative structures of the State (chapter II), they 
demand political and administrative autonomy in order to deliver better development 
policy implementation in the region. Owing to the inability of the rationalist State to 
respond successfully to this movement based on tribal heritage, the demand for 
autonomy has been finding greater support.
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The Jharkhandi leaders however, are not ready to divorce themselves from 
the issue of tribal identity. They have successfully managed to merge the issues of 
Jharkhandi identity with the poor performance of the development bureaucracy. 
They have successfully identified the defect of poor local participation in the 
development effort and therefore seek autonomy in order to implement policies that 
have greater local relevance. The issue of Jharkhandi identity is invoked to generate 
political support which is more inclusive than exclusive in nature. Despite being 
premised on tribal heritage and culture, the leadership is quick to include the non- 
tribal population of the Jharkhand region in the category of Jharkhandi because of 
the overall numerical minority of people of tribal origins:
sm w u s  % [fqr] ttfct
^fpfr w  1^rr i
qfff W^TcfT rft^T %
iT  fWrqr i .
.  .  r^rl%qT fWRrT %
^fpfc qrr %: i 
^fr 'd' ^  . . . *n*<sius "3-r r^*fr
w  deni %■ RqiRnfr w  i7
[The opponents of the Jharkhand propagate that after the creation of 
the Jharkhand state, the outsiders will be expelled. This propaganda 
is aimed at breaking the unity of the people of Jharkhand and at 
disrupting the Jharkhand movement. . . People of hundreds of jatis 
[here the term jati is used to mean tribes8] are original residents of the 
Jharkhand region but Jharkhand does not belong to them only. All 
those people who are living here for years. . . have the same claim to 
the region as the original residents.]
Thus, the leaders of the Jharkhand movement have used a peculiar mixture 
of tribal identity, populism and issues about the poor developmental profile of the
7 Sibu Soren, ‘w ^ s -  t t w  w  [The Question of Jharkhand state], in Narayan, S., ed.,
Jharkhand Movement: Origin and Evolution, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 20-1.
8 The term jati does not have a corresponding English equivalent. It is also used quite loosely in the 
Indian languages. It can mean race as well as tribe, depending on the context. In this extract it 
implies tribe.
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region to seek electoral support. Whether the people of the region see any relation 
between the poor developmental profile of the region and the demand for regional 
autonomy is also important to understand the salience of the Jharkhandi identity in 
the politics of the region.
People in the Jharkhand region assert that the state government at Patna does 
not care to invest enough in the Jharkhand region and hence they want an 
independent state for faster economic development.9 Clearly, the identity of being a 
Jharkhandi is bolstered by this attitude since it defines another dimension in the 
“we” and “them” division.
I I
By the time India gained independence in 1947, the Jharkhandi leaders had 
succeeded in the creation of a community in south Bihar. As discussed in chapter 
III, the autonomous form of community formation which had taken place at the 
national level, was replicated at the level of the Jharkhandi community. Tribal 
heritage and culture was seen as the foundation stone for this politically self- 
conscious community/ identity. By the time of independence, the Jharkhandis, or at 
least their leaders, were convinced of the existence of a Jharkhandi community (seen 
as akin to the Indian community created by the nationalist leadership), though at a 
lower ‘sub-national’ level. This conviction had become so strong by the late 1940s 
that they had also started to grapple with the rules of inclusion of non-tribal societal 
and political groups within this identity (as all identities premised on communal 
lines must do at some point or the other). The re-definition of the character of the 
Adivasi Mahasabha (see chapter II) and the opening of membership of the Jharkhand
9 This contention has been an important issue and is evident in most speeches and writings of the 
leaders in the Jharkhand region. For instance, in a speech at a public meeting die JMM Lok Sabha 
candidate for the 1996 election for Ranchi constituency said “R^re: -a R*t>m %  f^rA
w  te, ipEr Tfifrr vA [Bihar
government makes little effort for our development, that is why we are demanding the creation of a 
Jharkhand state], Public Meeting in Sonahatu Block in May 1996.
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Party (JHP) to the non-tribal population of the region provides proof that such a 
process had started as early as the late 1940s and early 1950s. This indicates that the 
leaders were convinced that the post-colonial Indian state would grant political 
recognition to the Jharkhandi identity and were eager to include non-tribal elements 
in their political strategies. Besides, the fact that only about 36 per cent of the 
population of the region was of tribal descent by 1951, such an inclusive policy 
indicates an astute political understanding of the operation of the new political 
system adopted in 1950.
Jharkhandi leaders such as Jaipal Singh had started to demand political 
recognition in a nascent form in the Constituent Assembly and later in various other 
public forums. The Jharkhandi leaders had hoped to engage in an exchange of 
resources with the independent Indian state in a manner similar to the nationalists. 
They hoped that the threat to the regime from political agitation would engage the 
State in a meaningful exchange of political, economic and information resources. 
However, the nationalistic, socialistic credentials of the Indian state gave it a degree 
of political legitimacy and support which the JHP was not able to undermine. The 
promises set out in the new Constitution were at least in the short term, enough to 
tilt the political balance in favour of the INC and the State. Also, the overwhelming 
control of the State over the economic and information resources skewed any 
exchange which might have taken place. The Jharkhandi community was clearly the 
recipient of the largesse which the State chose to allocate to them. Owing to their 
weak political position, the Jharkhandi leaders were unable to effectively lobby for a 
better resource allocation and development investment in the Jharkhand region. 
Consequently, they were unable to generate avenues for a meaningful exchange of 
resources between the State and the population of the region. Hence, the Jharkhandi 
population was constrained to depend on the plans that the State drew up for them 
instead of having a meaningful role in the development planning for the region.
Another feature of the politico-economic situation in Jharkhand in the early 
fifties was the relatively better development profile of the Jharkhand region vis-a-vis 
Bihar as a whole. As has emerged in the discussion in chapter IV, the development
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profile of the Jharkhand region in 1951 was quite poor but it was so in most parts of 
India. However, it was better than that of Bihar as a whole.
The death, birth and infant mortality rate of the Jharkhand region were better 
than that of Bihar as a whole. The number of patients treated in government and 
aided hospital and the expenditure on such hospitals was in proportion to the 
population that resided in the region. It produced more than 42 per cent of the paddy 
and more than 20 per cent of the maize and arhar produced in the whole of Bihar. A 
significant proportion of loans disbursed for wasteland reclamation was spent in the 
Jharkhand region. In consonance with the mineral wealth of the region, more 
persons lived within urban areas in the Jharkhand region than Bihar as a whole. 
There was roughly 40 per cent employment in the Jharkhand region compared with 
35 per cent in Bihar as a whole. It had more than 47 per cent literacy compared with 
about 29 per cent in Bihar as a whole.
However, all was not well in 1951. The proportion of sales Tax collected 
from the region as well as tax on electricity was quite high. On the other hand, 
agricultural tax collection was dismal.10 The agricultural loans available to farmers 
of the Jharkhand region represented only 16.4 per cent of the total amounts 
disbursed in the whole of Bihar. However, overall, as has been discussed in chapter 
IV, the development indicators in the Jharkhand region were slightly better than 
Bihar as a whole but left a lot to be desired.
In such conditions, the first general elections were held in 1952. The issue of 
the Jharkhand region had acquired some degree of mass appeal. Jaipal Singh and his 
JHP had begun to highlight the question of an autonomous territory for the 
Jharkhandis. The issue of a separate state of Jharkhand had mass support, which is 
confirmed by the results of the Lok Sabha elections.
10 From the point of view of the State but not from the potential taxpayers’.
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Jharkhandi Parties managed to win three of the eight Lok Sabha seats in the 
Jharkhand region (Tables 67 & 68). What makes their victories significant is the 
percentage of votes polled in these constituencies. The JHP won the Chaibasa seat 
with 76.7 per cent of the votes polled. In the Ranchi West constituency, Jaipal Singh 
managed 60.9 per cent of the votes whereas a CSPJ candidate with 57.1 per cent of 
the votes won the Hazaribagh West seat. In these seats the Jharkhandi parties polled 
an average of 64.9 per cent of the votes cast.
Moreover, the Jharkhandi parties had a significant political presence in four 
other constituencies. In the constituencies where such parties had an electoral 
presence amongst the first five candidates, an average of 48.6 per cent of votes was
Table 67: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1952
Constituency Number of
Winner Party 
and Per cent
Runner up 
Party and
HI Party and 
Percent of
IV Party and 
Percent of
V Party and 
Percent of
Name Candidates of Votes 
Polled
Percent of 
Votes Polled
Votes Polled Votes Polled Votes Polled
JHP 76.7 IND 13.9 IND
Chaibasa 3 Kanu Ram 
Deogam
Purno C. Birua 9.4 - -
CPI 50.3 CSPJ 37.7 SP
Hazaribagh
East
3 Nageshwar P. 
Sinha
Tara K Prasad 12.0 - -
Hazaribagh
West
3 CSPJ 57.1 
Ram N Singh
INC 35.5 
Jhansi Ram
SP
7.5
- -
Palamau cum INC 20.7 INC 18.4 JHP JHP CSPJ
Hazaribagh 
cum Ranchi
8 Jithan Kharwar Gajendra P. 
Singh
15.9 15.0 11.2
Pumea cum INC 25.2 JHP 22.4 INC JHP SP
Santhal 6 Bhagwat Jha Jughar S. Paul 22.4 18.4 8.1
Pargana Azad
Ranchi North 7 INC 32.6 SP 24.1 CSPJ 18.0 FBM 11.6 IND
East Abdul Ibrahim AjitN
Banerjee
5.4
Ranchi West 3 JHP 60.9 
Jaipal Singh
INC 32.0 
J.S. Manki
CSPJ
7.2
- -
Santhal INC 25.0 INC 22.9 IND IND IND
Parganas 6 Ram Raj Lai Hembrom 21.1 13.9 8.7
Cum Jajware
Hazaribagh
Three major delimitation of constituencies in 1952, 1957, 1967 and 1977 have altered the number, shape, size and demographic 
profiles of many constituencies in the Jharkhand region.
Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Pramioy Roy, India Decides: Elections 1952-1991, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers 
and magazines.
cast for them (Table 67 & 68). It is noteworthy that in some constituencies such as 
Palamau cum Hazaribagh cum Ranchi, the total votes polled by the Jharkhandi 
parties surpassed the votes polled by the victorious INC candidate. However, the
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lack of unity within JHP and between JHP and other Jharkhandi political groups 
precluded their victory in such seats. Overall, the Jharkhandi parties polled 42.56 
per cent of the total valid votes cast in the Jharkhand region.
The Jharkhandi political formations polled a high percentage of votes in the 
three constituencies which they won but faced mixed fortunes in the others. This 
indicates that most of their support was restricted to tribal pockets. Jaipal Singh and 
JHP had been emphasising the tribal characteristics of the region in the run-up to the
Table 68: Performance of Jharkhandi Political Parties in Lok Sabha Elections 1952
Election Year
Average Votes 
Polled by All 
Jharkhandi Parties 
in Constituencies 
with Electoral 
Presence
Average Votes 
Polled by All 
Jharkhandi Parties 
in all Constituencies 
of Jharkhand
Average Percentage 
of Votes Polled in 
Seats Won by 
Jharkhandi Parties
Seats Won Out of 
Total Seats in 
Jharkhand
1952 48.6 42.56 64.9 3 out of 8
elections. He and other tribal leaders had occasionally also talked of expelling the 
non-tribal dikus (outsiders) from the region. This campaign against the non-tribal 
inhabitants of the region when juxtaposed against the fact that only about a third of 
the total population of the Jharkhand region was classified as tribal (chapter IV), 
points to a not too practical political agenda. Any mobilisation on the basis of an 
exclusive tribal identity had mixed possibilities in a competitive political system in 
1951. It was a time when most people believed in Nehru’s vision of a modern, self- 
reliant and secular India and the credentials of the self-proclaimed socialistic State 
were yet to be tarnished.
It must also be noted that the 1952 elections was held at a time when the 
political climate of the country was quite different. There were major expectations 
from the newly independent Indian state and hopes were rife that the pace of 
development would soon accelerate to a level whereby a decade of concerted policy 
effort would solve most of the development-related problems. This is reflected in 
the fact that most of the constitutional provisions such as reservation for the 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes were conceived for a mere ten years. In this context it
245
is hardly surprising that other issues such as tribal identity were taking precedence 
over the developmental issues.
Undoubtedly, the vision of administrative autonomy for the region held 
considerable appeal for the tribal as well as the non-tribal voters in the initial phase. 
However, the slogans of “Jharkhand will come and outsider will be banished” and 
“Jharkhand for tribal people only” along with the politically significant trappings of 
tribal symbolism (see chapter II) ensured that whatever appeal the administrative 
autonomy vision might have held for the general population, it did not translate into 
a majority of parliamentary seats for the Jharkhandi groups (even though they had a 
significantly high share of the votes). In fact, the heavy leaning on the tribal heritage 
of the region was one of the contributory factors that were to gradually deprive the 
JHP and other Jharkhandi political groups of any significant political presence in the 
region after the 1957 general election.
However, as noted earlier, the level of development was not a significant 
issue for the Jharkhandi leaders in the 1952 elections. Their concern was to preserve 
the uniqueness and separateness of the tribal way of life, as is evident in their 
arguments in their memoranda to the States Reorganisation Commission. They had 
emphasised the lingual, cultural, and ethnic difference of the region. This point of 
view is reinforced when the large-scale demonstrations by Jharkhandi leaders and 
their largely tribal followers are taken into account. These demonstrations depended 
heavily on large numbers of the tribal population and tribal symbolism such as bows 
and arrows and the cock (see chapter II) in order to impress upon the State 
Reorganisation Commission the need to create a tribal state based on tribal 
separateness.
The Jharkhandi groups managed to win more seats in the 1957 elections 
though a slight decline in the percentage of votes that they polled is noticeable. The 
close contest with the INC in some constituencies is symptomatic of the gradual 
decline in popular support for the Jharkhandi groups which was to follow in the next
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few years. Also noticeable in this election is the rising support for the Leftist 
politics in the region.
In the 1957 elections, the Jharkhandi parties won eight of the 12" seats in the 
region (Table 69). The Jharkhandi parties retained an overwhelming degree of
Table 69: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1957
Winner Party Runner up III Party and IV Party and V Party and
Constituency Number of and Percent of Party and Percent of Percent of Percent of
Name Candidates Votes Polled Percent of 
Votes Polled
Votes Polled Votes Polled Votes Polled
2 CSPJ 66.0 INC 34.0
Chatra Vijaya Raje 
(W)
G Bhattacharya “ - -
Dhanbad 4 INC 48.1 CPI 20.4 PSP JHP -
Prabhat C Bose Kanailal Pal 19.4 12.1
JHP 25.6 JHP 22.9 INC INC PSP
Dumka 7 Suresh C 
Chaudhary
Debi Soren 16.6 15.0 8.1
4 CSPJ 51.3 INC 30.9 CPI PSP -
Giridih Qazi S A 
Matin
N P Sinha 11.4 6.4
3 CSPJ 67.7 INC 24.1 JHP
Hazaribagh L R Laxmi 
(W)
Badruzzaman
Khan
8.2 ~ -
INC 35.5 JHP 29.5 IND IND
Jamshedpur 4 Mohindra K 
Ghosh
Eric Da Costa 19.0 16.0 -
4 JHP 43.9 INC 30.3 IND 16.6 IND -
Lohardagga Ignes Beck Jithan Kharwar 9.2
INC 40.8 CSPJ 24.1 JHP PSP IND
Palamau 5 Gajendra P. 
Singh
Ramavtar
Sharma
15.1 13.3 6.7
INC 47.7 JHP 45.1 IND IND -
Rajmahal 4 Paika Murmu Robert S. 
Basra
4.9 2.9
7 JHP 34.6 INC 32.0 IND IND IND
Ranchi East Minoo R, 
Masani
Ibrahim Ansari 12.1 10.9 3.8
Ranchi West 5 JHP 60.3 INC 25.2 IND IND IND
Jaipal Singh C. Karketta 6.0 5.1 3.4
5 JHP 51.8 IND 15.7 PSP IND IND
Singhbum Shambu C 
Godsora
Sidui
Hembrom
12.2 12.0 8.4
Three major delimitation of constituencies in 1952, 1957, 1967 and 1977 have altered tire number, shape, size and demographic 
profiles of many constituencies in the Jharkhand region.
Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy, India Decides: Elections 1952-1991, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers 
and magazines.
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electoral support in these eight constituencies by polling an average of 50.15 per 
cent of the votes cast. In this election, the Jharkhandi parties had a noticeable 
electoral presence in every constituency and polled an average of 44.22 per cent of 
the votes in the whole region (Table 70). In the Lok Sabha elections of 1957, the 
Jharkhandi parties thus dominated the electoral results. Hence, it is correct to say 
that the 1957 election was the most glorious performance by the Jharkhandi groups.
Table 70: Performance of Jharkhandi Political Parties in Lok Sabha Elections 1957
Election Year
Average Votes 
Polled by All 
Jharkhandi Parties 
in Constituencies 
with Electoral 
Presence
Average Votes 
Polled by All 
Jharkhandi Parties 
in all Constituencies 
of Jharkhand
Average Percentage 
of Votes Polled in 
Seats Won by 
Jharkhandi Parties
Seats Won Out of 
Total Seats in 
Jharkhand
1957 44.22 44.22 50.15 8 out of 12
Despite the dominance of the Jharkhandi parties, national political parties 
started making inroads into the Jharkhand region with this election. The INC won 4 
seats and its candidates were able to secure a decent electoral support of 35 per cent 
or more in these our seats. In this election, the Leftist parties also emerged on the 
electoral horizon of the Jharkhand region. The CPI candidates figured amongst the 
first five in two constituencies and gained significant electoral support. Beginning 
with this election thus, the Jharkhand region was gradually integrated into the 
national political system. As a result, the issue of the Jharkhand state took a back 
seat for some years and the poor performance of the developmental machinery 
ensured that the socio-economic issues gradually started taking precedence over the 
issue of a separate Jharkhandi identity.
The prospects of a meaningful and mutually beneficial exchange of resources 
between the State and the Jharkhandi population were remote in the political system 
dominated by Jharkhandi parties. The electorate offered substantial support to the
Contd.
11 Three major delimitation of constituencies in 1952, 1957, 1967 and 1977 have altered the number, 
shape, size and demographic profiles of many constituencies in the Jharkhand region.
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Jharkhandi parties in the 1952 and 1957 elections. Notwithstanding the degree of 
electoral support for them, the Jharkhandi parties failed to secure a separate 
province of Jharkhand or a better policy response to the development problems in 
the region. The perpetual divisiveness amongst the leaders had an important role to 
play in this failure of the Jharkhandi groups (see chapter II). The 1951-61 decade 
saw deterioration in the development profile of the region. The electorate realised 
that if they continued to extend electoral support to Jharkhandi parties, they would 
not be able to exploit other avenues for an exchange of resources with the State. 
Consequently, as will be analysed below, the electorate of the region gradually 
started attaching more importance to the developmental issues and paid less 
credence to the more ascriptive tribal identity issues.
I l l
The failure of JHP and other Jharkhandi groups to secure a Jharkhand state 
had not led the Jharkhandi electorate to withdraw their support for such political 
formations. This is evidenced in the large electoral support to the Jharkhandi groups 
in the 1957 elections. However, the immense popularity of the Jharkhandi groups 
started declining due to the falling development profile of the region. The electorate 
realised the inability of the Jharkhandi parties to engage in a mutually beneficial 
exchange of resources with the State and gradually shifted their support to other 
political groups. Moreover, the Jharkhandi parties still leaned heavily on the ST 
population for their electoral support. This was in a scenario of a declining ST 
component of the Jharkhand population. From 36.8 per cent in 1951, the population 
of scheduled tribes in the region diminished to only 33.92 per cent in 1961 (Chart 
2).12 Although 93.6 per cent of the total ST population of Bihar resided in the 
Jharkhand region in 1961 (up from 84.7 per cent in 1951), they were losing their
12 In the interests of the continuity of the text and for ease of reference, all die charts have been 
included at the end of the chapter.
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political dominance.13 This went on to affect the political success of the Jharkhandi 
groups which was premised on the region’s tribal characteristics.
The immediate result of the reorganisation of states under the SRC report 
was that the Jharkhand region came to represent an even larger proportion of the 
total land area of Bihar. It now comprised of 45.78 per cent of the total land area of 
Bihar. Accordingly, there was also a slight increase in the percentage of population 
within the Jharkhand region. It now represented almost quarter of the total 
population of Bihar (see chapter IV and Chart II).
As far as the development indicators are concerned, the figures for 1961 
offer a mixed picture. Agriculture remained the dominant source of livelihood in 
Bihar as a whole as well as the Jharkhand region. Total agricultural production in 
the Jharkhand region had not grown in the period 1949-50 to 1961-62. In the same 
period, the graph of agricultural production in the whole of Bihar climbed quite 
steeply (Chart 6). Moreover, in 1961-62, the Jharkhand region produced only 39.4 
per cent of the paddy (42.28 per cent in 1949-50) and 14.64 per cent of maize 
(25.48 per cent in 1949-50). This indicates that growth in agriculture in Bihar as a 
whole was much faster than the Jharkhand region. Similarly, by 1961-62, only 11.8 
per cent of the total irrigated area of Bihar was in the Jharkhand region compared 
with 18.53 in 1951-52 but the proportion of area irrigated by government canals in 
Jharkhand region increased. However, efforts to increase agricultural production 
had succeeded better in Bihar as a whole than the Jharkhand region. Charts 8 and 9 
further amplify this picture of weaker effort in increasing agricultural output in the 
Jharkhand region. As is clear from Chart 8, the graph for agricultural loans
13 The decline in the overall popularity of the Jharkhandi groups was essentially due to the loss of 
support of the non-tribal tribal population of the region. This was partly due to the JHP’s hard-line 
stance against outsiders (diku) after the 1956 SRC report (see chapter II). The tribal support for 
JHP had also declined but was still sizeable as reflected in the fact that in the 1962 elections, the 
JHP won 3 of the 5 seats reserved for the STs. The falling development profile of the region was an 
important factor in the decline of overall support for the JHP.
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disbursed in the Jharkhand region shows a modest decline whereas the graph for 
Bihar as a whole displays a steep rise for the period 1950-51 to 1959-60.
The employment figures for 1961 indicate a rise in total employment rates in 
Bihar as a whole as well as the Jharkhand region. Total employment levels in the 
Jharkhand region rose to a over 50 per cent and to about 36 per cent in the whole of 
Bihar. However, in view of the fact that 1961 was the first year when data about 
workers was collected,14 the modest rise does not indicate a better economic scenario 
in the Jharkhand region. The proof of this argument is the fact that on the one hand 
we notice a poorer performance of agriculture whereas on the other hand, the total 
percentage of population employed in agriculture appears to have increased (Chart 
4). Surely, a declining agricultural sector cannot provide gainful employment for a 
larger percentage of the population. This indicates that significant rise in 
employment rates is a statistical artefact and not a fact.15
Literacy and health seem to be the only two components of public policy that 
showed a better profile in 1961. Literacy rates in the Jharkhand region grew at a 
faster pace than Bihar as a whole (Chart 5). Besides, the figures for infant mortality 
and death rates in the Jharkhand region also show a better performance than Bihar 
as a whole (Chart 3).
The rate of investment in the Jharkhand region had noticeably fallen in the 
previous decade (such as investment in agricultural loans and in comparative 
investment in the government irrigation schemes) but tax collection from the 
industrial sector such as the tax on electricity consumption increased (Chart 10). 
This pattern indicates that the Jharkhand region had started to emerge as almost an 
internal colony of Bihar.
14 As explained in chapter IV, data for comparison with 1951 is not very accurate on account of the 
fact that such data was not collected in 1951. All that can be calculated is a rough estimate.
15 This is specially so in view of the redefinition of categories as discussed in chapter IV.
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Thus, after two Five-Year Plans, two general elections and a decade of 
independent Indian governance, the Jharkhand region was relatively worse off in 
many indicators of developmental profile and had grown at a modest rate in others. 
A modest improvement can be noticed in some development indicators but other 
indicators that would point to the existence of a vibrant and efficient public policy in 
operation had performed poorly in the Jharkhand region over the last decade. 
Consequently, one may speculate that the modest improvements in the development 
profile (such as literacy, infant mortality and death rates) had been, to a large extent 
if not solely, dependent on private initiatives.16
In such conditions, the third general elections were held in 1962. Unlike the 
developmental profile of this period, the election results of the 1962 general 
elections showed a significant change in the popular support to various political 
parties in the region.
By 1962, the JHP had been in a state of decline (see chapter II). There was 
an atmosphere of doubt for the JHP as well as internal dissension in the ranks of the 
party. Even the tribal electorate of the region which was the mainstay of the JHP, 
started showing overt signs of political disenchantment. Moreover, the issue of a 
separate Jharkhandi state also declined in importance as it became clear that such a 
move would benefit the majority of the non-tribal sections of the population on 
account of the fact that they were more educated and exposed to governmental 
action. Consequently, it became clear that the issue of tribal identity and a separate 
state based on it (the main plank of the Jharkhandi groups) was to be relegated to the 
political backwaters of the region.
16 This conclusion is largely true for the Jharkhand region itself as well as the relative development 
profile of the region compared with the average for Bihar as a whole. The private initiatives which 
seem to have affected the modest improvements may have included factors such as individual effort 
at betterment of one’s life-chances as well as more concerted efforts such as missionary 
organisations, voluntary agencies, etc.
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Moreover, as the electorate became more experienced in the niceties of 
representative democracy, they realised that despite having won majority of the 
seats from the Jharkhand region in the last elections, the Jharkhandi groups were 
still a minority in the state and central legislatures. Hence they would not be able to 
derive any substantial policy measures for the region. Besides, the mainstream
Table 71: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1962
Constituency
Name
Number of 
Candidates
Winner Party 
and Percent of 
Votes Polled
Runner up 
Party and 
Percent of 
Votes PoUed
III Party and 
Percent of 
Votes Polled
IV Party and 
Percent of 
Votes Polled
V Party and 
Percent of 
Votes Polled
Chatra 2
SWA 62.5 
Vijaya Raje 
(W)
INC 37.5 
Tribhuwan 
Nath
- - -
Dhanbad 7 INC 37.8 
PR Chakravarti
SWA 25.6 
S. Trigunait
IND
17.3
CPI
11.4
SP
4.2
Dumka* 3
INC 37.7 
Satya Charan 
Besra
JHP 36.9 
Debi Soren
IND
25.3 - -
Giridih 5
SWA 40.6 
Bateshwar 
Singh
INC 37.8 
C Bhattacharya
CPI
10.8
PSP
5.7
IND
5.2
Godda 5
INC 42.7 
PD 
Himatsingka
JHP 32.0 
Mohan S 
Oberoi
SWA
11.2
CPI
10.2
IND
3.9
Hazaribagli 3 SWA 66.8 
Basant N Singh
INC 28.4 
M A Ansari
JHP
4.8
- -
Jamshedpur
5 CPI 43.0 
Udaikar 
Mishra
INC 31.6 
NC 
Mukherjee
JHP
17.0
IND
4.6
SWA
3.9
Lohardagga* 3
SWA 44.2 
David Munzni
INC 31.7 
Kartik Oraon
JHP
24.1 - -
Palamau 4
SWA 58.6 
S Manjari (W)
INC 26.8 
Gajendra P. 
Singh
PSP
7.5
JHP
7.1 -
Rajmahal* 3 JHP 52.8 
Iswar Marandi
INC 39.6 
Paika Murmu
IND
7.6
- -
Ranchi East 8
SWA 32.3 
Prashant K 
Ghosh
INC 28.5 
Ibrahim Ansari
JHP
22.0
IND
7.6
IND
5.3
Ranchi West* 3 JHP 52.6 
Jaipal Singh
SWA 26.7 
Joseph Tigga
INC
20.8
- -
Singhbum* 5 JHP 42.5 
Haricharan Soy
INC 28.4 
Lakho Bodra
IND
17.2
PSP
7.0
SP
4.9
* ST Constituency.
1 SC Constituency.
Three major delimitation of constituencies in 1952, 1957, 1967 and 1977 have altered the number, shape, size and demographic 
profiles of many constituencies in the Jharkhand region.
Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy, India Decides: Elections 1952-1991, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers 
and magazines.
253
parties also hi-jacked some of the effectiveness of the Jharkhandi agenda by talking 
of treating the developmental problem of the region in a way different from the rest 
of Bihar and the country.
Against this background the 1962 elections threw up a new set of political 
configurations. The state of disarray in the political resources of the Jharkhandi 
groups was so bad that they did not even bother to contest a seat that had 
traditionally returned a Jharkhandi candidate.
Jharkhandi groups managed to win only 3 of the 13 seats in the region (Table 
71) with an average of 49.5 per cent of the votes in these three seats (Table 72). The 
votes polled by the Jharkhandi parties add up to an average of only 21.85 per cent in 
all the constituencies of the Jharkhand region. They no longer had an electoral 
presence amongst the first five candidates in rest of the constituencies of the 
Jharkhand region. The average votes polled by the Jharkhandi groups in the 
constituencies where they figured amongst the first five candidates were down to 
28.41 per cent (Table 72). Besides, the sweeping majorities that the Jharkhandi 
candidates polled in the seats that they won were a thing of the past. Jaipal Singh 
and Is war Marandi, two legendary figures of the Jharkhand movement, did manage 
to poll a majority of more than 50 per cent but it was a far cry from the three- 
fourths majority that they used to poll in the previous elections.
Thus, the declining development profile and the absence of any noticeable
Table 72: Performance of Jharkhandi Political Parties in Lok Sabha Elections 1962
Election Year
Average Votes 
Polled by All 
Jharkhandi Parties 
in Constituencies 
with Electoral 
Presence
Average Votes 
Polled by All 
Jharkhandi Parties 
in all Constituencies 
of Jharkhand
Average Percentage 
of Votes Polled in 
Seats Won by 
Jharkhandi Parties
Seats Won Out of 
Total Seats in 
Jharkhand
1962 28.41 21.85 49.5 3 out of 13
improvement as a result of government policy initiatives had their toll on the 
popular support which the Jharkhandi political formations, particularly the JHP, 
enjoyed. In many ways, this marked the end of an era of overwhelming popular
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support enjoyed by the Jharkhandi groups. There are a number of other related 
reasons for the fall in popularity and electorate support for the Jharkhandi groups. 
The growing percentage of non-tribal population in the electorate of Jharkhand 
region combined with the growing political heterogeneity of the tribal population 
contributed their bit. In addition to this, there was an important role played by the 
poor performance of the policy implementation machinery. As has emerged in 
chapter IV, the development indicators had not improved in the Jharkhand region (in 
some cases the situation had worsened) during the hegemony of the Jharkhandi 
parties. The party had failed to translate their dominance in the region into political 
strength and secure a better allocation of development funds and initiatives. Hence, 
the decline of the party is not surprising.
This change in the popular support for the Jharkhandi groups can be 
understood within the framework of the Modified Resource Dependence Model. 
When faced with an inefficient and ineffective policy implementation, the popular 
electoral support (resources controlled by the electorate) was quickly withdrawn and 
was invested in another national party in the hope of securing a better policy 
environment and initiatives (resources controlled by the State and the political party 
in power). Thus, the electorate tried another avenue for a mutually beneficial 
exchange of resources with the State. As will be seen in the rest of the chapter, in 
years to come, this strategic use of the resource of political patronage enjoyed by 
the electorate is utilised by the population of the Jharkhand region in a number of 
ways. They have learnt to combine the resource of political patronage with another 
resource vested in their numbers; namely, the resource of political threat to the 
regime by agitational politics to secure a better public policy response. This 
strategic sharing of political resources vested in the general public has secured a 
better voice for the development problems of the region as well as secured some 
degree of autonomy.
255
IV
Soon after the 1962 general elections, the JHP merged with the INC. The 
latter realised that a stable support base in the Jharkhand region had to include the 
tribal population who had previously supported the JHP. On the other hand, the JHP 
realised that they had lost electoral support owing to their divisiveness and failure to 
secure a better policy intervention in the Jharkhand region. The merger of JHP with 
the INC provided the Jharkhandi leaders an opportunity to contain these cleavages 
amongst them by utilising the umbrella character of the INC.
Besides, the Jharkhandi leaders felt that the twin goals of creation of a 
separate state and a better public policy initiative for the Jharkhand region could be 
pursued better from within the INC than as one of the many parties in opposition. 
Within the INC, the Jharkhandi leaders had been accommodated as ministers and as 
heads of various developmental bodies but precious little was done on the 
developmental front. Gradually, the merger started showing signs of strain mainly 
due to dissension among the Jharkhandi groups within the INC. The erstwhile 
leaders of the JHP were caught up in the internal power struggles of the INC and 
failed to secure the efforts of the governmental machinery for development of their 
region, which led to further dissensions among them. The results of this intricate 
political game and the lack of effort on the developmental policy front further 
reinforced the trend towards multi-party ism in the Jharkhand region. The Jharkhandi 
groups (excluding those small splinter groups that were not a part of the INC and 
were therefore, members of the opposition) fared poorly in the 1967 elections. The 
electoral felt betrayed by the Jharkhandi leaders who were a part of the INC. The 
Jharkhandi parties did not carry much political legitimacy in the region any more.
Since JHP was a part of INC in the 1967 election, it is not possible to isolate 
the performance of the Jharkhandi political groups. However, there are some 
leaders who were renowned Jharkhandis and their fortunes can be analysed in this 
election.
256
Only three constituencies returned a distinctly Jharkhandi candidate. The 
constituency of Khunti once again, returned Jaipal Singh contesting under the INC
Table 73: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1967
Winner Party Runner up III Party and IV Party and V Party and
Constituency Number of and Percent of Party and Percent of Percent of Percent of
Name Candidates Votes Polled Percent of 
Votes Polled
Votes Polled Votes Polled Votes Polled
IND 34.6 INC 23.1 SSP BJS PSP
Ckatra 5 Vijaya
Raje(W)
S P Bhandari 18.9 15.7 7.7
6 JKD36.6 INC 25.7 SSP CPM BJS
Dhaubad L R Laxmi 
(W)
A P Sharma 12.0 10.1 9.3
INC 38.8 CPI 31.0 BJS IND IND
Dumka* 5 Satya Charan 
Besra
B Marandi 12.4 10.7 7.0
4 INC 35.1 IND 33.2 BJS CPI -
Giridih Imteyaz
Ahmed
M Oberoi 18.9 12.8
INC 38.2 BJS 28.0 IND PSP IND
Godda 5 PD
Himatsingka
S Tulsiyan 13.3 13.2 7.4
IND 44.4 INC 33.9
Hazaribagh 4 Basant N. 
Singh
Damodar
Pandey
BJS
14.8
CPI
7.0
-
INC 37.2 CPI 17.1 IND BJS CPM
Jamshedpur 6 Shiva C Prasad Udaikar
Mishra
16.5 17.1 11.4
Khunti * 9 INC 26.0 IND 23.1 BJS SWA IND
Jaipal Singh P Kachchap 16.6 13.7 6.1
Lohardagga* 6 INC 39.8 BJS 18.4 IND IND SWA
Kartik Oraon S. Baraik 17.0 11.1 10.1
INC 43.0 SSP 23.6 JKD BJS IND
Palamaug 5 Kainla Kumari 
(W)
J Ram 14.8 11.5 7.1
Rajmalial* 6 INC 27.9 SWA 23.6 IND BJS IND
Iswar Marandi Robert S Basra 18.5 15.4 7.9
INC 19.6 BJS 17.1 IND IND IND
Ranchi 10 Prashant K. 
Ghosh
A N Sinha 13.4 11.4 10.5
Singlibum* 6 IND 23.4 BJS 20.7 INC SSP IND
Kolai Birua M L Soy 17.9 17.7 12.4
*ST Constituency.
*SC Constituency.
Three major delimitation of constituencies in 1952, 1957, 1967 and 1977 have altered the number, shape, size and demographic 
profiles of many constituencies in the Jharkhand region.
Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy, India Decides: Elections 1952-1991, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers 
and magazines.
banner but his majority was reduced to half and he secured only 26 per cent (as 
opposed to 52.6 per cent in 1962) of the votes. Singhbhum also elected a Jharkhandi 
leader as a Congress candidate. Here again, this candidate was elected with a much- 
reduced majority of 23.4 per cent (compared with the 1962 majority of 42.5 per
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cent of the votes for the JHP candidate in 1957) (Table 73). The Rajmahal seat was 
also won by a Jharkhandi candidate representing the INC, Is war Marandi, with 27.9 
per cent of the votes (compared with the JHP candidate who had won the seat in 
1962 with 52.8 per cent of the votes). The INC did manage to win 9 of the 13 Lok 
Sabha seats from the region but the overwhelming electoral majorities (in terms of 
the percentage of votes) that Jharkhandi leaders had enjoyed in the past was not 
extended to the INC candidates.
As is evident from the above analysis, there were two significant features of 
this election. In 1967, there was largely a pattern of voting against the sitting 
members of Parliament in the Jharkhand region as elsewhere in India. It was clearly 
a vote for change in representation. Some candidates who represented the same 
parties were most likely victorious on the basis of their personal reputations rather 
than the party/ issues which they represented. This is reflected in the fact that a few 
members of Parliament who chose to contest the elections as independent candidates 
rather than represent a party, retained their seats. For instance, Basant N. Singh in 
Hazaribagh and Vijaya Raje in Chatra, both retained their seats.
The second pattern, which is quite clear from the results of the 1967 
elections is that the days of single party in the Jharkhand region (as in the rest of 
India, though not quite so clear yet) were over. The fact that the INC had won 9 of 
the 13 seats cannot be seen as one-party dominance because the percentage of votes 
polled by INC (even with Jharkhandi candidates representing it) was far lower than 
that enjoyed by the JHP and other Jharkhandi parties in their hey days. Besides, this 
election also offered a rare opportunity to the INC. It had managed to tap into a 
combination of support bases such as a vote for a change, Jharkhandi support base 
and personal reputation of the Jharkhandi leaders. It also benefited from the rational 
choice of the voters in favour of a party which was likely to form a stable 
government as they were tired of the divided JHP who had not managed to secure a 
better development initiative in the Jharkhand region. The INC as a party was not 
representing any Jharkhandi ideology but performed quite well. Also important is 
the increasing electoral support for the Leftist groups and parties. This also reflects
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a growing confidence within the Jharkhandi electorate who were now willing to 
extend political patronage to any political group that was likely to have the capacity 
of engaging in a meaningful exchange of resources with the State and the rest of the 
political system.
Thus, starting from the 1962 elections and culminating in the 1967 elections 
the electorate clearly rejected the Jharkhand state as a solution to the issue of 
declining development profile. Although the aspiration for a separate state and the 
recognition of the Jharkhandi identity were not quite dead, the issue of a proper and 
efficient policy implementation and socio-economic development took priority rather 
than the creation of a separate state. The electorate used the most potent weapon 
they had in their arsenal; namely, the withdrawal of electoral support for the 
Jharkhandi parties (who had promised a lot but had not delivered much), to make 
their point.
Apart from a desire for change amongst the electorate, the 1967 election also 
reflects a redefinition of the terms of resource dependence which has had long-term 
consequences. It appears that the Jharkhandi electorate realised that the economic 
potential of the Jharkhand region was important for the entire country. 
Consequently, it was willing to engage in a national-level exchange of resources 
through the avenues offered by the INC. The fourth general election thus, marked 
the emergence of multi-party politics in the Jharkhand region and also significantly, 
the growing distrust and disenchantment of the electorate with the Jharkhandi 
leaders.
This era in Jharkhandi politics can also be understood within the operational 
dynamics of the Modified Resource Dependence Model, the electorate used the 
resources at their command, namely the electoral patronage of certain parties/ 
candidates in the hope of being able to pressurise the State to share with them the 
resources which it commanded -  developmental funds and efficient policy delivery. 
However, this does not mean that the electorate was able to secure an equitable 
share of the resources which the State commanded in the coming years. This
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straggle to share resources under the control of the other became more intense in the 
coming years. The multiplicity of political parties and the continued inefficiency of 
the policy delivery mechanism led to an even more fluid political dynamics in the 
Jharkhand region.
y
After the 1967 elections, from the morass of the declining influence of the 
Jharkhandi groups in the region and divided political loyalties, there emerged 
numerous politically active ‘groups’. All of them claimed to be the true 
representatives of the cause of Jharkhand and to be the true successor of the 
erstwhile JHP. Although the political climate of the region had changed drastically 
since the last Census, the developmental profile hardly showed any sign of 
accelerated growth.
By 1971, as discussed in chapter IV, the population in Bihar and the 
Jharkhand region had grown rapidly. This growth altered the demographic balance 
of the Jharkhand region as well as Bihar as a whole. By 1971, 27.68 per cent of the 
population of Bihar lived in the Jharkhand region as opposed to 24.98 per cent in 
1961 (Chart 2). Also pertinent was the fact that the ST component of the population 
was reduced to 29.29 per cent (from 33.92 per cent in 1961). This change in the 
demographic profile had political repercussions in terms of still further reduced 
chances of success for particularistic tribal politics.
As far as the development indicators are concerned, the overall literacy rate 
had shown an improvement during the decade 1951-61. However, during 1961-71, 
the rate of growth in literacy had slowed down. Chart 5 and chapter IV tells us that 
in the Jharkhand region as well as in Bihar as a whole, there was hardly any 
improvement in literacy rates (Chart 5). This indicates a poorer rate of success in 
the implementation of public policy in both Bihar as a whole as well as the 
Jharkhand region. The health indicators also reflect a limited success. The patterns 
for death and infant mortality represented in Chart 3 indicate that by 1971 infant
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mortality in the Jharkhand region had shown a substantial decline to 28.38 per 1,000 
live births (from 58.95 in 1961). The same figures for Bihar as a whole were 32.54 
in 1973 compared with 87.01 in 1961.
This picture of declining development profile continues with the occupational 
patterns for the Jharkhand region. The total percentage of population gainfully 
employed in the Jharkhand region in 1971 fell to about 30 per cent of the population 
from more than 50 per cent in 1961. This decline was in the agricultural as well as 
non-agricultural occupations17 (Chart 4). Similar patterns can be discerned for Bihar 
as a whole as well. Chapter IV had analysed the declining agricultural production in 
the Jharkhand region and the poor efforts to improve it in the decade 1961-71. This 
is reflected in the occupational patterns as well as in the irrigation potential of the 
region (Chart 7). As far as the investments in the agricultural sectors were 
concerned, the loans disbursed in the Jharkhand region rose modestly compared 
with the substantial hike in Bihar as a whole (Chart 8). These minor improvements 
fade into insignificance when compared with the strides made in Bihar as a whole.
Thus, while the developmental profile of the region had been going from bad 
to worse in the 1961-71 decade, the political agenda of the region was getting more 
and more complicated. The Jharkhandi leaders within the INC and elsewhere 
realised that the cause of a Jharkhand state and the development of the region had 
been injured by the divisions within their ranks. Thus, desperate measures 
undertaken in 1968 to salvage their political influence in the region led to the 
creation of a loosely united All India Jharkhand Party (AIJP). This new political 
entity, the AIJP, was rife with mutual rivalries from its very inception and was soon 
divided into two factions (see chapter II). On the other hand, the urban and
17 Such drastic fall is due to a statistical artefact resulting from the re-definition of categories in 1961 
and 1971 (see chapter IV), Nevertheless, the falling potential for growth in employment 
opportunities in the agricultural occupations as witnessed in other indicators such as declining 
irrigation potential and falling cropped area points to a decline in employment capacity of the 
Jharkhand region, irrespective of the statistical artefact. Surely, a declining agricultural sector 
cannot gainfully support more agricultural workers.
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industrial factions of the Jharkhand movement began emerging after the debacle of 
the 1967 elections and multiple groups emerged which tried to draw upon the legacy 
of the tribal heritage to further their political aims.
The rate of development in the region had worsened during the last decade 
or so and the popular support for the Jharkhandi groups reached a nadir by the 
fourth general election in 1967. This trend continued in the 1971 election. The
Table 74: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1971
Winner Party Runner up III Party and IV Party and V Party and
Constituency Number of and Per cent Party and Percent of Percent of Percent of
Name Candidates of Votes 
Polled
Percent of 
Votes Polled
Votes Polled Votes Polled Votes Polled
INC 43.2 JP 36.8 SSP IND
Chatra 4 Shankar D. 
Singh
Vijaya
Raje(W)
18.8 1.2
INC 46.4 CPM 15.7 AIJP CPI BJS
Dlianbad 15 Ram N Sharma Vinod B Mahto 10.3 7.0 5.3
INC 35.4 CPI 29.1 BJS IND BPHJ
Dumka* S Satya Charan 
Besra
Satrughan
Besra
16.5 13.4 2.7
INC 38.3 INCO 35.9 CPI IND AIJP
Giridih 6 C Bhattacharya Krishna B 
Sahay
18.4 3.8 2.7
INC 47.6 INCO 22.6 IND BPHJ IND
Godda 6 Jagdish N 
Mandal
PD
Himatsingka
9.7 9.0 6.3
INC 32.8 JP 26.5 BJS SSP IND
Hazaribagh 7 Damodar
Pandey
L R Laxmi 
(W)
17.7 8.9 8.9
INC 27.5 CPI 27.4 AIJP BJS IND
Jamshedpur 12 Swaran S 
Soklii
Kedar Das 17.1 12.7 7.3
Khunti* 8 IND 30.5 BJS 28.8 AIJP IND IND
Niral E. Horo Karia Munda 19.3 16.5 2.2
Lohardagga* 8 INC 53.8 
Kartik Oraon
BJS 18.8 
Ropna Oraon
IND
14.8
IND
3.8
AIJP
3.6
INC 51.3 BJS 30.7 SSP IND IND
Palamau # 7 Kamla Kumari 
(W)
Ramdeni Ram 9.5 2.6 2.2
Rajmahal* 8 INC 44.8 BPHJ 29.8 BJS IND IND
Iswar Marandi Justin Richard 16.2 3.3 2.1
INC 43.3 BJS 34.4 IND AIFB AIJP
Ranchi 12 Prashant K 
Ghosh
Rudra P 
Sarangi
7.2 6.7 2.4
Singhbhum* 9 AIJP 40.7 
Moran S Purty
IND 25.5 
D N Champia
IND
13.2
IND
6.3
IND
4.2
'  ST Constituency.
1 SC Constituency.
Three major delimitation of constituencies in 1952, 1957, 1967 and 1977 have altered the number, shape, size and demographic 
profiles of many constituencies in the Jharkhand region.
Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy, India Decides: Elections 1952-1991, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers 
and magazines.
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electorate had lost all faith in the promises of the Jharkhandi groups. In the fifth 
general election in 1971, the role played by the Jharkhandi group was at best 
marginal and at worse non-existent. Once again, the electorate sought to exercise the 
power vested in them by the democratic process and paid little heed to the appeals of 
the faction-riddled Jharkhandi groups. Individual Jharkhandi leaders such as Iswar 
Marandi who won the Rajmahal seat as an INC candidate and N E Horo who won 
the Khunti seat as an independent candidate, performed well but political formations 
representing the Jharkhandi ideology, on the whole, faired poorly (Table 74).
The Jharkhandi political groups were able to win only one (Singhbhum) of 
the thirteen Lok Sabha seats from the region reserved for STs. Even in this 
constituency, the AIJP candidate polled only 40.7 per cent of the votes (Table 75)
Table 75: Performance of Jharkhandi Political Parties in Lok Sabha Elections 1971
Election Year
Average Votes 
Polled by All 
Jharkhandi Parties 
in Constituencies 
with Electoral 
Presence
Average Votes 
Polled by All 
Jharkhandi Parties 
in all Constituencies 
of Jharkhand
Average Percentage 
of Votes Polled in 
Seats Won by 
Jharkhandi Parties
Seats Won Out of 
Total Seats in 
Jharkhand
1971 13.76 10.58 40.7 1 out of 13
compared to an average of about 49 per cent votes polled by Jharkhandi candidates 
in the seats won by them in 1962.
The same pattern of declining electoral support for the Jharkhandi groups 
was reflected throughout the region. Overall, the Jharkhandi political groups 
managed to poll an average of only 10.58 per cent of the votes in the entire 
Jharkhand region. In three constituencies the Jharkhandi political parties/ formations 
had no presence amongst the first five candidates. In the constituencies where they 
did, they polled an average of 13.76 per cent compared with 28.4 per cent in 1962. 
Clearly, the strong trend of reduced electoral support for the Jharkhandi groups in 
the region which had started in 1962, continued in 1971 (Chart 1). Furthermore, the 
constituency of Dumka (ST constituency) which had once been one of the more 
important centres of Jharkhandi support extended very little political support to the 
Jharkhandis in the elections of 1971. The only noticeable presence of the Jharkhandi
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groups in this constituency was 2.7 per cent of the votes polled by one of the 
splinter groups under the banner of Bihar Prant Hul Jharkhand Party.
It is noteworthy that the leftist political groups enjoyed greater electoral 
support in the 1971 election than the Jharkhandi political formations. The 
relationship between the decline in popular support for the Jharkhandi groups and 
the developmental and socio-economic problems of the region is attested to by the 
fact that Leftist and socialist parties were commanding significant popular support. 
These leftist parties sought to address the very problems which had emerged due to 
the neglect of the developmental agenda of the region by the policy process. 
Undoubtedly, these parties did not win many seats in the Jharkhand region but their 
share in the percentage of votes is noteworthy and in a few constituencies, they 
emerged as the runner-up party (Table 74).
The centrality of development policy in this shift of electoral patronage is 
evident if the political stance of the INC vis-a-vis a separate state of Jharkhand is 
taken into account (see chapter VII). The fact that electoral support for the INC had 
improved (Table 74) despite its extreme reluctance to consider a separate state 
indicates the important place of the State's developmental effort in the politics of the 
Jharkhand region. The INC had used the political rhetoric of garibi hatao in the 
1970s. This had yielded a rich electoral harvest for the INC throughout India and 
the Jharkhand region was no different. This reflects the value attached by the 
Jharkhandi electorate to a better public policy initiative for the development of the 
region. The fact that the INC had managed to win eleven of the thirteen seats 
demonstrates that the Jharkhandi electorate was eager to extend all possible political 
patronage to the INC in the hope of better policy response. The declining 
development profile over the past two decades had made the problems of the region 
acute and a better exchange of resources on the development policy front was 
clearly more important to the electorate than a separate state.
In sum, the desperate efforts made in 1969 to salvage the fast declining 
popular political support for the Jharkhandi groups did not pay off. The factionalism
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that was rife within their ranks was one of the factors (see chapter II). Also 
important was the fact that the electorate had invested almost overwhelming trust in 
the Jharkhandi groups till 1957 but the overall developmental profile had worsened. 
The changing political profile of the region was reflected in the rising support for 
the leftist and national parties. The pattern of increasing support for the national 
parties which had emerged in the 1967 elections, was clear by the 1971 victory of 
the INC. The INC had won all the seats in the Jharkhand region except for two 
reserved seats. One of these was won by the AIJP and the other by the Jharkhandi 
leader N. E. Horo who had contested as an independent candidate.
The declining agricultural production, worsening educational levels and 
general under-development resulting in lower employment opportunities ensured 
that the issue of a separate state took a back seat. The electorate invested its support 
in the INC, which provided hope of a stable and efficient government at the state 
level and the centre.
The sixth general election was held against the backdrop of the Emergency 
(imposed under the INC government led by Indira Gandhi) which had been highly 
unpopular with the general population all over the country. The Jharkhand region 
was no different and the INC lost all the seats in the region. Although in the 1971 
elections it seemed that the INC had come to stay in the region, the backlash of the 
electorate against the draconian measures and policies of the emergency era was 
swift and complete. All the INC candidates and Jharkhandi leaders who had aligned 
themselves with the INC lost their seats. This trend is reflected in the fact that 
Moran S. Purty, who had won the Singhbhum seat in 1971 Lok Sabha elections as 
an AIJP candidate (with 40.7 per cent of the votes), lost the seat to an AIJP 
candidate when he fought under the INC banner in 1977 and polled only 14.2 per 
cent of the votes.
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Table 76: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1977
Winner Party Runner up III Party and IV Party and V Party and
Constituency Number of and Percent of Party and Percent of Percent of Percent of
Name Candidates Votes Polled Percent of 
Votes Polled
Votes Polled Votes Polled Votes Polled
BLD 75.0 INC 22.2 IND IND IND
Chatra 5 Sukhdeo P 
Verma
Shankar D. 
Singh
1.4 0.8 0.6
IND 68.7 INC 21.3 CPI IND IND
Dhanbad 13 AKRoy Ram N Sharma 5.9 0.7 0.7
BLD 49.5 INC 26.6 CPI PHJP IND
Durnka* 6 Bateshwar
Hembram
Prithivi C 
Kisku
16.6 4.3 1.8
BLD 58.4 INC 30,5 IND JHP
Giridih 4 Ramdas Singh Imteyaz
Ahmed
8.7 2.5 -
BLD 70.0 INC 25,6 IND IND PHJP
Godda 5 Jagdambi P 
Yadav
Jagdish N 
Mandal
1.8 1.5 1.1
BLD 64.7 INC 15.6 CPI IND IND
Hazaribagh 5 Basant N Singh Damodar
Pandey
12.4 4.4 2.9
BLD 50.2 INC 25.8 CPI JHP IND
Jamshedpur 12 Rudra P 
Sarangi
VGS Gopal 12.6 3.7 1.9
Khunti* 5 BLD 50.0 JHP 31.0 IND IND IND
Karia Munda N E Horo 16.6 1.3 1.1
BLD 67.3 INC 21.2 CPI IND
Koderma 4 Reet Lai P 
Verma
C Bhattacharya 8.5 2.9 -
Loliardagga* 5 BLD 56.9 INC 31.0 IND JHP IND
Lalu Oraon Kartik Oraon 5.6 4.0 2.6
BLD 77.6 INC 15.0 IND IND IND
Palamau # 7 Ramdeni Ram Kamla Kumari 
(W)
2.7 2.1 1.2
3 BLD 68.2 INC 25.8 BPHJ
Rajmahal* Anthony
Murmu
Yogesh C. 
Murmu
6.1 - -
BLD 49.0 INC 25.5 IND CPM IND
Ranchi 13 Ravindra
Verma
Shiv Prasad 
Sahu
8.5 5.1 3.8
AIJP 73.3 INC 14.2 JHP IND IND
Singhbhum* 9 Bagun Sumburi Moran S. 
Purty
4.4 2.6 1.7
*ST Constituency.
'S C  Constituency.
Three major delimitation of constituencies in 1952, 1957, 1967 and 1977 have altered the number, shape, size and demographic 
profiles of many constituencies in the Jharkhand region.
Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy, India Decides: Elections 1952-1991, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers 
and magazines.
Table 77: Performance of Jharkhandi Political Parties in Lok Sabha Elections 1977
Election Year
Average Votes 
Polled by All 
Jharkhandi Parties 
in Constituencies 
with Electoral 
Presence
Average Votes 
Polled by All 
Jharkhandi Parties 
in all Constituencies 
of Jharkhand
Average Percentage 
of Votes Polled in 
Seats Won by 
Jharkhandi Parties
Seats Won Out of 
Total Seats in 
Jharkhand
1977 16.3 9.3 73.3 1 out of 14
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Despite the anti-INC feeling, the Jharkhandi groups failed to win any more 
seats in the 1977 elections. The AIJP won the Singhbhum seat with a majority (73.3 
per cent) that was a reminiscent of the hey day of the JHP. However, this was the 
only seat which the Jharkhandi groups won from the 14 Lok Sabha seats in the 
region. The average votes polled by these parties in all the constituencies in the 
Jharkhand region fell once again, to a mere 9.3 per cent. The Jharkhandi parties had 
no presence amongst the first five candidates in 6 constituencies in the 1977 
elections. This inflates the average votes polled by the Jharkhandi parties in the 
constituencies where they had electoral presence to 16.3 per cent (Table 76). 
However, their electoral appeal had declined both in terms of number of 
constituencies where they managed to secure some degree of electoral support as 
well as in terms of the percentage of the votes polled.
The 1977 election does not reflect a new political trend in the Jharkhand 
region. No doubt there was a large-scale support for the Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD) 
but this was more an anti-INC sentiment than a pro-BLD vote. However, the 
declining electoral support for the Jharkhandi parties in this election is a 
continuation of a similar trend in the last few elections.
Another notable feature in the election of 1977 was that the Jharkhandi 
groups had a presence only in the constituencies reserved for the STs. In other 
constituencies, they did not figure in the tally of first five candidates. It appears that 
whatever little popular support was left for the political groups premised on the 
Jharkhandi ideology was restricted to pockets of the tribal population. Their political 
legitimacy did not mobilise even ail the tribal people which is evident in the low 
level of support in the tribal constituencies. Moreover, there seems to have been a 
very limited degree of support for them in non-tribal pockets. Thus, the declining 
support for Jharkhandi groups which started in the 1960s, was noticed in this 
election as well. Faced with the electoral debacle, the JMM and the Jharkhand 
Alliance between the Jharkhandi and some leftist leaders of the region declined to 
the point of disappearing.
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This election reflects another element in the changing dynamics of resource 
dependence in the region. By the mid-seventies, the JMM's agenda of social reform 
had started finding enthusiastic support amongst the masses (see chapter II). This 
indicates that the electorate was happy to respond to the agenda of social change and 
cultural revivalism that was proposed by the JMM but was unwilling to elect the 
uneasy alliance to represent them in the legislatures. In other words, the masses 
were unwilling to entrust them with a meaningful exchange of resources with the 
State.
Moreover, the lessons learnt in the events which led to the proclamation of 
Emergency in 1975, had taught the masses the value of agitational politics and 
strength in numbers. Consequently, starting from late 1970s the agitational agenda 
of the JMM had drawn substantial popular support which was reflected in the well- 
attended rallies and demonstrations. However, as far as electoral support was 
concerned, the masses chose to invest this element of the political resources at their 
command in the national political parties which were likely to be in a position to 
influence the developmental policy in the Jharkhand region.
The unstable government which was formed after the 1977 election did not 
last its full term and elections were held again in 1980. The Jharkhandi electorate 
were all too familiar with the factionalism in the Jharkhandi parties and its effects on 
the region. Consequently, the Indian National Congress (Indira) (INCl) was voted 
back and won six of the fourteen Lok Sabha seats in the region (Table 78).
The Janata Party (JP) which had emerged from the numerous mergers and 
factionalism, of which the BLD was a part, did not fare well in this election. 
Ironically, the political party that won the most number of the seats — INCI—was 
itself borne out of the second major split in the original the INC. Moreover, JP 
came second in 8 of the 14 seats in the region. However, a noteworthy feature of 
this election was an absence of predominance of any one political party/ group.
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Table 78: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1980
Winner Party Runner up III Party and IV Party and V Party and
Constituency Number of and Percent of Party and Percent of Percent of Percent of
Name Candidates Votes Polled Percent of 
Votes Polled
Votes Polled Votes Polled Votes Polled
INCI 40.0 JP 22.9 JPS IND IND
Chatra 12 Ranjit Singh Sukhdeo P. 
Verma
17.4 7.5 3.2
IND 34.2 INCI 30.4 JP JPS IND
Dhanbad 20 AKRoy Yogeshwar
Prasad
19.6 6.9 2.7
IND 37.5 INCI 36.4 JP CPI JHP
Dumka* 5 Shibu Soren Prithivi C. 
Kisku
12.4 12.1 1.5
IND 35.4 JP 26.6 IND JPS CPI
Giridih 11 Bindeshwari
Dube
Ramdas Singh 18.9 8.2 6.5
INCI 36.6 JP 27.9 CPI IND JPS
Godda 11 Saminuddin Jagdambi P 
Yadav
16.6 9.5 5.0
JP 35.1 INCI 24.4 CPI JPS IND
Hazaribagh 10 Basant N Singh Azima Hussain 
(W)
19.0 11.1 5.6
JP 29.2 INCI 25.9 CPI JHP JPS
Jamshedpur 21 Rudra P 
Sarangi
VGS Gopal 24.4 5.6 4.4
Khunti* 14 JHP 36.4 JP 26.7 INCI JPS IND
N E Horo Karia Munda 20.8 7.7 1.3
JP 40.7 INCI 32.3 INCU IND IND
Koderma 9 Reet Lai P 
Verma
Javed Warsi 11.8 8.7 2.2
Lohardagga* 13 INCI 51.5 JP 23.8 JPS JHP IND
Kartik Oraon Karma Oraon 10.0 4.5 3.5
INCI 48.3 JP 31.3 JPS IND IND
Palamau# 9 Kamla Kumari 
(W)
Ramdeni Ram 8.9 4.2 1.7
INCI 40.4 JP 22.3 IND JPS IND
Rajmahal* 8 Seth Hembram Palu Hasda 20.1 11.0 3.1
INCI 38.7 JP 24.8 JPS AIFB IND
Ranchi 17 Shiv Prasad 
Sahu
Shiv Kumar 
Sinha
9.7 9.4 8.9
JP 32.4 INCI 22.2 IND JPS JHP
Singhbhum* 11 Bagun Sumburi Theodore
Bodra
20.2 10.2 6.6
* ST Constituency, 1 SC Constituency
There have been three major delimitation of constituencies since 1952 in 1957, 1967 and 1977. As a result, the number o f '  
constituencies have changed as have their size and demographic profiles.
Source; David Buder, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy, India Decides: Elections 1952-1991, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers 
and magazines.
It must be noted that this fluidity in the political dynamics of the region did 
not do much to improve the electoral fortunes of the Jharkhandi political groups/ 
parties. In the 1980 Lok Sabha elections, Jharkhandi parties once again won only 
one of the 14 Lok Sabha seats (Khunti) in the region with 36.4 per cent of the votes
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polled (Tables 78). Some leaders of the Jharkhand Alliance had also won the seats 
that they had contested as independents. Shibu Soren, the head of JMM, had won 
the Dumka seat with 37.5 per cent of the votes and A. K. Roy was successful in 
Dhanbad with 34.2 per cent of the votes polled.
Table 79: Performance of Jharkhandi Political Parties in Lok Sabha Elections 1980
Election Year
Average Votes 
Polled by All 
Jharkhandi Parties 
in Constituencies 
with Electoral 
Presence
Average Votes 
Polled by All 
Jharkhandi Parties 
in all Constituencies 
of Jharkhand
Average Percentage 
of Votes Polled in 
Seats Won by 
Jharkhandi Parties
Seats Won Out of 
Total Seats in 
Jharkhand
1980 10.9 3.9 36.4 1 out of 14
However, it is likely that they had won their respective seats due to their 
roles in the Leftist politics in the Jharkhand region during the late 1960s and the 
1970s and not due to any Jharkhandi ideology. The ideological fluidity of the 
Jharkhandi parties can also be noted in the fact that Bagun Sumburi had contested 
the Singhbhum seat in 1977 as an AIJP candidate but in the 1980 election, he won 
the same seat as a JP candidate. This also reflects the fact that personal reputation 
had come to weigh more than the ideological proximity in the minds of the voters.
The share of the votes polled by the Jharkhandi parties plummeted to an all- 
time low of 3.9 per cent. The Jharkhandi political groups figured amongst the first 
five candidates in only four of the fourteen constituencies. The average votes polled 
by these parties in such constituencies were 10.9 per cent (Table 79). Thus, the 
electoral decline of the Jharkhandi parties continued in the 1980 elections. However, 
there was a revival in the political fortunes of these groups as reflected in mass 
support to their agitational politics (chapter II). This however, did not translate into 
electoral support for these parties on account of the strategic utilisation of the 
resources controlled by the electorate.
It is also noteworthy that there had been numerous political splinter groups 
claiming to represent the cause of Jharkhand in the 1977 Election. Of them, only the 
JHP was noticeable in the results of the 1980 elections. Although the once dominant
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JHP was struggling for survival in the electoral contest, national parties who had 
become major players in the region could not succeed in securing the political 
support and influence that the JHP had at one time enjoyed. There was an absence 
of widespread support for the INCI, CPI or JP. The results of this election were as 
mixed as the developmental scenario of Jharkhand.
The strategic use of the political resources controlled by the electorate in the 
1977 and 1980 elections had not translated into a better development profile in the 
Jharkhand region. The electorate had shifted their political support from the 
Jharkhandi groups to the national parties in the hope of being able to derive policy 
initiatives from them. However, these national political parties had become as 
faction-riddled as the JHP (with probably the relatively least factionalism within the 
INCI). Consequently, various pockets of the Jharkhand region seemed to be trying 
parties of all political hues and colours.
VI
By the time the INCI government was formed in the year 1980, the Tribal 
Sub-Plan had been operational for nearly six years and the Sixth Five-Year Plan was 
being drafted with TSP as an important component. However, six years of operation 
of the TSP did not seem to have generated any major improvements in the 
development profile of the region.
Demographically, the balance tilted back to pre-1971 position with just over 
a quarter of the population residing within the Jharkhand region. The ST component 
of the population of the Jharkhand region also increased to 30.25 per cent (from 
29.29 per cent in 1971). However, this improvement in the demographic balance 
was not due to any governmental policy but to administrative reorientation of the 
internal boundaries of Bihar by virtue of which the Jharkhand region represented 
only 45.84 per cent of the land area compared with 52.64 per cent in 1971 (see 
chapter V).
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As far as the development profile of the Jharkhand region is concerned, very 
few indicators are available for the year 1981. However, literacy seems to be the 
only component of public policy to have shown positive growth. After almost no 
change in the previous decade, during 1971-81 there was a growth in literacy in the 
region from about 22 per cent in 1971 to almost 28 per cent in 1981 (Chart 5). 
There was also a modest growth in education in the Jharkhand region reflected in 
the greater percentage of workers educated up to middle school level (chapter V). 
The occupational pattern of the population of the Jharkhand region show a small 
decline in agricultural occupations but a doubling of the percentage of those in non- 
agricultural jobs. Overall, there was a rise in employment opportunities from about 
30 per cent in 1971 to about 36 per cent of the population being employed in gainful 
activities in 1981 (Chart 4).
Despite the growth in the proportion of persons employed in non-agricultural 
activities in the Jharkhand region, the predominant majority still depended on 
agriculture for their livelihood. There is no indication of the availability of better 
agricultural facilities due to the extremely modest increase in the total irrigated area 
in the Jharkhand region (Chart 7). The total area irrigated by governmental canals 
showed a small increase but this increase is insignificant compared with similar 
increases in Bihar as a whole.
Further, as discussed in chapter V, TSP was the only component of public 
policy that had been showing results. The ST population thus, demonstrated a 
higher rate of education and employment. However, these improvements were also 
quite modest.
On the whole, the performance of public policy over the last decade had not 
shown any significant improvement. Further, as discussed in chapter V, Jharkhand 
region seems to have become an internal colony of Bihar. In such a development 
scenario, the political ferment in the Jharkhand region during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s is not surprising.
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The advantage of the marginal improvements which were noticed in the 
1971-81 decade (see chapter V), was garnered by the INC who performed 
handsomely in the region. The INC was the undisputed winner in the region in the 
1984 elections winning every seat. The review of the developmental policies and the 
vision of the new future that it represented in the 1984 elections led the voters to
Table 80: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1984
Winner Party Runner up III Party and IV Party and V Party and
and Per cent Party and Percent of Percent of Percent of
Constituency Number of of Votes Percent of Votes Polled Votes Polled Votes Polled
Name Candidates Polled Votes Polled
INC 56.4 ICJ 14.6 BJP IND IND
Chatra 13 Yogeshwar P 
Yogesh
Sukhdeo P. 
Verma
14.4 7.2 2.3
INC 41.4 IND 28.7 BJP JP IND
Dhanbad 24 Shankar D 
Singh
AKRoy 14.3 11.2 0.6
INC 53.9 JMM 27.7 CPI IND IND
Dumka* 8 Prithivi C 
Kisku
Shibu Soren 15.2 1.3 0.8
INC 53.5 IND 19.4 BJP JP JMM
Giridih 9 Sarfraj Ahmed Binod B. 
Mahto
18.0 3.3 1.9
INC 45.4 BJP 17.0 JMM CPI LKD
Godda 12 Saminuddin Falguni P 
Yadav
16.3 14.6 1.7
INC 47.8 CPI 31.4 BJP JMM JP
Hazaribagh 13 Damodar
Pandey
B Mehto 7.1 4.9 2.9
INC 45.7 CPI 30.4 BJP JMM JP
Jamshedpur 17 Gopeshwar Tikaram
Manjhi
10.4 5.2 3.3
Khunti 9 INC 41.1 IND 27.2 BJP IND IND
Simon Tigga N E Horo 17.7 9.1 1.4
INC 58.8 BJP 27.4 IND JP IND
Koderma 13 Tilak Dhari 
Singh
Reet Lai P 
Verma
2.9 2.8 2.1
INC 59.6 BJP 20.9 JP IND IND
Lohardagga* 14 Sumati Oraon 
(W)
Lalit Oraon 7.4 3.9 1.5
INC 72.5 JP 19.9 ICJ IND IND
Palamau* 6 Kamla Kumari 
(W)
Ram Sunder 
Das
3.3 2.2 1.1
Rajmahal* 10 INC 50.1 JMM 24.5 CPM BJP JP
Seth Hambram Simon Mardi 12.6 8.2 1.8
INC 49.5 BJP 16.5 JP LKD JMM
Ranchi 23 Shiv Prasad 
Sahu
RT Chowdhary 15.5 5.6 3.1
INC 44.5 IND 18.5 JMM BJP LKD
Singhbhum* 14 Bagun Sumburi Devendra
Manjhi
9.0 8.6 6.1
*ST Constituency 
*SC Constituency
Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy, India Decides: Elections 1952-1991, New Delhi, 1991 and various newspapers 
and magazines.
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elect the INC.
It must be noted that the INC won this election by enthusiastic support of the 
electorate as reflected in the sizeable percentage of votes polled by its candidates in 
all the constituencies of the Jharkhand region and the size of its winning margin 
(Table 80). Clearly, there was an overwhelming support for the INC in the region in 
the eighth general election. It seems that the electorate supported the stability and 
relative lack of factionalism which the INC provided in order to further the slight 
improvement in the development profde.
However, the 1984 elections were not an unqualified success for the INC. 
There was indeed a massive electoral support for the INC but caution needs to be 
exercised while analysing this election as a part of a long-term electoral trend in the 
Jharkhand region. The reason for this caution is the fact that this election was 
truncated by the assassination of Indira Gandhi. Hence, this unprecedented result 
was partly due to a ‘sympathy-vote’ for the INC.
The performance of Jharkhandi groups in this election continued downhill. 
They failed to win any seats in the entire region in the 1984 elections (Table 80). 
Their presence in the first five candidates increased to eight constituencies and they 
polled an average of 5.4 per cent of the votes in the Jharkhand region (compared 
with 3.9 per cent in 1980). In the eight constituencies where the JMM had electoral 
presence within the first five candidates, they polled the same percentage of votes as 
in 1980, i.e. 10.9 per cent (Table 81).
Table 81: Performance of Jharkhandi Political Parties in Lok Sabha Elections 1984
Election Year
Average Votes 
Polled by All 
Jharkhandi Parties 
in Constituencies 
with Electoral 
Presence
Average Votes 
Polled by AH 
Jharkhandi Parties 
in all Constituencies 
of Jharkhand
Average Percentage 
of Votes Polled in 
Seats Won by 
Jharkhandi Parties
Seats Won Out of 
Total Seats in 
Jharkhand
1984 10.9 5.4 0 0 out of 14
The electorate were unwilling to elect ineffective Jharkhandi leaders who had 
in the past failed to secure any public policy initiatives. The development profile of
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the Jharkhand region had deteriorated the most when there had been sizeable 
support for the Jharkhandi leaders. Further, the shifting stances of the Jharkhandi 
leaders across the spectrum - from extreme left to centre - were not liked by the 
voters. They perhaps reasoned that it was better to vote for the INC who would 
form the government and therefore could be forced to engage in an exchange of 
public policy resources under its control in return for political support. The JMM or 
other such Jharkhandi political groups were closely aligned with the INC but were 
faction-ridden political entities. Consequently, they had very little political clout to 
engage in any meaningful exchange of resources with the INC-controlled 
government.
After the extremely poor performance of the Jharkhandi political interests in 
the elections of 1984, there was a regrouping (as after all elections) of the 
Jharkhandi leaders. One of the major weaknesses of the Jharkhandi movement in the 
past had been its propensity to splinter and form numerous, mutually exclusive as 
and contesting political entities. As the movement draws heavily on the cultural 
heritage of the region, the necessity of joint action led to the formation of the 
Jharkhand Co-ordination Committee (JCC) to spearhead the struggle for a separate 
state of Jharkhand as well as to press for policy initiative for a faster development of 
the region (see chapter II). In the period between the eighth and ninth general 
elections, the JCC was active but failed to secure any long-term gains for the region. 
It staged some successful economic blockades to force the government to accede to 
their demand but soon its coherence and initiative slipped away. The JCC and its 
most vocal component, the AJSU, adopted the classic style of popular politics in 
India which may be summed up as ‘agitate first, demand later’. The AJSU became a 
victim of its own success when other constituents of the JCC distanced themselves 
from it over the relatively more radical and extreme stance adopted by the ASJU. 
The Jharkhand movement once again fell into disarray and the political vacuum was 
filled by the BJP’s grassroots organisation.
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Meanwhile, the development initiative of the government in the region 
continued under the Seventh Five-Year Plan. Whether it was able to change 
anything in the development profile of the region, is another matter.
In accordance with the operation of the Modified Resource Dependence 
Model, the 1989 election demonstrated that the electorate was willing to experiment 
with newer political parties. After about a decade of enthusiastic support for the 
INC, the electorate decided that it was time to try other political parties. During the
Table 82: Performance of Political Parties in Constituencies of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1989
Winner Party Runner up III Party and IV Party and V
Constituency Number of and Percent Party and Percent of Percent of Party and
Name Candidates of Votes 
Polled
Percent of 
Votes Polled
Votes Polled Votes Polled Percent of 
Votes Polled
Chatra 14 JD 49.6 INC 32.5 IPF IND LKDB
U N Verma Y P Yogesh 7.8 5.8 1.3
Dlianbad 22 MCOR 38.8 BJP 36.6 INC IND IND
AKRoy S Singh 18.6 0.9 0.7
JMM61.0 INC 34.0 IND IND DDP
Dumka * 8 Shibu Soren Prithivi C. 
Kisku
1.5 0.7 0.7
BJP 33.9 IND 32.2 INC JD IND
Giridih 6 Ramdas Singh Binod B 
Mahto
27.6 5.5 0.5
BJP 54.2 JMM 22.3 INC JPJP IND
Godda 11 Jagdambi
Yadav
S Mandal 21.2 0.5 0.3
Hazaribagh 11 BJP 44.0 CPI 35.8 INC IPF IND
Y Pandey B Mehto 11.6 4.1 2.1
Jamshedpur 13 JMM27.1 INC 25.4 BJP CPI JKD
S Mahtoo C Bagghi 23.0 22.0 0.8
Kliunti 8 BJP 33.2 JKD 32.0 INC IND DDP
Karia Munda N E Horo 28.6 2.3 1.4
Koderma BJP 45.5 INC 26.4 JMM 20.7 IND DDP
8 R P Verma T P Singh 5.7 0.6
Lohardagga* 11 INC 40.2 BJP 29.6 JD JMM JKD
Sumati Oraon Lalit Oraon 18.7 4.8 2.4
Palamau * 8 JD 37.3 BJP 28.6 INC IPF LKDB 2.1
J Ram Ramdeni Ram 23.4 6.0
Rajmahal* 7 JMM58.1 IND 21.7 INC IND HJD
S Marandi J Tudu 17.1 1.4 0.8
19 JD 35.2 BJP 31.9 INC IND JPJP
Ranchi S K Sahay RT
Chowdhary
27.4 1.0 0.8
11 INC 30.6 JD 23.4 JMM 23.0 IND JKD
Singhbhum* Bagun
Sumburi
M S Lamaye 17.2 2.4
'S T  Constituency, 'S C  Constituency
There have been three major delimitation of constituencies since 1952 in 1957, 1967 and 1977. As a result, the number of 
constituencies have changed as have their size and demographic profiles.
Source: David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy, India Decides: Elections 1952-1991, New Delhi, 1991 and various 
newspapers and magazines,
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period 1984-89 the development profile did not make great strides as seen in the 
discussion of the development profile in 1991 (chapter V).
Consequently, the electoral results in 1989 shows a wide variety of parties 
finding political support in the Jharkhand region. The electorate voted for the whole 
political spectrum from the extreme left in the guise of the MCOR, to the right in 
the form of the BJP. Furthermore, the Janata Dal with its pro-poor and pro-weaker 
section policies began making inroads in the INC vote banks (Table 82).
The failure of the political process to generate adequate avenues for the 
exchange of resources between the Jharkhandi electorate and the State led the BJP to 
win five out of the fourteen seats in 1989. Apart from this, there is another 
important reason for the splendid performance by this relative newcomer to the 
political scene. Faced with a declining development profile and the failure to engage 
in any meaningful exchange of resources with the State through the avenues of the 
available political parties, the support for the demand for a separate state was again 
finding popular support. The support for the agitational politics of the JMM and the 
AJSU are a reminder of this. In this scenario, popular support for the BJP grew as it 
is the only national political party which has promised statehood within the Indian 
Union to the region.
The successful economic blockade by the JCC and AJSU in the late 1980s 
increased the political legitimacy of the Jharkhandi political groups which resulted 
in the revival of their electoral fortunes. One feature which started emerging in this 
period was that a number of parties were gradually adopting Jharkhandi stances of 
supporting autonomy for the region.
Table 83: Performance of Jharkhandi Political Parties in Lok Sabha Elections 1989
Election Year
Average Votes 
Polled by All 
Jharkhandi Parties 
in Constituencies 
with Electoral 
Presence
Average Votes 
Polled by All 
Jharkhandi Parties 
in all Constituencies 
of Jharkhand
Average Percentage 
of Votes Polled in 
Seats Won by 
Jharkhandi Parties
Seats Won Out of 
Total Seats in 
Jharkhand
1989 31.9 18.2 48.73 3 out of 14
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After being unable to win any seats in the 1984 elections, the JMM won 
three of the fourteen Lok Sabha seats in the region (Table 82). In these seats, the 
JMM polled an average of 48.73 per cent of the votes. This represented an 
important turn around in its fortunes. However, the Jharkhandi parties still did not 
figure amongst the first five candidates in seven of the fourteen constituencies. 
However, in the other seven, they polled an average of 31.9 per cent of the votes 
(compared with 10.9 per cent in 1984). Overall, they polled 18.2 per cent in the 
Jharkhand region (Table 83).
Apart from bringing the Jharkhandi parties back into the electoral reckoning, 
this election represents an important landmark in the relationship of resource 
dependence. It was noticed that in the 1950s and 1960s, the failure of the JHP to 
secure a separate state had gradually led to a decline in its electoral fortunes to an 
extent that it disappeared from the political map. The electorate found the 
development issues more important than those of Jharkhandi identity and autonomy. 
Consequently, they tried to develop a meaningful relationship for exchange of 
resources with the State through the avenues offered by the various parties over the 
decades. However, on being met with failure, the electorate now feels that a faster 
and more efficient development initiative in the Jharkhand region is possible within 
an autonomous state.
The development profile in the decade 1981-91 did not improve. The 
demographic balance altered during this decade to make politics on tribal lines even 
more difficult since by 1991 only 27.66 per cent of the population of the Jharkhand 
region were of tribal origin. Very few development indicators are available for the 
year 1991. Literacy continued to represent the successful component of public 
policy in the region. By 1991, more than 33 per cent of the population of the region 
was literate. This growth in literacy was matched by a growth in further education 
as well (chapter V). The Jharkhand region continued to outperform Bihar as a whole 
as far as literacy was concerned.
278
There was a decline in employment in the Jharkhand region with just about 
32 per cent of the population being employed in 1991 (over 36 per cent in 1981). 
There was an increased percentage of population depending on agriculture and a 
decline in percentage of population employed in the non-agricultural sector (Chart 
4). Despite a rise in the number of persons employed in agricultural activities, there 
had been a decline in the irrigation potential of the Jharkhand region during the past 
decade. This decline can also be noticed in land irrigated by government canals 
(Chart 7). The overall development profile of the Jharkhand region had declined 
over the past two decades.
This falling development profile contributed another component to the 
dynamics of resource dependence in the Jharkhand region. The planners of 
development policy in the early 1950s had hoped that a vigorous development policy 
would weaken demands for autonomy on cultural lines. However, the poor 
implementation of the policy and the declining development profile had encouraged 
the electorate to demand an autonomous state precisely for the reason of a non- 
functional development policy under the present arrangements. Under these 
circumstances, the issues of Jharkhandi identity are raised to augment the political 
resources controlled by the electorate. The fortunes of the Jharkhandi groups who 
have stood for a separate state of Jharkhand reflect these dynamics.
The INC lost its legitimacy and the support which was generated by its pro­
poor rhetoric and some concrete efforts at improving development. The population 
and the electorate of Jharkhand were willing to once again experiment with the 
various political parties that were present in the region, including the Jharkhandi 
political groups. The success of BJP can also be explained partially by this analysis. 
The BJP exploited the slogan “^ r  ~^rt *nr, w t  «n>r”
[‘You (the electorate) have tried all parties time and again, try us once’] to appeal to 
the electorate of the region who had been let down by all political groups in the 
region as far as their developmental requirements were concerned. BJP also started 
speaking of its own concept of a Vananchal (Forest State) to appeal to a cross- 
section of the electorate in the region.
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The interplay between political dynamics and changing electoral support for 
the Jharkhandi political groups reflects the exasperation of the voters with the 
political choices available to them. It also partly explains the trajectory of decline 
and resurgence of the support for the national as well as Jharkhandi political groups 
over the past half-century.
V II
The failure of the political parties active in the Jharkhand region to offer 
avenues for the exchange of resources between the electorate and the State and the 
consequent decline in the development profile has also added another dimension to 
the relationship of dependence in region. In the nineties, the electorate is splitting 
the political resources which they control into three components. The 1991 and 1996 
elections have shown that the state level electoral support goes to the Janata Dal, 
which is in office at the state level18 and can influence public policy implementation. 
In the Lok Sabha elections, BJP finds political support as it is the only national party 
that has promised the creation of a state in Jharkhand. The third component of the 
strategic use of political resources by the public at large consists of avenues to force 
the two parties to remember their promises during the term of office. This is 
manifested in the support for the agitational politics of the JMM, the JCC and the 
AJSU consisting of economic blockades and general strikes. This kind of agitational 
politics forces the State to take cognisance of the Jharkhandi electorate, since these 
agitations often require violence by the State in order to keep the mineral lifeline of 
the country running. Such violence undermines the legitimacy of the State and the 
regime. Consequently, the regime in office is forced to take urgent policy measures 
to contain future strife.
18 The Janata Dal split after the charges of corruption were levelled against the Chief Minister, Laloo 
Prasad Yadav. Consequently, he formed a new party called the Rashtriya Janta Dal (RJD) that is 
currently in office in Bihar with Rabri Devi as the Chief Minister.
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This three-pronged approach in the late 1980s and the 1990s has yielded 
better profits for the people of the Jharkhand region than all others till now. This 
strategic use of political resources has led the State to engage in a more meaningful 
exchange of resources with the population of the Jharkhand region. As a result, a 
Committee on Jharkhand matters (COJM) was appointed and by 1995, Bihar Vidhan 
Sabha had legislated to create the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (JAAC). 
The splitting of political resources at the command of the electorate have thus forced 
the State to respond with better policy measures.
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Chart 1
Average Votes Foiled by Jharkhandi Firtics in the Constituencies 
of Jharkhand in Lok Sabha Elections 1952-89
■  Average Votes IV J  led by All Jharkhandi Parties in Constituencies where they had Electoral Presence
■  Average Votes tailed by All Jharkhandi Parties in all Constituencies of south Bihar 
□  Average tarcertage of Votes tailed in Seats Won by Jharkhand Parties
f t i L ■ I
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Hectkn Year
In the 1967 election, the JHP was a part of the INC. Hence, the performance of the Jharkhandi political formations in this election 
cannot be calculated.
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Chart 2
Growth in Total and Scheduled Tribes Population in Bihar and Jharkhand 1951-91
■  Bihar Total tabulation
■  Jharkhand Total Population
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□  Jharkhand ST tabulation
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Chart 3
Inf art Nfartaility and Death Rates in BOiar and Jharkhand 1950-75
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Chart 4
Occupational Pattern of Workers in Bihar and Jharkhand 1951-91
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Chart 5
Growth of Literacy in Bihar and Jharkhand 1951-91
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Chart 6
Total Agricultural Output of Principal Crops in Bihar and Jharkhand 1949-50 -1961-62
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Chart 7
Source of Irrigation In Bihar and Jharkhand 1961 -89
3500000
3000000
2500000
■  Bihar-Total Irrigated Area
■  B ihar-A rea Irrigated by G overnm ent C anals
□  Jharichand-Total A rea Irrigated
□  Jharkhand-A rea Irrigated by G overnm ent C anals
1000000
500000
1961-62 1973-74*
Year
Rounded up to the nearest thousand in the source. '  Area irrigated by means other than government canals is not available.
Chart 8
Land Improvement Loans Advanced in Bihar and Jharkhand 1950-51 to 1972-73
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Chart 9
Collection of Agricultural Income Tax in Bihar & Jharkhand 1950-51 to 1975-76
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Chart 10
Electricity Tax Collected in Bihar & Jharkhand 1990-51 to 1975-76
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Chapter VII
Demand for Autonomy in the Jharkhand Region
The issue of administrative autonomy for the region of Jharkhand can be 
traced back to the British period. There were submissions before the Simon 
Commission which had pleaded for the creation of a new province in the Jharkhand 
region. However, the Commission did not advocate this course of action. Hence, 
although the province of Orissa was created under the constitutional reforms of 
1935, the practice of exclusion of the region of Jharkhand from normal 
administration was continued. This was seen by the colonial administration as a 
paternalistic alternative to a separate province (see chapter III).
After independence, the issue of autonomy surfaced once again. Jaipal Singh 
and the JHP continued to try to persuade the various official forums of the need to 
create a state of Jharkhand premised on the tribal way of life and its separate 
heritage and culture. These efforts did not meet with any noticeable success till the 
1990s when the question of a separate administrative structure for the region was 
taken seriously and the JAAC was created.
The Premises and Construction of the Jharkhandi Identity
Until recently, the Jharkhandi identity was premised on the uniqueness and 
separateness of the tribal population of south Bihar. Writers on the subject went to 
great lengths to trace the origin of the separate political existence of the Jharkhand 
region. The leaders of the movement sought to invoke the past political entity (real 
or imagined) so as to forge a politically significant modern identity. They argued 
that the Jharkhand region, with its unique tribal heritage and culture, had been an 
autonomous political actor in the past and hence should be created an autonomous 
state under the present system. The Jharkhandi leaders isolated relevant historical 
incidents and symbols to forge and sustain an identity. It may be commented that 
this exercise (like all similar ventures) verged on the edge of creation and correction 
of history.
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A good example of this exercise can be seen in an article by a respected 
tribal figure, Bhagwat Murmu, who is a recipient of the Padma Shri award. In this 
article1 he attempts to delineate the reasons for the growth of the Jharkhand 
movement and explores possible solutions. To begin with he briefly points out that 
‘Jharkhand5 was an old term which was mentioned in the Ain-i-Akbari by Abul Fazl 
during the rule of the Mogul Emperor Akbar.2 He does not dwell on this point for 
long, but the effort at historical legitimisation of the movement and identity is clear. 
The underlying point of this exercise is to examine the possible existence of the 
political entity of Jharkhand in the region during the Mogul rule. Murmu goes on to 
emphasise that the tribes despite being under-developed, lead peaceable and simple 
lives and are self-sufficient in their tribal way of life. He interprets the tribal way of 
life in traditional as well as modern terms:
w  s r r i ^ r  w  srfic (sic)] H^rn^fr
i"4. i ^rajfLii^ sftvr
. . . wrfcrqt sttr
TO 3TT^|RcT % I MriV ^TFTrfW^T 0 <LJ-TOT,
UT®(T 3TR~ VTOT [RPT (sic)] fVTTOT %■ JTRr 
sffir ^  w ^rR rqt
cTtcr" % \ . w tR ttT  *i«CI
% i . . . r a r  ^ rm T f^ r  j|uicf-=t h^R i
to T^T^ riRcr %: cr*ir torto tot %: sfR: to  spfr f^r
^fr i3
[These aboriginal jatis4 differ on the lines of language and traditions 
and customs. Educationally and economically, with a few exceptions, 
they are largely, similar . . . These jatis are peace loving and depend 
primarily on agriculture for their living. They have deep respect for 
their social traditions, language and customs and are ready for the 
greatest sacrifices to protect them . . . These have never been 
aggressive jatis . . . their social organisation is based on purely
1 Bhagwat Murmu, a rF ^ r^ rr  — ’^ iot  R < m ' [Jharkhand Movement: Reasons
and Solutions] in Narayan, S., ed., Jharkhand Movement: Origin and Evolution, New Delhi, 1992, 
pp. 37-47.
2 ibid., p. 37.
3 ibid., p. 38.
4 Here the term jati has been used to mean tribes.
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republican system and has been extremely strong. It is still able to 
keep the entire society united.]
On the one hand, the social autonomy of the tribals and their respect for their 
traditions and customs are emphasised. On the other hand, their ‘modernity’ is 
exalted by dwelling on the ‘republican aspects’ of their social systems. The sub-text 
seems to be based on a dichotomy of ‘we’ versus ‘them’. The fact that Murmu 
thinks that the ancient social system of the tribal population of Bihar is inherently 
democratic points to the discourse that ‘we’ had developed a form of social 
organisation centuries before ‘them’. Hence it is imperative that ‘we’ must be given 
the right to rejuvenate it by means of administrative autonomy. He also seems to be 
implying that that the ‘tribal democratic life’ was borne out of an inherent 
democratic element in the social system (as opposed to political democracy) and 
hence was more stable.
The extract also dwells on the construction of an image of a typical tribe. It 
emphasises the point that tribal people are peaceM and simple and have few needs. 
Consequently, they were open to exploitation by the ‘others’. Besides, this image is 
construed by Murmu to justify the need of administrative autonomy. Such an image 
of an independent and exclusive tribal society was the basis of the Jharkhand 
movement for a long time.
Simultaneously however, since the movement requires the political support 
of the non-tribal populace, the existence of a long-standing social intercourse 
between the tribes and the ‘others’ is emphasised as well:
[^m r^r (sic)] 
wferqT F^?r w f t  r^crr to* %; . . .
H'bl-hV 'vjtTNh R d l^ t dl^TT T^TfcT % I5
[Since the ancient times the Santhal society has offered a place in 
their villages to the [non-tribal] functional/ occupational jatis . . .
5 ibid.
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these jatis have never been the ones to spend their lives in total 
isolation.]
To this end, Murmu partially contradicts the claim he had made earlier about 
the uniqueness of the tribal society when he emphasises the similarities between the 
tribal and other people:
^  [v ^ r (sic)] w rfcrqr %  ^ tpt
T^l i j i-hi
fWrqr ^ftt . . .
^rrn: cfr h m  afhr [v^r (sic)] it'qiwY ^r
•3^q- wfrnfT ctcq* %: i6
[The similarities between the culture and traditions of the tribal jatis 
with other jatis have not been encouraged but have either been 
ignored or brushed aside . . .  In fact, as far as this point of view is 
concerned, there are more elements of similarities between their 
customs and traditions and those of other jatis.]
Thus, a very curious mixture is created in which on the one hand, an effort 
is made to convince the people that the tribal population and their developmental 
needs must be recognised as different from the rest of the population. On the other 
hand, it is also stressed that the tribal population of the region has been engaged in 
social and economic intercourse with the rest of the population for centuries and 
consequently their customs and traditions are indistinguishable from the rest of the 
people. Jharkhand movement thus relies on multiple bases of political mobilisation 
which leads to ideological fluidity and opportunistic political stances of the 
leadership.
Murmu also criticises this opportunism of the leaders of the Jharkhand 
movement, their inability to put forward a creative agenda before the Jharkhandi 
population and the absence of any ideals or principles in the movement:
a n ^ f r^ r r  l ^ f t  ^rr nv: arrm ft^r
6 ibid., p. 39.
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-trCterr ^ r  dRrT m tf  iRKU k F'K rm  mRcr mtv: ^ i w  
jnf^r #r Tr^ fnr^ T % mmr?: mr^ r kv: t^ mrerFfr kt w
R m R 4ct *tr ? tk  i s t f k t f f t  %■ 's t^ r  ^ r  #  mrRrdT^ff 
d H im  %- d  I-hA T^fJ^RWT Md^d ^ T  Rid I,
r k  rndd* '^iddi m r [ ^ t  (sic)] safurdr mtv: u ^h ^F r
FTeRl %- d W  dcidl 3TR: K^ci I W “ . . .7
[Jharkhand movement has never been a movement based on any 
principle or ideal. None of its leaders have passed through the tests of 
stmggle and consequently, whenever a temptation of acquiring power 
and comfort arises, they have easily deviated from their goals. This 
movement has never put forward a constructive programme in a 
concrete form before the Adivasi society, this movement has been 
rising and falling on the waves of momentary excitement and 
temptation of the public . . .]
He goes further and attacks the perceptual shallowness and divisiveness in 
the movement. However, he does try to relate the unrest in the region to its 
developmental problems. Murmu points out:
d m  IdR dcr % fm
anFN r d  j-r^m<Rt 3tF: crdT mRrsrr ft m Rpr
mRm ttp^ t mtcff %; i 3ttr: dddH id l d m  cFfr
*rt f^rr mp? crtt m^r mmr w  t f t r t  ^hh<iC 1
RrRTT dTK cfr d d d ld F r  dT ^RT cT^T #T [^ r  (sic)] dRcff 
dRT: R i d ^  WR?Tr 1 (sic)] d-dcll U^ RcM
%  ^RT IK  *ff dmf R R ^di w  K f¥ T R  %c i . .  .Film qRdH l 
%, w r  dimcl %, ^iR>d K i Rtftctt mtT i mrmnfr 45 
dKH -mm - W ^ t  d H H  d  ddd I m tf  Ijf" dR : Rfr
m r f t m  ^ T # r  dTd~ % cid -ij d  d l d t  *tT Mi di '  I8
[It is certain that the Jharkhand movement finds its strength from the 
economic problems of the Adivasi society and their backwardness and 
illiteracy. If a fraction of these problems is solved or even an honest 
effort is made to solve these problems, then the very ground under 
the feet of the movement will slip away on its own. Despite the 
abundance of the minerals, poverty reigns . . . People are hard 
working, they want work but it is not available to them. Even after
7 ibid., pp. 40-1.
3 ibid., p. 41.
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45 years of independence their problems of land have not been solved 
and irrigation facilities have not reached the land that is held by 
them.]
The foregoing analysis of the movement by a respected Jharkhandi figure all 
but sums up the premises of the movement. Almost all the published works have 
expressed similar points of view. The various writers, many of whom are also 
important political figures, emphasise the tribal basis of the movement in terms of 
the culture and heritage of the region. In this aspect of their argument, they attempt 
to historically legitimise the movement by drawing upon the agrarian revolts of the 
nineteenth century to emphasise a tradition of protest against exploitation. Although 
not many actual parallels can be drawn between the tribal revolts of the colonial 
period and the present day movement, the political and intellectual figures active in 
the movement have been trying to create and sustain a politically significant ethnic 
identity with the help of such historical legitimisation. However, they realise that the 
basis of the movement cannot be merely harking back to a bygone era of tribal 
abundance. Consequently, they are all quick to point to the development aspects and 
invariably end up by pointing to the region’s poor development profile to add to the 
legitimacy of the movement. Moreover, they realise that the movement is likely to 
find more support if it can be related to the contemporary problems faced by the 
general population of the region instead of depending on tribal uniqueness only.
This approach of relating recent disturbances and demand-making by the 
politically active groups in Jharkhand to the poor development profile had a two-fold 
effect. It provided an opportunity to the government to officially translate the ethnic 
character of the movement into one premised on ‘ development-deficits ’ in the 
region. Such a formulation about the character of the movement by the government 
that the Jharkhand movement is essentially a protest against poor implementation of 
development policy in the region gave the leaders an avenue by which to legitimise 
their demands. This in turn was taken up by the government to minimise the 
implications of the demand for administrative and political autonomy.
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Consideration of the Demands for Autonomy
As has been noted the demand for the creation of a separate state of 
Jharkhand predates independence (chapter III). After independence, a sizeable 
amount of political energy was invested in demanding the creation of separate states 
all over India. Although some amount of deliberation had gone into the principles 
and practices behind the organisation of the states in 1948 when the integration of 
the numerous princely states was being considered, the first large-scale review was 
undertaken in the years 1953-55. The States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) 
dealt with the issue comprehensively and reported against the creation of a state in 
the Jharkhand region. It had recommended creation of new states on lingual lines 
only, rather than on principles such as tribal cultural identities.9 On the lingual 
criterion the Jharkhand region had not qualified for a new state.10
The SRC acknowledged the good performance of the Jharkhand Party in the 
1952 elections but noted that it had not secured an absolute majority in the region. It 
also pointed out that with the exception of the Jharkhand Party, no other political 
party in the region was in favour of the creation of a Jharkhand state.11 The 
Commission also took note of the fact that the tribal population in the region was 
only a third of the total population and was divided into several linguistic groups. 
Therefore, it opined that “even if it is assumed that Adivasis are solidly in favour of 
the formation of a Jharkhand State, a major issue of this kind cannot, in our 
opinion, be decided on the basis of the views of the minority. There seems to be no 
warrant, however, for the assumption that even Adivasi opinion can be considered 
to be unanimous on this point”.12 Furthermore, the SRC pointed out that the creation
9 Although there has never been a revision of the criteria for the creation of a state, instances do exist 
where states have been created on the basis of regional and cultural identities such as Nagaland in 
1963 and Mizoram in 1986.
10 This was so because of the multiplicity of languages spoken in tribal south Bihar. Moreover, these 
languages have only now begun to acquire some written form. Consequently, some people do not 
consider them languages but dialects.
11 Report o f the States Reorganisation Commission, New Delhi, 1955, n. d., para 617-8.
12 ibid., para 618.
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of state of Jharkhand would affect the “entire economy of the existing state.” It 
noted that “the plains are predominantly agricultural and Chota Nagpur plateau 
provides an industrial balance . . . The residual area can hardly afford to lose the 
benefits derived from this situation . . . [it] will upset the balance between 
agriculture and industry in the residual State which will be a poorer area with fewer 
opportunity and resources for development . . .”13 The Commission found no 
deficiency in the development profile of the Jharkhand region and saw south Bihar 
as an industrial complement to the agricultural north Bihar.
The goal of this Commission was to recommend the reorganisation of states 
with a view that regional aspirations were satisfied but at the same time 
administrative convenience was retained. It did not see any grounds for a separate 
administrative set up for the tribal population in south Bihar, as they were a 
numerical minority in the region. Besides, it also pointed out that the goal of 
administration and development programme was economic and political 
advancement of the whole population and therefore, was generally satisfied with the 
existing administrative arrangements in the region.
Clearly, as far as the SRC was concerned, there was no drawback in the 
development profile of the region. As has emerged in chapter IV, the relative 
development profile of the Jharkhand region was better than that of Bihar as a whole 
in the 1950s. It was only from 1960s (despite the progress of the Five-Year Plans) 
that the relative development profile of the region deteriorated or did not advance at 
the same rate as Bihar as a whole.
The linking of the demand for a separate state of Jharkhand to the 
developmental issues had however, started. The SRC observed that it had been 
“suggested that Chota Nagpur is bound to benefit from the separation, because it has 
been neglected so far by the Bihar Government [but] . . . there is little evidence, on 
the whole, of lop-sided economic development . . . ”14
13 ibid., para 619-20.
14 ibid., para 621.
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This view of the SRC indicates that the Government had started interpreting 
the problems thrown up by the articulation of identities in terms of developmental 
imbalances. This seems to be true of most such movements in India where the 
governmental response has been to pump in more developmental funds instead of 
trying to deal with the socio-political roots of the problems. Besides, it was the 
Jharkhandi leaders such as Jaipal Singh who had first started to emphasise the 
developmental problems of the region (real or perceived), as seen in the 
Constitutional Assembly debates (see chapter III). In the political climate of the 
1950s, with high expectations from the independent Indian state and nationalistic 
euphoria running high, the Jharkhandi leaders used the argument of poor 
developmental avenues in the Jharkhand region and exploitation by Bihar as a means 
of legitimising their demand for a separate state. The demographic heterogeneity 
and absence of lingual contiguity in the region rendered the arguments used by 
Andhrites, Kannadas, Oriyas and others useless in the region. Therefore, the 
development argument would have been seen as secular and functional enough to be 
put forward as the basis of a new state. Thus, the issue of development became 
inextricably linked to the Jharkhandi identity.
The analysis in the previous chapters has shown that around the year 1951, 
the development profile of the region of Jharkhand was better than Bihar as a whole 
but gradually deteriorated over the years. It soon reached a point when the growth 
of development opportunities in the region became stagnant at best and negative at 
worst. Therefore, with the passing years, the issue of poor performance of the 
public policy delivery mechanism further entrenched the links between the issue of a 
separate state, the Jharkhandi identity and the developmental issues.
Apart from the States Reorganisation Commission, the Commission on 
Centre-State Relations chaired by Justice R. S. Sarkaria carried out the only other 
large-scale official review into the issue of state autonomy and other related issues 
and reported in 1987. Although the terms of reference of the Commission did not 
include the prospect of creation of new states, the report of this Commission is 
valuable in terms of what the respondents to its questionnaire had to say about the 
equilibrium between the states and the centre and their perception about the linkages 
between the issue of state autonomy and developmental issues.
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The Jharkhand Mukti Morcha was the only registered party in south Bihar 
region at the time when the Commission was eliciting the views of the major 
regional political actors. While responding to the questionnaire, the JMM continued 
the discourse of linking regional imbalances created by development initiatives to 
the demands for administrative autonomy. Addressing the question whether JMM 
was in favour of greater decentralisation of powers, it responded that it was in 
favour of such an action “but the decentralisation should not itself be between centre 
and state, but also between district and districts considering the heterogeneity [,] un­
even development and multicultural character of the state itself with specific mention 
of the hilly and tribal areas of Bihar now existing [as] a[n] internal colony of both 
the State and Centre”.15 The practice of emphasising developmental imbalances as a 
basis for the demand of autonomy which had been quite important since 
independence, had now become predominant.
The questionnaire also asked whether the respondents knew of any actual 
existence of a federation where national and regional governments were co-ordinate 
and absolutely independent within their respective constitutional jurisdictions? In 
response to this question, the JMM responded that they believed that such a set up 
existed in the USSR.16 They seemed to be pointing to the nationality based political 
set-up in the erstwhile USSR. From this it may be deduced that the JMM was not 
ready to give up the cultural and tribal identity based articulation of the Jharkhandi 
identity. The general tone of its response to the Sarkaria Commission questionnaire 
shows that the JMM saw the issue of administrative autonomy for Jharkhand as akin 
to the nationality question in the erstwhile USSR. Thus, the effort at combining the 
cultural and developmental reasons for the demand of a separate state of Jharkhand 
had come full circle. The JMM was by now able to combine both issues in its 
discourse. It hoped that such a practice would fulfil its purpose of generating 
political support in both the tribal and the non-tribal sections of the population of the
15 Response of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha to the Questionnaire of the Commission on Centre-State 
Relations in Report o f the Commission on Centre- State Relations, Part II, New Delhi, 1987, para 
1.3.
16 ibid., para 1.4.
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region. At the same time, it was assumed that the underpinning of the demand for 
political autonomy with cultural aspects would also give the movement a sense of 
identity which would not only differentiate it from other demands for administrative 
decentralisation but also create a relatively more potent political force.
Another response by the JMM to the Sarkaria Commission questionnaire 
indicates their approach to the correlation between underdevelopment and demands 
for administrative autonomy. They were critical of the development model followed 
by the Indian state and commented that " . . .  major difficulties would not be 
removed . . .  as they are ingrained in this post colonial social structure and its ill 
advised capitalist mode of development vitiating the very motivation of the society, 
with suspicion and acquisitiveness”.17
The JMM further amplified this point with the comment that although the 
independence and unity of the country has paramount importance, “ . . . [the] 
constitution has failed in the purpose as all the provisions of the directive principle 
of the States [Directive Principles of State Policy (sic)] have been violated or 
rendered dead letter”.18 This statement is valuable since it was the JMM’s response 
to the question whether the unity and independence of India was of paramount 
importance. Clearly, the JMM saw the implementation of development aspirations 
as enshrined in the Directive Principles of State Policy (Articles 36-51 of the 
constitution), the best possible avenue of maintaining the independence and unity of 
India. The JMM appears to imply that these provisions of the constitution had been 
violated or rendered useless and therefore, there was a case for a redefinition of the 
structures of the state and the creation of the state of Jharkhand. Thus, the JMM 
leadership advocated a reorganisation of the administrative structures in India based 
on the development aspiration enshrined in the section on DPSP. Furthermore, in 
response to the question whether it supported the power of the Parliament to alter 
the states in any respect it deemed fit (Article 3), the JMM replied:
17 ibid., para 1.5.
18 ibid., para 1.6.
297
We support the power under Article 3 but . . . this has not been 
properly utilised for political consideration of the dominating section 
to ensure development of culture, language, identity of the oppressed 
nationalities as that residing in the area called Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, 
Uttarakhand and others in the country creating tensions between 
nationalities. A provision should be made in Article 3 to review with 
statutory commissions . . .  to form any more states in the country, to 
ensure proper development . . .”19
This is another good example of the balance which Jharkhandi leaders have 
been able to create between their demand for autonomy based on the ‘nationalistic’ 
aspirations of the people of the Jharkhand region and their need for development, 
despite the fact that they have also criticised the model of development and poor 
implementation of that model. It seems that the JMM leadership has been arguing 
that the State’s model of development had failed owing to its inability to respond to 
the needs of a Jharkhandi society that is a politically self conscious identity. 
Therefore, according to the JMM leadership, there is an urgent need to grant 
autonomy to the Jharkhand region. Such an act will not only bring about faster 
development (since the development initiative will then be based on a model that is 
suitable to the socio-economic peculiarities of the region) but will also help in 
realising the legitimate political aspirations of the region. This will in turn, ensure a 
stronger commitment to the unity and independence of the country.
This model of development that the JMM seems to be proposing is based on 
an increasing degree of decentralisation of power. It is noteworthy that the JMM 
wanted the power of the union government to be restricted to defence, 
communications, currency, foreign affairs, inter-state relations and creation of new 
states. They also did not deem it fit for the Parliament to have any power to legislate 
in the national interest on subjects on the State List.20 However, despite criticism 
that the All-India Services undermined the autonomy of the states, the JMM was in 
favour of creation of more All-India Services with the proviso that all such officers
19 ibid., para 1.8.
20 ibid., para 2.2 & 2.3.
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must be posted outside their native states.21 Interestingly, they had nothing to say 
about the undermining of the states’ autonomy by the central technical agencies 
which it has been alleged, had become a parallel government in some states. This 
indicates that the JMM sought autonomy from the Bihar government and not the 
central government.
Further, the JMM’s responses to the Financial Arrangements section of the 
Sarkaria Commission questionnaire were rather shallow and often incompatible with 
each other. Most of their responses in this section were general in nature. According 
to them “mismanagement, corruption, lack of planning and political will of the 
states run by political party which is also running the centre” were the prime cause 
of growing indebtedness of the states.22
The JMM sought to reduce the role of the central government in the 
development administration in the states and demanded a total separation between 
the fiscal arrangements of the states and the centre. Besides, they were of the 
considered view that the regional imbalances born out of public policy 
implementation could be ameliorated only by “clear cut division of resources of the 
States enforced by the centre for its different regions with particular instances to the 
backward regions” .23 It wanted the centre and the Planning Commission to suggest 
to the state ways and means of developing their resources despite an earlier 
expressed wish that the states must be left alone to chalk out their own plans and 
implement them. On the other questions, the JMM suggested further consideration 
by a parliamentary committee or pointed to the need to strengthen certain sections of 
the administration. Overall, except for the first few questions, the responses of the 
JMM to the questionnaire indicate a state of confusion and lack of comprehensive 
understanding of the issues involved. They were quite clear and eloquent when 
answering questions about the relationship between identity, development and the
21 ibid., para 4.8.
22 ibid., 5.17.
23 ibid., para 5.3.
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Directive Principles of State Policy but as far as the details of administration was 
concerned, they lacked coherent and original alternatives.
The Jharkhandi demand for autonomy has also been considered in some 
other forums since independence. This process of deliberations provided an 
opportunity for mutual sharing of resources between the State and the Jharkhandi 
political groups. An important document in this process of sharing of an information 
resource24 by both the State and the Jharkhandi political groups is the Report of the 
Committee on Jharkhand Matters 1990 (COJM). This Committee was constituted by 
the union ministry of Home Affairs in an attempt to find a solution to the issue. It 
comprised all the major political figures of the Jharkhand movement irrespective of 
their official party affiliation.25 The joint secretaries to the ministries of Rural 
Development, Tribal Development and Home Affairs represented the central 
government while the government of Bihar was represented by the secretaries in the 
ministries of Home Affairs and Tribal Welfare and the Regional Development 
Commissioner of the Jharkhand region. There were many other experts ranging 
from anthropologists to social activists who served on the COJM.
This report defined the Jharkhand movement in terms of developmental 
problems. It noted that:
apart from its other dimensions, basically, it is a socio-economic 
problem and that it has arisen as a response to the exploitation o f the 
indigenous people inhabiting the Jharkhand region. Specifically, for 
the scheduled tribes people, measures have been undertaken by the 
Government of Bihar and the Central Government to effect 
improvement in their socio-economic conditions and to combat 
exploitation . . . Notwithstanding these and various other steps taken, 
it would appear that the discontent o f the people o f the region has not 
only continued to simmer, but has also shown a tendency to rise. The
24 In this case the definition of the nature and character of the movement.
25 The important political figures of the Jharkhand movement who were members of the COJM were 
Dr. R. D. Munda, Dr. A. K. Singh, N. E. Horo, Shibu Soren, B. B. Mahto, B. P. Kesri, S. S. 
Besra, Prabhakar Tirkey, Santosh Rana, Suraj Mandal, Shailendra Mahato and Prof. Stephen 
Marandi.
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demand for a separate state of Jharkhand falls into that pattern26 
(emphasis added).
The Report also examined the process of conversion of the Jharkhand 
movement premised on ethnic factors into one that is primarily premised on the 
relative underdevelopment of the region. It regarded the movement as originating 
from the tribal ethnic characteristics but gradually losing its tribal heritage character 
to become merely an avenue for political action to demand better public policy 
delivery in the region. It pointed out that
. . . even though when Jharkhand movement as an ethnic movement 
has not been able to recapture its peak of electoral performance 
reached in the 1950s, the issues articulated by it centering on regional 
autonomy as a remedy against underdevelopment and inequality have 
been largely accepted by almost all parties and political forces in the 
region . . . MLAs and MPs . . . have repeatedly emphasised the need 
for autonomy and development. Wherever the Committee went, the 
Congressmen equally complained of neglect and underdevelopment of 
the region, even though they did not support separation. The 
Bharatiya Janata Party has supported the formation of Vananchal [the 
BJP’s version of a Jharkhand state27] comprising of 12 districts of 
Santhal Pargana and Chotanagpur. The CPI has favoured the 
formation of a separate state out of the Scheduled Areas of 
Chotanagpur and Santhal Pargana. The Lok Dal has supported the 
idea of carving out smaller states. A poll recently taken . . . has 
suggested the presence of sizeable support for autonomy amongst 
many sections of the population. We believe the reasons for this 
support arises from a widespread feeling of alienation among a large 
section of people of Chotanagpur, both tribal and non-tribal from the 
rest of Bihar . . .28
The Committee thus felt that there was a political consensus about regional 
autonomy in the region due to widespread neglect of the region by development 
initiatives. It did not however, recognise the significant ethnic tribal components in 
the movement. It felt that the ethnic component was at its height in the 1950s and
26 Report o f the Committee on Jharkhand Matters, May 1990, New Delhi, n. d., chapter I, para 2.
27 The original demand of a Jharkhand consisted of the 25 districts from tribal regions of four states -  
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal and Orissa. However, the BJP has proposed that a state 
called Vananchal be created comprising of the tribal districts of south Bihar only.
28 Report of the Committee on Jharkhand Matters, op. cit., chapter III, para 19.
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had since run out of steam. Thus, there appears to be a political consensus that the 
movement was a product of inefficiencies in the public policy delivery mechanism 
and the consequent underdevelopment and that the issue of an ethnic identity was 
not of primary importance.
The gradual decline of the ethnic component of the movement is further 
emphasised by the COJM by stressing its regional aspect in the observation that
in the early phases of the autonomy movement in Chotanagpur, the 
lead was given by the tribal people. They were also good reasons for 
it. They were more literate and articulate. They were also more 
conscious. They had primarily led uprising and movements in 19th 
century. Agrarian laws were enacted to confer special benefits on 
them. In the early years of the Adivasi Mahasabha and Jharkhand 
movement, in spite of the fact that some non-tribals joined them, the 
non-tribals as a whole kept out of such movements. The reason for 
this lies in the colonial policy of separatism. The missionaries and the 
colonial officers treated the tribes and non-tribes as two separate 
categories. The hang-over of this policy persisted even after 
Independence for many years, even though the operation of market 
forces and of economy in general and the surfacing of underlying 
cultural processes tended to mitigate such dichotomous perceptions . .
. the distinction between the two categories became blurred and their 
perceptions of regional problems converged as both became victims 
of progress. A sense of neglect gripped them. Therefore, from the 
beginning of 1960s, the tribes and non-tribes started interacting more 
closely within the framework of the movements for autonomy and 
separation. In the process, they invoked cultural symbols and created 
myths and legends to provide cultural underlining of political 
movement . . . The movement is still dominated by major tribal 
groups . . . but others have also joined hands.29
Such underplaying of the tribal heritage aspects of the movement and 
highlighting of the regional aspect has become the predominant character of the 
movement. The points of view expressed by the Report can be taken as the 
articulation of the Jharkhandi groups as well since all major political and social 
organisations of the region were represented on the COJM. These Jharkhandi 
leaders did not contest any major point of the Report with the exception of the
29 ibid., para 21, 24.
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proposals for the new administrative arrangements and hence, this definition of the 
nature and character of the movement has become the dominant point of view across 
the political spectrum.
The cultural traits of the movement were further undermined when COJM 
expressed its view that over “the last forty years there has crystallized the concept 
of Jharkhand region . . . with a distinct identity, language, form, cultural traits, 
elements of material culture and historical development”30 and recommended the 
creation of a cultural development authority for the overall cultural development of 
the region with possible autonomous powers and the introduction of tribal languages 
in the syllabi in schools and the development of a composite culture. This cultural 
development authority suggested by the COJM, if operationalised, would probably 
mean an institution akin to the existing national cultural academies. Thus, while the 
COJM found it salient to preserve and promote the cultural uniqueness of the 
region, it did not consider this uniqueness to be a pertinent premise for the creation 
of an autonomous state in the Jharkhand region.
Hence, against the views of the Jharkhandi representation in the Committee, 
the report did not recommend the creation of a separate state in the Jharkhand 
region. Consequently, in a Supplementary Note31 most of the major leaders of the 
region emphasised the need to create such a unit. Their major point of difference 
with the report of the COJM was the nature of the proposed administrative 
arrangements. After a brief paragraph on the cultural uniqueness of the region, this 
note of dissent swiftly went on to differ from the COJM on the ground that the 
experience of the past four decades had proved that adequate development of 
Jharkhand region was not possible within Bihar. Hence, a clear relationship 
emerged between the failure of policy delivery mechanism and the articulation of a 
politically pertinent ethnic identity in the Jharkhand region.
30 ibid., para 30.
31 Supplementary Note to COJM, op. cit.
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All the major political interests therefore, agreed that the reason behind the 
demand for a separate state in the Jharkhand region was the poor developmental 
profile of the region. This is also a good example of the exchange of information 
resources between the societal political actors and the State which went on to alter 
the self-perception of the Jharkhandi identity. From a cultural identity, it evolved 
into one that has the poor developmental profile as the primary basis of its 
articulation and relegated the cultural aspects to the background. The State and the 
Jharkhandi political opinion have thus, gradually created an articulation of the ethnic 
identity that is acceptable to both of them. The report of the COJM thus amplified 
the clear correlation which was seen between the demand for the creation of a 
separate state in the Jharkhand region and the poor performance of public policy 
since independence.
Issue of Autonomy in Parliamentary Forums:
The growing developmental imbalance in the Jharkhand region led to some 
important developments in the agenda of Indian politics. The first consequence was 
that the Indian State’s ability to resolve political conflict without resort to violence 
declined further. The ultra-leftist alignment of some Jharkhandi leaders in the 1960s 
and 1970s (see chapter II) provided the perfect excuse for the State to crack down 
on the Jharkhand Alliance. At the same time, popular support for the Jharkhandi 
groups was declining which was expressed in the loss of electoral support for them. 
Consequently, the ability of the movement to launch popular agitation for securing 
its demands was diminished. In sum, from being the foremost political force in the 
Jharkhand region, the Jharkhandi groups became increasingly marginalised. Hence, 
the Jharkhandi leaders sought to involve themselves in parliamentary politics in 
order to make their point heard. The parliamentary approach involved asking a 
series of questions in the Lok Sabha which kept the issue on the national agenda.
The opinions expressed in the parliamentary debates are of salience. They 
not only provide us with a rare coherent articulation of the Jharkhandi points of 
view but also indicate the response to it across the political spectrum. The issue of 
creation of the state of Jharkhand was raised in the Parliament a number of times 
without much consequence. For instance, Mukul Wasnik, Simon Marandi and Bir
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Singh Mahto tabled an unstarred question on July 9 199232 inquiring into the status 
of representation awaiting the demand for the creation of Jharkhand state. M. M. 
Jacob, the then Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs, replied that a 
number of meetings had been held but “the Government of Bihar were requested to 
offer their comments on the recommendations of the Committee on Jharkhand 
Matters. Their comments are still awaited”. No substantial discussion took place on 
the issue. In the classic manoeuvre of parliamentary nicety, the persons who had 
asked the questions had something to tell their constituents about their efforts while 
the Government of India transferred the blame onto the Bihar government. In effect, 
the issue was put on the back burner for the time being.
Another such example was a question in the Rajya Sabha on 30 November 
1992 which sought to find out whether the government was considering the 
appointment of another states reorganisation commission to examine the numerous 
demands for creation of separate states. The debate which followed indicates that 
there was a divide between the desirability of small states or large states. On the one 
hand, Ram Lala Rahi, the then Deputy Minister of Home Affairs surmised that large 
states were more self-sufficient due to their variety of produce whereas on other 
hand, other members pointed out the advantages of smaller states in terms of their 
better manageability. The BJP MP, Sushma Swaraj, raised a pertinent point:
v a i  i TpsRTcrnruff -Hi-nr fT w  w r
“csTiA «=tTl■ Iji h m  R -J  fT  leiR cfi
I :  i . . . 
y*u<yR-tv tt^ t ^trdt % i33
[ . . .  the demand for Uttaranchal, Vananchal, or Vidarbh cannot be 
placed in the category of the demand for a separate Kashmir or 
Khalistan. Separatist demands change the map of the world whereas 
if the demands for smaller states are acceded to, only the internal
32 Question Number 304, Lok Sabha Debates, 9 July 1992, New Delhi, 1992.
33 Question Number 87, Rajya Sabha Debates, 30 November 1992, New Delhi, 1992,
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map of India will change . . .  In some states this demand is emerging 
only due to their administrative (mis) management.]
The view expressed by the BJP MP is significant since die BJP has been able 
to generate substantial following in the Jharkhand region, both amongst tribal as 
well as non-tribal sections of the population. This statement is in consonance with 
the dominant viewpoint and traces the roots of such demands to administrative 
mismanagement but significantly, it also seeks to categorise and differentiate 
between the demands for an independent sovereign state (such as Khalistan) and that 
for a separate state within the Indian Union.
This differentiation is significant when viewed in light of resistance to the 
creation of new states on grounds of national unity and integrity. It seems to be an 
obsession with the INC that no further states should be created in order to protect 
the unity and integrity of the country. The Deputy Minister’s reply expresses this 
point of view:
t e r  vvcr %: , vt^ tT ^ r  t e r  % t e ;  q r  f q f te r
''sfi Piq oy ^ t e r  , <5-1
crmv ^  -kh « tft i ^ r
^ t e r  t e  ^ r  ^ te f r
te r ro r  q t e r  w  w r  t e ’ . . , 34
[. . . the Government’s point of view has always been broad, in 
national interest, in states’ benefit and in the benefit of those who live 
in the various regions of the states, its attention have always been 
towards their problems. From this point of view, we wish to 
strengthen national unity and work towards their development. . .]
Apart from the misplaced emphasis on the unity of the country, the view of 
the government also carries the undertone of ‘we know what is best for all of you’. 
Further, it does not recognise the difference between separatist movements which 
may require a repressive response from the State and movements for autonomy such
34 ibid.
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as the demand for the state of Jharkhand within the Indian Union that require 
political and public policy- based solutions.
Nevertheless, the government underlined the construction of the demand for 
autonomy as being dependent on the level of development. S. B. Chavan, the then 
Home Minister, intervening in the same debate, said “if there is an economic 
blockade, it becomes my responsibility to call them and request them to call it off 
because it would harm the entire country. I do not agree that there has been a proper 
development of the Jharkhand area. In fact, the entire demand has arisen because of 
the fact that it was a totally neglected area in spite of the fact that resources are very 
rich in the area . . .  the kind of development which should have been there is not 
there” .35
As is evident in the above extract, the government continues to see a direct 
correlation between the demands for a separate Jharkhand state and the level of 
development in the region. This viewpoint has become so dominant by now that the 
rest of the discussion on the creation of a state in Jharkhand focuses on whether 
small or large states are better to foster speedy development. There is very little 
reference to the cultural aspects of the Jharkhand movement. It is noteworthy that 
MPs who had almost no relationship with the Jharkhand movement conducted the 
entire discussion. The leaders from Jharkhand did not intervene at any point to 
emphasise that their movement was a cultural one as well. This by default indicates 
that the Jharkhandi leaders were not unhappy with the ‘development deficit5 
definition of the movement.
This direct correlation between autonomy and development was further 
emphasised in the Resolution Regarding Creation of New states o f Uttaranchal and 
Vananchal tabled by Jagat Vir Singh Drona 011 5 March 1993 in the Lok Sabha. The 
resolution sought to recommend to the government that the two states (Uttranchal 
and Vananchal) be created. In the opening statement itself, Jagat Vir Singh Drona 
drew a direct relationship between the two issues and observed that
35 ibid.
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even after these 45 years of independence, there has been very little 
or negligible development in the hill areas of Uttar Pradesh and in the 
16 districts under Chota Nagpur and Santhal Pargana area of Bihar.
The people of the area have been expressing their resentment on the 
issue from time to time . . . Since the independence no educational 
and medical facilities have been provided to the residents of these 
areas . . .  It becomes the duty of the Central government to do so . .
. Jharkhand Mahaparishad proposal was mooted to the effect that 
efforts were being made to form a Jharkhand state . . . wherever 
various State Governments participate in such areas . . .  the situation 
becomes complicated . . .  So, the proposal for formation of 
Jharkhand state [by] carving out some district from four States is not 
practicable nor it is in the interests of the country and the people of 
the area because difference of opinion will crop up from time to time 
which will stall the development schemes. In this connection, it is the 
well-considered opinion of my party [the BJP] that all the 16 districts 
in Chotanagpur and Santhal Pargana areas have their won [own (sic)] 
culture, their own thinking and their own language and a state by the 
name of Vananchal may be formed comprising of these 16 districts.36
The above extract reflects two important points which explain the recent 
improvement in political support for the BJP in the Jharkhand region. Firstly, the 
BJP was the first national party that offered a practical alternative to the demand for 
a Jharkhand state. It pointed out that the political possibility of carving out a new 
state comprising 25 districts spread over 4 states verges on improbability owing to 
the differences of opinion amongst the four states concerned. Consequently, the 
likelihood of creation of such a state was remote. It argued that in such a scenario of 
continuing disagreement, development work in the region would suffer. Thus, it 
raised a bogey of even worse development policy effort if the demand for a separate 
state was continued in the present form. At the same time, the BJP was also able to 
alter the way in which the demand for a Jharkhand state had been articulated since 
independence by postulating that the region of Santhal Pargana and Chota Nagpur 
was in some way, the ‘real Jharkhand’ by dwelling upon the separateness and 
uniqueness of the region. The electorate, faced with the already poor development 
performance of the public machinery, was quick to understand this message. In a 
surprisingly short time, all the major political opinions had accepted this approach.
36 Debate on the Resolution Regarding Creation of New States of Uttaranchal and Vananchal, Lok 
Sabha Debates, 5 March 1993, New Delhi, 1993, col. 418-427.
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Today even the most conservative of Jharkhandi groups have, unofficially, watered 
down their demand to the districts of south Bihar only.
Jagat Vir Singh Drona continued his rather lengthy speech and emphasised 
that south Bihar region was contributing disproportionately to the economy of Bihar 
and India and was getting very few returns. He painted a dismal picture of the 
region in terms of absence of educational and medical facilities and employment 
opportunities and added that “it is obvious that unless a separate state is formed, the 
people there, will not have political approach . . . They will not be able to think 
seriously over the problems of their area personally in [a] practical way . . .”37 
Clearly, a direct link was constructed between the creation of a Jharkhand state and 
improvement of the development profile of the region.
Cutting across the political spectrum, various members expressed similar 
views. They differed marginally in their views but there was a common thread in 
their speeches. All the speakers concurred on the view that the demand for 
autonomy was due to imbalances in the development of the region. All of them 
quoted cultural factors such as language and cultural uniqueness but soon went on to 
emphasise that south Bihar was rich in mineral and forest resources and that the 
speed of development in the region was not in consonance with its contribution to 
the economy of Bihar and India.
Suraj Mandal, one of the JMM MPs, intervened in the debate and read out a 
catalogue of ills that have plagued the region. However, he did not point out any 
cultural factor as the basis of the JMM’s demand for a separate state. He 
emphasised the mineral wealth of the region but also brought up a new issue which 
had not been underlined till then. He asked for sharing of power with the people of 
the Jharkhand region: “ . . . no development of the area was done. The people were 
not allowed sharing of power. Rather colonialism was no [on (sic)] the rise after 
exploiting of its mineral resources and establishing factories . . . ”38
37 ibid.
38 ibid., col. 437-443.
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No other political group had brought up this issue of sharing of power with 
the populace of the Jharkhand region. The general trajectory of the debate on the 
Jharkhand issue until then had been on the course of action that was best for speedy 
development of the people of the Jharkhand region. It essentially involved a greater 
sharing of developmental resources. However, this intervention by Suraj Mandal 
points to the fact that the Jharkhandi groups were no longer happy to share 
economic resources only, they wanted to share power as well. This is another good 
example of the operation of the Modified Resource Dependence Model. The 
Jharkhandi leaders, after failing to force the State to share its largesse of policy 
recourses and after losing political patronage of the electorate, were now demanding 
a slice of power. Since this political group had failed to bargain effectively for other 
kinds of resource sharing, it was now seeking a new kind of resource sharing in 
order to achieve some degree of control over other kinds of resource. It can be 
argued that this new element in the discourse of political autonomy reflects 
desperation on the part of the Jharkhandi leaders in the face of a shrinking support 
base. However, in some ways this new demand speaks of an increasing maturity and 
confidence of the Jharkhandi groups. Over the years they have come to realise that 
any meaningful exchange of resources between the Jharkhandi electorate and the 
State could occur only if the resources controlled by the electorate (apart from mere 
political patronage) becomes crucial to the Indian State (which controls vast amount 
of political, economic and information resources). This exercise of demanding a 
share of governmental power by decentralisation of the administrative apparatus of 
the State is an effort to improve the resource-base of the electorate. A greater local 
control over the economic and information resources by the populace of Jharkhand 
would also augment their political influence. This would in turn, secure a better 
policy response from the State due to the region’s mineral deposits.
The protracted debate on the Resolution led to a consensual view about the 
nature and character of the Jharkhand movement. The remarks of Chitta Basu on 19 
March 1993 seem to summarise mainstream opinion:
. . . there is no basic question of ethnicity, language or culture for the 
demand of creation of Jharkhand State. The basic issue or the basic 
emotion or the basic sensitivity for the demand of creation of
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Jharkhand state is a regional disparity of development . . . and 
because of regional disparity in development, the question of having a 
separate state has arisen and not on the basis of language, not on the 
basis of culture and not on the basis of ethnicity because even if 
Jharkhand State is created, it will be a multi-lingual State . . ., it will 
be a multi-ethnic State; . . .  it will be a multi-cultural State . . . [The 
problem exists because] there has been exploitation, that there has 
been a backwardness; and that backwardness has been a planned 
backwardness . . . The grievance is even if some resource is 
transferred to the State by the centre, the appropriate proportion does 
not go [to] the Jharkhand area and therefore, there should be an 
autonomous council which should be guaranteed with wide powers of 
administration and legislative business and also guaranteed with 
statutory financial resources both from the centre and State. This can 
be reasonable, rational and satisfactory solution to the Jharkhand 
problem . . .39
Such an emphasis on the developmental problems in the region by both the 
Jharkhandi groups as well as the government altered the character of the demand for 
autonomy itself. Increasingly, there emerged a consensus in favour of decentralised 
developmental machinery in the region but not a separate state. This occurred 
despite there being a largely consensual view that small states were better for the 
developmental effort as well as for efficient administration of the area concerned. 
There were some members who voiced their concerns about the state of exploitation 
in the Jharkhand region continuing, even becoming worse or new forms of 
exploitation emerging in a new Jharkhand state. Hence, the government did not see 
it prudent to create smaller states as solutions to the bottlenecks in poor 
implementation of public policy. Here, it is pertinent to speculate that if so much 
emphasis had not been laid on the developmental problems in the Jharkhand region, 
the issue of a separate state might not have been overtaken by an autonomous 
council although perhaps, it would not have enjoyed cross-party support in any other 
form.
It is noteworthy that these debates in the Lok Sabha have been used by the 
JMM in a way that is rather unknown in the political life of India. The JMM has
39 Continuation of debate on the Resolution regarding Creation of New States of Uttranchal and 
Vananchal, Lok Sabha Debates, 19 March 1993, New Delhi, 1993, col. 380-6.
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published extracts from the debates in the form of little booklets which are 
distributed to the general population in the Jharkhand region. These booklets contain 
the interventions by Suraj Mandal and Shibu Soren in the Lok Sabha. By way of 
these booklets the JMM is making an effort to point out to the local populace that 
despite being a small parliamentary group, the JMM is trying its best to put forward 
the points of view of the Jharkhandi people in the highest forums of power. This 
action is in consonance with the earlier point made by Suraj Mandal that the 
Jharkhandi population now wants a sharing of power. The availability of 
parliamentary debates to the common man performs this exact function of giving the 
impression that their access to power has improved through their JMM 
representatives.
It must also be noted that the parliamentary debates as well as the debates in 
the Constituent Assembly (see chapter III) seem to indicate that the government 
believes that it is possible to evolve an objective set of criteria for the creation of a 
new state within the Indian Union. While some movements such as the Jharkhand 
movement seek a separate state to secure political recognition of their tribal/ cultural 
identity, the national mainstream opinion seems to be searching for a set of non- 
ascriptive criteria to create such states. The issue of poor rate of development in a 
region within an existing state seems to have been accepted as this objective 
criterion. Political parties across the political spectrum, including the JMM and 
other Jharkhandi political groups, seem to have come to accept that a faster pace of 
development (however defined) is desirable. They also seem to believe that 
administrative reorganisation of states (or creation of new states) must be made in a 
way that secures a faster and more efficient public policy implementation. It follows 
from this that the only objective (and politically acceptable) ground for the creation 
of a new state in the Jharkhand region is the fact that within the existing 
arrangements, the development profile of Jharkhand has declined over the last 50 
years. Therefore, some degree of autonomy for the region is essential if speedy 
development is to be fostered.
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Political Parties’ Approach to Autonomy of the Jharkhand Region:
The demand for an autonomous state in the Jharkhand region is a complex 
political process in which the political parties are key players in the exchange of 
resources between the State and the electorate. The political parties active in the 
region influence the demand for autonomy by not only shaping the opinions of the 
general population of the Jharkhand region but also by playing a significant role in 
articulating these opinions. The manifestos published by various parties for the 
elections are important in this respect. These manifestos are also important because 
the political parties attempt to seek political patronage from the region based on the 
promises in them. In this sense, they form an important linkage in the resource 
dependence relationship between the electorate and political parties (and through 
them, the State).
The election manifestos of the JMM are the only set of manifestos of a 
regional political party which has been analysed below. The others are all published 
by national parties. The are a number of reasons for this. The first reason is 
availability of manifestos. The manifestos of older Jharkhandi political parties (such 
as the JHP, the CSPJ, the PSHJ and such like) which had a brief, sometimes 
meteoric existence on the political horizons of Jharkhand between 1950 and the 
1980s are not available. Most of these parties no longer exist. This makes it 
extremely difficult to decipher their political viewpoint vis-a-vis the demand of a 
Jharkhand state.
Besides, the creation of a separate state in the Jharkhand region falls within 
the domain of the Union Parliament. Consequently, the opinions expressed in the 
political manifestos of national parties are relevant. Only a national political party 
that is able to secure a sufficient majority in the Parliament can ensure that a bill for 
the creation of the state of Jharkhand is passed. The analysis of the manifestos of 
national parties is also significant on account of the fact that the national parties also 
compete for popular support regionally. An analysis of these manifestos will 
indicate how the political parties have been treating the issue of a new Jharkhand 
state when going to the electorate for election to the Lok Sabha.
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An analysis of the manifestos of the CPM is also pertinent because of its 
electoral presence and influence in the region as well as due to the fact that they 
represent a significant viewpoint. CPM may not have any reasonable chance of 
forming the central government but its opinions are politically relevant. Its 
manifestos not only reflect the analyses and opinions of a section of liberal-Left 
intelligentsia of India but are also important in a scenario when the CPM is a part of 
a coalition government at the centre (as was the case in the Eleventh Lok Sabha 
during 1996-97).
The older political manifestos of most political parties are not very 
enlightening about the Jharkhand issue. Moreover, it is only after the early 1980s 
that the Jharkhand movement became politically volatile in terms of economic 
blockades. When the JCC, the JMM and the AJSU were successful in holding up 
transportation of minerals from the region, national attention was forced on to the 
problems of the Jharkhand region. Therefore, the 1980s are probably most 
significant for the movement in terms of the definition of its character and demands,
(a) Jharkhand Mukti Morcha:
There have been a number of political parties in the Jharkhand region which 
have attempted to align themselves with the demand of a separate state in the hope 
of greater political and electoral legitimacy. However, in the continuous process of 
political realignments in the region, many of them have vanished from the active 
political scene. As has been outlined in chapter II, constant splits and mergers have 
left the JMM as the only politically active Jharkhandi party in south Bihar.
It has been seen in the preceding pages that the Jharkhandi political groups 
played a marginal role in the creation of the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council 
(JAAC). For instance, in the parliamentary debates, the JMM MPs did not play a 
central role in the debate on the resolution regarding ‘Creation of New States of 
Uttaranchal and Vananchal \  In fact, the resolution was not even tabled by a JMM 
MP. Another good example of this marginal role is the fact that the JMM’s 
contribution to COJM was restricted to a note of dissent in the report against the 
creation of an autonomous council. It was unable to influence the COJM in any 
major way. However, this fact did not preclude their attempt to claim benefit for it
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in their manifesto40 for the 1995 Vidhan Sabha elections. This starts with the slogan 
Rhui %: ^frsr srt -^rSr ^ ’4I [We have obtained the
Council by force, now we will obtain the state with the help of votes].
The JMM manifesto clearly claimed credit for the creation of the JAAC:
•HUR RpCKT SR>bR =HR^U£
^ftfcpfr, 3fR: qRid.^1 ui ^rr ^ r ^ r r  ^xicH %:
^TRDT (1) ‘^ T^TRfr - q f tW  ^ T  q ^ R i 3TR: ^ R r j  RRVfCT 
3 fR  trtrhT W  3 rf^ m R  ^r€r R r^ r -sfR; (2 ) ‘w ^ rr^ T  u R q <  ’
7T5FT V t ^ K l  I42
[Jharkhand Mukti Morcha considers the ‘Autonomous Council’ as its 
achievement and criticises the anti-Jharkhand policies, programmes 
and view-points of the Janata Dal govermnent of Bihar due to which 
(1) ‘Autonomous Council’ was not given adequate and necessary 
financial and administrative powers and (2) undue delays were made 
in the formation of the ‘Autonomous Council’.]
This document is also interesting and important in the light of the Modified
Resource Dependence Model. The Manifesto goes on to say:
'^R 'yu^- ^ g (w  Tfr^r s r w  w tr^ tj^ ~  v t ^ t  # r  R t t  - ^ r f e r  
^R"^u^- [^t] ^r^crr w r  ^ r r t -  ^cfr %: W  ^ tc re  'sreHr
3tR: 3-Tl^^M 4^ iR<yu^
HI'-Mcll fH^n %: l43
[Jharkhand Mukti Morcha congratulates the population of Jharkhand 
which has been engaged in the struggle for the Jharkhand state. Its 
continuous efforts and struggle has been recognised in the form of 
‘Jharkhand Autonomous Council’]
40 Election manifestos for elections other than the Vidhan Sabha elections of 1995 and the Lok Sabha 
election of 1996 are not available even at the Central Office of the JMM.
41 Manifesto o f the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha for the Bihar Vidhan Sabha Election 1995, Ranchi, 
1995, p. 1.
42 ibid.
43 ibid.
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This statement in the JMM manifesto demonstrates the fact that the 
movement depended on the State’s recognition for the legitimisation of their 
demand. The resource dependence of the movement (governmental recognition of 
the demand) on the State is clear. In tacit terms, this action on the part of the 
government also amplifies the fact that the developmental profile of the Jharkhand 
region had left much to be desired. The JAAC was seen as a body which would 
promote speedy and efficient implementation of the developmental programmes with 
the help of local resources and manpower. This is a clear recognition of the fact that 
till date the performance of the developmental machinery in the region had been far 
from efficient. The creation of the JAAC bestowed the long elusive legitimacy on 
the movement. In the past all the considerations of the demand had seen no case for 
the creation of any new representative developmental body in the Jharkhand region.
The JMM’s point of view carries the undertone that the JMM sees itself as 
the vanguard of the Jharkhandi interests in the region. In some ways, this is correct. 
There is now no major politically active party in the region which clearly aligns 
itself with the creation of the state of Jharkhand from parts of the 4 states, as the 
JMM does:
^ru<siu£ ■gf^ rcr g W r ^ * 1 1  fT w ^rr^fr ’
qfr mi'j'M q?r mpc w  w m  g n i  A- i ^ h k i  ^i Rih
afrf^ MTT, tt^ t # r
g g w  r %: i %  f^rq;
y R tq ^ t i i  w  w g g t  ^cft %: i44
[Jharkhand Mukti Morcha has always considered the ‘Jharkhand 
Autonomous Council’ as a stepping stone on the road to the 
Jharkliand state. Our ultimate goal is the ‘Jharkhand state’ comprising 
the Jharkhandi landmasses in Orissa, Bengal, Bihar and Madhya 
Pradesh. JMM pledges its commitment to continue the struggle for 
the state.]
It is noteworthy that the issue of tribal identity did not appear in the 
manifesto of the JMM in 1995. Perhaps, the necessity to increase the political base
44 ibid.
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forced the JMM to include all the people living in the geographical region in its 
appeal:
^ f r f w ;  T f r f ^ c r  w  ^ j t  % : f ^ r c t  w  % ^ r
%■ l^ 'y  i-il, wr^T, -ii'^i«n-il, -nfenI'ifr,
^ i m iR^Tl -stR t R s r w f ^ r r  3a iT 'T r  'tRio-i i t f t t  % t
mR: ^ tr ■qyx mv^r %■ f^ rr  gTRr -hHV
W r ^ :  %  i45
[Jharkhand Mukti Morcha is an organisation of all groups, classes, 
exploited, tortured humanity of this region and it has been considered 
as their own political organisation by the labourers, farmers, 
students, youth, women, intellecmals, merchants and sportsmen of 
this region and Jharkliand Mukti Morcha is committed to fulfilling 
this responsibility.]
It sought to highlight the developmental problems of the region rather than 
underlining its tribal character:
wrRVsrn "^ g l w  TfH t h m c Ti %; R r mR:
s f R :  T R i w f ^ R T  R g j  * f l R < r i ,  s f R :  ^ h f e r c r
s u ix tv yu d ] ^ f m r  g f w  m R :  Iw r t  ^ tR t  w
3 t t  vsfr w  I m ^ i ^ t h d i  a f R :
■^qpg^rr ^m i^t # t R t^t 3tRptfT %: i46
[Jharkliand Mukti Morcha believes that without adequate financial 
and administrative powers it will not be possible to ameliorate the 
centuries of exploitation and marginalisation of the Jharkhandi 
population. These powers are essential to accelerate development to a 
rate which is required to convert this backward region into an 
equitable and prosperous state.]
Thus, the whole question of the autonomy of the Jharkhand region came to 
acquire more geographical, regional and development-related overtones. The issue 
of the tribal identity of the region was lost in emphasis on the developmental
45 ibid.
46 ibid.
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problems, both by the governmental agencies as well as the political groups of the 
region.
However, in the best tradition of the ideological fluidity of the Jharkhandi 
movement, by the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, the issue of the unique cultural identity 
was back in the JMM manifesto. The motto of the 1996 election manifesto was:
h i
sr^Ffr ^rrqr, q tq^nt, sH'k ^ us" arq^rr q^rnt i47
[Our land, our policy, our identity, our culture.
Our language, our traditions; let’s make our Jharkhand happy and
prosperous.]
The inability of the JMM to increase its electoral support, as well as its 
inability to secure any substantial progress from the Bihar government on the JAAC, 
had a lot to do with this reorientation. The Bihar Vidhan Sabha had passed the Act 
constituting the JAAC in 1994 but the necessary financial resources and 
administrative powers had still not been transferred to the JAAC. In fact, the Act 
itself was notified only in March 1995. Consequently, once again, the JMM tried to 
resurrect the cultural aspects of the Jharkhandi identity in order to mobilise political 
support. This was done to persuade the Bihar government to convert the JAAC into 
an effective developmental body with an overall control of developmental activities 
in the region based at Ranchi and not Patna.
This manifesto invoked a mixture of emphases on the historical tradition and 
culture of the Jharkhand region and developmental issues. The manifesto began with 
the familiar emphasis on the historical construction of the Jharkhandi identity. 
However, the emphasis on the developmental factors as well as efforts to reassure 
the non-tribal population of the region remained of prime importance. It correlated 
the need for development to this historical construction and reassured the non-tribal 
populace in the following mamier:
47 Manifesto of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha for the Lok Sabha Election 1996, Ranchi, 1996, p. 1.
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^ f r w  tiR^r %  R n r ^ m hruii %
R r TRmdtRr^r ^ R d -^ u i, m-kuuR^v ^ r w ,  R r T F t ^ W  
3tr~ w r  f ^ w  41 Id 3f id^-r^dT  4 r a r^ r^ r
R ^ R c t  t  I . . . ^ n fr vrm 4  ^  f4=r w ^ sr o s - g i w
Tpfr^r %  -^nfr ^ i t  %■ h ijiRRI m w  3rr«4n5r %;,
'cid% ^ m 4 w  tpr t  ^rr4t % i ^t r w  ^ R r r  r W t strR^u^
%■ “rmRRT 4 r ^ 4 > ‘ tm r  ^+>r  ^r 4~
t ^ r  ^  i4S
[Jharkhand Mukti Morcha is of the firm belief that for freedom from 
exploitation, political viewpoint, administrative arrangements, 
financial arrangements, and policies for all-round development must 
be framed according to the needs of Jharkhand . . . Everyone is 
aware of the fact that Jharkliand Mukti Morcha is the strong voice of 
the citizens of Jharkliand from all classes and their best friend in their 
struggle. Jharkhand Mukti Morcha is resolved to join the citizens in 
their battle cry for struggle oil all issues.]
Further on, the manifesto listed a long charter of promises without many 
specifics. It promised to start agitation on a number of issues without any concrete 
goals or programmes. The only specific matter mentioned was that they would 
‘struggle’ for the transfer of adequate administrative and financial powers to the 
JAAC.
Thus, the leaders of the JMM have been eager to keep all the elements of the 
Jharkhandi movement as part of their political manifesto. On the one hand, they 
have been invoking the historical tradition of the region which was essentially tribal 
but on the other hand, they were equally keen to garner support from all sections of 
the Jharkhandi society. Simultaneously, the JMM was not willing to give up the 
development-based demand, since the poor development profile of the region had 
succeeded in securing governmental (the State’s) recognition to their demands in the 
form of at least the legislative creation of the JAAC. However, the JMM has also 
been keen to point out that their acceptance of the JAAC has been a tactical 
withdrawal only. As the Central Committee Member of the JMM, Shailendra 
Bhattacharya, pointed out time and again in the interviews with him in January and
48 ibid., pp. 4-5.
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May 1996, they wish to use the JAAC as an example to prove that the Jharkhandi 
leaders were capable of administering their own affairs. As explained by him, once 
the JMM and other Jharkhandi leaders have shown their mettle in administration 
they would seek the creation of a state. This point of view was also reflected in the 
JMM manifesto for the 1996 Lok Sabha election.
Thus, the overall articulation of Jharkhandi identity as reflected in its poll 
promises was a mixture of a number of issues in which the developmental angle was 
always predominant. The identity of a Jharkhandi was hence, made up of a mixture 
of a number of unspecified themes such as culture, heritage and tradition. 
Nonetheless, the JMM did succeed in creating a politically significant identity, even 
if only for the purpose of securing a better share of developmental funds.
(b) Bharatiya Janata Party:
The BJP is comparatively a new entrant to the electoral scene of the 
Jharkhand region. However, it has been able to secure considerable popular support 
in the region as in other parts of India. In fact, the BJP has proposed some fresh 
alternatives to the demand for the creation of a new state of Jharkhand which is 
finding increasing political support in the Jharkhand region.
The BJP portrays itself as a political party seeking to ensure equity, progress 
and social justice. Its manifesto for the Lok Sabha elections of 1989 began with the 
following words:
■h  I'tcfl'H i Li tA l . . . sfR T  tri-H  iL*i'+>
^rrq~ arFcrf^r w  % i
JlCHV cRTT OT'ffid %: I49
[Bharatiya Janata Party . . . supports law and order, social justice and 
internal and external security. It is devoted to the uplift of poor and 
downtrodden.]
49 Manifesto o f the Bharatiya Janata Party for Lok Sabha Election 1989, New Delhi, n. d. p. 5.
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However, such cliches are nothing new in Indian politics and none of the 
mainstream political parties offer anything different. All of them promise to improve 
the lot of the poor, backward classes and the downtrodden.
As far as the question of autonomy is concerned, the 1989 BJP manifesto 
does not provide us with any insight. It may be significant that it isolated cases such 
as those of the north-east, Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab and made some limited 
promises for these regions. There is almost no mention of the issue of the Jharkhand 
region or the question of its autonomy. However, the Jharkhandi-minded supporters 
of the BJP in south Bihar may have taken heart from what the manifesto had to say 
in the brief section entitled ‘Sy c t^i qur fqqVq l^qjRui ’’[Decentralisation of Power]:
v h c ii -crr^r 'LHi’Hcfi crqT "w u iu h
^*TP3fr qR qRRdl 3tR:
#  r a R G m c i  %■ H p fr q r ? :  R t c r T
W  "3% xo^qr sr^nqr i r w i c  qjqT ^ r: Rt4r~ r ^ t t  
-q% - I50
[Bharatiya Janata Party will confer constitutional status on the 
panchayats and other local self-government institutions and make 
them a partner in the sharing of resources in a well-determined 
manner so that they are not at the mercy of state or central 
governments.]
This promise in the manifesto may have been used by the local BJP activists 
to argue that if a BJP government took office, it would favourably consider the 
demand for the Jharkhand state. As emerged in the interview with the BJP MP from 
Ranchi, this promise was interpreted as the willingness of a future BJP government 
to create the state of Jharkhand. About the tribal population in India, the manifesto 
said that schemes would be framed so that the tribal people could be saved from 
exploitation, alienation of land and indebtedness. Additionally, it also promised to 
amend the forest produce laws so as to enable a better realisation of forest rights of 
the tribals. It also promised a sub-plan to ensure the economic development of the
50 ibid., p . 15.
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tribal people.51 These are a few of the many similar general promises made in the 
manifesto. As far as autonomy for the region of Jharkliand was concerned, there 
were no concrete promises. In fact, the above proposals are in line with the general 
policy of the Indian State since independence.
Subsequently however, the BJP election manifesto for the mid-term Lok 
Sabha polls in 1991 stated a clear policy towards the region of Jharkhand as a part 
of its policy of smaller states:
The BJP recognises that regional imbalances have developed in some 
states because of their size. The party would appoint a commission to 
report on formation of smaller states which are economically and 
democratically viable. Initially, BJP will have Uttaranchal, Vananchal 
and Union Territory of Delhi as three new states of the Indian 
Union; . . ,52
It is significant that the thrust of this observation/ promise in the BJP 
manifesto was on the regional imbalances borne out of the large sizes of the existing 
states. It made no mention of the identity aspect of the Jharkhandi region and sought 
to emphasise the developmental-deficit line of argument. It is also noteworthy that 
the BJP has practically hijacked the issue of a Jharkhand state with its Vananchal 
proposals. The JMM’s and other Jharkhandi parties’ leaders have a vision of a 
Jharkliand comprised of 25 districts from four states. The BJP on the other hand, 
has proposed the creation of a state called Vananchal from the 16 (now 18 due to 
internal reorganisation) districts of south Bihar only. The new proposals of the BJP 
offered an alternative that was simpler to implement since it is administratively and 
politically easier to divide a state into two than to carve out portions of four states to 
create a new state. The political mileage which the BJP drew from this proposal in 
the region of south Bihar was of such significance that by now, except for a few 
hard-liners, most mainstream JMM leaders have accepted the fact that any hope of
51 ibid., pp 29-31.
52 Manifesto o f the Bharatiya Janata Party for Lok Sabha Election 199i ,  New Delhi, n. d. p. 3.
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seeing a separate Jharkhand state will materialise only if they restrict their demand 
to the districts of south Bihar only.53
The fact that this alternative offered by the BJP was premised wholly on the 
‘poor developmental profile’ argument does not bother anyone in the region because 
they have been using the same argument since independence and by now, one 
suspects all the Jharkhandi leaders also believe it. Moreover, emphasis on the tribal 
identity is likely to displease the sizeable non-tribal element in the region. Hence, 
even JMM uses the terms like culture and heritage in a general way so as to also 
appeal to about three-quarters of the population of the region which is of non-tribal 
origins.
Returning to the 1991 manifesto, it is noteworthy that as far as the BJP was 
concerned, the whole issue of a separate state for the Jharkhand region was part of 
its favoured design of smaller, more manageable states. As one BJP MP argued, the 
whole issue of creating the state of Jharkhand is contingent on the fact that the large 
size of the state of Bihar has led to imbalances in development. Creating smaller and 
more efficiently manageable states will ensure that local needs would be handled in 
a more efficient maimer.54 Consequently, as far as the BJP was concerned, it may be 
safely deduced that the Jharkliand issue was a development issue and not that of an 
identity demanding political recognition. This fact is also reflected in the fact that its 
1991 manifesto referred to unrest in the north-east, Punjab, Ladakh, and even 
Telangana under separate sections but the issue of the Jharkhand region found 
mention only as a part of its policy of smaller and more manageable states.
The 1996 manifesto of the BJP went one step further again and promised to 
“carve out Uttaranchal, Vananchal, Vidarbh and Chattisgarh and give them full 
statehood. We will further consider setting up a Commission to examine the 
formation of smaller states.55 By this time the BJP had established its views about
53 The JMM manifesto still lays claim to a ‘Greater Jharkliand’ as their final goal. However, their 
leaders doubt the political practicability of such a proposal.
54 Interview with R. T. Singh, the BJP MP for Ranchi, in May 1996,
55 Manifesto o f the Bharatiya Janata Party for Lok Sabha Election 1996, New Delhi, 1996. p. 10.
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the Jharkliand region in the national political life. The BJP had regarded the issue of 
Jharkhand as emanating from the poor performance of the policy delivery 
mechanism in large, poorly managed states. The fact that there had emerged almost 
a consensus in the parliamentary debates that the poor development profile of the 
region demanded the creation of a state, added to the validity of its views on the 
issue. Besides, any political opposition to the BJP’s proposal of creation of a state of 
Vananchal from the districts of south Bihar was blunted by it by also promising a 
creation of a state of Chattisgarh from the tribal regions of Madhya Pradesh. That 
left only a few districts of Orissa and West Bengal from the original demand of the 
Jharkhandi groups which would not attain some form of autonomy under the 
proposals of the BJP. Any opposition from the tribal elements in the Jharkhand 
region had been taken care of by constant promises of “social equality for all 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes through political and economic 
empowerment” ,56
The fact that the BJP had been consistently clubbing SC and ST together 
since their first manifesto indicates that they did not see any question of a tribal 
identity existing in the region of south Bihar or elsewhere. Their base line seems to 
be that all social and political unrest was rooted in poorly managed and inefficient 
implementation of public policy in large, unmanageable states. They do recognise 
vanvasis as a societal group but the undertone of this recognition is reminiscent of 
the viewpoints of one strand of the colonial discourse and the early social reformers 
of the 19th century which saw tribes at a lower level of evolution waiting to be 
absorbed into the larger Hindu fold (see chapter III).
Nonetheless, the BJP’s version of the issue of Jharkhand did catch the 
popular imagination. During the field study in January and May 1996, it was 
noticed that the BJP has sizeable following in the Jharkliand region. Also significant 
is the fact that, unofficially, JMM has gradually scaled down its stance of not 
settling for anything less than a state carved out of the four states concerned and 
accepted the JAAC with its jurisdiction over the districts of south Bihar only.
56 ibid., p. 60.
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Following the same political logic, the geographical jurisdiction of the JAAC would 
become that of a future state of Jharkhand.
(C) Indian National Congress:
The INC manifesto for the Lok Sabha elections 1984 talked more of its 
achievements during the 1980-84 term of office than what it had to offer in the next 
five years. The general tone of the manifesto was that the INC government had done 
a splendid job in the past five years and would review its policies in order to find 
ways to improve them. Consequently, it had nothing to say about the Jharkhand 
movement. About the scheduled tribes in the country, the INC manifesto for 1984 
elections promised to:
-  Implement effectively the strategy of the tribal sub-plan with stress 
on human resource development with particular reference to women, 
beneficiary-oriented schemes, drinking water supply, health services, 
general and technical education and technological improvement of 
agriculture, animal husbandry fisheries, village and cottage industries 
and forestry.
-  Protect the distinctive culture and way of life of tribal communities.
-  Protect the rights of tribal communities to forest produce.57
As is clear from the above extract, the INC decided to continue its emphasis 
on the developmental problems faced by the tribal population as the mainstay of 
their policies towards the Scheduled Tribes. The now well-known and modestly 
successful tribal sub-plan continued to be their central plank. However, the INC was 
perhaps, the only mainstream national political party which took some note of the 
tribal and cultural components of the movement. It sought to protect the ‘distinctive 
culture and way of life of the tribal community’, but this effort was in consonance 
with the general policy towards the tribes since independence. It did not make any 
concessions to the effect that a tribal identity might also seek political autonomy. 
Since independence, the general approach of the INC had been based on the 
developmental model adopted by the Indian state. The INC sought to minimise the
57 Indian National Congress (I) Election Manifesto 1984, New Delhi, n. d., p. 18.
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effect of political demand-making by the Jharkhand movement through a more 
intensive developmental effort.
There were very few differences between the 1984 and 1989 manifestos of 
the INC as far as policies towards the Jharkhand region were concerned. The INC 
government was re-elected to office in 1984 and consequently, there was a need for 
them to defend their policies during the 1984-89 period. The whole issue of an 
autonomous administrative arrangement in the region was conspicuous by its 
absence. A greater amount of financial investment in public policy initiative towards 
the tribal population was again promised. It drew attention to the fact that “a 
National Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Finance and Development 
Corporation, with an authorised capital of Rs. 75 crores [Rs. 750 Million] has been 
established to develop and assist schemes of employment generation for SC/ST 
communities . . .  a Tribal Co-operative Marketing Development Federation 
[TRIFED] has been set-up as a multi-state co-operative society to provide 
remunerative prices to the tribals for minor forest produce . . .”58 For the future 
years, the INC promised that “future programmes for Harijan and Adivasi welfare 
will consolidate the large number of initiatives already taken. In addition, 
programmes will be designed for specific occupation groups. Schemes under 
agriculture and irrigation will be given priority . . . ”59
Thus, as far as the INC was concerned, it continued to believe that political 
problems like the demand for separate state or autonomy can and must be dealt with 
greater financial outlay and more intensive policy efforts. Ironically, the INC 
leaders, despite a long experience in governance, were not alive to the fact that 
although it may be possible to contain the sharpening of political identities, to a 
certain degree by intensive and efficient policy initiatives, efforts to satisfy the 
political demands of already articulated identities by similar action are unlikely to 
yield significant results. The existing channels of exchange of resources between the
58 Election Manifesto o f the Indian National Congress (I): General Election 1989 New Delhi, n. d.,
p. 26.
59 ibid., pp. 26-7.
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State and the societal and political groups in the Jharkhand region had not worked in 
the last half-century. The INC seemed to be conveniently unconcerned about the 
overall declining development profile of the Jharkhand region which was a result of 
this skewed exchange of resources and instead sought to concentrate its policy 
efforts at the ST population only. It carried on with its emphasis on a more intensive 
rationalist and bureaucratic policy implementation with the target group approach to 
deal with political problems.
The INC manifestos with their over-emphasis on tribal development, did not 
consider the fact that the Jharkhand region as a whole (which included more non- 
tribal than tribal persons) might require some solution. This was in a situation where 
the JMM was straining to assure the Jharkhandi electorate that the Jharkhand 
movement represented all sections of the Jharkhandi society and the BJP was 
reinforcing this picture by promising a state on regional/ geographical basis. The 
INC on the other hand, showed a remarkable lack of ability to respond to new 
reality with new policy mechanisms. It went on flogging the older policies of direct 
support to the ST population in the region, even though the ST and non-ST 
populations were equal victims of developmental imbalances. This fact must be 
interpreted in light of the fact that ST population was actually a minority in the 
region of Jharkhand (even if all the ST persons are seen as a monolithic political 
bloc which they are not). Besides, political action by the JMM and the AJSU in the 
last few years had secured support from almost all sections of the Jharkhandi 
population. All this makes the INC’s policy out of touch with reality.
The INC manifesto of 1991 has only one major difference from that of 1989. 
It had a substantial section which underlined the follies, according to the INC, 
committed by the National Front governments of V. P. Singh and Chandrashekhar. 
This section was followed by a list of achievements of the INC in its last term in 
office. As far as the future was concerned, in its characteristic way the INC 
promised to review and strengthen the programmes that it had already started before 
1989. About the ST population, it promised to extend and strengthen the various 
ongoing programmes.
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The 1991 manifesto of the INC also promised to invest the SC/ST 
Commission with statutory powers of enforcement. Additionally, it promised to set 
up special courts “in adequate numbers in all tribal areas of the country to protect 
tribal interests, including protection against arbitrary acquisition by forest officials, 
ensure the handing over of forest lands to genuine tribal owners, and safeguard 
customary tribal laws and practices”.60
The INC continued to show its sensitivity to the existence of some 
uniqueness of culture and practices in the tribal regions of the country but failed to 
come up with any new solutions to the movements that were sprouting in almost 
every tribal area in India. It did not succeed in devising any practical political 
solution to political demands in the Jharkhand region.
The INC manifesto for 1996 elections once again, listed a catalogue of 
achievements in the past five years and promised stability. However, as the results 
of the elections of 1996 showed, stability and status quo were not good enough for 
most of the electorate of India and they wanted change, while all that the INC 
promised was more investment in the ongoing programmes. As far as tribal 
development was concerned, the INC pointed to the ten-fold increase in the turnover 
of TRIFED established in 1987. However, faced with persistent demands from most 
tribal areas in the country, the INC made a small concession by promising that 
“Tribal Commission under Article 339(1) of the Constitution will be constituted 
soon to report on the administration of Scheduled Areas and welfare of Scheduled 
Tribes in States”.61
Despite considerable unrest with regard to the question of autonomy in the 
Jharkhand region and serious disturbances in the transportation of minerals from the 
region due to the economic blockades, the INC did not think it important to 
reconsider its approach towards the region. The debates in Parliament over the
60 Election Manifesto of the Indian National Congress (I); General Election 1991, New Delhi, n. d., 
p. 27-8.
61 Election Manifesto o f the Indian National Congress (I): General Election 1996, New Delhi, n. d.,
p. 18.
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resolution tabled by the BJP, the creation of the JAAC, the furores over the non­
notification of the JAAC Bill and other similar events did not lead it to re-examine 
its approach. It continued its approach of pumping in an ever-increasing amount of 
developmental funds in the region, although this made almost no difference to the 
region’s development profile. Policies intended to target the tribal population for 
development initiatives were not able to fulfil their intended purpose. It seems that 
the INC also failed to realise that the Jharkhand issue was no longer an issue of 
tribal identity but had emerged as a regionalist aspiration of the entire Jharkhandi 
population.
(d) Communist Party of India (Marxist):
The political value of the CPM manifestos lies in the fact that Leftist political 
parties/ groups had a considerable degree of influence on the political life of south 
Bihar in the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, most of the present leaders of the JMM have 
flirted with Leftist ideology at one point of time or another (see chapter II). 
Moreover, the CPM and some ultra-Leftist political groups still command some 
political support in the region of Jharkhand. Often, the support for these parties does 
not fully express itself in the electoral results but the vigorous efforts by leftist 
activists to educate the populace were noticed in the field study. The vaguely 
Marxist rhetoric of the Jharkhandi political groups also makes the view of the CPM 
relevant. Moreover, as was the case with the government during the term of the 
Eleventh Lok Sabha (1996-97), the CPM may exercise some degree of influence 
over the policy formulation by being a part of a coalition government.
The CPM is one of the few political parties in India which regularly 
publishes an analysis of the political situation in India. In 1981, their analysis of the 
problems in tribal areas was as below:
. . . [reservations] have proved farcical and the Scheduled Tribes 
have been less successful than Harijans in reaping minimum benefits 
from reservations . . . the process of expropriation from land has 
gone apace, notwithstanding pious legislations preventing transfer of 
land to non-adivasi . . .  in the adivasi areas, endowed with mineral 
reserves, the Adivasis get the lowest paid jobs . . .  in the interior 
also, the slogan of separate state - Jharkhand, etc. - are being raised 
for a long time. But the Congress (I) government would not think of
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an autonomous district or region . . . ‘Drive out non-Adivasi from 
the Adivasi areas’ is also the slogan in Bihar tribal areas . . ,62
Clearly, the CPM saw a close relationship between the poor development
profile and the demand for autonomy in the Jharkhand region. The election
manifesto of the CPM for the 1991 Lok Sabha elections continues with this analysis:
The tribal areas in the country are in turmoil. Centuries of oppression 
have been heightened by the rapacious loot of contractors and traders.
Their lands are snatched away, their traditional rights in the forests 
blocked; their women folk sold into prostitution and the men forced 
to work in slave conditions. Their struggle to assert their tribal 
identity, linguistic-cultural distinctiveness meets with cruel 
repression.63
Despite the fact that it is slightly strongly worded and tries to imply that
there has consistently been a negative growth in the development profile of the
region over the past half-century, the manifesto is the only one that does not pull its 
punches. The CPM has been able to come to terms with the fact that the tribal 
regions were (and still are) looking for political solutions to their problems and not 
merely an ever-increasing allocation of resources, of which most will never reach 
the intended beneficiaries. The manifesto opined elsewhere that “without giving 
more powers to states and ensuring autonomy for the ethnic and tribal minorities 
within states, where necessary, to fulfil their aspirations of development of their 
linguistic-cultural identity and economic progress, the Centre will fail to counter the 
growing separatist and divisive threats to the country”.64 Therefore, the CPM has 
been able to recognise that the demands for a separate state were arising not only 
due to poor developmental initiative but also due to a desire on the part of socio­
cultural identities to assert themselves. The exploitation of regions or social groups 
was likely to result in political demand-making for separate administrative units.
62 The CPM Central Committee's Report on Political Development, New Delhi, 1981, pp. 31-33.
63 Election Manifesto o f the Communist Party of India (Marxist), New Delhi, 1991, pp. 8-9.
64 ibid., p. 6.
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The CPM manifesto also pointed out the worsening conditions of the lower 
sections of the population, exploitative working conditions and poor growth of 
educational and employment opportunities. It desired urgent and effective policy 
measures to ameliorate the situation to contain political and social strife and ensure 
peace and progress. In this way, it was also addressing the situation of the 
worsening developmental profile in the Jharkhand region as observed in chapters IV 
and V.
Owing to the political configuration in which that the CPM found itself, 
instead of promises, it put forth a set of demands to be placed before the next 
government. It desired the electorate to vote for its candidates so that those demands 
could be pursued effectively in the Parliament. Concerning the tribal regions, it 
demanded that steps must be taken to ensure “protection of the land, culture and 
language of tribal people. Autonomy for compact, contiguous, tribal majority areas 
within states where necessary”.65 This emphasis of the CPM on autonomous 
administrative structures for tribal pockets was quite different from the Jharkhandi 
demand for a separate state and the scope of creating such areas of tribal autonomy 
was remote. Besides, the resultant arrangement would be undesirable as well as 
impractical as there are hardly any exclusively tribal regions left and it is 
improbable that the creation of tribal autonomy in small compact tribal pockets was 
a plausible course of action. Moreover, the desirability of separating the tribal 
population from the rest of the population of the region and allowing them to 
become ‘national tribal parks’, is questionable. However, the views of the CPM 
have some merit since it recognised the need to seek solutions to the Jharkhandi 
problem at a political level.
The 1996 manifesto of the CPM continues with similar analyses and 
demands. It did not support the JMM’s demand for a separate state. The party 
continued its demand for “prevention of atrocities against tribals; protection of land,
65 ibid., p. 17.
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culture and language of tribal people; granting of autonomy for compact contiguous 
tribal majority areas within the framework of existing states” .66
Before ending the analysis of the CPM’s political stance, it must be noted 
that the CPM has been quite vocal in its demand for greater state autonomy vis-a-vis 
the central government. It has also been demanding greater autonomy for the tribal 
areas. However in West Bengal, the CPM despite being in office for twenty years, 
has not extended any substantial measure of autonomy to the Gorkha areas which 
could have been a beacon for other regions demanding autonomy. In fact, there are 
no references to the Gorkhaland issue in their manifesto. This indicates that the 
CPM also has only been paying lip service to the cause of autonomy like most other 
political parties.
(e) National Front/ Janata Dal:
The last few years have seen the rise of the Janata Dal and National Front 
(of which an important constituent was the Janata Dal). The National Front has had 
two stints in office at the centre and the Janata Dal was in office in Bihar.67 
Consequently, the views expressed by this party are of some consequence.
The 1989 election manifesto of the National Front presented a new 
dimension to the problems in the tribal areas of the country. It listed this issue under 
the section of “Regional Aspirations” and was of the view that “regional aspirations 
of the submerged groups residing in such underdeveloped areas as the eastern tribal 
belt call for fulfilment by appropriate measures”.68
It is significant that National Front was the first political party in India with 
perhaps, the qualified exception of the JMM, to publicly recognise that the issue of 
Jharkhand was no longer a tribal issue and had over the years, acquired a regional
66 Manifesto o f the Communist Party o f India (Marxist): Eleventh Lok Sabha Elections, New Delhi, 
1996. p. 14.
67 Presently, Rashtriya Janata Dal is in office in Bihar which was formed after a split in the Janata 
Dal in 1997.
68 Manifesto o f the National Front: Lok Sabha Elections 1989, New Delhi, n. d., p. 13.
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character. The JMM and other Jharkhandi groups have some degree of 
responsibility for this change in the character of the movement, which no longer 
perceives itself as a movement for a tribal state. By the late 1980s, many of the 
people of Jharkhand were in favour of a Jharkhand state irrespective of their origin. 
It had truly become a regional aspiration.
However, despite its recognition of the regional character of the Jharkhand 
movement, the National Front sought to ensure that the tribal population of the 
region was not crushed under the majoritarianism of the non-tribal populace. It said 
that:
the tribals’ interests will be fully protected and various hardships and 
evictions, which they face owing to ill-conceived forest laws and 
arbitrary actions of forest officials, will be removed. Their customary 
laws will be respected and observed . . . their special needs will be 
attended to in the formulations and execution of forest policies and 
they will be made active participants in the process of massive 
afforestation.69
This recognition by the National Front that even after the creation of a state 
of Jharkhand, the tribal and other backward social groups would require active 
policy support indicates that its leaders had a good grasp of realities in Bihar. 
However, the overemphasis on forest rights vis-a-vis the tribal population 
underplays the fact that the tribal population of Bihar is no longer dependent on 
forest produce alone and requires active public policy intervention in their lives at 
the same level as any other poor and weak social group.
However, with the Janata Dal government in office in Bihar, the election 
manifesto of National Front for the 1991 election had softened its stance with regard 
to the Jharkhand issue. Whereas in the 1989 manifesto the National Front had 
promised ‘appropriate measures’ to deal with the regional aspiration of the people in 
the ‘eastern tribal belt’, by the 1991 election the ‘appropriate measures’ had boiled
69 ibid., p . 26.
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down to the JAAC. The 1991 manifesto mentioned Jharkhand by name and 
promised:
T=iWr %  ^fprpr srTwrtemfr %  trier
^ ctt % i u h  iA ht^ I "  %■ ^fRi-nr %
3T ^  e r e r  T it t e r  t^ r fc r  %: i
cr^^rmfr afPr ^rrem ^fr w  ^rfcr % ^ t^ c r
"er r^r^TT strc: srf^Rr w^ ptt % i
csRci aiwt^rrsfr w  sn ^ r tbxLcr in: R^ir ^praT 
■5R=r >y<^\< %■ *5F?r %■ R ^ tth - n- ^TRiRRpfr
T^HKH^  n eJ^ cT VX^ cT ^ r  ^  NrURI
•qf^ w^ - w m r  i *tRfr 3^ rt rt^ t
'jTRT W  H ^W T frT  «tnR ^T  TRTRT <=L^>II I70
[National Front sympathises with the aspirations of the people of 
Jharkhand. Long drawn exploitation has kept our tribal brethren in 
extreme poverty. Their problems and pain has been aggravated by an 
insensitive and over-centralised administration.
With a view of respecting their legitimate aspirations, maintaining 
developmental and other activities, and for immediate relief, the 
Janata Dal government in Bihar has recently established a 
development council. National Front will attempt to build a consensus 
on the demand of a separate state.]
This manifesto needs to be viewed in light of the fact that the then Janata Dal 
Chief Minister of Bihar, Laloo Prasad Yadav, had declared that he would allow the 
creation of a separate state in Jharkhand only over his dead body. Additionally, 
despite the Bill creating the JAAC having been passed in 1994, the first election to 
the JAAC has not yet been held and the powers allocated to it have not been 
transferred. In such a situation, the promise of meeting the aspirations for autonomy 
in the region made by the National Front in 1989 with the Janata Dal as one of its 
main constituents, amounts to little more than political rhetoric.
However, the other promises made by the National Front in the manifesto 
vis-a-vis the ST population do not have many new or original strands. They follow
70 Manifesto of the National Front: Lok Sabha Elections 1991, New Delhi, n. d ., p. 14.
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the well-known promise of more investment in the development of the ST 
population. The analyses in the last three chapters indicate that despite continuous 
increase in the money allocated, there has not been a proportionate improvement in 
the rate of growth of the developmental profile of either the region as a whole or the 
ST population.
It is also noteworthy that the National Front did not see the issue of 
Jharkhand as an identity-based movement. It was politically astute to recognise that 
the movement has acquired a regionalist character but it continued to view the 
movement as a product of developmental imbalances. The reason provided for the 
creation of the JAAC definitely leads to this interpretation (The JAAC Act has been 
discussed later in the chapter).
The National Front did not last till the next elections in 1996. The 
constituent parties fought the elections as different parties. It is another matter that 
after the elections, 13 of them joined together to form an unstable coalition 
government which was in office during 1996-97 with the outside support of the INC 
to give it necessary majority in the Parliament.
The Janata Dal manifesto of 1996 did not refer to the issue of Jharkhand at 
all, although it dwelt on the question of smaller states, probably to counter the BJP’s 
promise of smaller states. On this issue it simply promised to set up another 
commission to enquire into the matter:
Demands have been raised for several decades for the creation of 
smaller States in view of economic backwardness of certain regions 
within the respective States, aspirations for regional identity and large 
size of certain States, which causes difficulties to the people in 
dealing with State level administration. Janata Dal will appoint a 
Commission to go into these demands and make appropriate 
recommendations.71
The Janata Dal was of the opinion that new states must be created to improve 
administrative convenience. The fact that cultural identities may aspire for a
71 The Janata Dal Election Manifesto for the Lok Sabha Election 1996, New Delhi, n. d. p. 21.
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separate state seems incidental to the Janata Dal. Further, the tone of the manifesto 
indicates that as far as the Janata Dal was concerned, the issue of Jharkhand had 
been settled for good with the creation of the JAAC. With relation to the ST 
population of the country, it repeats many of its developmental promises from the 
1991 manifesto.
There is one factor that is common to all the above parties. All of them club 
Scheduled Tribes and the Scheduled Castes together. The fact that regional/ tribal- 
cultural identity may have a significant input into political demand-making which is 
presently being witnessed in India, does not seem to be central to any political 
manifesto. Further, the above delineation of the election manifestos of the various 
political parties seems to indicate that all the parties believe that the only 
justification for the creation of a new state is the prospect of better administrative 
convenience to improve public policy delivery. In this sense most political parties 
still seem to believe that narrower ascriptive identities will be subsumed into the 
national identity under the impetus of a faster and efficient development. The 
viewpoint of political actors hardly seems to have evolved since the time of 
independence.
With regard to the Jharkhand region, all the political parties (including the 
JMM) lay a lot of emphasis on its poor developmental profile. The fact that the 
Jharkhandi identity has become politically significant was secondary for all of them. 
As far as the single-purpose party -  JMM -  was concerned, they did not want to 
over-emphasise the identity aspect since the political system has been unable to 
evolve mechanisms to deal with such demands. Too much emphasis on the distinct 
identity of the Jharkhand region could lead to State repression. Also, the 
‘development-deficit’ argument was secular and non-controversial enough to draw 
cross party support. The various political points of view could differ over the 
remedy of underdevelopment -  from an autonomous council to a state to the 
panchayati raj system -  but no one could disagree that urgent action was required to 
devolve power to the local communities so that development could be accelerated. It 
is curious that other similar demands in the country which had adopted violence and 
separatism (for instance, Assam and Punjab) drew a lot of condemnation but also 
political attention whereas demands such as that of a separate state of Jharkhand
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could only secure marginal reference and consideration, if any. It seems that the 
political system has lost all its will and capability to attempt resolution of socio­
political conflict without resort to violence. In this sense, the system has neglected a 
fundamental aspect of its responsibility.
This unwillingness and inability on the part of the political system to provide 
enough political space for political differences with a view to resolving them before 
such political demand-making groups take up arms also speaks of the instability of 
the State and leads to what some commentators have called the ‘crisis of 
governability5.72
The Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council Act, 1994
The incessant struggle on the part of the Jharkhandi political parties and 
social groups and the accompanying economic blockade of minerals in the south 
Bihar region in the 1980s and 1990s succeeded in bringing the necessity of new 
politico-administrative arrangements for the Jharkhand region onto the national 
agenda. There were considerable differences of opinion across the political spectrum 
about the shape of the proposed politico-administrative body. The options ranged 
from a new state as demanded by the JMM, to a mere revamping of the public 
policy delivery mechanism as suggested by the INC. Amongst the national political 
parties, the question of a new state had found favour only with the BJP whereas 
other political parties have suggested merely a development council. Nonetheless, 
despite the differences in opinion about the structure, all political parties concurred 
with the view that the Jharkhand movement was premised on the poor track record 
of development policy in the region of south Bihar. If the movement was at all seen 
as one premised on an identity, it was a regional identity united by poverty and 
underdevelopment. The possibility of the existence of a tribal identity in the region 
had become of least importance.
72 Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s Crisis of Governability, Cambridge, 1990.
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Accordingly, the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council Act, 1994 (JAAC) 
was passed on the presupposition of a regional, development- based demand. Taking 
a look at the very first sentence of the Act reinforces this point of view:
An Act To establish An Autonomous Council for all round
accelerated development of the Jharkhand Area. Be it enacted by the
Legislature of Bihar . . ,73
The then Janata Dal government of Bihar in accordance with the position 
proclaimed in the manifesto, viewed the whole issue of Jharkhand as one born out of 
developmental imbalances that could be ameliorated by devolution of administrative 
powers. The Act sought to do precisely that.
The Act created the Council as a legal entity with not more than 162 directly 
elected and eighteen nominated members.74 As far as the structure of the Council is 
concerned, it follows the pattern of the state legislative assemblies all over the 
country, with seats reserved for both Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 
Curiously, unlike most developmental council models in the country, the local MPs, 
MLAs, or heads of other developmental bodies such as panchayat heads have no ex­
officio rights to sit in the Council. The eighteen nominated seats are filled up in the 
following manner:
1. the Speaker of the Bihar Vidhan Sabha has the power to appoint not more 
than 8 MLAs from the region to the JAAC;
2. the state government could also appoint two MPs from the region to the 
Council;
73 Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council Act 1994 (Bihar Act 13, 1994), Bihar Gazette 
Extraordinary, 8 March 1995, Patna, 1995.
74 ibid., section 3(1).
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3. the state government is empowered to appoint not more than eight 
persons with experience of public works, urban works, rural 
development or social welfare who live in the area to the JAAC.75
This provision seriously undermines the autonomy of the Council. If the state 
government thinks that the JAAC is functioning too independently for its liking, it 
can utilise these provisions to interfere with the business of the Council. Moreover, 
the scope of such independent action on part of the Council is remote. The state 
Governor has discretionary powers to dissolve the Council and take over all its 
functions through an officer not below the rank of an additional secretary in the 
Government of India who shall be appointed for the purpose.76 In this sense, the 
Council is no more than a developmental body with some degree of elected 
representation. Its continued existence depends on the discretion of Governor77 and 
therefore is susceptible to pressures from the state government. In terms of 
autonomy for the region, this model is not of much consequence. The JAAC turns 
out to be nothing more than a glorified municipal government.
The only recognition to the tribal character of the region in the Act is that 
the Chairman elected to preside over the meetings of the JAAC meetings must be a 
tribal.78 As far as all other provisions are concerned, the JAAC could be a 
developmental body in any other part of the country (such as Panchayati Raj 
institutions) with a regional scope. Apart from a couple of entries in the subjects to 
be transferred to the JAAC concerning tribal welfare and development, there is no 
recognition of the unique culture and tradition of the region that the JMM is so fond 
of pointing out.
75 ibid., section 13(1).
76 ibid., section 12.
77 In this context, the discretion of the Governor effectively means that of the Chief Minister and the 
Government of Bihar as JAAC is a creation of the Bihar Vidhan Sabha and therefore, the 
Governor will normally act in accordance with the advice of the Chief Minister. However, keeping 
in mind the discretionary powers of the Governor under the constitutional arrangements in India, 
we will have to wait until this provision is operationalised and then challenged in a court of law. 
The judicial interpretation will clarify this point.
78 JAAC Act, op. cit., section 15.
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The essentially developmental character of its activities and the overall 
control of the state government over it is highlighted by the powers and functions 
assigned to the Council:
Subject to the general guidelines of the State Government, the
Council shall have the following powers and functions on the subjects
specified in Schedule 3:-
(a) to fix priority and prepare plans for development programmes;
(b) to formulate projects;
(c) to sanction projects;
(d) to get projects executed;
(e) to sanction Central Plans relating [to] the Area and to get it 
executed;
(f) to review, supervise, co-ordinate and monitor the projects.79
The above provisions make it amply clear that the Council was conceived as 
nothing more than a plan implementation body. It followed the general assumption 
that major political problems could be solved by greater and more intensive policy 
investment with some degree of local representation. Owing to the fact that the state 
government could exercise tight control over all the activities of the Council, the 
realisation of the regional aspirations of the Jharkhandi leaders and population (as 
promised by the Janata Dal manifesto) was realised only as far as minor adjustments 
to the general developmental policy of Bihar government were concerned. At best, it 
could act as a local public policy implementation department and at worst become a 
powerless political window dressing.
The Act certainly did not grant the Council any greater degree of autonomy 
even with regard to developmental programmes in the region. In fact, the state 
government’s control is clearly spelled out in sections 42 & 44. Section 42 requires 
that “the Council in the discharge of its functions, shall be guided by such direction 
on policy matters as may be given to it from time to time by the State 
Government” .80 Section 44, instead of designating Patna High Court as the arbitrator 
in matters of dispute, provides that “if in the interpretation of the provision of the
79 ibid., section 29(3).
80 ibid., section 42.
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Act, there is a difference of opinion between the State Government and the Council, 
it shall be settled by the Governor”.81 There thus seems to be no actual devolution of 
power.
With regard to the executive power of the JAAC, the office of the Council is 
to be headed by a Chief Executive Officer appointed by the Governor of Bihar after 
consultation of the Chief Executive Councillor (Chairman of the Council and ex­
officio head of the Executive Council). All staff recruited for the JAAC are subject 
to budgetary and other controls of the state government. It is empowered to 
discipline only class three and four staff. All disciplinary powers with respect to 
other staff rest with the state government. Further, all administrative postings of the 
staff are subject to guidelines issued by Bihar government.82 Thus, the executive 
power of the JAAC is also under the control of the state government.
As far as financial powers are concerned, the Council has been promised “a 
minimum of 25 percent of the State’s Annual Plan”.83 However, as a member of the 
Central Committee of JMM complained in May 1996, the actual transfer of powers 
and resources to the JAAC was still awaited. Even the elections to the JAAC had 
not been held and at present the JAAC consists of appointees of the state 
government. Besides, with almost total control by the state government over its 
activities, there is very little scope for the JAAC to actually reallocate this money to 
projects which it deems to be of greater importance in the region. Furthermore, the 
numerous instances of centrally sponsored schemes (CSS) in the states which have 
undermined the developmental autonomy of the states show that the Bihar 
government has ample scope of undermining the limited developmental autonomy 
granted to the region in the form of the JAAC.
The powers devolved to the JAAC are not much more than those which had 
been devolved to the panchayats under the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment)
81 ibid., section 44.
82 ibid., section 32.
83 ibid., section 34(7).
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Act, 1992. A comparison of the subjects devolved has been made in the annex at the 
end of the chapter. If the comparison is pursued, it becomes clear that almost all the 
powers that Bihar government intends to devolve to the JAAC had already been 
devolved to the panchayats by the Parliament in 1992. It would not be untrue to hold 
that Bihar government devolved those powers which it no longer possessed after the 
Seventy-third Amendment to the Constitution. The only exceptions are subjects that 
are peculiar to the region, such as bee keeping, sericulture, minor minerals, tribal 
sub-plan & welfare and tribal welfare.
Some other subjects are not in the Eleventh Schedule but are present in the 
JAAC Act such as regional planning and implementation, urban development, and 
municipal corporations. Such subjects could not have been included in the panchayat 
structure created by the Seventy-third Amendment since it was meant to deal mainly 
with rural village conditions whereas the JAAC Act deals with a region which has a 
larger geographical scope. The subjects that have been included in the Eleventh 
Schedule of the Constitution of India by the Seventy-third Amendment but not in the 
JAAC Act are fuel and fodder, non-conventional energy, adult & continuing 
education and public distribution system. It could also be argued that these powers 
conferred greater initiative on the panchayats compared with the JAAC.
The powers delegated to the JAAC under regional planning and 
implementation are a major item in principle but in practice all planning of 
developmental programmes has been centralised in the Planning Commission with 
even the states having very limited powers over this area. The present initiative of 
indicative planning by the Planning Commission could lead to a substantial role for 
the JAAC. However, if the indicative planning initiative does go on to actually 
decentralise development planning, the JAAC will be no greater beneficiary than the 
panchayati institutions. If the devolution of planning does not go ahead, the JAAC 
will end up as a line agency implementing state and central plans.
Thus, it would not be an exaggeration to state that the JAAC seems to be a 
panchayat with a much larger geographic scope and consequently, greater financial 
and developmental allocations. Such an administrative structure cannot be seen to 
fulfil the ‘legitimate regional aspirations’ of the people of the Jharkhand region. The
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people of the region wanted a separate state but what they got was in fact a glorified 
panchayat. Jharkhandi leaders and population expected some degree of regional 
autonomy under the JAAC. However, all they were granted was a regional 
municipal council.
Identity and Autonomy
It may also be questioned whether the tribal-cultural identity survives in the 
Jharkhand region anymore. The experience in the interviews with the ordinary men 
and women of Jharkhand indicates that they might not be too concerned about the 
Jharkhandi identity premised on a shared history and culture but all of them would 
like to see their developmental affairs administered from Ranchi and not from Patna. 
Even the local INC activists and leaders in the region admitted (it must be borne in 
mind that the INC has not supported the creation of a Jharkhand state) that 
Jharkhandi governance must rest in Ranchi. A bicycle mechanic in the region 
emphatically put it: 'dT ” [Government must
definitely be at Ranchi]. It was noticed that many of the common persons of the 
region did not understand the complicated political reorientation that has become the 
hallmark of Jharkhandi politics; some of them thought that the old Jharkhand Party 
still exists. However, they seemed to be of the firm opinion that if the affairs of the 
Jharkhand region were administered from Ranchi, it would benefit them immensely. 
Not all of the respondents were able to provide a reason for this belief but their 
responses can be summarised as follows:
(a) The closer the government is, the simpler it is to influence and control it. If 
officials personally known to the general population are in control of the affairs 
of the government, then there is a better chance of efficient delivery by the 
policy mechanism.
(b) Some respondents believed that geographical proximity of the government would 
make it easier for them to pursue matters that otherwise take months to be 
processed.
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(c) Apart from the very involved political activists, no respondents from the general 
population pointed to the unique identity of the region. However, their emphatic 
responses to the question if they wanted the government to be based at Ranchi, 
indicates that they are aware of the difference of the region from the rest of 
Bihar. They are also acutely aware of their distance -  both physical and 
psychological - from the existing government at Patna and New Delhi. The 
populace no doubt has a feeling of alienation and regards the government and its 
policy machinery as remote and inaccessible.
The political leaders of the regions support some degree of political 
autonomy irrespective of their party affiliations. Some of them seem to think that it 
would be better to have a union territory, others support a separate state while yet 
others seek greater autonomy within Bihar. Marxist leaders point to the fundamental 
flaws in the whole structure of economic relations whereas the JMM leaders seek to 
secure a state by demonstrating the scope of development with the help of the 
JAAC. The fact remains that no one seems to be satisfied with the present 
arrangements. In fact, dissatisfaction over the way in which the whole question of 
the JAAC has been treated by the Bihar government has already set in. The JMM 
leaders pointed out in 1996 that election to the Council have not been held despite 
more than a year having passed. In the meantime, the Council is composed of Bihar 
government’s nominees and the powers and funds earmarked for it have not been 
transferred. Shibu Soren, the current Chairman of the Executive Committee of the 
JAAC and the leader of the JMM has been threatening another economic blockade 
over the issue of transfer of economic and financial powers to the JAAC. The 
involvement of some of the JMM MPs, including Soren, in a corruption scandal has 
harmed their position and it has been losing electoral and popular support to the BJP 
which has been promising a separate state.
The political dynamics of Bihar and the Jharkhand region have been 
changing very fast in the last year or so. After the field trip, some crucial 
developments have taken place. The Chief Minister who was so adamant against the 
creation of a state in Jharkhand, Laloo Prasad Yadav, was charged with corruption 
and arrested. During the events leading to his arrest, the Janata Dal split and he 
formed a new party called Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). For this new RJD
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government to survive, the support of Jharkhandi MLAs was crucial. Consequently, 
the JMM MLAs supported the new government and in return secured the passing of 
a resolution in the Vidhan Sabha which recommended to the Union government that 
a separate state must be created in Jharkhand. This resolution was passed on 23 July 
1997.84
On the development front, there seems little likelihood of major 
improvements under the still powerless JAAC. The structure of the JAAC ensures 
meddling by Patna which will fuel the demands for a separate state. The unrest over 
the JAAC promises to fester for a long time. In the political climate of unstable and 
corruption ridden governments, the only thing that stays constant is the demand for 
greater autonomy culminating in a separate state.
84 Times of India, Internet edition at http://www.timesofindia.com.
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Annex to Chapter VII
Subjects devolved to the JAAC under the JAAC Act 1994 and its Corresponding Entry in the
Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution
JAAC Act85 Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution86
Entry Number on the List and Subject Entry Number on the List and Subject
1. Public health 23 Health and Sanitation including Hospitals, 
Primary Health Centres and Dispensaries
2. Hospital, Dispensary and Nurses 
Training
Partly included in number 23.
3. Tourism Partly included in number 29
4. Vocational Education 18 Technical Training and Vocational Education
5. Agriculture 1 Agriculture including agricultural extension
6 Construction and Maintenance of Rural 
Roads
13 Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, water ways 
and other means of communication
7. Cremation and burial Grounds Partly included in number 29
8. Hat, Market and Fairs 22 Market and fairs
9. Minor Irrigation 3 Minor Irrigation, Water Management and 
Watershed development
10. Public Health, Engineering and 
Sanitation 11
Corresponds to section 23 
Drinking Water
11. Dairy Development 4 Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Poultry
12. Fisheries 5 Fisheries
13. Bee-Keeping - -
14. Sericulture
15. Primary and Secondary (up to plus two) 
Education
17 Education including Primary and Secondary 
Schools
16. Management of Land and Building 
under the ownership of the Council
2 Land Improvement, Implementation of Land 
Reforms, Land Consolidation and Soil 
Conservation
17. Rural Development 14
10
16
Rural electrification including distribution of
electricity
Rural housing
Poverty alleviation programme
18. Small and Cottage Industries 8
9
Small Scale industries including Food
Processing Industries
Khadi, Village and Cottage Industries
19. Minor Minerals - -
20. All Programmes of Welfare Department 24
25
26
27
Family Welfare
Women and Child Development 
Social Welfare including welfare of the 
handicapped and the mentally retarded 
Welfare of the Weaker Section and in 
particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the 
Scheduled Tribes
85 Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council Act, 1994, op. cit., Schedule 3.
86 The Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act 1992, New Delhi, 1993.
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21. All Programmes relating to Urban 
Development
- -
22. Repairs, Renovation and maintenance of 
Medium and Minor Irrigation Projects
Included in number 3.
23. Forest (excluding settlement) 6
7
Social forestry and farm forestry 
Minor forest produce
24. The use of Canal Water for Irrigation 
purposes, excluding canals which 
pertain to medium and major projects
Included in number 3.
25. Recommendation for the settlement of 
available Government land for 
Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, 
Government Primary, High and plus 
two schools, Government Hospitals and 
Cottage and Small Scale Industries
Partly corresponds to number 4
26. Cattle pound - -
27, Implementation of Externally aided 
projects relating to specified subjects of 
the Council and Regional Planning
28. Tribal Sub-Plan and Welfare - -
29. Cultural Affairs including Theatre and 20 Libraries
Drama 21 Cultural Activities
30. Sports
31. Youth Welfare Included in number 26
32. Animal Husbandry Included in number 4.
33. Vital Statistics - -
34. Weights and Measures
35. Local Transport
36. Food and Civil Supplies
37. Flood Control for Village protection Included in number 3.
38. Tribal Welfare - -
39. Public Works Included in numbers 3 & 29 as well in some 
others
40. Municipal corporation, Improvement 
Trust, District Board and Other Local 
Self-government and Village 
Administration
41. Panchayats - -
42. Recommendation to the State 
Government with regard to Electricity
Included partially in numbers 14.
12 Fuel and Fodder
15 Non-conventional energy sources
19 Adult and non-formal education
28 Public distribution system
29 Maintenance of community assets
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Chapter VIII
Conclusions
This study of the relationship between the dynamics of development policy 
implementation and the crystallisation of an ethnic identity using the Modified 
Resource Dependence Model has yielded significant insights into the avenues by 
which State action influences formation and/ or crystallisation of ethnic identities. It 
also points to significant maladies in the process of development planning and 
implementation in India.
The Jharkhandi identity draws upon cultural differences premised on a 
collection of selected historical facts and constructs and is rooted in the political 
discourse which emerged in the colonial and post-colonial India under the influence 
of nationalist thought. The autonomous forms of community formation by the 
nationalist leaders during the anti-colonial struggle had repercussions for ‘sub- 
national’ ethnic communities who utilised cultural premises and symbolism similar 
to the ones utilised by the nationalist leadership at the national level to create a 
politically pertinent identity. Such a process occurred in the Jharkhand region where 
the educated elite created a Jharkhandi identity which was premised on the 
uniqueness of the tribal cultural heritage and way of life. The Jharkhandi community 
was seen as distinct from all other such communities (for instance, the lingual 
communities that emerged in many parts of India) and sought political recognition 
(as had been extended to the lingual communities). This identity showed a 
remarkable ability to respond to new ground realities as witnessed in the redefinition 
of a diku due to the changing demographic profile of the region. The premise of 
tribal culture and heritage was construed to represent all the inhabitants of the 
geographical region of Jharkhand and not merely the tribal inhabitants. Thus, the 
identity became more inclusive than exclusive (unlike most other identities which 
are more exclusive than inclusive). The Jharkhandi identity also successfully utilised
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other grounds for political mobilisation, notably the declining development profile 
of the Jharkhand region, to tap into the tribal and non-tribal popular support.
The post-colonial state in India adopted a rationalist-integrationist model of 
administration. The new administrative structures were framed with the objective of 
achieving the same ideals that the nationalist leadership had learnt to cherish from 
the colonial discourse. Consequently, significant strands of the colonial discourse 
continued in the independent Indian administration. However, this rationalist- 
integrationist premise of the post-colonial administrative structures also meant that 
the State was unable to respond adequately to the political demands from the newly 
articulated political identities premised on cultural factors. The lingual criterion of 
reorganisation of states adopted by the SRC was intended to enable a more efficient 
implementation of the rationalist-integrationist development planning and 
implementation. However, in some ways the criterion of language was a 
compromise between rational reorganisation and the need to give political 
recognition to some of the many ‘sub-national5 communities which had crystallised 
in independent India.
In the case of Jharkhand, another factor was to intervene in the politics of 
identity, i. e. the issue of development imbalances in the region. The support for the 
Jharkhandi parties was high in the first decade of independence as the development 
profile of the Jharkhand region was marginally better than Bihar as a whole during 
this period and there was popular support for the politics of the Jharkhandi identity. 
By the end of the 1950s, the developmental profile of the region became stagnant 
and sluggish. As the development problems became acute, popular support for the 
Jharkhandi political parties with a single-point agenda of the creation of a separate 
state, began to deteriorate. Hence, it can be deduced that the electorate chose faster 
development over the political recognition of the Jharkhandi identity, although the 
Jharkhandi leaders would have argued (and do so even today) that a separate state 
would not only lead to political recognition of the Jharkhandi identity but also to 
better long-term development prospects.
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The avenues for exchange of resources offered by the Jharkhandi parties 
were too narrow to yield a meaningful exchange of political, economic and 
information resources between the State and the electorate. Even if the electorate 
had invested all the political resources at its command in the Jharkhandi parties, the 
institutional arrangements in India precluded the possibility of their being able to 
secure a better policy response from the State.
The declining development profile of the region undermined the issue of a 
separate state and autonomy by the 1962 election. Hence, it is not out of place to 
speculate that if the state policy machinery had performed well after this period, the 
demand for autonomy might have been marginalised even further. However, since 
the politics of identity does not always operate on such rational lines, nothing can be 
said conclusively.
The entry of national parties onto the political stage of Jharkhand beginning 
in the 1960s, coincided with a period of declining development profile. The 
electorate invested a great deal of political support in the national parties, especially 
the INC, in the hope of securing a better public policy response to the development 
problems in the region. However, there were only brief periods of relatively 
improved performance of the policy machinery, that too in certain development 
indicators only. Besides, during such periods as well, public policy demonstrated a 
better performance in Bihar as a whole than the Jharkhand region except with regard 
to the ST population under the TSP. The TSP approach began in the mid-1970s 
when the issue of underdevelopment was a problem for the entire region and not just 
the ST population. Moreover, the ST population was just over a quarter of the total 
population of the Jharkhand region. Hence, the new policy initiatives failed to quell 
the political aspirations of the Jharkhandi identity which by now had become a 
peculiar mixture of regional, cultural and ethnic identity with the declining 
development profile providing additional grounds for political mobilisation. The 
hope of a more balanced exchange of resources between the electorate and the State 
within the avenues offered by the national parties did not show adequate results. 
Furthermore, the Jharkhand region gradually came to contribute a very large 
proportion to the state exchequer without receiving reciprocal investment in
350
developmental activities. What made the Jharkhandi electorate even more resentful 
was the fact that the Jharkhand region, with its vast mineral reserves, contributed 
substantially to the economic well being of the entire country but was being treated 
like an internal colony.
Ironically, the same developmental imbalances which had earlier 
overshadowed the issues of identity and autonomy in the 1960s and 1970s, were the 
reason for a renewal in the popular support for a separate state in the mid-1980s. 
There emerged a strong correlation between the declining development profile and 
this new phase of demand for a separate province in the Jharkhand region. In some 
ways, this is reminiscent of the anti-colonial struggle. The population of the 
Jharkhand region came to see the Bihar government as an oppressive regime from 
which redemption is possible only with the creation of a separate state.
The State sought to underplay the threat to its legitimacy from the Jharkhandi 
identity by interpreting the movement as having its base in the developmental 
imbalances in the Jharkhand region. The over-sensitivity of the Indian state to what 
it perceives as a threat to national integrity had a role to play in this. It has not been 
able to reconcile to the fact that regional cultural identities do not necessarily 
threaten the national identity and it is possible for individuals and communities to 
have multiple identities. The Jharkhandi identity has however, been able to arrive at 
a balance between the regional-cultural ethnic identity and national identity which is 
expressed in the JMM’s slogan: Jai Jharkhand, Jai Bharat [Glory to Jharkhand, 
Glory to India]. The two identities are thus construed as mutually complementary.
The rationalist-integrationist bureaucratic State’s inability and unwillingness 
to respond to the political aspirations of the Jharkhandi identity has resulted in its 
attempts to interpret the Jharkhand movement in purely developmental terms. The 
question of development is no doubt, closely linked to the Jharkhandi identity 
because popular support for the demand for autonomy had re-emerged due to the 
failure of the public policy mechanism to fulfil its part of the exchange of resources. 
Further, the Jharkhandi political opinion was quick to point out that the failure of 
the developmental policy in the existing political and administrative arrangements
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provided even more grounds for the creation of a separate province. The exchange 
of information resources between the State and the Jharkhandi political opinion 
which followed led to the ‘development-deficit’ definition of the character of the 
Jharkhand movement being adopted by the Jharkhandi political formations as well. 
It not only provided them with an additional basis for the mobilisation of the non- 
tribal component of the population of the region but this acceptance on the part of 
the State that all was not well in the Jharkhand region also bestowed the long 
eluding political legitimacy on the movement. The falling development profile, 
changing demographic balance in Jharkhand and legislative impotence of the 
Jharkhandi political groups led the Jharkhandi identity to become inextricably linked 
to the developmental profile of the region.
The population of Jharkhand has experimented in vain with political parties 
of all hues and colours in the hope of securing a balanced exchange of resources. 
However, the political machinery has let them down once too often. Consequently, 
during the current phase of identity articulation since mid-1980s, they have not been 
too enthusiastic in extending all their electoral support to the Jharkhandi parties. The 
electorate of Jharkhand therefore, has adopted a three-pronged approach as a part of 
a strategic exchange of resources. It continues to extend political patronage to the 
national parties in the elections for the parliamentary seats as only the Parliament 
has the powers to create a new state. Some of this patronage is also extended to the 
Jharkhandi parties to represent the Jharkhandi opinion in the Parliament. At the state 
level, sizeable support is extended to the party that is likely to enter office at Patna 
in the hope of securing a better public policy response pending the creation of a 
territorial state in the Jharkhand region. However, the third strand of the political 
resources at the command of the electorate is invested in the agitational politics of 
the JCC, the JMM and the AJSU. The demonstrations and agitations draw the 
support of a large number of the Jharkhandi populace. This was witnessed in the 
economic blockades of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The disruption in the 
transportation of vital minerals from the region had often been met by coercive 
actions of the State which in turn, undermined the legitimacy of the regime. 
Consequently, the State was forced to seek out a mutually acceptable public policy
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response to the situation. Thus, a more meaningful exchange of resources emerged. 
This three-pronged strategic investment of political resources by the population of 
the Jharkhand region has yielded better results. The JAAC was created as a result 
of this phase of the exchange of resources.
However, the creation of a regional developmental council is not the end of 
either the developmental problems or the politics of identity in the region. The 
Jharkhand issue promises to fester for sometime due to two broad reasons. Firstly, 
the creation of the JAAC is not an adequate devolution of powers to the local level. 
Hence, it can neither ensure an improved delivery by the public policy machinery 
nor satisfy the regionalist aspirations of the Jharkhandi population. Secondly, the 
fundamental imbalances in the existing bureaucratic delivery mechanism have been 
the absence of infrastructure to utilise the financial allocations and the lack of 
avenues for significant local inputs into the process of development planning. The 
new arrangements do not significantly alter this state of affairs. Therefore, even if a 
separate state is created in the Jharkhand region, unless a large-scale reorientation of 
delivery mechanisms is undertaken, the developmental problems of the region are 
unlikely to be solved.
As far as the politics of identity in the Jharkhand region is concerned, the 
creation of a separate state seems to be the only alternative as the population has lost 
faith in the ability and desire of Bihar government to effect significant 
improvements. The population of the region does not wish to continue living in an 
internal colony. The leadership of the JMM has made this amply clear:
w  f^nTui ^FRTT %  UPTf #
^T P E F T  ^ T xT l f ^ R T  W t  'cl (1%  I 34 m  | F t TTK T
tt't* . . . su i«sius wrfcrqt fcTT
W HTrrr W  34f^TRT -  TTtcT X Wl'H I ^TiIAm. I1
1 Sibu Soren, w  [The Question of Jharkhand state] in Narayan, S., ed.,
Jharkhand Movement: Origin and Evolution, New Delhi, 1992, p. 19.
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[The power of governance of this region must be transferred into the 
hands of the population of this region by creating the Jharkhand state 
so that the population of this region can bring about its own 
development . . . The right to autonomy for the jatis of Jharkhand 
region -  Jharkhand province must be given.]
The dynamics of public policy implementation and the political process of 
the region have come to such a pass that nothing short of a new political unit with 
adequate autonomy will be able to solve the cause of unrest in the Jharkhand region. 
On 8 September 1992, the then Union Home Minister, S. B. Chavan, said at Pune 
that the “formation of either a separate state or a Union Territory is the only 
solution to the Jharkhand problem”.2 This statement does not reflect the official 
position of the government or the INC but it certainly reflects the political reality of 
the region.
2 Quoted in S. Narayan, ‘Introduction1 in Narayan, S., ed., Jharkhand Movement: Origin and 
Evolution, New Delhi, 1992, p. 17.
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Annex 1
Statistical Annex
District-wise Population in Jharkhand 1951
District Area (Sq. Miles) Total Population Males Females
Santlial Parganas 5,452 2,322,092 1,172,594 1,149,498
Dhanbad 790 731,700 410,140 321,560
Hazaribagli 7,016 1,937,210 981,264 955,946
Palamau 4,896 985,767 498,564 487,203
Ranchi 7,159 1,861,207 938,255 922,952
Singhbhum 4,508 1,480,816 752,424 728,392
Jharkhand Total 29,821 9,318,792 4,753,241 4,565,551
Bihar Total 70,330 40,225,947 20,223,675 20,002,272
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of Bihar 42.40 23.16 23.50 22.82
Source: Census o f India 1951, vol. V, Bihar Part II-A (Tables A, C, D & E series) -  General Population Tables, Patna: Government 
Printing Press, n. d.
District-wise Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1951
District Total Population Males Females
Dhanbad 114,529 57,137 57,392
Hazaribagli 267,552 137,647 129,878
Palamau 172,027 82,401 89,626
Ranchi 1,125,802 566,507 559,295
Santhal Pargana 1,037,167 516,516 520,651
Singhbhum 713,522 347,313 366,209
Jharkhand Total 3,430,599 1,707,521 1,723,051
Bihar Total 4,049,183 2,017,414 2,031,769
Jharkhand as Percentage of 
Bihar 84.72 84.63 84.80
Jharkhand Percentage 36.81 35.92 37.74
Source: Census o f India 1951, vol. V, Bihar Part II-A (Tables A, C, D & E series) -  Genera! Population Tables, Patna: Government 
Printing Press, n. d.
District-wise Infant Mortality and Birth & Deatli Rates in Jharkhand 1950
Districts
Total number 
of Live Births1
Total number 
of Deaths1
Infant
Mortality2
Infant 
Mortality Rate2 
(per 1000 live 
Birth)
Birth Rate3 
(per 1000 
Population)
Death Rate3 
(per 1000 
Population)
Hazaribagh 25,062 16,362 1,491 59.49 14.31 9.34
Manbhum 37,990 23,036 1,372 36.11 18.69 11.34
Palamau 21,965 13,705 1,697 77.25 24.07 15.02
Ranchi 31,350 24,284 2,416 77.06 18.71 14.49
Santhal
Pargana
23,161 19,843 1,784 77.02 10.36 8.50
Singhbhum 18,729 12,050 931 49.70 16.36 10.53
Jharkhand 
Total/ Average
158,257 109,280 9,691 62.77 17.08 11.54
Bihar Total/ 
Average
714,376 461,335 57,945 81.11 19.01 12.36
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar/Average 22.15 23.68 16.72
'■ Registered,
2- Provisional Figures.
3'Based on 1941 calculations.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 46.
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District-wise Output of Principal Crops (in thousands of tons) in Jharkhand  1949-50
Districts Paddy Wheat Gram Barley Maize Masoor Arhar Kliesri Peas Sugar
cane
Potato Tobacco Jute Chilli
Santhal Pargana 345 2 8 4 35 0 7 21 2 1 2 0 1 0
Ranchi 323 1 3 1 4 0 5 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Palamau 64 3 14 11 22 1 8 4 1 3 1 0 0 0
Hazaribagli 258 4 3 3 29 0 4 1 1 2 14 0 0 0
Manblium 386 0 0 0 10 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Singhbhum 207 0 1 0 5 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Jharkhand Total 1583 10 29 19 105 1 27 27 4 7 20 0 1 0
Bihar 3744 357 296 213 412 87 129 468 71 265 219 12 76 15
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
42.28 2.80 9.79 8.92 25.48 1.14 20.93 5.76 5.63 2.64 9.13 0 1,31 0
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 22.
District-wise Land Improvement Loans Advanced To Agriculturists in Jharkhand 1950-51*
District Loan Advanced (Rupees)
Hazaribagli 286,012
Manbhum 503,817
Palamau 265,700
Ranchi 58,992
Santhal Pargana 589,978
Singhbhum 564,423
Jharkhand Total 2,268,922
Bihar Total 13,826,343
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 16.41
# Under the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, Agriculturists’ Loans Act, 1884, Natural Calamities Loans Act and Gratuitous 
Relief.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 116.
District-wise Loans Disbursed for Reclamation of Wasteland and Areas of Wasteland Reclaimed in Jharkhand 1951-52
District
Land Improvement Loans 
Disbursed
(Rupees)
Area of Waste Land Reclaimed (Acres)
By Manual Labour By State Tractors
Dhanbad 50,200 401
Hazaribagli 72,539 282 -
Manblium 145,247 1,451 -
Palamau 123,775 792 -
Ranchi 35,014 1,000 -
Santhal Pargana 754,484 3,255 -
Singhbhum 180,229 795 -
Jharkhand Total 1,361,488 7,976
Bihar 2,804,286 37,208 3,602
Jharkhand as Percentage of 
Bihar
48.55 21.43 -
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 27.
District-wise Distribution of In-door and Out-door Patients Treated in Public Medical Institutions Owned, Subsidised 
_____________________________ or Aided by Public Authorities in Jharkhand 1947_____________________________
District Number Indoor Patients Treated Number Outdoor Patients Treated
Hazaribagli 5,317 224,267
Manblium 5,265 270,838
Palamau 2,655 166,268
Ranchi 7,930 196,434
Santhal Pargana 3,822 190,441
Singhbhum 2779 143,053
Jharkhand Total 27,768 1,191,301
Bihar Total 127,844 5,620,869
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 21.72 21.19
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 70.
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District-wise Expenses of Public Medical Institutions Owned, Subsidised or Aided by Public Authorities in Jharkhand
1947
District Income (Rupees) Expenditure (Rupees)
Hazaribagli 258,843 197,266
Manblium 275,303 226,404
Palamau 53,084 47,962
Ranchi 290,802 275,724
Santhal Pargana 1,28,296 90,325
Singhbhum 127,154 121,317
Jharkhand Total 1,033,483 958,998
Bihar Total* 10,797,502 4,712,237
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 9.57 20.35
’Figures for Saharsa are not available.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 70.
District-wise Municipal Councils’ Income and their Expenditure on Primary Education in Jharkhand 1949-50
District
Number of 
Municipalities
Population within 
Municipal Limits
Total Income 
(excluding opening 
balance) (Rupees)
Total Expenditure
(Rupees)
Percentage of 
Total Expenditure 
on Primary 
Schools to Total 
Income
Hazaribagli 3 60,003 387,052 284,447 35.10
Manblium 4 68,337 597,382 457,045 33.60
Palamau 1 14,198 218,718 219,895 37.80
Ranchi 3 92,425 734,021 720,407 33.50
Santhal Pargana 4 68,412 581,754 559,642 26.63
Singhbhum 4 184,033 464,753 448,671 43.90
Jharkhand Total/ 
Average
19 487,408 2,920,680 2,690,107 35.92
Bihar Total 58 1,653,346' 12,399,875 10,284,678 24.97
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
32.7 29.48 23.55 26.15 -
’Excludes Dehri Notified Area Committee.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 75.
Circle-wise Collection of Agricultural Income Tax in Jharkhand 1950-51
District Tax Collected (Rupees)*1
Dhanbad 4,969
Hazaribagli 55,471
Manblium 75,417
Palamau 45,348
Ranchi 112,262
Santhal Pargana 154,281
Singhbhum 51,230
Jharkhand Total 498,978
Bihar Total 6,986,079
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 7.14
* Provisional figures.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 101,
Circle-wise Collection of Revenues under Electricity Act 1948 in Jharkhand - 1950-51
Circle Tax Collected (Rupees)*
Dhanbad 156,906
Santhal Pargana 11,896
Ranchi 47,275
Hazaribagli 80,063
Palamau 7,021
Manblium 20,956
Singhbhum 255,691
Jharkhand Total 579,808
Bihar Total 1,085,565
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 53.41
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* Provisional figures
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 109.
Circle-wise Collection of Sales Tax 1950-51
Circle Tax Collected (Rupees)*
Dhanbad 3,670,516
Santhal Pargana 1,243,132
Ranchi 1,115,259
Hazaribagli 1,547,494
Palamau 503,529
Manblium 1,050,705
Singhbhum 5,895,783
Jharkhand Total 15,026,418
Bihar Total 40,814,811
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 36.81
6 Provisional figures
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 103.
District-wise Number of Moneylenders’ Licenses Issued and Moneys Advanced in Jharkhand 1950-51
District Number of Licenses 
Issued
Amount of Loan Advanced 
(Rupees)
With Security Without Security Total
Hazaribagli 70 3,564,652 447,767 4,012,419
Manbhum 202 2,904,771 174,360 3,079,131
Palamau 51 348,917 19,888 368,805
Ranchi 115 728,840 301,945 1,030,785
Santhal Pargana 291 223,309 266,205 489,514
Singhbhum 399 444,688 322,321 767,009
Jharkhand Total 1,128 8,215,177 1,532,486 9,747,663
Bihar Total* 4,996 153,090,492* 5,792,081 158,882,573
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of Bihar 22.57 5.36 26.45 6.13
’Figures from Muzzafarpur and Darbangha include the figures for loans advanced widiout security as well.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Pauia: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 130.
District-wise Livelihood Classes in Jharkhand 1951*
Districts Agricultural and Related Activities Non- Agricultural Activities
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Santhal
Parganas
2,131,032 1,067,743 1,063,289 191,060 104,851 86,209
Dhanbad 352,943 177,666 175,277 378,757 232,474 146,283
Hazaribagli 1,650,708 822,075 828,633 286,502 159,189 127,313
Palamau 898,191 451,250 446,941 87,576 47,314 40,262
Ranchi 1,666,917 833,297 833,620 194,290 104,958 89,332
Singhbhum 1,107,657 547,927 559,730 373,159 204,497 168,662
Jharkhand Total 7,807,448 3,899,958 3,907,490 1,511,344 853,283 658,061
Bihar Total 34,611,254 17,189,156 17,422,098 5,614,693 3,034,519 2,580,174
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
22.55 22.68 22.42 26.91 28.11 25.50
Jharkhand
Percentage
83.78 82.04 85.58 16.21 17.95 14.41
Bihar
Percentage
86.04 84.99 87.10 13.95 15.00 12.89
* The 1951 Census differed from the earlier ones because “the 1941 table gave distribution of population of each district by the main 
communities, this table gives distribution of population of each district according to . . livelihood classes. . [Census o f India 1951, 
vol. I - India, Patna, n. d., p.333] It classified tire population according to Self-supporting, Non-earning Dependent and Earning 
Dependent in Agricultural and Non-agricultural sectors. This figure is for the total population and not workers only as in later years. 
Source: Census o f  India 1951, vol. V, Bihar Part II-B Tables - Economic Tables, Patna, Government Printing Press, 1953.
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District-wise Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand 1951*
Districts Agricultural and Related Activities Non- Agricultural Activities
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Dhanbad 131,227 90,103 41,124 189,133 158,766 30,367
Hazaribagli 572,900 410,979 161,921 99745 78,113 21632
Palamau 306,513 216,659 89,854 29,513 23,073 6,440
Ranchi 603,076 392,413 210,663 59,413 47,753 11,660
Santlial
Parganas
1,064,026 637,688 426,338 89,372 59,488 29,884
Singhbhum 413,364 278,056 135,308 132,267 110,132 22,135
Jharkhand Total 3,091,106 2,025,898 1,065,208 599,443 477,325 122,118
Bihar Total 12,451,892 8,605,463 3,846,429 1,892,303 1,486,559 405,744
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
24.82 23.54 27.69 31.67 32.10 30.09
Jharkhand
Percentage
33.17 42.62 23.33 6.43 10.04 2.67
Bihar
Percentage
30.95 42.55 19.22 4.70 7.35 2.02
'The 1951 Census differed from the earlier ones because “the 1941 table gave distribution of population of each district by the main 
communities, diis table gives distribution of population of each district according to . . livelihood classes. . [Ce/imr o f India 1951, 
vol. I - India, Patna, n. d., p .333] It classified the population according to Self-supporting, Non-earning Dependent and Earning 
Dependent in Agricultural and Non-agricultural sectors. This figure is for the total population and not workers only as in later years. 
Therefore, these figures have been arrived at by subtracting Non-earning Dependants from the figures for the categories of 
Agricultural and Non-agricultural classes. This is the closest figure that can be calculated for die category of workers in die two 
sectors in the year 1951.
Source: Census o f India 1951, vol. V, Bihar Part II-B Tables - Economic Tables, Patna: Government Printing Press, 1953.
Contd.
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District-wise Livelihood Classes by Educational Standards in Jharkhand 1951*
District/
Educational
Standards
Agriculture-Related Activities Non- Agricultural Activities
Person | Male | Female Persons | Male | Female
Bihar Total
Literate 3,053,967 2,671,054 382,913 1,133,318 856,850 276,468
Middle School 265,033 234,797 30,236 205,991 171,255 34,736
Matriculate 54,869 50,798 4,071 94,502 84,056 10,446
Intermediate 10,408 9,713 695 26,348 23,335 3,013
Graduate and 
Others s
27,310 25,340 1,970 50,107 45,701 4,406
Jharkhand Total ®
Literate 539,007 451,214 87,793 613,303 532,367 80,936
Middle School 50,595 39,447 11,148 47,446 38,786 8,660
Matriculate 9,481 8,279 1,202 34,800 30,757 4,043
Intermediate 1,283 1,126 157 6,133 5,321 812
Graduate and 
Others #
2,732 2,587 145 10,856 9,652 1,204
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar
Literate 17.64 16.89 22.92 54.11 62.13 29.27
Middle School 19.09 16.80 36.86 23.03 22.64 24.93
Matriculate 17.27 16.29 29.52 36.82 36.59 38.70
Intermediate 12.32 11.59 22.58 23.27 22.80 26.94
Graduate and 
Odiers #
10.00 10.20 7.36 21.66 21.11 27.32
Jharkhand Percentage
Literate 6.90 11.56 2.24 40.57 62.39 12.29
Middle School 0.64 1.01 0.28 3.13 4.54 1.31
Matriculate 0.12 0.21 0.03 2.30 3.60 0.61
Intermediate 0.01 0.02 0.004 0.40 0.62 0.12
Graduate and 
Others u
0.03 0.06 0.003 0.71 1.13 0.18
Bihar Percentage
Literate 8.82 15.53 2.19 20.18 28.23 10.71
Middle School 0.76 1.36 0.17 3.66 5.64 1.34
Matriculate 0.15 0.29 0.02 1.68 2.76 0.40
Intermediate 0.03 0.05 0.003 0.46 0.76 0.11
Graduate and 
Others
0.07 0.14 0.01 0.89 1.50 0.17
*The 1951 Census differed from die earlier ones because “die 1941 table gave distribution of population of each district by die main 
communities, tliis table gives distribution of population of each disuict according to . . livelihood classes. . [Census o f India 1951, 
vol. I, India, Patna, n. d., p .333] It classified the population according to Self-supporting, Non-earning Dependent and Earning 
Dependent in Agricultural and Non-agricultural sectors. This figure is for the total population and not workers only as in later years. 
This Table has therefore, used die Tables on Livelihood Classes 1951 to calculate the proportion of population in various educational 
categories amongst the Agricultural and Non-agricultural Livelihood Classes, Therefore die cross-tabulation for Educational Levels is 
available only for the entire population and not the working population, as in later Censuses.
s Includes Graduate, Postgraduate, Teaching, Engineering, Commerce, Agriculture, Veterinary, Legal, Medical and odier 
qualifications.
® Totals for die Jharkhand region have been arrived at by adding die relevant categories for each district of the region.
Source: Census o f India 1951, vol. V, Bihar Part II-A Tables (A, C, D, & E series), Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.
Contd.
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District-wise Area Irrigated by Different Sources in Jharkhand (in Hectares) 1949-50
District Government
Canals
Private Canals Tanks Wells Other Sources Total Area 
Irrigated
Hazaribagli Nil 404.69 1,214.08 5,665.72 1,214.08 8,093.88
Manbhum Nil Nil 228,652.37 2,428.16 Nil 231,080.53
Palamau Nil Nil * 2,832.86 404.69 3,237.55
Ranchi Nil * 5,665.72 4,451.63 13,759.61 23,876.97
Santhal
Pargana
Nil 22,258.19 82,152.97 5,665.72 31,566.16 141,643.06
Singhbhum Nil * 10,522.05 * 809.38 11,736.13
Jharkhand
Total
Nil 22,662.89 328,207.20 21,044.11 47,753.94 419,668.15
Bihar Total 403,480.37 259,004.45 465,398.62 260,623.23 875,758.80 2,264,265.50
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
0 8.75 70.52 8.07 5.41 18.53
Jharkhand
Percentage
0 5.40 78.20 5.01 11.37 -
Bihar
Percentage
17.81 11.43 20.55 11.51 38.67 -
* Negligible.
Totals may not tally due to rounding off of figures to the nearest diousands in die source and due to conversion of figures Acres in die 
source to Hectares for comparative purposes, Factor used is 2.471 Acres equals 1 Hectare.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1951, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1953, p. 15.
District-wise Population in Jharkhand 1961
District Area (Sq. Miles) Total Population Males Females
Dhanbad 1,114 1,158,610 646,597 512,013
Hazaribagli 7,016 2,396,411 1,203,503 1,192,908
Palamau 4,925 1,187,789 598,600 589,189
Ranchi 7,047 2,138,565 1,076,251 1,062,314
Santhal Pargana 5,470 2,675,203 1,351,149 1,324,054
Singhbhum 5,191 2,049,911 1,045,801 1,004,110
Jharkhand Total 30,763 11,606,489 5,921,901 5,684,588
Bihar Total 67,196 46,455,610 23,301,449 23,154,161
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of Bihar
45.78 24.98 25.41 24.55
Source: Census o f India 1961, Paper I of 1962 - Bihar, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.
District-wise Scheduled Tribes Population in Jharkhand 1961
District Total Population Males Females
Dhanbad 128,385 66,890 61,495
Hazaribagh 270,693 137,295 133,398
Palamau 228,589 113,901 114,688
Ranchi 1,317,513 650,668 666,845
Santhal Pargana 1,023,078 511,188 511,890
Singhbhum 969,807 473,077 496,730
Jharkhand Total 3,938,065 1,953,019 1,985,046
Bihar Total 4,204,770 2,087,994 2,116,776
Jharkhand as Percentage of 
Bihar 93.65 93.53 93.77
Jharkhand Percentage 33.92 32,97 34.91
Source: Census o f India 1961, Paper I of 1962 -Bihar, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.
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District-wise Infant Mortality and Birth & Death Rates in Jliarkliand 1961
Districts Total number 
of Live Births
Total number 
of Deaths
Infant
Mortality
Infant 
Mortality Rate
(per 1000 live 
Birth)
Birth Rate
(per 1000 of 
Population)*
Death Rate
(per 1000 of 
Population)*
Dhanbad 11,906 4,640 373 31.32 10.27 4.00
Hazaribagh 25,231 10,129 1,361 53.94 10.52 4.22
Palamau 18,658 9,028 2,058 110.30 15.71 7.60
Ranciii 23,086 12,411 1,822 78.92 10.79 5.80
Santhal
Pargana
21,047 11,295 936 44.47 7.86 4.22
Singhbhum 17,459 6,533 607 34.76 8.51 3.16
Jliarkliand 
Total/ Average 117,387 54,036 7,157 58.95 10.61 4.83
Bihar Total/ 
Average 458,442 229,442 39,891 87.01 9.86 4.94
Jliarkliand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
14.87 23.55 17.94 - - -
* Mid-year population.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 96.
District-wise Causes of Death in Jharkhand 1961-62
Districts Cholera Small Pox Plague Fever Dysentery & 
Diarrhoea
Respiratory Injury All other 
Causes
Total
Dhanbad 34 6 0 2,801 238 145 158 2,258 4,640
Hazaribagh 162 102 10 7,439 259 291 240 1,626 10,129
Palamau 114 6 1 7,108 269 84 152 2,294 9,028
Ranchi 175 81 9 8,103 704 195 232 2,912 12,411
Santhal Pargana 118 34 13 8,240 223 589 165 1,913 11,295
Singhbhum 7 49 7 4,195 196 319 115 1,645 6,533
Jharkhand 
Total/ Average
610 278 40 37,886 1889 1623 1062 12,648 54,036
Bihar Total 8,883 786 78 158,155 5,101 5,189 3,246 48,004 229,442
Jliarkliand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
6.86 35.36 51.28 23.95 37.03 31,27 32.71 23.34 23.55
Jharkhand
Percentage
1.12 0.51 0.07 70.11 3.49 3.00 1.96 23.40 -
Bihar
Percentage
3.87 0.34 0.03 68.93 2.22 2.26 1.14 20.92 -
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 97.
District wise Number of Children at School in Jharkhand 1961-62
District Total Males Females
Dhanbad 202,118 152,017 50,101
Hazaribagh 179,424 148,235 31,189
Palamau 105,307 83,673 21,634
Ranchi 230,781 166,577 64,204
Santhal Pargana 231,635 182,676 48,859
Singhbhum 105,861 84,533 21,328
Jharkhand Total 1,055,126 817,711 237,315
Bihar Total 4,152,641 3,324,292 828,349
Jliarkliand as Percentage of 
Bihar
25.40 24.59 28.64
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d ., p. 118.
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District-wise Occupational Patterns in Jharkhand by Educational Standards in Jharkhand  1961
Districts/
Educational
Standards
Agriculture-Related Activities3 Non- Agricultural Activities4
Person | Male | Female Person | Male | Female
Jliarkliand Total*
Illiterate 4,006,423 1,851,523 2,154,900 897,371 632,792 264,579
Literate1 427,803 401,188 26,615 332,383 327,536 4,847
Middle School2 103,657 95,155 8,502 117,603 114,123 3,480
Matriculate and 
above
6,808 6,689 119 111,356 108,206 3,150
Biliar Total
Illiterate 12,231,525 7,029,907 5,201,618 2,846,728 1,916,005 930,723
Total Educated/ 
Literate
2,549,946 2,471,414 78,532 1,598,203 1,546,242 51,961
Literate1 2,060,789 1,993,749 67,040 981,999 948,537 33,462
Middle School2 425,925 414,724 11,201 316,171 304,306 11,865
Matriculate and 
above
63,232 62,941 291 300,033 293,399 6,634
Jliarkliand as Percentage of Bihar
Illiterate 32.75 26.33 41.42 31.52 33.02 28.42
Literate1 20.75 20.12 39.70 33.84 34.53 14.48
Middle School2 24.33 22.94 75.90 37.19 37.50 29.32
Matriculate and 
Above
10.76 10.62 40.89 37,11 36.88 47.48
Jharkhand Percentage
Illiterate 88.17 78.66 98.39 63.30 55.37 95.22
Literate1 9.41 17.04 1.21 23.44 28.66 1.74
Middle School2 2.28 4.04 0.38 8.29 9.98 1.25
Matriculate and 
above
0.14 0.28 0.005 7.85 9.46 1.13
Biliar Percentage
Illiterate 82.75 73.99 98.51 63.91 55.45 93.16
Literate1 13.94 20.98 1.26 22.04 27.45 3.34
Middle School2 2.88 4.36 0.21 7.09 8.80 1.18
Matriculate and 
above
0.42 0.66 0.005 6.73 8.49 0.66
* The Jharkhand Total has been arrived at by adding up the relevant categories of all the districts of the area.
*• Without Educational Level.
2- Primary or Junior Basic.
3- Includes Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers.
4- Includes those in Mining, Quarrying, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and Allied activities; Household 
Industry; Manufacturing other than Household Industry; Construction; Trade and Commerce; Transport, Storage and Communication; 
and Other services.
Source: Census o f India 1961, vol. IV, Bihar Part II-B (i) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I to B-IV & B-VII), Patna: 
Government Printing Press, n. d.
District-wise Occupational Patterns in Jliarkliand 1961
District Agricultural and Related Activities1 Non- Agricultural Activities2
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Dhanbad 252,431 130,439 121,992 312,937 270,899 42,038
Hazaribagh 895,412 471,297 424,115 264,836 215.928 48,908
Palamau 474,735 269,447 205,288 92,610 72,600 20,010
Ranchi 1,014,637 496,804 517,833 190,282 143,067 47,215
Santhal Pargana 1,157,835 618,079 539,756 245,431 187,996 57,435
Singhbhum 748,632 367,480 381,152 311,413 249,167 62,246
Jliarkliand Total 4,543,682 2,353,546 2,190,136 1,417,509 1,142,657 277,852
Bihar Total 14,780,446 9,500,296 5,280,150 4,454,119 3,455,113 999,006
Jharkhand as 
Percentage of 
Bihar
30.74 24.77 41.47 31.82 33.07 27.81
Jliarkliand
Percentage
39.14 39.74 38.52 12.21 19.29 4.88
Bihar Percentage 31.81 40.77 22.80 9.58 14.82 4.31
'■ Includes Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers
2- Includes those in Mining, Quarrying, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and Allied activities; 
Household Industry; Manufacturing other than Household Industry; Construction; Trade and Commerce; Transport, Storage and 
Communication; and Other services.
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Source: Census o f India 1961, vol. IV, Bihar Part n-B (i) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I to B-IV & B-VII), Patna: 
Government Printing Press, n. d.
District-wise Output of Principal Crops in Jliarkliand (in thousands of tons) 1961-62
Districts Paddy Wheat Gram Barley Maize Masoor Arliar Kliesri Peas Sugar
cane
Potato Tobacco Jute* Chilli
Dhanbad 118 * * * 4 * * * * 2 4 * * *
Hazaribagli 294 3 2 2 24 * 2 1 1 89 9 * * *
Palamau 105 8 19 14 20 * 6 10 1 78 2 * Nil *
Ranchi 335 1 2 * 6 * 4 1 * 3 4 * * *
Santhal
Pargana
469 4 9 5 58 2 4 11 1 84 7 7 0
Singhbhum 387 1 2 * 9 * 1 2 * 1 * * *
Jharkhand
Total
1708 17 34 21 121 2 17 25 3 257 26 7
Bihar 4335 513 296 253 826 75 89 521 54 6229 219 13 1264 14
Jharkhand
as
Percentage 
of Bihar
39.40 3.31 11.48 8.30 14.64 2.66 19.10 48.07 5.55 4.12 11.87 0 0.5 0
s In thousands of bales of 400 pounds each.
* Less than 1000 tons.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 49,
District-wise Land Improvement Loans Advanced To Agriculturists 1959-6fty
District Loans Advanced (Rupees)
Dhanbad 181,600
Hazaribagli 163,985
Palamau 103,126
Ranchi 93,090
Santhal Pargana 136,042
Singhbhum 715,000
Jharkhand Total 1,392,843
Bihar 32,663,478
Jharkhand as Percentage of Bihar 4.26
s Distributed under Land Improvement Loan Act 1883,and Agriculturists’ Loans Act, 1884.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n, d., p. 267.
District-wise Loans Disbursed for Reclamation of Wasteland and Areas of Wasteland Reclaimed 1959-60
District
Land Improvement Loans 
Disbursed (Rupees)
Area of Waste Land Reclaimed (Acres)
By Manual Labour " By State Tractors/ Private 
Enterprise/ Other Means
Dhanbad 163.53 Nil
Hazaribagh 73.70 330.31
Palamau 369.17 Nil
Ranchi 259.75 Nil
Santhal Pargana 136,042 235.95 Nil
Singhbhum 290.02 186.28
Jharkhand Total 1392.12 510.59
Bihar Total 32,663,478 7,638.70 510.59
Jharkhand as Percentage 
of Bihar
36.25 18.22 100
* With assistance of Land Improvement Loans.
Totals may not tally due to rounding off of figures to the nearest thousands in the source.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 55.
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District-wise Net Area Irrigated from Different Sources (in Hectares) in  Jliarkliand 1961-62
D istrict G overnm ent
C anals
P riva te  Canals Tanks W ells O th e r Sources Total A rea 
I rr ig a ted
D hanbad * * 3,642.25 809.38 404.69 4,856.33
H azaribagh 809.38 * 6,879.80 9,712.66 4,856.33 22,258.19
P alam au 4,856.33 * 3,642.25 3,642.25 59,490.09 71,630.92
R anchi 404.69 * 1,014.08 4,451.63 5,665.72 11,736.14
Santhal
P arganas
809.38 1,618.77 59,894.78 8,498.58 23,472.28 94,293.81
S inghbhum 4,046.94 404.69 14,973.69 809.38 5,665.72 25,900.44
Jh a rk h a n d
T otal
10,926.75 2,023.47 90,246.87 27,923.91 99,554.84 230,675.87
B ihar Total 528,531.02 32,375.56 223,391.36 236,993.16 831,647.20 1,942,938.30
Jlia rk lian d  as 
P ercentage of 
B ihar
2.06 6.25 40.39 8.53 11.97 11.87
Jlia rk lian d
Percentage
4.73 0.87 39.12 12.10 43.15 -
B ihar
P ercentage
27.20 1.66 11.49 16.82 42.80 -
* Less than 404.69 Hectares.
Totals may not tally due to rounding off of figures to the nearest thousands in the source and due to conversion of figures from Acres
in the source to Hectares for comparative purposes. Factor used is 2.471 Acres equals 1 Hectare.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook, 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 44.
D istrict-w ise F igures for R egistered Deeds of Sale in  R espect of R ayati Holdings H aving O ccupancy R ights in
Jlia rk lian d  1961
E ntire In  P a r t
D istrict
N um ber
A rea 
T ran sfe rred  
(in Acres)
A nnual 
Payable to 
L andlord
(Rupees)
C onsideration
Money
(Rupees)
N um ber
A rea
T ra n s fe rre d
(in Acres)
A nnual 
Payable to 
L and lo rd
(Rupees)
C onsideration
Money
(Rupees)
D hanbad 1 1 3 500 9,518 4,989 5,827 5,598,740
H azaribagli 6 30 42 10,600 23,619 16,282 22,318 9,407,757
Palam au 77 182 335 50,443 6,123 10,028 11,967 2,882,697
R anchi 8 46 36 18,500 4,978 8,630 9,066 6,384,515
S anthal
P arg an a
1,031 1,836 1,535 1,094,644 3,701 3,555 4,744 1,586,921
Singhbhum 2 3 4 2,150 6,112 3,721 5,081 3,509,527
Jh a rk h a n d
Total
1,125 2,098 1,955 1,176,837 54,051 47,205 59,003 29,370,157
Jh a rk h a n d
Average
187.50 349.66 325.8 1,961,395 9,008.50 7,867.50 58,997 4,895,026.20
B ihar 73,982 62,486 149,608 40,228,591 473,734 259,491 860,337 264,216,217
B ihar
A verage
6,623.36 5,489.81 13423 3,550,159.5 42,511.09 23,251.81 72,848.54 21,349,641.81
Totals may not tally due to rounding off in die source.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, PaUia: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 239.
Contd.
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D istrict-w ise N um ber of M oneylenders’ Licenses Issued, N um ber of Licenses in  F orce and  M oneys A dvanced in
Jh a rk h a n d  1961-62
D istrict
N um ber of 
Licenses 
R egistered  fo r the 
F irs t T im e
N um ber of 
Licenses in  Force 
a t the  E nd  of the 
Y ear
A m ount of L oans A dvanced 
(Rupees)
Total
W ith  Security W ithou t Security
U rb an R u ra l U rb an R ural U rb an R u ra l U rb a n R u ra l
D hanbad 100 141 575 788 561,211 766,008 40,006 79,300 1,446,525
H azaribagli 72 87 441 308 340,948 348,416 35,091 253,471 977,926
P alam au 31 23 336 274 113,897 415,584 N/A 900 530,381
R anchi 64 129 780 592 625,818 1,251,631 737,003 1,474,007 4,088,459
Santhal
P argana
30 176 591 3,323 7,252,402 66,811,776 3,221 8,249,389 82,316,788
Singhbhum 174 21 1,280 137 628,656 142,363 70,530 1,240 842,729
Jliark liand
Total
471 577 4,003 5,422 9,522,932 69,735,778 885,851 10,058,307 90,202,808
B ihar Total 2,264 5,396 15,574 35,254 1,600,528,478 1,046,522,741 47,147,432 66,277,446 2,760,476,097
Jh a rk h a n d  as 
Percentage of 
B ihar
20.80 10.69 25.70 15.37 0.59 6.66 1.87 15.17 3.26
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p, 241.
Circle-wise Collection of A gricu ltu ral Incom e Tax in Jh a rk h a n d  1961-62
D istric t Tax Collected (Rupees)
D hanbad 22,215
H azaribag li 102,109
P alam au 9,683
R anchi 65,103
Santhal P arg an a 122,693
Singhbhum 4,862
Jh a rk h a n d  Total 326,665
B ihar Total 5,284,369
Jh a rk h a n d  as P ercentage of B ihar 6.18
Totals may not tally due to rounding off in the source.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 213.
Circle-wise Collection of Sales Tax in  Jh a rk h a n d  1961-62
Circle Tax C ollected (Rupees)
D hanbad 10,867,816
H azaribagh 2,400,294
P alam au 740,806
R anchi 3,164,869
Santhal P a rg an a 1,354,414
Singhbhum 13,769,405
Jlia rk lian d  Total 32,297,604
B ihar Total 74,443,528
Jlia rk lian d  as P ercentage of B ihar 43.38
Totals may not tally due to rounding off in tire source.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n, d., p. 215.
D istrict-w ise L ength of PW D  Roads in J lia rk lian d  1960
D istrict Total M ileage of PW D  R oads (Kilometres)
D hanbad 154
H azaribagli 652
P alam au 363
Ranclii 600
San thal P a rg an a 505
S inghbhum 335
Jlia rk lian d  Total 2,609
B ihar T otal 6,951
Jlia rk lian d  as Percentage of B ihar 37.53
Up to March 31.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1961, PaUia: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 244.
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District-wise Population in Jharkhand 1971
D istrict A rea (Sq. Kms.) Total Population M ales Fem ales
D hanbad 2,994 1,466,417 818,460 647,957
G iridili 6,907 1,374,376 693,699 680,677
H azaribagh 18,060 3,020,214 1,526,193 1,494,021
P alam au 12,677 1,504,350 766,257 738,093
R anchi 18,331 2,611,445 1,323,303 1,288,142
S anthal P arg an a 14,129 3,186,908 1,627,014 1,559,894
Singhbhum 18,447 2,437,799 1,254,993 1,182,806
Jlia rk lian d  T ota l 91,545 15,601,509 8,009,919 7,591,590
B ihar Total 173,876 56,353,369 28,846,944 27,506,425
Jh a rk h a n d  as 
Percentage of B ihar 52.64 27.68 27.76 27.59
Source: Census o f India 1971, Series 4, Bihar Part II-A - General Population (Tables A-I, All, AIII and PCA), Patna: Government 
Printing Press, n. d.
D istrict-w ise Scheduled T ribes Population  in  Jh a rk h a n d  1971
D istrict Total Population M ales Fem ales
D hanbad 155,645 79,145 76,500
H azaribagh 331,798 165,220 166,578
P alam au 287,150 145,353 141,797
R anchi 1,516,698 753,615 763,083
Santhal P argana 1,154,281 576,734 577,547
Singhbhum 1,124,317 557,017 567,300
Jh a rk h a n d  Total 4,569,889 2,277,084 2,292,805
B ihar T otal 4,932,767 2,462,265 2,470,502
Jlia rk lian d  as Percentage of 
B ihar
92.64 92.47 92.80
Jh a rk h a n d  Percentage 29.29 28.42 30.20
Source: Census o f  India 1971, Series 4, Bihar Part V-A Tables SC-I - IV (Part A & B) and SCI-V (Part) - Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes, Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.
D istrict-w ise O ccupational P atterns in  Jh a rk h a n d  1971
D istrict A gricu ltu ra l an d  R elated  A ctivities1 Non- A gricu ltu ra l A ctivities2
T ota l M ale Fem ale Total M ale Fem ale
D hanbad 174,629 159,014 15,615 317,934 292,653 25,281
H azaribagh 689,376 587,530 101,846 209,061 192,089 16,072
Palam au 434,669 357,987 76,682 49,498 46,206 3,292
R anchi 669,653 553,688 115,965 161,586 146,347 15,239
Santhal
P argana
911,552 774,612 136,940 132,406 120,641 11,765
Singhbhum 565,482 434,007 131,475 243,688 222,404 21,284
Jh a rk h a n d
Total
3,445,361 2,866,838 578,523 1,114,173 1,020,340 92,933
B ihar T otal 14,554,384 12,324,644 2,229,740 2,934,495 2,722,660 211,835
Jlia rk lian d  as 
Percentage of 
B ihar
23.67 23.26 25.94 37.96 37.47 43.87
Jh a rk h a n d
P ercentage
22.08 35.79 7.62 7.14 13.90 1.22
B ihar
P ercentage
25.82 42.72 8.10 5.20 10.17 0.77
1 Includes Cultivators; Agricultural Labourers and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and allied 
activities.
2 Includes those in Mining & Quarrying; Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing & Repairs; Construction; Trade & Commerce; 
Transport, Storage & Communications and Other services.
3 There is a discrepancy in the Census data here since the Total population of Female Workers in Agriculture related activities in Bihar 
adds up to less than that of Jharkhand.
Source: Census o f India 1971, Series 4 Bihar, Part II-B (i) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I Part A and B-II), Pauia: 
Government Printing Press, n. d.
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D istrict-w ise O ccupational P a tte rn s by E ducational S tandards in  J lia rk lian d  1971
D istricts/ 
E ducational S tandards A griculture-R elated  A ctivities4 Non- A gricu ltu ra l Activities5
P erson M ale Fem ale Person M ale Fem ale
B ihar Total
Illiterate 11,412,858 9,209,797 2,203,061 1,240,979 1,067,887 173,092
Literate* 1,149,627 1,137,945 11,682 433,803 428,682 5,121
Middle School1 1,710,601 1,696,400 14,201 711,280 695,401 15,879
Matriculate 248,457 247,702 755 416,452 405,463 10,989
Intermediate2 10,009 9,973 36 25,014 23,847 1,167
Graduate and Others 3 23,118 23,108 10 160,058 153,165 6,893
Jlia rk lian d  Total
Illiterate 2,800,082 2,230,324 569,758 490,321 411,833 78,488
Literate* 230,738 226,250 4,488 129,655 127,969 1,686
Middle School1 351,863 345,865 5,998 262,818 257,221 5,597
M atriculate 30,930 30,666 264 159,479 154,422 5,057
Intermediate2 1,736 1,721 15 10,645 10,311 334
Graduate and Odiers3 2,098 2,098 0 61,274 57,909 3,365
J lia rk lian d  as P ercen tage of B ihar
Illiterate 24.53 24.21 25.86 39.51 38.56 45.34
Literate* 20.07 19.88 38.41 29.88 29.85 32.92
Middle School1 20.56 20.38 42.23 36.95 36.98 35.24
M atriculate 12.44 12.38 34.96 38.29 38.08 46.01
Intermediate2 17.34 17.25 41.66 42.55 43.23 28.62
Graduate and Others3 9.07 9.07 0 38.28 37.80 40.81
Jh a rk h a n d  P ercentage
Illiterate 81.27 77.79 98.48 44.00 40.36 84.45
Literate* 6.69 7.89 0.77 11.63 12.54 1.81
Middle School1 10.21 12.06 1.03 23.58 25.20 6.02
M atriculate 0.89 1.06 0.04 14.31 15.13 5.44
Intermediate2 0.05 0.06 0.002 0.95 1.01 0.35
Graduate and Others3 0.06 0.07 0 5.49 5.67 3.62
B ihar P ercentage
Illiterate 78.41 74.72 98.80 42.28 39.22 81.71
Literate* 7.89 9.23 0.52 14.78 15.74 2.41
Middle School1 11.75 13.76 0.63 24.23 25.54 7.49
Matriculate 1.70 2.00 0.03 14.19 14.89 5.18
Intermediate2 0.06 0.08 0.001 0.85 0.87 0.55
Graduate and Odiers3 0.15 0.18 0.0004 5.45 5.62 3.25
* Without Educational Level.
1 Includes Primary and Middle School.
2 Includes Technical or Non-technical Diploma or Certificate not equal to Degree.
3 Includes those who hold a University Graduate or Postgraduate Degree or an Engineering and Technology, Medical, Agricultural, 
Veterinary and Dairying or Teaching Degree.
4 Includes Cultivators; Agricultural Labourers and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and allied 
activities.
s Includes those in Mining & Quarrying; Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing & Repairs; Construction; Trade & Commerce; 
Transport, Storage & Communications and Other services.
Source: Census o f India 1971, Series 4, Bihar Part II-B (ii) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I Part B, B-II & B-VII to B-IX), 
Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.
D istrict-w ise A rea un d er P rincipal C rops in  Jh a rk h a n d  (in thousands of Hectares) 1974-75
D istricts Paddy W heat G ram B arley M aize M asoor A rh ar K hesri Peas Sugar
cane
Potato Tobacco Ju te  " Chilli
D hanbad 69 1 * * 6 * * * * * * * * *
G iridili 100 2 1 * 21 * 1 * * * 3 * * *
H azaribagh 131 7 3 2 26 * 2 1 * 2 6 * * *
P alam au 100 20 28 17 47 3 16 6 1 3 2 * * 1
R anchi 478 12 6 1 15 * 11 2 1 3 6 * * *
Santhal
P argana
4532 27 11 5 65 3 5 2 1 5 *
Singhbhum 356 5 4 * 11 * 1 4 * * 1 * * *
Jlia rk lian d
Total 1,687 74 53 25 191 6 36 15 2 9 23 * * 1
B ihar 5,228 1,478 248 192 881 146 107 622 28 141 115 9 105 11
Jlia rk lian d  as 
P ercentage O f 
B ihar
32.26 5.00 21.37 13.02 21.67 4.10 5.78 2.41 7.14 6.38 20.0 0 0 9.09
* Nil or less than 500 Hectares
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 46-7. 49.
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District-wise area under High Yielding Variety Crops in Jharkhand (in Acres) 1974-75
D istrict Rice W heat
D hanbad 1,097 1,020
G irid ih 6,862 2,049
H azaribagh 801 6,399
P alam au 9,275 11,787
R anchi 67,702 13,175
S anthal P arg an a 66,507 52,989
S inghbhum 24,205 4,365
Jlia rk lian d  Total 176,449 91,784
B ihar Total 1,506,974 2,152,963
Jh a rk h a n d  as Percentage of B ihar 11.70 4.26
Total may not tally due to rounding off of figures in die source.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 44.
D istrict-w ise N et A rea  I rr ig a ted  from  D ifferent Sources in  Jh a rk h a n d  (in Hectares) 1973-74
D istrict G overnm ent
C anals
P riva te  C anals Tanks W ells/
Tube-w ells
O th e r Sources Total A rea 
I rr ig a ted
D hanbad __* __* 1,000 . .  * 1,000 2,000
G irid ih * * 1,000 4,000 __  * 6,000
H azaribagh 1,000 2,000 2,000 9,000 3,000 16,000
P alam au 5,000 * 5,000 11,000 39,000 62,000
R anchi 12,000 —  * 1,000 13,000 4,000 30,000
Santhal
P argana
7,000 16,000 7,000 11,000 41,000
Singhbhim i 9,000 __  * 7,000 1,000 2,000 19,000
Jh a rk h a n d
Total
34,000 2,000 33,000 45,000 60,000 176,000
B ihar Total 896,000 4,000 82,000 717,000 621,000 2,316,000
Jlia rk lian d  as 
Percentage of 
B ihar
3.79 50 40.24 6.27 9.66 7.59
Jh a rk h a n d
Percentage
19.31 1.13 18.75 25.56 34.09 -
B ihar
Percentage
28.68 0.17 3.54 30.95 29.81 -
* Nil or less than 500 Hectares
Total may not tally due to rounding off of figures in the source.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook, 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 40-41.
D istrict-w ise L and  Im provem ent Loans A dvanced To A gricu ltu rists in  Jh a rk h a n d  1972-73
D istrict Loans A dvanced (Rupees)
D hanbad 577,160
G irid ih 0
H azaribagh 1,580,912
P alam au 1,059,430
R anchi 2,627,875
Santhal P arg an a 2,764,813
S inghbhum 613,720
Jh a rk h a n d  Total 9,223,910
B ihar Total 57,918,086
Jlia rk lian d  as P ercentage of B ihar 15.92
* Under die Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883 and Agriculturists’ Loans Act, 1884.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 152.
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Circle-wise Collection of Agricultural Income Tax in Jliarkliand 1975-76
C ircle T ax Collected (Rupees)
B okaro 1,000
C haibasa 6000
D eoghar 119,000
D hanbad 5,000
G irid ih 1,000
H azaribagh 2,000
P alam au 18,000
R anch i 6,000
Singhbhum 12,000
Jlia rk lian d  Total 170,000
B ihar Total 1,778,000
Jh a rk h a n d  as P ercentage of B ihar 9.56
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 159.
D istrict-w ise N um ber of E lectrified  Villages in  Jh a rk h a n d  1973*
D istrict Total N um ber of E lectrified  Villages
D hanbad 207
G irid ih 111
H azaribagh 268
P alam au 336
R anchi 134
S anthal P a rg an a 343
Singhbhum 86
J lia rk lian d  Total 1,485
B ihar T ota l 9,280
Jlia rk lian d  as Percentage of B ihar 16.00
'A s on 31 March 1973.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 234.
Circle-wise Collection of Revenues un d er E lectricity  Act 1948 in  J lia rk lian d  1975-76
C ircle Tax Collected (Rupees)
B okaro 3,193,000
C haibasa 2,879,000
Colliery 11,714,000
D hanbad 6,452,000
G irid ih 3,967,000
H azaribagh 2,636,000
P alam au 503,000
R anch i 4,879,000
Santhal P arganas (Deoghar) 889,000
Singhbhum 23,574,000
Jh a rk h a n d  Total 60,686,000
B ih ar Total 86,256,000
Jh a rk h a n d  as Percentage o f B ihar 70.35
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d . , p. 159.
District-w ise L ength of PW D Roads in Jh a rk h a n d  1977-78
D istrict T ota l L ength of PW D  R oads1 (ill Kilometres)
D hanbad 226
G irid ih 502
H azaribagh 569
P alam au 779
R anchi 1,006
Santhal P arg an a 1,149
S inghbhum 774
Jh a rk h a n d  Total 5,005
B ihar Total 15,026
Jh a rk h a n d  as Percentage of B ihar 33.30
’■ Includes State Highways, Major District Roads and other Divisional Roads. National Highways’ district-wise break-up is 
unavailable.
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, PaUia: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 197.
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D istrict-w ise Figures for R egistered Deeds of Sale in  Respect of Rayati Holdings H aving O ccupancy Rights in
Jh a rk h a n d  1974
D istrict E n tire In  P a r t
N um ber A rea
T ran sfe rred
(in Acres)
A nnual 
R en t 
Payable to  
L and lo rd  
(Rupees)
C onsideration
Money
(Rupees)
N um ber A rea 
T ra n s fe rre d  
(in Acres)
A nnual 
R ent 
Payable to 
L andlord
(R upees)
C onsideration
M oney
(Rupees)
D hanbad 0 0 0 0 26,491 7,530 9,272 26,356,173
G irid ih 0 0 0 0 34,798 13,135 20,780 21,030,239
H azaribagh 0 0 0 0 43,148 25,537 40,111 3,933,341
P alam au 1,268 1,350 1,850 2,514,634 22,988 1,546 19,565 31,877,998
R anchi 0 0 0 0 16,489 13,535 14,061 43,395,342
Santhal
P argana
0 0 0 0 11,305 13,252 12,920 14,290,636
Singhbhum 0 0 0 0 24,119 8,815 13,733 22,702,355
J liark liand
T otal
1,268 1,350 1,850 2,514,634 179,338 83,350 130,442 163,586,084
B ihar Total 94,129 43,942 177,069 141,953,017 817,131 816,771 1,145,442 1,443,940,925
Jh a rk h a n d
Average
181.14 192.85 264,28 - 25,619.71 11,907.14 18,634.57 -
B ihar
A verage
3,036.14 1,417.48 5,711,90 - 26,359.06 26,347.45 36,949.74 -
Source: Bihar Statistical Handbook 1978, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, n. d., p. 192.
D istrict-w ise Scheduled T ribes O ccupational P a tte rn s in  Jh a rk h a n d  1961
A g ricu ltu ra l and  R ela ted  A ctivities1 N on- A gricu ltu ra l Activities2
Total Male Female Total M ale Female
Jh a rk h a n d  as 
Percentage of 
B ihar
90.51 85.67 95.34 90.47 89.96 91.55
Jh a rk h a n d
P ercentage
49.47 47.61 52.18 7.03 9.56 4.54
B ihar P ercentage 51.65 51.98 51.33 7.27 9.93 4.65
L Includes Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers.
2-Includes those in Mining, Quarrying, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and allied activities; Household 
Industry; Manufacturing other titan Household Industry; Construction; Trade and Commerce; Transport, Storage and Communication; 
and Other services.
Source: Census o f  India 1961, vol. IV, Bihar Part V-A - Special Tables for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Patna: 
Government Printing Press, n. d.
D istrict-w ise Scheduled T ribes O ccupational P atterns in  Jh a rk h a n d  1971
D istrict A g ricu ltu ra l and  R ela ted  A ctivities1 Non- A gricu ltu ra l A ctivities2
T otal M ale Fem ale T otal M ale Fem ale
D hanbad 37,315 31,954 5,361 17,981 13,047 4,934
H azaribagh 93,027 79,787 13,240 14,933 11,200 3,733
P alam au 93,313 78,325 14,988 3,796 3,203 593
R anchi 445,147 365,511 79,636 46,674 38,860 7,814
Santhal
P arg an a
402,496 327,792 74,704 14,460 11,123 3,337
Singhbhum 362,881 270,346 92,535 44,952 36,913 8,039
Jlia rk lian d
Total
1,434,179 1,153,715 280,464 142,796 114,346 28,450
B ihar T otal 1,563,065 1,252,056 311,009 148,285 117,329 30,956
Jlia rk lian d  as 
P ercentage of 
B ihar
96.75 92.14 90.17 96.29 97.45 91.90
Jh a rk h a n d
Percentage
31.38 50.66 12.23 3.12 5.02 1.24
1 Includes Cultivators; Agricultural Labourers and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantations, Orchards and allied 
activities.
2 Includes those in Mining & Quarrying; Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing & Repairs; Construction; Trade St. Commerce; 
Transport, Storage & Communications and Other services.
Source: Census o f India 1971, Series 4, Bihar Part V-ASC-I-IV (Part A & B) and ST I-V (Part A & B) - Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes, Pauia: Government Printing Press, n. d.
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District-wise Scheduled Tribes Educational Levels in Jharkhand 1971
D istrict Illite ra te L ite ra te1 M iddle School2 M atricu la te  and  Above
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
D hanbad 132,246 56,932 75,314 6,986 6,272 714 4,729 4,319 410 629 567 62
H azaribagh 312,069 148,328 163,741 10,671 9,139 1,532 7,725 6,745 980 1,333 1,008 325
P alam au 261,100 123,388 137,712 16,136 13,724 2,412 8,926 7,388 1,538 988 853 135
Ranchi 1,250,651 563,715 686,936 118,250 81,780 36,470 129,969 94,578 35,391 17,837 13,551 4,286
Santhal
P argana
1,070,062 505,496 564,566 43,685 36,628 7,057 37,104 31,623 5,481 3,430 2,987 443
Singhbhum 984,840 437,368 547,472 66,665 55,813 10,852 64,121 56,026 8,095 8,681 7,810 871
Jh a rk h a n d
Total
4,010,968 1,835,227 2,175,741 262,393 203,356 59,037 252,574 200,679 51,895 32,898 26,776 6,122
B ihar Total 4,358,575 2,007,955 2,350,620 275,481 214,845 60,636 263,997 211,058 52,939 34,714 28,407 6,307
Jh a rk h a n d  as 
Percentage of 
B ihar
92.02 91.39 92.56 95.24 94.65 97.36 95.67 95.08 98,02 94.76 94.25 97.06
Jh a rk h a n d
Percentage
87.76 80.59 94.89 5.74 8.93 2.57 5.52 8.81 2.26 0.71 1.17 0.26
1 Without Educational Level
2 Primary or Junior Basic
Source: Census o f India 1971, Series 4, Bihar Part V-A (SCI-IV Part A & B; SCI-V Part) - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, 
Patna: Government Printing Press, n. d.
D istrict-w ise Population  in Jh a rk h a n d  1981
D istrict A rea (Sq. Kms.) Total M ales Fem ales
D hanbad 2,996 2,115,010 1,166,126 948,884
G irid ih 6,892 1,731,462 876,172 855,290
H azaribagh 11,165 2,198,310 1,121,263 1,077,047
P alam au 12,749 1,917,528 979,955 937,573
R anchi 18,266 3,070,432 1,563,821 1,506,611
San thal P a rg an a 14,206 3,717,528 1,899,410 1,818,118
S inghbhum 13,440 2,861,799 1,473,697 1,388,102
Jlia rk lian d  Total 79,714 17,612,069 9,080,444 8,531,625
B ihar Total 173,887 69,914,734 35,930,560 33,984,174
Jh a rk h a n d  as 
Percentage of B ihar 45.84 25.19 25.27 25,10
Source: Census o f India 1981, Series 1, India Part II-B (i) - Primary Census Abstract, General Population, Patna: Government 
Printing Press, n. d.
D istrict-w ise Scheduled T ribes Population in Jh a rk h a n d  1981
D istrict Total Population Males Fem ales
D lianhad 192,777 99,280 93,497
G irid ih 224,878 113,298 111,580
H azaribagh 198,792 101,231 97,561
Palam au 351,432 177,229 174,203
R anchi 1,732,032 859,862 872,170
Santhal P arg an a 1,367,868 690,213 677,655
S inghbhum 1,261,504 628,712 632,792
Jh a rk h a n d  T otal 5,329,283 2,669,825 2,659,458
B ihar Total 5,801,867 2,915,492 2,895,375
Jh a rk h a n d  as Percentage of 
B ihar
91.85 91.57 91.85
Jh a rk h a n d  Percentage 30.25 29.40 31.17
Source: Census o f India 1981, Series 4, Bihar Part II-B - Primary Census Abstract, Patna: Goveriunent Printing Press, n. d. and Bihar 
Through Figures 1981, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Goveriunent of Bihar, 1984.
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D istrict-w ise D istribu tion  o f In-door and  O ut-door Patients T reated  in Public M edical In stitu tions O w ned, Subsidised 
_________________________________ or A ided by Public A uthorities in  Jh a rk h a n d  1979_________________________________
D istrict N um ber Indoor Patients T reated N um ber O utdoor P atien ts T reated
D hanbad Not Available Not Available
G irid ih 42,551 124,088
H azaribagh 22,254 192,741
P alam au 16,809 354,403
R anchi Not Available Not Available
S anthal P arg an a 21,592 619,201
Singhbhum Not Available Not Available
J lia rk lian d  Total 103,206 1,290,433
B ihar Total 448,098 5,861,169
Jlia rk lian d  as Percentage of B ihar 23.03 22.01
Source: Bihar Through Figures 1981, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1984, pp. 164-5.
District-w ise O ccupational P atte rn s in Jh a rk h an d  1981
D istrict A gricu ltu ral and  R ela ted  A ctivities1 Non- A gricu ltu ra l A ctivities2
T otal M ale Fem ale Total M ale Fem ale
D hanbad 153,962 136,044 17,918 480,819 426,935 53,884
G irid ih 339,468 288,817 50,651 249,941 150,497 99,444
H azaribagh 421,255 348,079 73,176 325,889 213,681 112,208
P alam au 527,745 410,160 117,585 152,610 94,107 58,503
R anchi 802,313 579,887 222,426 479,676 248,011 231,665
Santhal
P argana
988,297 804,612 183,685 524,741 245,789 278,952
Singhhhuin 586,016 421,570 164,446 536,877 347,344 189,533
Jlia rk lian d
Total
3,819,056 2,989,169 829,887 2,750,553 1,726,364 1,024,189
B ihar Total 16,409,058 13,674,163 2,734,895 6,208,027 4,355,278 1,852,749
Jh a rk h a n d  as 
Percentage of 
B ihar
23.27 21.85 30.34 44.30 39.63 55.27
Jh a rk h a n d
Percentage
21.68 32.91 9.72 15.61 19.01 12.00
Bihar
Percentage
23.47 38.05 8.04 8,87 12.12 5.45
'■ Includes Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers.
2 Includes those in Household Industry, Processing, Servicing, Repairs and Other workers.
Source: Census o f India 1981, Series 1, India Part II-B (i) - Primary Census Abstracts, General Population, New Delhi: Census 
Commissioner of India, n. d.
Contd.
District-wise Occupational Patterns of M ain W orkers by Educational Standards in Jliarkliand 19811
Educational
S tandards
A griculture-R elated  A ctivities7 Non- A gricu ltu ra l Activities8
Person M ale Fem ale Person M ale Fem ale
Jh a rk h a n d  Total
Illiterate 2,986,465 2,178,429 808,036 653,132 531,476 121,656
Literate2 262,722 253,406 9,316 145,516 142,333 3,183
Middle School3 490,228 472,491 17,737 366,154 358,944 7,210
M atriculate4 117,778 115,928 1,850 291,177 281,119 10,058
Intermediate5 12,657 12,526 131 96,727 91,078 5,649
Graduate and 
Others6
5,196 5,128 68 117,675 109,516 8,159
B ihar Total
Illiterate 12,332,523 9,646,037 2,686,486 1,511,132 1,265,996 245,136
Literate2 1,179,332 1,152,872 26,460 405,353 396,020 9,333
Middle School3 2,110,370 2,077,737 32,633 867,049 849,279 17,770
Matriculate4 800,656 797,051 3,605 761,267 736,729 24,538
Intermediate5 108,644 108,177 467 260,558 246,590 13,968
Graduate and 
Others6
45,687 45,541 146 351,819 335,003 16,816
Jh a rk h a n d  as Percen tage of B ihar
Illiterate 24.21 22.58 30.07 43.22 41.98 49.62
Literate2 22.27 21.98 35.20 35.89 35.94 34.10
Middle School3 23.22 22.74 54.35 42.22 42.26 40.57
Matriculate4 14.71 14.54 51.31 38.24 38.15 40.98
Intermediate5 11.64 11.57 28.05 37.12 36.93 40.44
Graduate and 
Others6
11.37 11.26 46.57 33.44 32.69 48.51
Jlia rk lian d  Percen tage
Illiterate 78.19 72.87 97.36 37.82 33.99 74.63
Literate2 6.87 8.47 1.12 8.42 9.10 1.95
Middle School3 12.83 15.80 2.13 21.20 22.95 4.42
Matriculate4 3.08 3.87 0.22 16.86 17.97 6.17
Intermediate5 0.33 0.41 0.01 5.60 5.82 3.46
Graduate and 
Others6
0.13 0.17 0.008 6.81 7.00 5.00
B ihar Percentage
Illiterate 75.15 70.54 98.22 34.78 31.63 71.58
Literate2 7.18 8.43 0.96 9.33 9.89 2.72
Middle School3 12.86 15.19 1.19 19.95 21.22 5.18
Matriculate4 4.87 5.82 0.13 17.52 18.41 7.16
Intermediate5 0.66 0.79 0.01 5.99 6.16 4.07
Graduate and 
Others6
0.27 0.33 0.005 8.09 8.37 4.91
1 Excludes Marginal workers 
z  Without Educational Level 
3 Primary or Middle School.
4- Matriculation or Secondary
5- Includes Higher Secondary, Intermediate, Pre-University and Technical/ Non-technical Diploma not equal to Degree 
6 Includes those who hold a University Degree, and above.
7- Includes Cultivators, Agricultural Labourers, and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting, Plantations, Orchards and allied 
activities.
fi Includes those in Mining & Quarrying, Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing, Repairs, Construction, Trade & Commerce, 
Transport, Storage, Communication and Other services.
Source: Census o f India 1981, Series 4, Bihar Part HI-A & B (i) - General Economic Tables (Tables B-I to B-VI), Patna: Government 
Printing Press, n. d.
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District-wise Literacy in Jharkhand 1981
D istrict L iterate Percen tage of L iteracy
D hanbad 828,000 608,000 220,000 39.1 52.1 23.2
H azaribagh 516,000 399,000 117,000 23.5 35.6 10.9
G irid ih 414,000 328,000 86,000 23,9 37.4 10.0
P alam au 391,000 306,000 85,000 20.4 31.20 9.1
R anchi 965,000 669,000 296,000 31.4 42.8 19.6
S antlial P arg an a 827,000 636,000 191,000 22.2 33.5 10.5
S inghbhuni 990,000 692,000 298,000 34.6 46.9 21.5
Jh a rk h a n d  
T otal/ A verage 4,931,000 3,638,000 1,293,000 27.87 39.92 14.97
B ihar T ota l/ 
A verage
18,321,000 13,691,000 4,630,000 26.2 38.1 13.6
Jh a rk h a n d  as 
Percentage of 
B ihar
26.91 26.57 27.92 - - -
* Some totals do not tally because the Figures have been rounded up to the nearest 500 in the source.
Source: Bihar Through Figures 1981, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1984., pp. 48-9.
D istrict-w ise A rea u n d er P rinc ipa l C rops in  Jh a rk h a n d  (in thousands o f Hectares) 1985-86
D istricts Paddy  / R ice W heat G ram B arley M aize
D eoghar 66 5 1 0 4
D hanbad 59 1 0 0 3
D uinka 153 5 0 0 17
G irid ih 101 4 0 0 11
Godda 68 7 5 1 10
G um la 198 3 2 0 2
H azaribagh 132 11 2 1 24
L ohardagga 42 4 0 0 5
P alam au 91 21 14 12 36
Ranchi 226 5 2 0 6
Sahebganj 115 5 4 1 11
Singhbhuiu 340 2 2 0 8
Jh a rk h a n d  T otal 1,591 73 32 15 137
B iliar Total 5,335 1,835 191 83 669
Jh a rk h a n d  as 
P ercentage o f B iliar
29.82 3.97 16.75 18.07 20.47
Totals may not tally since the figures have been rounded up to the nearest thousand in the source.
Source: Bihar Through Figures 1991, Patna: Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Government of Bihar, n. d., pp. 90-3.
D istrict-w ise Net A rea Irr ig a ted  from  D ifferent Sources in Jh a rk h a n d  (in Hectares) 1980-81
D istric t
G overnm ent
Canals
P riva te  Canals Tanks W ells/
Tube-wells
O th e r Sources T otal A rea 
Irr ig a ted
D hanbad _* 1,000 _* 1,000
G irid ih _* 1,000 7,000 1,000 9,000
H itzaribagh 1,000 3,000 12,000 1,000 18,000
Palam au 8,000 _4 5,000 13,000 28,000 53,000
R anchi 9,000 _* 1,000 18,000 7,000 35,000
Santhal P arg an a 28,000 _* 8,000 10,000 8,000 54,000
Singlibhm n 10,000 __* 4,000 1,000 2,000 16,000
Jh a rk h a n d  T ota l 56,000 _* 22,000 62,000 47,000 186,000
B ihar Total 1,094,000 96,000 96,000 994,000 767,000 2,953,000
Jh a rk h a n d  as 
Percentage of 
B ihar
5.11 - 22.91 6.23 6.12 6.29
Jh a rk h a n d
Percentage
30.10 - 11.82 33.33 25.26 -
B ihar Percen tage 37.04 3.25 3.25 33.66 25.97 -
’ Nil or less than 500 Hectares
Totals may not tally as figures have been rounded off in the source to the nearest thousand.
Source: Bihar Through Figures 1981, Patna: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Bihar, 1984., pp. 110-1.
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District-wise Population in Jharkhand 1991
D istrict A rea (Sq. Kms.) Total Population M ales Fem ales
D eoghar 2,497 918,323 480,683 437,640
D hanbad 2,996 2,709,170 1,477,768 1,231,402
D um ka 6,212 1,497,266 765,653 731,613
G irid ih 6,892 2,224,006 1,146,906 1,077,100
G odda 2,110 858,678 446,656 412,022
G iunla 9,077 1,153,557 580,041 573,516
H azaribagh 11,165 2,838,836 1,468,083 1,370,753
L ohardagga 1,491 288,585 146,315 142,270
P alam au 12,749 2,451,048 1,269,276 1,181,772
R anchi 7,698 2,205,034 1,144,385 1,060,649
Sahibganj 3,405 1,297,391 669,565 627,826
E ast Singhblnm i 3,533 1,617,170 848,015 769,155
W est S inghbhum 9,907 1,789,796 910,864 878,932
Jh a rk h a n d  Total 79,732 21,848,860 11,354,210 10,494,650
B ihar Total 173,877 86,338,853 45,147,280 41,191,573
Jh a rk h a n d  as P ercentage 
of B ihar 45.85 25.30 25.14 25.47
Source: Census o f India 1991, Series -1, Paper 2 of 1991 - Provisional Population Tables: Rural- Urban Distributions, New Delhi: 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 1991.
D istrict-w ise Scheduled T ribes Population  in  Jh a rk h a n d  1991
D istric t T otal Population M ales Fem ales
D eoghar 119,085 60,945 58,140
D hanbad 225,282 116,569 108,713
D um ka 621,484 314,616 306,868
E ast Singhbhum 466,572 236,318 230,254
G irid ih 271,924 139,560 132,364
G odda 216,047 109,314 106,733
G um la 816,988 408,004 408,984
H azaribagh 250,586 129,321 121,265
L ohardagga 162,964 82,045 80,919
Palam au 443,266 226,486 216,780
R anchi 964,422 490,510 473,912
Sahibganj 507,321 257,135 250,186
W est S inghbhum 978,069 488,892 489,177
Jh a rk h a n d  Total 6,044,010 3,059,715 2,984,295
B ihar Total 6,616,914 3,357,563 3,259,351
Jh a rk h a n d  as Percentage 
of B ihar
91.34 91.12 91.56
Jh a rk h a n d  Percentage 27.66 26.94 28.43
Source: Census o f India 1991, Series I, India, Part II-B (i), vol. I - Primary Census Abstract, General Population, New Delhi;
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, n. d.
Contd,
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District-wise Occupational Patterns of in Jharkhand 1991
D istrict A gricu ltu ral and  R elated  A ctivities1 N on- Agr icu ltu ra l A ctivities2
T otal M ale Fem ale Total M ale Fem ale
D eoghar 204,897 172,644 32,253 66,850 60,670 6,180
D hanbad 201,056 171,869 29,187 508,522 473,860 34,662
D um ka 457,721 335,036 122,685 81,895 71,604 10,291
E ast S inghbhum 242,592 170,876 71,716 261,671 235,062 26,609
G irid ih 452,259 368,372 83,887 173,150 158,873 14,277
G odda 247,816 196,250 51,556 33,912 29,703 4,209
G um la 383,377 264,237 119,140 43,251 35,279 7,972
H azaribagh 566,750 444,252 122,498 248,594 229,218 19,376
L ohardagga 87,929 55,906 32,023 15,353 13,332 2,021
P alam au 649,880 504,514 145,366 107,676 98,578 9,098
R anchi 494,492 338,142 156,350 232,703 206,375 26,328
Sahibganj 360,933 282,831 78,102 81,240 62,109 19,131
W est S inghbhum 505,991 343,102 162,889 139,391 123,005 16,386
Jh a rk h a n d  Total 4,855,693 3,648,031 1,207,652 1,994,208 1,797,668 196,540
B ihar T otal 20,680,521 16,824,720 3,855,801 4,972,048 4,517,478 454,570
Jh a rk h a n d  as 
Percentage of 
B ihar
23.47 21.68 31.32 40.10 39.79 43.23
Jh a rk h a n d
Percentage
22.22 32.12 11.50 9.12 15.83 1.87
B ihar P ercentage 23.95 37.26 9.36 5.75 10.00 1.10
1 Includes Cultivators & Agricultural Labourers.
2- Includes ail other workers including Marginal workers.
Source: Census o f  India 1991, Series 1, Paper 3 Of 1991 - Provisional Population Totals: Workers and their Distribution, New Delhi: 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 1991.
D istrict-w ise L iteracy  in  Jh a rk h an d l9 9 1
D istrict L iteracy P ercen tage o f L iteracy
Total M ale Fem ale Total M ale Fem ale
D eoghar 281,540 210,835 70,705 30.65 41.86 16.15
D hanbad 1,270,469 876,029 394,440 46.89 59.28 32.03
D um ka 418,200 309,292 108,907 27.93 20.65 14.88
E ast Singhbhum 815,130 516,931 298,199 50.40 60.95 38.76
G irid ih 638,142 485,195 152,947 28.69 42.30 14.19
G odda 237,188 176,998 60,190 27.62 39.62 14.60
G um la 371,593 ' 243,186 128,407 32.21 41.92 22.38
H azaribagh 856,552 625,133 231,389 30,17 42.58 16.88
L ohardagga 93,311 63,824 29,487 32.33 43.62 20.72
P alam au 596,049 448,096 147,953 24.31 35.30 12.51
R anchi 919,274 606,029 313,245 41.68 52.95 29.53
Sahibganj 281,307 198,257 83,050 21.68 29.60 13.22
W est S inghbhum 573,460 408,573 164,887 32.04 44.85 18.75
Jh a rk h a n d  T ota l/ 
A verage 7,352,215 5,168,378 2,183,806 33.65 45.51 20.80
B ihar
Total/A verage
26,854,389 19,176,364 7,678,025 31.10 42.47 18.63
Jh a rk h a n d  as 
Percentage of 
B ihar
27.37 26.95 28.44 32.81 42.72 20.35
Source: Census o f India 1991, Series 5, Paper 1 of 1991 - Provisional Population Totals, Patna: Director of Census Operations, n. d.
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District-wise Area Under Principal Crops in Jharkhand (in thousands of Hectares) 1988-89
D istricts Paddy  /  Rice W heat Barley M aize G ram
Deoghar 64 3 - 4 -
D hanbad 60 - - 4 -
D um ka 151 3 - - -
G irid ih 100 4 - 11 1
G odda 66 5 1 9 2
G um la 201 2 - 2 1
H azaribagh 126 8 1 20 3
L ohardagga 41 2 - 2 -
P alam au 83 17 9 33 10
R anchi 203 3 - 5 2
Saliebgaiy 104 5 - 10 3
S inghbhum 319 1 1 6 1
Jh a rk h a n d  Total 1,518 53 12 106 23
B ihar 5,308 2,112 58 693 148
Jh a rk h a n d  as 28.59 2.50 20.68 15.29 15.54
P ercentage of 
B ihar
Totals may not taliy since the figures have been rounded up to the nearest thousand in the source.
Source: Bihar Through Figures 1991, Patna: Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Government of Bihar, n, d., pp. 90-3.
D istrict-w ise Net A rea I rr ig a ted  from  D ifferent Sources in Jh a rk h a n d  (in Hectares) 1988-89
D istricts G overnm ent C anals P rivate  Canals T otal
D eoghar Not Available Not Available Not Available
D hanbad Not Available Not Available Not Available
D um ka 6,000 Not Available 6,000
G irid ih Not Available Not Available Not Available
G odda 2,000 Not Available 2,000
G um la 1,000 Not Available 1,000
H azaribagh 3,000 Not Available 3,000
L ohardagga 1,000 Not Available 1,000
P alam au 9,000 Not Available 9,000
R anchi 5,000 Not Available 5,000
Sahebganj 2,000 Not Available 2,000
S inghbhum 10,000 Not Available 10,000
Jh a rk h a n d  T ota l 39,000 Not Available 39,000
B ihar 1,262,000 Not Available 1,262,000
Jh a rk h a n d  as Percentage o f 
B ihar
3.09 Not Available 3.09
Totals may not tally since the figures have been rounded up to the nearest thousand in the source.
Source: Bihar Through Figures 1991, Pauia: Directorate of Statistics and Evaluation, Government of Bihar, n. d ., pp. 149-51.
D istrict-w ise Scheduled T ribes O ccupational P atte rn s in Jh a rk h a n d  1981
D istrict A gricu ltu ral and  R elated  A ctivities2 Non- A g ricu ltu ra l Activities3
T otal M ale Fem ale Total M ale Fem ale
D hanbad 34,497 29,190 5,307 35,475 24,008 11,467
G irid ih 61,605 52,070 9,535 28,397 11,546 16,851
H azaribagh 43,718 36,140 7,578 32,614 19,120 13,494
P alam au 121,940 91,275 30,665 25,465 8,524 16,941
R anchi 569,609 405,598 164,011 223,132 62,094 161,038
S anthal
P arg an a
479,932 367,984 111,948 197,143 47,210 149,933
S inghbhum 404,803 281,023 123,780 197,572 79,304 118,268
Jh a rk h a n d
Total
1,716,104 1,263,280 452,824 739,798 251,806 487,992
B ihar T o ta l1 1,884,324 1,385,531 498,793 784,639 277,715 504,924
Jh a rk h a n d  as 
Percentage of 
B ihar
91.07 91.17 90.78 94.28 90.67 96.64
1 Includes Seeking/ available for work
2■ Includes Cultivators, Agricultural Labourers and those in Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting & Plantation, Orchards and allied 
activities.
’Includes those in Mining & Quarrying, Manufacturing, Processing, Servicing & Repairs, Construction, Trade & Commerce, 
Transport, Storage & Communications and Other services and Marginal workers.
Source: Census o f India 1981, Series 4, Bihar Part IX (iii) - Special Tables for Scheduled Tribes (Tables ST-1 to ST-3), Patna: 
Government Printing Press, n. d.
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District-wise Scheduled Tribes Educational Levels in Jharkhand 1981
D istrict Illite ra te L ite ra te 1 M iddle School2 M atricu late
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
D hanbad 165,038 75,166 89,872 10,133 8,841 1,292 12,115 10,849 1,266 3,952 3,422 530
G irid ih 2,045,28 95,295 109,233 9,027 7,864 1,163 8,959 8,248 711 1,827 1,563 264
H azaribagh 174,249 81,592 92,657 9,947 8,043 1,904 10,655 8,804 1,851 3,160 2,398 762
Palam au 299,614 133,387 166,227 23,396 19,653 3,743 23,381 19,985 3,396 4,457 3,781 676
R anchi 1,329,90
2
579,430 750,472 127,660 86,026 41,634 198,210 137,723 60,487 99,095 42,396 56,699
Santhal
P argana
1,187,10
3
542,885 644,218 81,174 63,474 17,700 75,253 65,243 10,010 17,951 15,692 2,259
Singhbhum 1,035,38
9
444,702 590,687 72,736 55,885 16,851 114,054 94,564 19,490 31,381 27,128 4,253
Jh a rk h a n d
Total
4,193,36
8
1,952,45
7
2,443,36
6
334,073 249,786 84,287 442,627 345,416 97,211 161,823 96,380 65,443
B ihar Total 4,823,47
0
2,152,51
9
2,670,95
1
356,388 268,018 88,370 474,773 370,323 104,450 126,213 102,306 23,907
Jh a rk h a n d
Percentage 78.68 73.13 91.87 6.26 9.35 3.16 8.30 12.93 3.65 3.67 4.56 2.77
1 Without Educational Level, including figures for Educational Level not classified.
2 Primary, Middle or Junior Basic.
3 Higher Secondary, Intermediate/ Pre-University or Non-technical/ Non-technical Diploma or Certificate not equal to Degree and 
those who hold a University Degree, Postgraduate Degree, Technical Degree, Agriculture and Dairying, Veterinary Engineering 
and Technology, Medicine or an equivalent qualification.
Source: Census o f India 1981, Series 4, Bihar Part IX (iv) - Special Tables for Scheduled Tribes (Tables ST-4 to ST-7), Patna: 
Government Printing Press, n. d.
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Annex 2
Fieldwork Interview Schedule
Dear Sir/ M adam,
I am conducting this survey as a part of my PhD thesis. I shall be obliged if you 
could discuss the following questions with me. I must assure you that your responses will 
be kept confidential and will be used for academic purposes only.
Thank you for your co-operation in advance.
Yours sincerely, 
(AM IT PRAKASH)
Interview Schedule
Background Information 
Name:
Age:
Gender;
How is the interviewee linked to the Jharkhand movement:
Government O ffic ia l:________________
Party F unctionary :___________________
National Level: _ _ _
Regional L e v e l:_____
Local L ev e l:________
General P opulation :__________________
Level of E ducation :_____________________________________
Source of In co m e :_____________________________________
Level of Income: Rs.
(a) 0 -  1,000
(b) 1,001 -  5, 000
(c) 5, 001 - 10,000
(d) 10, 000 and above 
Social strata to which the respondent belongs:
(i) Original Inhabitant of the Jharkhand a re a :______
If yes, are you of
(a) Tribal o rig in :________________
(b) Non-tribal o rig in :____________
Ancestor arrived from  outside the Jharkhand area:
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Government Officials:
•  W hat, in the Governm ent’s opinion, is the Jharkhand issue?
• W hat is the origin of the issue?
• Does the Government see the Jharkhand issue as a problem?
• W hat kind o f problem  is the Jharkhand issue? For example, a threat to law and order/
developmental fallout/ political fallout? or any other?
• W hy has this problem  become so acute over the past decade or so?
• How far does the Government see the Jharkhand issue as fallout o f the development
imbalances?
• If developmental imbalances are a factor in the sharpening of the Jharkhandi identity, 
why has this process become so important over the last decade or so?
• If development has no or marginal role to play, what factors does the Government see 
as being in the root of the recent Jharkhandi mobilisation?
• W hy has the area known as Jharkhand not been very high on the Governm ent’s 
development agenda despite being one of the most backward areas in India?
• W hat does the Government plan to do to accelerate poverty alleviation and employment 
generation in Jharkhand?
• How does the Government see these efforts in relation to the demands made by the 
Jharkhandis?
• How does the Government perceive the demands made by the Jharkhandis?
• To what extent is their demand genuine and to what extent is their demand a mere 
bargaining stance?
• How far is the Government ready to go with their demands?
• Does the Government agree that the issue might not have acquired this proportion if 
adequate developmental efforts had been made in the area?
• How does the Government perceive the demand of autonomy by the Jharkhandis?
• How would the present limited regional autonomy proposal effect the issue?
• Does the Government see a demand for complete autonomy as a reality in the near 
future?
Party Functionaries and the General Population:
• Does the Government have any policy of employment generation and poverty 
alleviation in Jharkhand?
• If yes, which ones?
• Have you or anyone you know benefited from  these policies?
• If  yes, in what ways?
• If no, why not?
• W hat kind o f policies are needed in the Jharkhand region for poverty alleviation and 
employment generation or how can the existing policies (if you think such policies 
exist) be modified to make them more useful?
• W hat kinds of policies are more likely to succeed in Jharkhand and why? (e.g. area- 
oriented versus target-group oriented versus community-group based policies?)
• How would you and most people you know like the policies to be administered? : from 
Delhi/ Patna/ district capital/ locally (panchayati institutions)?
• How do you and others perceive the problem  of employment generation and poverty 
eradication in Jharkhand and what role do you see for the Governm ent in it?
• Have the Government efforts helped to improve the state o f employment and poverty?
• If  yes, how?
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• If no, why not?
• W ill the formation of Jharkhand state help in this regard?
• Are you a m ember of JM M  or any other such regional party?
• If yes, in what capacity?
• If  no, do you know about the existence o f such parties?
• W hat are the policies and aims of these parties?
• W ho told you about such a party?
• W hat, according to you, are the goals and aims of this party?
•  How would the fulfilment of these goals help you and others?
• In what way do you and others think that supporting JM M  and other such organisations 
will help remove poverty and generate employment?
• Do you meet the leaders regularly?
• How often?
• How do the leaders propose to improve conditions in the area?
• How do you and others see such proposals?
• How do dikus (outsiders) affect your employment prospects?
• W hat do you and others think would be the effect of regional autonomy on such issues?
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Interviews:
The interviews conducted during the 1995-96 field study were important in
shaping my understanding of the political and development dynamics of the region.
More than 25 hours of these interviews with the following categories of individuals 
were recorded on tapes.
• Interviews with government officials such as the Regional Development
Commissioner, Ranchi; Joint Secretary (in-charge of Bihar), Government of
India, New Delhi; Director, Planning Department, Government of Bihar and 
members of the local development bureaucracy including Sarpanchs, Block 
Development Officers and Secretary to the JAAC.
• Interviews with the political actors in the Jharkhand region such as the Member 
of Parliament for Ranchi; candidates of political parties for the 1996 elections; 
political activists of BJP, INC, JD, JMM and other political parties and 
politically aware individuals such as school teachers, retired government 
officials and local political opinion leaders.
• Interviews with the general population of the region across the urban areas and 
the rural interior. Particular emphasis was laid on interviewing women, youths 
and members of the ST (Christians as well as non-Christians).
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